Introduction to international relations

Introduction to international relations M. Cox with R. Campanaro IR1011, 2790011 2012 Undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences This subject guide is for a 100 course offered as part of the University of London International Programmes in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences. This is equivalent to Level 4 within the Framework for Higher Education Qualifi cations in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FHEQ). For more information about the University of London International Programmes undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences, see: www.londoninternational.ac.uk

This guide was written for the University of London International Programmes by Professor Michael Cox, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science. Professor Cox has written more than 20 volumes the most recent being Soft power and US foreign policy (Routledge, 2010) and The global 1989: continuity and change in world politics (Cambridge, 2010). Between 2006 and 2009 he was chair of the European Consortium for Political Research and before that he served on the executive committee of the British International Studies Association and the Irish National Committee for the Study of International Affairs. He is also an associate research fellow at Chatham House, London, and between 2001 and 2002 was director of the David Davies Memorial Institute for the Study of International Politics based at the University of Aberystwyth. In 2002, 2007 and again in 2011 he was appointed as a research fellow at the Nobel Institute in Oslo, and in 2003 was made chair of the United States Discussion Group at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. In 2007, Professor Cox became an associate fellow on the Transatlantic Programme at the Royal United Services Institute Whitehall. He is co-director of IDEAS, a centre of strategy and diplomacy based at the LSE, and editor of the journal International Politics. In writing the 2012 edition of the subject guide, Professor Cox had additional editorial support from Richard Campanaro a PhD student in the LSE s Department of International Relations. This is one of a series of subject guides published by the University. We regret that due to pressure of work the authors are unable to enter into any correspondence relating to, or arising from, the guide. If you have any comments on this subject guide, favourable or unfavourable, please use the form at the back of this guide. University of London International Programmes Publications Office Stewart House 32 Russell Square London WC1B 5DN United Kingdom www.londoninternational.ac.uk Published by: University of London University of London 2012 The University of London asserts copyright over all material in this subject guide except where otherwise indicated. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form, or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher. We make every effort to contact copyright holders. If you think we have inadvertently used your copyright material, please let us know.

Contents Contents Acknowledgements...v Introduction... 1 Introduction to the subject area... 1 Syllabus... 1 Aims of this course... 2 Learning outcomes... 2 The structure of this guide... 2 Overview of learning resources... 3 Examination advice... 12 Part 1: Introduction... 13 Chapter 1: The twentieth century origins of international relations... 15 Aim of the chapter... 15 Learning outcomes... 15 Essential reading... 15 Further reading... 15 Works cited... 16 Introduction... 16 The origins of international relations: the First World War and the interwar years... 17 Your first international relations theory: Realism... 20 Growing diversity in IR... 22 International relations and the end of the Cold War... 24 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 26 Chapter vocabulary... 26 Sample examination questions... 26 Part 2: Foundations... 27 Chapter 2: Europe and the emergence of international society... 29 Aims of the chapter... 29 Learning outcomes... 29 Essential reading... 29 Further reading... 29 Introduction... 30 Rethinking the international : the English School and international history... 30 European expansion... 32 European hegemony... 33 From the Long Peace to the Great War... 34 The First World War... 37 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 38 Chapter vocabulary... 38 Sample examination questions... 38 Chapter 3: The end of the Cold War... 39 Aims of the chapter... 39 Learning outcomes... 39 Essential reading... 39 Further reading... 39 Introduction... 40 The failure of prediction... 41 Who won the Cold War?... 42 i

11 Introduction to international relations ii IR theory debates the end of the Cold War... 43 The international system after the end of the Cold War... 45 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 48 Chapter vocabulary... 48 Sample examination questions... 49 Chapter 4: Globalisation: the past and present of international society... 51 Aim of the chapter... 51 Learning outcomes... 51 Essential reading... 51 Further reading... 51 Introduction... 52 The history of globalisation... 53 The Zeitgeist of the 1990s... 54 Globalisation and the international political order... 55 Thinking about globalisation... 56 The double crisis of globalisation?... 58 Globalisation 4.0?... 60 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 60 Chapter vocabulary... 61 Sample examination questions... 61 Part 3: Theories of international relations... 63 Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism... 65 Aims of the chapter... 65 Learning outcomes... 65 Essential reading... 65 Further reading... 65 Introduction... 66 Realism: the basics... 67 What sorts of things might Realist ideas help to explain?... 69 What is Liberalism in IR?... 72 What might Liberal ideas help explain?... 75 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 77 Chapter vocabulary... 77 Sample examination questions... 78 Chapter 6: Alternative theories: Marxism, Constructivism and gender theory... 79 Aims of the chapter... 79 Learning outcomes... 79 Essential reading... 79 Further reading and works cited... 79 Introduction... 80 Constructivism... 80 Marxism... 82 Poststructuralism... 83 Gender theory... 84 What questions do these alternative perspectives address?... 86 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 88 Chapter vocabulary... 88 Sample examination questions... 88 Part 4: Central problems in international relations... 89 Chapter 7: War... 91 Aims of the chapter... 91 Learning outcomes... 91 Essential reading... 91

Contents Further reading... 91 Works cited... 92 Introduction... 92 Wars in theory... 94 Wars in particular... 96 Intrastate wars... 99 Liberal wars... 100 Just wars: right and wrong in battle... 101 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 104 Chapter vocabulary... 104 Sample examination questions... 104 Chapter 8: Peace... 105 Aims of the chapter... 105 Learning outcomes... 105 Essential reading... 105 Further reading... 105 Works cited... 106 Introduction... 106 The meaning of peace... 107 Theories of peace... 108 Peace treaties... 110 Peace movements... 112 Peace processes... 113 A more peaceful world?... 115 Explaining peace in an age of terror... 116 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 117 Chapter vocabulary... 117 Sample examination questions... 117 Chapter 9: The state... 119 Aims of the chapter... 119 Learning outcomes... 119 Essential reading... 119 Further reading... 119 Works cited... 120 Introduction... 120 The rise of the sovereign state... 121 Peace of Westphalia... 122 State success... 124 Non-state actors... 127 Problems with sovereign states... 130 Security and the state... 131 The continuing importance of the state... 132 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 132 Chapter vocabulary... 133 Sample examination questions... 133 Chapter 10: Power... 135 Aims of the chapter... 135 Learning outcomes... 135 Essential reading... 135 Further reading... 135 Works cited... 136 Introduction... 137 The concept of power... 137 Geography as power... 139 iii

11 Introduction to international relations Relative power... 140 Authority, soft power and smart power... 141 Europe: the limited superpower... 143 America and the unipolar moment... 145 Unipolar in theory, imperial in practice... 146 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 147 Chapter vocabulary... 147 Sample examination questions... 148 Part 5: Challenges to international order... 149 Chapter 11: The new world of security... 151 Aims of the chapter... 151 Learning outcomes... 151 Essential reading... 151 Further reading... 151 Works cited... 152 Introduction... 152 Climate change... 152 Health... 154 Resources... 155 Energy security... 157 Demographics... 158 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 159 Chapter vocabulary... 159 Sample examination questions... 159 Chapter 12: Global governance and international organisations... 161 Aims of the chapter... 161 Learning outcomes... 161 Essential reading... 161 Further Reading... 161 Introduction... 162 The United Nations... 163 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization... 165 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund... 166 The International Atomic Energy Agency... 168 Regional organisations... 170 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 171 Chapter vocabulary... 172 Sample examination questions... 172 Chapter 13: Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East?... 173 Aim of the chapter... 173 Learning outcomes... 173 Introduction... 173 Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East?... 174 A reminder of your learning outcomes... 180 Sample examination questions... 181 Appendix 1: Sample examination paper... 183 Appendix 2: Sample Examiners commentaries... 185 World map: Provided for the activities on pp.83 and 140 2010-GEOATLAS.com iv

Acknowledgements Acknowledgements First, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr Nick Kitchen and Dr Adam Quinn former Phd students of mine at the London School of Ecomomics and Political Science (LSE) for suggesting some useful ways forward when I set out to write this course. Second, a very special vote of thanks must go to all of the LSE team who navigated this course through some very tricky editorial waters. Finally, I would like to thank Richard Campanaro another great LSE doctoral student whose insights and inputs have proved indispensable throughout. Michael Cox, LSE November 2011 v

11 Introduction to international relations Notes vi

Introduction Introduction Of all the students of the social sciences taught in universities, those concerned with IR probably encounter the greatest degree of misunderstanding and ignorance, and engage in more groundclearing, conceptual, factual and ethical, than any other. Halliday, F. Rethinking international relations. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994) p.5 Introduction to the subject area Students of this new course are bound to ask the question what exactly is IR? What distinguishes it from history or law, economics or political science? When did IR emerge as an academic subject? How has it changed over time? What does IR contribute to the sum of human knowledge? And why has it become one of the most popular twenty-first century social sciences, despite the fact that according to Halliday at least IR students have to spend more time than most defending and defining their subject? The purpose of this course is to try and answer these questions while providing you with a foundation for some of the more specialised IR topics that you may choose to study in the coming years. We will look in some detail at both the real world problems which IR addresses, and some of the essential theories it employs to understand the international system. This course does not presuppose a specialised knowledge of international affairs. On the other hand, it does assume that you will have a genuine interest in world politics and a willingness to expand your knowledge of geography and key moments in international history. This course is therefore a roadmap and guide to complex issues. Rather than trying to be exhaustive, it seeks to introduce you to a wide range of issues and problems that have preoccupied writers, scholars and policy-makers for many decades even centuries. Instead of arguing in favour of a specific approach or pointing to an absolute truth in IR, this course will ask you to think about international events in a systematic and critical fashion, coming to well-reasoned conclusions based on a combination of empirical observation and theoretical rigour. The aim, in other words, is to inform and stimulate and, in so doing, to get you to ask questions and think of answers that you may never have thought of before. Syllabus This course examines the evolution of IR and the international systems it describes, focusing especially on ways in which social structures bring order to our otherwise anarchic international society. In doing so it considers: the evolution of IR in practice and theory during the twentieth century; the impact of international history on the development of the discipline prior to 1919; the end of the Cold War and the failure of IR to predict this epochal shift; the nature of globalisation and its influence on the discipline s main theories and concepts; the similarities and differences between mainstream approaches to IR; the alternatives presented by some of the discipline s newer theoretical schools; the difficulties implicit in defining and limiting war between and within states; the contentious place of peace in international society; the role and responsibilities of the 1

11 Introduction to international relations 2 state as one actor among many in the international system; our changing understanding of international power; the impact of globalisation and the end of the Cold War on actors definitions of security; the difficulties of global governance in an anarchic international society; and the likely impact of Asia s (especially China s) rise on the units, processes and structures of the international system. Aims of this course This course aims to: explore the evolution of the discipline of IR over the past century by examining our changing understandings of order within the anarchic international system consider the impact of major historical events on the evolution of academic IR, including the ongoing impact of globalisation introduce you to a range of theoretical tools that will help you to examine the behaviour of international actors and the nature of international systems define and discuss some of the main concepts within the discipline, including war, peace, the state and power critically assess challenges facing contemporary international society, including security, global governance and the rise of East Asian actors. Learning outcomes At the end of the course, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain the relevance of key terms in IR identify the strengths and weaknesses of IR s various theoretical approaches analyse international events from a variety of theoretical viewpoints describe the nature of units and social structures within the contemporary international system. The structure of this guide Chapters in this subject guide follow a standard format. Each begins by listing the aims and the learning outcomes that you are meant to achieve by the chapter s end. Read these carefully and keep them in mind as you work your way through the course material. International relations (IR), like many academic subjects, is too vast to cover in a single course. The learning outcomes will help you to focus on the main topics selected for that chapter. Next, you will find the chapter s Essential reading. The vast majority of this will be from the textbook (see Essential reading below), with a few selected journal articles that you will be able to access via the Online Library in the Student Portal (see Overview of learning resources below). You will be prompted to read these as you work through the subject guide so wait until you reach the appropriate section. Along with each reading is a set of questions or activities designed to help you to connect with the material. Next, you will find a list of Further reading, mainly scholarly articles that address specific points raised in the text. These should be read once you have worked your way through the entire chapter and will give

Introduction you additional sources from which to draw as you prepare essays and examination questions. Throughout this subject guide, you will find key terms highlighted in bold and summarised at the end of each chapter. Note these terms down in a glossary. Many terms used by IR scholars are contested. That is to say, there is no single agreed-upon definition that you can memorise and use every time a word comes up. Keep track of how different thinkers use the vocabulary that you are learning. As you will discover, language is a powerful tool in IR and it is well-worth investing your time to understand its multiple meanings. Chapters also include several activities that are designed to help you to think through important points covered in the subject guide. These should be completed as you work your way through the course. Unless otherwise stated, all reading for the activities is taken from, the textbook. Chapters conclude with a set of sample examination questions. You should try to answer each of these in a short essay of between 500 and 1,000 words. Your answers can be shared with peers and an academic moderator on the VLE, where the questions will also form the basis for a set of podcasts by LSE academics. Overview of learning resources The subject guide Part 1 of this course provides a brief overview of how IR first came into being as an academic subject. It examines the influence of the First and Second World Wars on the discipline, as well as the ways in which the Cold War affected its evolution, covering the period from 1914 to around 1989. The first chapter covers a lot of ground, including your first thumbnail sketches of several important IR theories. Take your time with these. As we will discuss at several points in this subject guide, theories are simplifying devices that we use in IR to draw general conclusions from a limited number of examples. Different theories answer different kinds of questions and emphasise different kinds of IR, so do not waste your time trying to decide which theory is absolutely correct. Just as different jobs around the house require different tools, different questions in IR also require different theories. Relying on one to the exclusion of all others is rather like a plumber arriving at your home armed with a single screwdriver! Part 2 provides a theoretically-informed history of contemporary IR, including the development of important concepts such as the international system and international society. Its chapters each focus on one of three key episodes: Europe s imperial expansion and global dominance between 1500 and 1914 (Chapter 2), the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991 (Chapter 3) and the subsequent rise of globalisation (Chapter 4). The intervening years, 1914 to 1989, are covered in Chapter 1. The historical material in Part 2 plays a double role. First, it contextualises the changing world of contemporary IR, providing you with a set of historical cases that can be used to support your opinions and analysis. Second, it gives you the opportunity to see how different theories can be used to produce different interpretations of any given event. Chapter 2 is particularly important in this respect, as it introduces you to the main idea behind the English School of IR international society. In Part 3 we go theoretical by examining other key IR theories in more depth. Here we point out, among other things, that theories have practical applications and should not be indulged in for their own sake. Chapter 3

11 Introduction to international relations 5 looks at two mainstream approaches to the subject: Liberalism and Realism. Chapter 6 examines several alternative theories in the IR toolbox. These highlight different aspects of IR than their orthodox counterparts, often with the goal of unmasking people, units, processes or structures that orthodox theories tend to ignore. In Part 4, we look at some of the key concepts around which IR debates still revolve: war, peace, the state and power. These are central to the study of IR, and are all too often presented as highly abstract. We will try to show why IR needs these concepts, and how they can be used to make sense of the real world. Part 5 will conclude by examining three of the key challenges facing the world: new security threats facing international society, the role of international organisations in global governance, and the changing distribution of power and influence between the West and the East. The final chapter will conclude by looking at three interrelated questions: 1. Is the USA in decline after having enjoyed unrivalled dominance since the collapse of the USSR? 2. Are there other great powers out there most obviously China willing, and able, to replace the USA at the head of the international table? 3. Does the increasing influence of emerging powers indicate a more general decline of the West and the rise of what is loosely called the East? These have been much talked about since the beginning of the new millennium. If analyses of the eastward shift are accurate as many seem to believe it represents a massive change in world politics. If, on the other hand, the decline of the West, or the rise of the East, has been overstated, our world will see power and decision making remain in the hands of the same combination of largely Western states that have sat at the centre of international society for the past 500 years. Your job at the end of the course will be to assess these arguments both on their empirical merits and by examining the theoretical assumptions on which they rest. Essential reading This guide has been written to work alongside the textbook for this course: Baylis, J., S. Smith and P. Owens The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) fifth edition [ISBN 9780199569090]. As you work your way through the next 13 chapters, you will be prompted to read specific sections from the textbook. Unless otherwise stated, all Essential reading for this guide comes from this textbook. Only chapter titles will therefore be provided. The textbook contains a fairly extensive glossary which will be of use. Detailed reading references in this guide refer to the edition of the textbook listed above. A new edition may have been published by the time you study this course. You can use a more recent edition of the book; use the detailed chapter and section headings and the index to identify relevant readings. Also check the VLE regularly for updated guidance on readings. You can also access the following book via the Introduction to international relations page of the virtual learning environment (VLE): Griffiths, M., T. O Callaghan and S.C. Roach International relations: the key concepts. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) second edition [ISBN 9780415774376]. 4

Introduction The following articles are also Essential reading and are available on the Online Library: Galtung, J. Violence, peace and peace research, Journal of Peace Research 6(3) 1969, pp.166 91. Hirst, P. The Eighty Years Crisis, 1919 1999 power, Review of Additional International Studies 24(5) 1998, pp.133 48. Further reading General overview Brown, C. and K. Ainley Understanding international relations. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) fourth edition [ISBN 9780230213111]. A concise, if somewhat advanced, text, focusing on the relationship between international relations theories and twentieth-century events. Burchill, S., Linklater A, Devetak R et al. Theories of international relations. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009) fourth edition [ISBN 9780230219236]. An edited volume with individual chapters that deal with the major theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. Cox, M. and D. Stokes (eds) US foreign policy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) second edition [ISBN 9780199585816]. An edited volume with chapters by leading thinkers in the field, covering all aspects of US foreign policy including its relationships with the different regions of the world. Dunne, T., M. Cox and K. Booth (eds) The Eighty Years Crisis: international relations 1919 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780521667838]. A comprehensive edited volume examining the influence of twentieth-century events on the development of IR. Halliday, F. Rethinking international relations. (London: MacMillan, 1994) [ISBN 9780333589052]. A concise, well-written, and thought provoking introduction to the study of IR, covering a broad range of approaches, debates, and historical events. Please note that as long as you read the Essential reading you are then free to read around the subject area in any text, paper or online resource. You will need to support your learning by reading as widely as possible and by thinking about how these principles apply in the real world. To help you read extensively, you have free access to the VLE and University of London Online Library (see below). Other useful texts for this course include: Books Adler, E. Condition(s) of peace in Dunne, T., Cox, M. and Booth, K. The Eighty Years Crisis: international relations 1919 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780521667838]. Brown, C. Reimagining international society and global community in Held, D. and A. McGrew Globalization theory: approaches and controversies. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) [ISBN 9780745632117]. Bull, H. War and international order in Bull, H. The anarchical society. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) third edition [ISBN 9780333985878]. Buzan, B. and R. Little Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the fall in Cox, M., K. Booth and T. Dunne The Interregnum: controversies in world politics 1989 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780521785099]. Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 25(5) 1999. Buzan, B. and R. Little Units in the modern international system in Buzan, B. and R. Little International systems in world history. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780198780656]. 5

11 Introduction to international relations 6 Cabalerro-Anthony, M. The new world of security: implications for human security and international security cooperation in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley Issues in 21st century world politics. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524]. Campbell, D. On dangers and their interpretation in Campbell, D. Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) [ISBN 9780816631445]. Cox, M. Introduction in Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years Crisis. Edited by M. Cox. (New York: Palgrave, 2001) [ISBN 9780333963777]. Darwin, J. The Eurasian revolution in Darwin, J. Tamerlane: the global history of empire. (London: Penguin Books, 2007) [ISBN 9781596913936]. Doyle, M. A more perfect union? The liberal peace and the challenge of globalization in Booth, K. T. Dunne, and M. Cox How might we live? Global ethics in the new century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780521005203]. Gellner, E. Plough, book and sword: the structure of human history. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) [ISBN 9780226287027]. Griffiths, M. Introduction: conquest, coexistence and IR theory in Griffiths, M. Rethinking international relations theory. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011) [ISBN 9780230217799]. Halliday, Fred A necessary encounter: historical materialism and international relations in Halliday, F. Rethinking International Relations. (London, MacMillan, 1994) [ISBN: 0774805080]. Hammerstad, A. Population movement and its impact on world politics in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley Issues in 21st century world politics. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524]. Held, D. and A. McGrew Globalization and the end of the old order in Cox, M., T. Dunne and K. Booth Empires, systems and states: great transformations in international politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780521016865] Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 27(5) 2001. Higgott, R. Contested globalization: the changing context and normative challenges in Booth, K., T. Dunne and M. Cox How might we live? Global ethics in the new century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) [ISBN 9780521005203]. Higgott, R. Governing the global economy: multilateral economic institutions in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley Issues in 21st century world politics. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524]. Holsti, K.J. Scholarship in an era of anxiety: the study of international politics during the Cold War in Dunne, T., M. Cox and K. Booth The Eighty Years Crisis: international relations 1919 1999. (Cambridge University Press, 1998) [ISBN 9780521667838]. Krasner, S. Rethinking the sovereign state model in Cox, M., T. Dunne and K. Booth Empires, systems and states. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780521016865] Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 27(5) 2001. Krasner, S. Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780691007113]. Note: especially Chapter 1, pp.3 42. McNeill, W.H. The rise of the West: a history of the human community. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) [ISBN 9780226561417]. Meadwell, H. The long nineteenth century in Europe: reinterpreting the concert system in Cox, M., Dunne, T. and Booth, K. Empires, systems and states: great transformations in international politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780521016865]. Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 27(5) 2001. Morris, I. The Western age in Morris, I. Why the West rules for now: the patterns of history, and what they reveal about the future. (London: Profile Books, 2011) [ISBN 9781846682087].

Introduction Organski, A.F. et al Power transition theory tested in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Abdollohian M., C. Alsharabati, B. Efird et al. Power transitions: strategies for the 21st century. (Chatham House: Seven Bridges Press, 2000) [ISBN 9781889119434]. Roberts, J.M. The European world hegemony in Roberts, J.M. The new Penguin history of the world. (London: Penguin Books, 2007) fifth edition [ISBN 9780141030425]. Parmar, I. and M. Cox (eds) US foreign policy and soft power: theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives. (London: Routledge, 2010) [ISBN 9780415492041]. Scheurman, W.E. Why (almost) everything you learned about Realism is wrong in Scheurman, W.E. The Realist case for global reform. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) [ISBN 9780745650302]. Sheehan, J. The monopoly of violence: why Europeans hate going to war. (London: Faber, 2008) [ISBN9780571220854]. Note: especially Part III, States without war pp.147 221. Sorsensen, G. International relations theory after the Cold War in Dunne, T., M. Cox and K. Booth (eds) The Eighty Years Crisis: international relations 1919 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780521667838]. Tilly, C. Coercion, capital and European states AD 990 1990. (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 1992) second edition [ISBN 9781557863683]. Umbach, F. Energy security and world politics in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley Issues in 21st century world politics. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524]. Wallace, W. Europe after the Cold War: interstate order or post-sovereign regional order in Cox, M., K. Booth, and T. Dunne The Interregnum: controversies in world politics 1989 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780521785099]. Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 25(5) 1999. Waltzer, M. Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations. (London: Basic Books, 2006) [ISBN 9780465037070]. Weiss, L. Globalization and national governance: antinomies or interdependence in Cox, M., K. Booth and T. Dunne The interregnum: controversies in world politics 1989 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780521785099] Note: This is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 25(5) 1999. Journal articles Beyond hypocrisy? Sovereignty revisited Special issue of International Politics 46(6) 2009, pp.657 752. Adler, E. Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics, European Journal of International Relations 3(3) 1997, pp.319 63. Armstrong, D. Globalization and the social state, Review of International Studies 24(4) 1998, pp.461 78. Ashworth, L. Did the Realist-Idealist debate ever take place?: a revisionist history of international relations, International Relations 16(1) 2002, pp.33 51. Ayres, R.W. A world flying apart? Violent nationalist conflict and the end of the Cold War, Journal of Peace Research 37(1) 2000, pp.105 17. Ba, A. and M. Hoffman Making and remaking the world for IR101: a resource for teaching social constructivism in introductory classes, International Studies Perspectives 4(1) 2002, pp.15 33. Baldwin, D. Power analysis and world politics, World Politics 31(2) 1979, pp.161 94. Bellamy, A.J. Is the war on terror just?, International Relations 19(5) 2005, pp.275 96. Bennett, A. The guns that didn t smoke: ideas and the Soviet non-use of force in 1989, Journal of Cold War Studies 7(2) 2005, pp.81 109. 7

11 Introduction to international relations 8 Brooks, S. and W. Wohlforth Power, globalization and the end of the Cold War: reevaluating a landmark case for the study of ideas, International Security 25(3) 2000 1, pp.5 54. Bull, H. International theory: the case for a classical approach, World Politics 18(3) 1966, pp.20 38. Buzan, B. A leader without followers? The United States in world politics after Bush, International Politics 45 2008, pp.554 70. Buzan, B. A world order without superpowers: decentred globalism, International Relations 25(1) 2011, pp.3 25. Buzan, B. and R. Little Why international relations has failed as an intellectual project and what to do about it, Millennium 30(1) 2001, pp.19 39. Cha, V.D. Globalization and the study of international security, Journal of Peace Research 37(3), 2000, pp.391 403. Checkel, J.T. The constructivist turn in international relations theory, World Politics 50(1) 1998, pp.324 48. Collins, R. Explaining the anti-soviet revolution by state breakdown theory and geopolitical theory, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.575 90. Cox, M. Another transatlantic split? American and European narratives and the end of the Cold War, Cold War History 7(1) 2007, pp.121 46. Cox, M. Is the United States in decline again?, International Affairs 83(4) 2007, pp.643 53. Cox, M. Power shift and the death of the West? Not yet!, European Political Science 10(3) 2011, pp.416 24. Cox, M. The uses and abuses of history: the end of the Cold War and Soviet collapse, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.627 46. Cox, M. Why did we get the end of the Cold War wrong?, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11(2) 2009, pp.161 76. de Alcantara, C.H. Uses and abuses of the concept of governance, International Social Science Journal 50(155) 1998, pp.105 13. Deudney, D. The case against linking environmental degradation and national security, Millennium 19(3) 1990, pp.461 76. Deudney. D. and G.J. Ikenberry The international sources of Soviet change, International Security 13(3) 1991/2, pp.74 118. Dodge, T. The ideological roots of failure: the application of kinetic neo-liberalism to Iraq, International Affairs 86(6) 2010, pp.1269 86. Dorussen, H. and H. Ward Trade networks and the Kantian peace, Journal of Peace Research 47(1) 2010, pp.29 42. Dupont, A. The strategic implications of climate change, Survival 50(3) 2008, pp.29 54. English, R.D. Merely an above-average product of the Soviet Nomenklatura? Assessing leadership in the Cold War s end, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.607 26. Falkner, R., S. Hannes and J. Vogler International climate policy after Copenhagen: towards a building blocks approach, Global Policy 1(3) 2010, pp.252 62. Ferguson, N. Empire falls. Vanity Fair (October 2006) www.vanityfair.com/politics/ features/2006/10/empire200610 Ferguson, N. Sinking globalization, Foreign Affairs 84(2) 2005, pp.64 77. Freedman, L. The age of liberal wars, Review of International Studies 31(S1) 2005, pp.93 107. Gaddis, J.L. The long peace: elements of stability in the post-war international system, International Security 10(4) 1986, pp.92 142. Garrett, G. Global markets and national politics: collision course or virtuous circle?, International Organization 52(4) 1998, pp.787 824. Glaser, C. Will China s rise lead to war?, Foreign Affairs 90(2) 2011, pp.80 91. Grader, S., The English School of international relations: evidence and evaluation, Review of International Studies 14(1) 1988, pp.29 44. Haas, M.L. A geriatric peace? The future of US power in a world of aging populations, International Security 32(1) 2007, pp.112 47.

Introduction Halliday, Fred International relations: is there a new agenda?, Millennium 20(1) 1991, pp.57 72. Hill, C., 1939: the origins of liberal realism, Review of International Studies 15(4) 1989, pp.319 28. Hindness, B. On three dimensional power, Political Studies 24(3) 1976, pp.229 333. Hoge, J.F. A global power shift in the making, Foreign Affairs 83(4) 2004, pp.2 7. Homer-Dixon, T. Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases, International Security 19(1) 1994, pp.5 40. Homer-Dixon, T. On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict, International Security 16(2) 1991, pp.76 116. Horborn, L. and P. Wallensteen Armed conflict, 1989 2006, Journal of Peace Research 44(5) 2007, pp.623 34. Houweling, H. and J.G. Stevens Power transition as a cause of war, Journal of Conflict Resolution 32(1) 1998, pp.87 102. Ikenberry, G.J. A crisis of global governance, Current History 109(730) 2010, pp.315 21. Ikenberry, G.J. The future of the liberal world order internationalism after America, Foreign Affairs 90(3) 2011, pp.56 68. James, A. The practice of sovereign statehood in contemporary international society, Political Studies 47(3) 1999, pp.457 73. Jellisen, S.M. and F.M. Gottheil Marx and Engels: in praise of globalization, Contributions to Political Economy 28(1) 2009, pp.35 46. Kagan, R. Power and weakness, Policy Review 113 2002. http://homepage.univie. ac.at/vedran.dzihic/kagan.pdf Kaysen, C. Is war obsolete? International Security 14(4) 1990, pp.42 64. Kennedy, P. The First World War and the international power system, International Security 9(1) 1984, pp.7 40. Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye Globalization, what s new? What s not? (And so what?), Foreign Policy 118 2000, pp.104 19. Khong, Y.F. War and international theory: a commentary on the state of the art, Review of International Studies 10(1) 1984, pp.41 63. Kivimaki, T. The long peace of ASEAN, Journal of Peace Research 37(5) 2000, pp.635 49. Knutsen, T.L. A lost generation? IR scholarship before World War I, International Politics 45(6) 2008, pp.650 74. Korf, B. Resources, violence and the telluric geographies of small wars, Progress in Human Geography 35(6) 2011, pp.733 56. Krahmann, E. National, regional and global governance: one phenomenon or many? Global Governance 9(3) 2003, pp.323 46. Layne, C. Impotent power? Re-examining the nature of America s hegemonic power?, The National Interest 85 2006, pp.41 47. Le Billon, P. The geopolitical economy of resource wars, Geopolitics 9(1) 2004, pp.1 28. Lebow, R.N. The long peace, the end of the Cold War and the failure of realism, International Organization 48(2) 1994, pp.249 77. Levy, M. Is the environment a national security issue?, International Security 20(2) 1995, pp.35 62. Little, R. The English School vs. American Realism: a meeting of minds or divided by a common language?, Review of International Studies 29(3) 2003, pp.443 60. Mann, M. Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation state?, Review of International Political Economy 4(3) 1997, pp.472 96. Moravcik, A. Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international politics, International Organization 51(4) 1997, pp.513 53. Morton, A. New follies on the state of the globalization debate, Review of International Studies 30(1) 2004, pp.133 47. 9

11 Introduction to international relations 10 Osiander, A Sovereignty, international relations and the Westphalian myth, International Organization 55(2) 2001, pp.251 87. Osiander, A. Rereading early 20th century IR theory: idealism revisited, International Studies Quarterly 42(3) 1998, pp.409 32. Pang, T. and G.E. Guindo Globalization and risks to health Science & Society, EMBO Reports 5(1) 2004, pp.s11 16 www.nature.com/embor/journal/v5/n1s/ full/7400226.html Pelletier, N. Of laws and limits: an ecological economic perspective on redressing the failure of contemporary global environmental governance, Global Environmental Change 20(2) 2010, pp.220 28. Risse, T. Ideas, discourse power and the end of the Cold War: 20 years on, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.591 606. Rosenberg, J. Globalization theory: a post-mortem, International Politics 42(1) 2005, pp.3 74. Schmidt, B. Anarchy, world politics and the birth of a discipline, International Relations 16(1) 2002, pp.9 32. Schmidt, B. Lessons from the past: reassessing interwar disciplinary history of international relations, International Studies Quarterly 42(3) 1998, pp.433 59. Schmidt, B. Political science and the American Empire: a disciplinary history of the politics section and the discourse of imperialism and colonialism, International Politics 45(6) 2008, pp.675 87. Scholte, J.A. Global capitalism and the state, International Affairs 73(3) 1997, pp.427 52. Schroeder, P.W. The 19th century international system: changes in the structure, World Politics 39(1) 1986, pp.1 26. Schweller, R. and W. Wohlforth Power test: updating Realism in response to the end of the Cold War, Security Studies 9(3) 2000, pp.60 108. Singer, P.W. Corporate warriors: the rise of privatized military industry and its ramifications for international security, International Security 26(3) 2001 2, pp.186 220. Singh, R. The exceptional empire: why the United States will not decline again, International Politics 45 2008, pp.571 93. Smith, S. The discipline of international relations: still an American social science, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2(3) 2000, pp.374 402. Smith, S. The United States and the discipline of international relations: hegemonic country, hegemonic discipline, International Studies Review 4(2) 2002, pp.67 85. Snyder, J. The domestic political logic of Gorbachev s new thinking in foreign policy, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.562 74. Sofka, J.R. `The eighteenth century international system: parity or primacy?, Review of International Studies 27(2) 2001, pp.147 63. Sterling-Folcker, J. Realism and the constructivist challenge, International Studies Review 4(1) 2002, pp.73 100. Strange, S. The westfailure system, Review of International Studies 25(3) 1999, pp.345 54. Suganami, H. Explaining war: some critical observations, International Relations 16(3) 2002, pp.307 26. Tickner, J.A. You just don t understand: troubled engagements between feminism and IR theorists, International Studies Quarterly 41(4) 1997, pp.611 32. Van Evera, S. Offense, defence, and the causes of war, International Security 22(4) 1997, pp.5 43. Van Ham, P. The power of war: why Europe needs it, International Politics 47(6) 2010, pp.574 95. Waever, O. The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in international relations, International Organization 52(4) 1998, pp.687 727. Walt, S.M. International relations: one world, many theories, Foreign Policy 110 1998, pp.29 47.

Introduction Weiss, L. Globalization and the myth of the powerless state, New Left Review 225 1997, pp.3 27. Wendt, A. Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics, International Organisation 46(2) 1992, pp.391 425. White, D.H. The nature of world power in American history: an evaluation at the end of World War II, Diplomatic History 11(3) 1984, pp.181 202. Williams, M. The empire writes back (to Michael Cox), International Affairs 83(5) 2007, pp.945 50. Wohlforth, William No one loves a Realist explanation, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.441 59. Youngs, G. From practice to theory: feminist international relations and gender mainstreaming, International Politics 45(6) 2008, pp.688 702. Online study resources In addition to the subject guide and the Essential reading, it is crucial that you take advantage of the study resources that are available online for this course, including the VLE and the Online Library. You can access the VLE, the Online Library and your University of London email account via the Student Portal at: http://my.londoninternational.ac.uk You should have received your login details for the Student Portal with your official offer, which was emailed to the address that you gave on your application form. You have probably already logged in to the Student Portal in order to register! As soon as you registered, you will automatically have been granted access to the VLE, Online Library and your fully functional University of London email account. If you forget your login details at any point, please email uolia.support@ london.ac.uk quoting your student number. Making use of the Online Library The Online Library contains a huge array of journal articles and other resources to help you read widely and extensively. To access the majority of resources via the Online Library you will either need to use your University of London Student Portal login details, or you will be required to register and use an Athens login: http://tinyurl.com/ollathens The easiest way to locate relevant content and journal articles in the Online Library is to use the Summon search engine. If you are having trouble finding an article listed in a reading list, try removing any punctuation from the title, such as single quotation marks, question marks and colons. For further advice, please see the online help pages: www.external.shl.lon.ac.uk/summon/about.php The virtual learning environment The VLE, which complements this subject guide, has been designed to enhance your learning experience, providing additional support and a sense of community. It forms an important part of your study experience with the University of London and you should access it regularly. The VLE provides a range of resources for EMFSS courses: Self-testing activities: Doing these allows you to test your own understanding of subject material. Electronic study materials: The printed materials that you receive from the University of London are available to download, including updated reading lists and references. 11

11 Introduction to international relations Past examination papers and Examiners commentaries: These provide advice on how each examination question might best be answered. A student discussion forum: This is an open space for you to discuss interests and experiences, seek support from your peers, work collaboratively to solve problems and discuss subject material. Videos: There are recorded academic introductions to the subject, interviews and debates and, for some courses, audio-visual tutorials and conclusions. Recorded lectures: For some courses, where appropriate, the sessions from previous years Study Weekends have been recorded and made available. Study skills: Expert advice on preparing for examinations and developing your digital literacy skills. Feedback forms. Some of these resources are available for certain courses only, but we are expanding our provision all the time and you should check the VLE regularly for updates. Examination advice Important: the information and advice given here are based on the examination structure used at the time this guide was written. Please note that subject guides may be used for several years. Because of this we strongly advise you to always check both the current Regulations for relevant information about the examination, and the VLE where you should be advised of any forthcoming changes. You should also carefully check the rubric/instructions on the paper you actually sit and follow those instructions. Over the course of three hours, students must answer any four of the 12 essay questions provided. These cover the main topics in this syllabus, and test your ability to apply the theories and concepts of IR to a range of historical and policy-based questions. All answers should be written in the form of an essay, with a thesis statement and supporting evidence organised in a series of paragraphs that support your conclusions. As you will learn throughout this course, there are very rarely any definitive answers in IR. Theories, concepts, history and policy are contested by students, professors and practitioners alike. As indicated in the examination preparation material on the VLE, Examiners look for well-crafted arguments that use conceptual tools to understand and analyse real-world events. Before sitting your examination, be sure that you have worked through every chapter of this subject guide. You must be familiar with the Essential readings for each chapter. These can be supplemented with material from the Further readings, various printed media and other literary sources. A Sample examination paper and commentary are included at the end of this guide. Remember, it is important to check the VLE for: up-to-date information on examination and assessment arrangements for this course where available, past examination papers and Examiners commentaries for the course which give advice on how each question might best be answered. 12

Part 1: Introduction Part 1: Introduction 13

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 14

Chapter 1: The twentieth century origins of international relations Chapter 1: The twentieth century origins of international relations The armistices has been signed and the statesmen of the nations will soon assemble to undertake the task of concluding the pact of Peace which we all hope will herald in a new world, freed from the menace of war... Old problems must be confronted in a new spirit; insular and vested prejudices must be removed; understanding and toleration need to be greatly developed. It is an immense task and a myriad of agencies will be required to discharge it. Among these must be our universities Major David Davies, MP, in a letter to Sir John Williams, President of the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, donating 20,000 for the establishment of the Wilson Chair in International Politics, 1920 Aim of the chapter The aim of this chapter is to: introduce you to the main background factors that led to the creation and evolution of IR as an academic discipline. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: discuss what is meant by the twenty years crisis describe the influence of twentieth-century crises on the development of IR illustrate some of the fundamental differences between Realist, Liberal, English School and Postcolonial approaches to IR discuss the subjects with which IR should be concerned define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Baylis, J., S. Smith and P. Owens Introduction. Cox, M. From the Cold War to the world economic crisis. Scott, L. International history 1900 1999. Further reading Ashworth, L. Did the Realist-Idealist debate ever take place?: a revisionist history of international relations, International Relations 16(1) 2002, pp.33 51. Buzan, B. and R. Little Why international relations has failed as an intellectual project and what to do about it, Millennium 30(1) 2001, pp.19 39. Cox, M. Introduction in Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years Crisis. Edited by M. Cox. (New York: Palgrave, 2001) [ISBN 9780333963777]. 15

11 Introduction to international relations Works cited Introduction Halliday, Fred International relations: is there a new agenda?, Millennium 20(1) 1991, pp.57 72. Holsti, K.J. Scholarship in an era of anxiety: the study of international politics during the Cold War in Dunne, T., M. Cox and K. Booth The Eighty Years Crisis: international relations 1919 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) [ISBN 9780521667838]. Knutsen, T.L. A lost generation? IR scholarship before World War I, International Politics 45(6) 2008, pp.650 74. Osiander, A. Rereading early 20th century IR theory: idealism revisited, International Studies Quarterly 42(3) 1998, pp.409 32. Schmidt, B. Anarchy, world politics and the birth of a discipline, International Relations 16(1) 2002, pp.9 32. Schmidt, B. Lessons from the past: reassessing interwar disciplinary history of international relations, International Studies Quarterly 42(3) 1998, pp.433 59. Schmidt, B. Political science and the American Empire: a disciplinary history of the politics section and the discourse of imperialism and colonialism, International Politics 45(6) 2008, pp.675 87. Smith, S. The discipline of international relations: still an American social science, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2(3) 2000, pp.374 402. Smith, S. The United States and the discipline of international relations: hegemonic country, hegemonic discipline, International Studies Review 4(2) 2002, pp.67 85. Sorsensen, G. International relations theory after the Cold War in Dunne, T., M. Cox and K. Booth (eds) The Eighty Years Crisis: international relations 1919 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780521667838]. Waever, O. The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in international relations, International Organization 52(4) 1998, pp.687 727. Gaddis, J. The long peace: inquiries into the history of the Cold War. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) [ISBN 9780195043358]. Hoffman, S. An American social science: international relations, Daedelus 106(3) 1977, pp.41 60. Halliday, F. Rethinking international relations. (London: MacMillan, 1994) [ISBN 9780333589052] pp.1 4. Morgenthau, H. Politics among nations. (London : McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006) seventh edition [ISBN 9780072895391]. White, D.W. The nature of world power in American history Diplomatic History 11(3) 1987, pp.181 202. Although IR is a relatively young discipline, less than a century old, many of its most important questions and concepts have deep roots in intellectual history. From Classical Greece to the British Empire, Ming China to modern America, leaders, advisers, academics and students have wrestled with problems of war, trade, culture and diplomacy. This is not to say, however, that there is nothing new under the sun. Even those who insist that the problems we face are more or less the same as those of the ancients, recognise that the world has changed dramatically in terms of its economic development, military technologies and rise of political democracy. IR whose ambitious goal is to understand the complex network of social, economic and political interactions that connect human societies is a contradictory subject. Its first academic chair was 16

Chapter 1: The twentieth century origins of international relations established in the early twentieth century, many years after other social sciences, yet its fundamental questions are as old as any. IR deals with the best and the worst of humanity: respect and hatred, cooperation and war. These are not new debates. Look at any standard history of IR and you can trace them through the idea of past greats : writers like Thucydides (a Greek historian of the fifth century BC), St Thomas Aquinas (a thirteenthcentury Christian theologian), Hugo Grotius (a seventeenth-century Dutch lawyer), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (an eighteenth-century French philosopher) and Immanuel Kant (a German thinker writing in the shadow of the Napoleonic wars). Though none of these men thought of themselves as working in a subject called IR, each contributed to our understanding of topics that have since become associated with the discipline: the causes for war, the possibilities of peace, and the impact of trade and ideas. Their works are the intellectual foundations upon which much of modern IR is constructed. The origins of international relations: the First World War and the interwar years Despite its deep intellectual roots, IR is a young discipline. For some time, scholars have been discussing who first taught IR, where and for what precise purpose. There is general agreement that its institutional growth in Western universities notably British and American is a twentiethcentury phenomenon directly connected to the simple and terrible fact that between 1914 and 1989 the world experienced three terrible and protracted conflicts: the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War. These took tens of millions of lives, led to revolutionary social transformations around the world, nearly eliminated whole human populations, facilitated the rise of some great powers, and led to the demise of others. The hugely destructive wars of this bloodiest era in history have been at the heart of IR since it first emerged as a taught subject after 1918. Activity Stop and read sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 3, pp.52 54 Complete the table below by listing events from the twentieth century that have influenced the development of key topics in IR. This list will be useful when you prepare essays and examination answers to questions on these topics. IR topic Human rights Associated historical events (Example: the Holocaust) Causes of war Role of economics in IR Conditions for peace If war gave birth to academic IR, the establishment of peace was its first mission. IR is sometimes thought of as being too pessimistic in its views on war and peace, and too theoretical in its approach to global issues. However, many of its key thinkers have been practical people keen to discover tangible and morally acceptable solutions to real world problems. 17

11 Introduction to international relations When David Davies, a survivor of the Western Front in the First World War, funded the first permanent academic post in IR in the small Welsh seaside town of Aberystwyth in 1920, he made it clear that the position was not to be used for vague theorising. Rather, it was to help scholars engage in practical thinking that would herald in a new world freed from the menace of war. As we know, Davies dream of peace was not realised. The end of the war to end all wars in 1918 did not lay the foundations for a more stable world based on mutually-agreed rules and international organisations like the League of Nations. This had been the hope of IR s earliest dedicated specialists, the intellectual forerunners of today s Liberals. Instead, the post- First World War settlement led to what E.H. Carr, one of the most influential writers in the discipline, later called the twenty years crisis. He argued that the settlement contained within it the seeds for an even greater conflict. He was especially critical of the idealistic US President Woodrow Wilson. Carr saw powerful revisionist states, dissatisfied with the status quo created after the Great War, pushing hard to shift the balance of power in their favour. As a seasoned British diplomat, and later as an influential academic, Carr hoped that German and Japanese ambitions might be contained through a strategy of diplomatic concession. The status quo, he argued, was not sacrosanct, and peaceful change was preferable to war. In the end, Carr s policy options proved to be unworkable. Germany and Japan could not be satisfied through appeasement as he had hoped. Their policies of conquest and expansion continued, drawing Britain and France (in September 1939), the USSR (in June 1941) and the USA (in December 1941) into the most destructive war in history. The post-1945 world: American hegemony and European decline The Second World War compelled writers and statesmen to think with greater urgency about the kind of world that had produced such appalling aggression. It also forced policy-makers to seriously think about how such disastrous events might be avoided once the war came to an end. Though neither question ever saw a consensus, these turbulent times generated an enormous amount of creative thought. Among Western powers at least, several important lessons were learnt. First, that global security would never be achieved so long as the international economy did not function properly. Second, there was a need to construct some kind of reformed League of Nations, the United Nations (UN), within which the great powers would be given a special role and special responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, leading to the creation of the permanent five (P5) within the UN Security Council. Lastly, it was believed that the USA could not retreat into political isolationism, as it had done following the First World War, but that it needed to remain actively engaged in international affairs as Europe s international influence waned. The chances of a return to the pre-war status quo were very slim. America s deepening involvement and increased influence effectively ruled out any rerun of what had happened in 1919 and 1920. Indeed, the USA had become so powerful by 1945 that it would not have been feasible for it to have retreated. This is rarely, if ever, what rising powers do, and it was certainly no longer an option. Later in this course we will discuss the notion of power and America s use of it. Here, we only need make passing reference to how much of this extraordinarily important commodity the USA possessed when the guns fell silent in 1945. Never had the world witnessed such a phenomenon. By 1945, every other great power winners and losers alike was in a state of severe disrepair, barely able to recover from a war 18

Chapter 1: The twentieth century origins of international relations that had left their societies in ruins. This included the USSR, which had lost over 25 million of its citizens. The USA, meanwhile, had never been in better economic and military heath, accounting for nearly 60% of the world s economic wealth, over 50% of its research and development, 70% of its naval tonnage, and the lion s share of its agricultural surpluses. The age of the superpower had begun. Even as the Second World War came to an end, analysts of international politics were aware that a huge power shift was underway; one that pointed towards the emergence of what IR would later define as a two power, bipolar system. Bipolarity describes a distribution of power among two great powers in the international system, and and can be contrasted with unipolarity with a single dominant great power and multipolarity in which capabilities are divided among many great powers. Moreover, this emerging world order would be dominated not by European empires still in possession of considerable assets in 1945 but by the United States of America and, later, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. By 1945, military planners in Washington DC were already wondering who the next enemy might be. Europe s imperial power, dominant prior to the First World War, was seen to be in decline. As the colonial empires of the UK, France, Portugal and other European powers disintegrated, the USA saw a need to establish new forms of economic and political hegemony. Such was American self-confidence in the period that many of its policy-makers discounted any threat from the USSR, which had been economically weakened by its brutal three year war of extermination with Germany and confronted by the atomic bomb. There was, at first, little indication of the great contest that was to follow. Stop and read section 3 of Chapter 3, pp.54 56 1. Which came first, the decline of European power in the international system, or the independence of its colonies around the world? 2. Did the decline of European imperialism mark an end to all forms of hegemony in the international system? If not, what new forms took its place? The Cold War and the birth of Realism As we now know, the high hopes born out of the US sense of its own preponderance of power in 1945 were not realised. Very quickly, deep differences over the future shape of Europe, the status of Germany, the situation in China and even the future of capitalism divided the victorious allies. The origins of the ensuing 45-year long Cold War have been hotly debated. Some blame Soviet expansionism for causing the rift, others the political and economic policies of the USA. The Cold War has also been viewed as a natural consequence of competition between the two superpowers and their opposing ideologies, with the USA and its allies devoted to capitalist principles, while the Soviets and their allies were wedded to their vision of state socialism. Activity Stop and read sections 4 and 5 of Chapter 3, pp.56 63 In no more than 500 words, respond to the question below. Your answer should include a one-sentence thesis statement that clearly states your position, followed by the main points on which you base that position: To what extent were the Soviet and American blocs during the Cold War similar to the empires of European states prior to the Second World War? What made them similar and different? 19

11 Introduction to international relations 20 IR scholars have been central to discussions about the causes and consequences of the Cold War. Then and now, many believe that the wartime alliance between the West and the USSR was bound to fail, not just because of the Allies political and economic differences, but because that is the fate of alliances once unifying threats in this case Nazi Germany and imperial Japan were overcome. Furthermore, while both sides in the Cold War exaggerated the aggressive intentions of their opponent, the fact remains that the larger international system was in turmoil after the Second World War. Insecurity was the order of the day. Nowhere was this more visible than in post-war Europe, where economic recovery was proving difficult and the pre-war balance of power had been overturned by the defeat of Germany and the enormous territorial gains made by the USSR. Even if the USSR had no plans to invade Western Europe and there is little evidence indicating that it did there was every need to restore the health of European economies and the political self-confidence of individual states. Many Western policy-makers saw no reason to trust their Soviet counterparts. The USSR s repressive actions in Eastern Europe, its construction of a sphere of influence, its links with increasingly influential communist parties in Italy and France, its closed economy, and its brutal policies at home were seen as ample evidence that cooperation would be impossible. This was certainly the view held by the USA and the UK by 1946, and by early 1947 the idea was truly embedded. The outcome of this process led to what British writer George Orwell (1945) and American columnist Walter Lippmann (1947) called a Cold War. This very new kind of war would be conducted in a bipolar world where power was polarised in the hands of two nuclear-armed superpowers. First Europe and later many other regions of the world divided into blocs, one pro-soviet and one pro-american. The Cold War was to have all the features of a normal war except it was hoped for direct military confrontation. Unsurprisingly, this state of affairs had a profound impact on the way an emerging generation of increasingly American IR scholars thought about IR. These rising thinkers saw themselves living in dark and dangerous times, making them extraordinarily tough minded. The vast majority of them continued to believe that diplomacy and cooperation were possible, even essential, in a nuclear age. Nevertheless, most were decidedly pessimistic. Having witnessed the outbreak of two global wars, one world depression, the rise of fascism and a confrontation with an expanded communist threat often equated with fascism in official US minds many analysts of world politics came to look at the world through a particularly dark prism born of harsh experience. Your first international relations theory: Realism Activity Stop and read Realism and world politics in the Introduction, p.4 Note down the main assumptions that Realism uses to understand the world around it. Pay special attention to who is considered an international actor, why they act the way they do, and what kind of international system they inhabit. The hugely influential American writer Hans J. Morgenthau, himself a Jewish exile from Nazi Germany, set the tone for this kind of thinking in his highly influential textbook Politics among nations (1948). Morgenthau was neither a natural conservative, nor uncritical of US foreign policy. As one keen on speaking truth to power as he once put it, he had no time for

Chapter 1: The twentieth century origins of international relations wishful thinking. Lessons had to be learned, and if history taught anything it was not that we could build a better world based on new principles as interwar Liberals had suggested prior to the Second World War. Rather, Morgenthau believed that we should be trying to build a more orderly world by learning from the past. This distinction between building a better world and a more orderly one continues to separate Liberals and Realists to this day. The past taught Morgenthau: that states were driven by deep power ambitions that these drives were permanent features of IR that it was the international responsibility of the USA as the most powerful democracy after the Second World War to act as a great and responsible power, especially once confronted by a powerful Soviet adversary. To be fair, Morgenthau never thought that the USSR was driven by great ideological ambitions. However, he pointed out that it controlled a land mass stretching across 11 time zones, had a formidable army that had just defeated Nazi Germany, and was bound to want to convert this power into greater global influence. As a result, Morgenthau argued that the USA had to pursue what one of his fellow Americans the policy-maker George F. Kennan termed a long-term and patient containment of Soviet ambitions. In this way, some form of stability could be restored to the world. States might one day learn to work with each other but, for Morgenthau and Kennan, that day lay in the distant future. For the time being, it was better to plan for the worst case scenario on the assumption that by doing so the worse might never come to pass. This no-nonsense way of thinking about the world seemed logical and sensible, and called itself Realism surely one of the most effective branding exercises in the social sciences. Within the Realist framework there was room for disagreement. Some Realists did not think that the Cold War could remain cold forever, and would inevitably end in a nuclear war if it went on for any length of time. Others arrived at another, equally erroneous, conclusion: that the confrontation would never end at all! For many, what began as a dangerous global competition gradually evolved into what the structural Realist Kenneth Waltz regarded as an essential stabilising element in the anarchic international system. Two superpowers, he argues, were better than one hegemon or many great powers in terms of creating a balanced international situation. The Cold War simplified world politics and, in doing so, made it far more predictable. Waltz concludes that in an international system without a supreme ruler an anarchic international system the see-saw of Cold War bipolarity was responsible for bringing some order to relations between the superpowers. Waltz is not alone in this view. Another American writer, the influential historian John Gaddis, argued in 1987 that the Cold War was a new form of long peace ; underwritten by the reality of nuclear mutually assured destruction (MAD), and supported by two rationally constrained superpowers whose passing would probably destabilise the international system they dominated. Remember, this was before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and disintegration of the Soviet Union two years later. 21

11 Introduction to international relations 22 Growing diversity in IR Stop and read from the beginning of Liberalism and world politics (p.4) to the end of Postcolonialism (p.6) in Chapter 1 Activity Using the list of Realist assumptions that you created in the last activity, draw up a parallel list of assumptions for each of the alternative theories on pp.4 6. Remember to think about key questions: Who acts? Why do they act? What kind of system shapes their actions? Though Realism is normally identified as the dominant tradition in IR, it has never held the field alone. Depending on how you date it, Liberalism predates Realism dating back to the much-derided idealism of the interwar years and remains one of the discipline s most influential approaches. For Liberals, interdependence mutual dependence on one another for social and material goods provides the best foundations on which we can build a more peaceful world. According to supporters of Liberalism like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the extraordinary expansion of trans-boundary interactions since the end of the Second World War is the most obvious foundation on which to build a new international system in a post-hegemonic age. Increasing interdependence, they argue, means that states are not absolutely sovereign insofar as they remain vulnerable to transnational forces. This is not to deny the continued importance of the state and power in IR. However, in a world in which the USA appears to be losing its capacity to lead from a position of hegemonic strength, Liberals argue that additional means must be sought to guarantee the stability and improvement of the international system. Their analysis, therefore, includes an expanded set of international actors, focusing also on the role of multinational corporations (MNCs), nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). Another distinct contribution to IR has been made by the English School (ES), first developed at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Many of its theorists accept a good deal of what Realists have to say about power and the competitive, anarchic character of IR. At the same time, they disagree with Realism s claim that the international system is a free-for-all, anything goes arena. Realism, argues the ES, cannot explain why states even ones as hostile to each other as the USA and the USSR work together, engage in diplomacy, and thereby generate forms of international order in an otherwise anarchic system. Instead of accepting Realism s Hobbesian view of IR, the ES argues that the international system is best described as an international society, in which actors (including states, MNCs, NGOs, etc.) are bound together by socially-generated practices and principles. These practices and principles which some ES scholars call institutions range from bilateral and multilateral treaties (the formal institutions of international society) to unwritten but influential principles such as sovereignty and democracy promotion (society s informal institutions). Both are historically changeable, varying over time and space. In the past 50 years, European international society has gone from being one of the world s most unstable and war-torn regions to one of its most tranquil. Its institutions have evolved over time away from the use of force as a legitimate means of

Chapter 1: The twentieth century origins of international relations conflict resolution. This does not mean that war in Europe is impossible, but only that it is made less likely as an alternative means of conflict resolution mainly via the European Union (EU) become available and accepted. We will discuss the English School s institutions at greater length later in this guide. For now, it should suffice to note that whereas Realism sees IR as conflictual and Liberalism sees it as cooperative, the ES leaves the answer open. International societies can be cooperative or conflictual, depending on when and where you look. Furthermore, institutions evolve over time, changing the character of the international societies that they describe. Analysing the character and evolution of international institutions therefore remains the main object of ES research. As the Cold War progressed, issues arose for which Realists and Liberals had few answers. In the 1960s, a new generation of critical theorists began to question global power structures rather than merely taking them for granted. Few of these thinkers traced their intellectual roots directly back to IR. The overwhelming majority were either historians of US diplomatic history dissatisfied with standard accounts of American conduct abroad, or radical economists with an interest in the Third World and its discontents. Through the efforts of these thinkers, critical theories born in other branches of the social sciences began to have a major impact on the generation of IR scholars who entered the field in ever-larger numbers. This includes Marxism, with its class-based analysis of global economics, Social Constructivism, with its focus on humans ability to consciously alter the principles by which the world operates, Post-structuralism, which denies the existence of any absolute Truths on which to base analyses of human action, and Post-colonialism, which traces the international system s social, economic, and political foundations back to its colonial and ultimately European roots. In a related development, the 1970s saw an upsurge of interest in what became known as International Political Economy (IPE). This branch of IR seeks to explain links between the international economic and political systems. The collapse of the post-second World War Bretton Woods economic system in 1971, perceptions of relative US economic decline, and a general recognition that one could not understand IR without at least having some knowledge of the material world forced some in IR to come to terms with economics, a branch of knowledge of which they had hitherto been woefully ignorant. But even a little knowledge of international economics had its advantages. For, if the US was in decline as some were already arguing in the 1970s a new form of world order had to be forged. These challenges to Realism have risen to greater prominence since the end of the Cold War in 1991. That said, Realism remains very much at the heart of the discipline, particularly in the USA where it originated. Other attempts to dethrone this academic heavyweight have met with only limited success. Moreover, even while Realism has come under increasing attack, the USA has become the uncontested centre of our academic discipline. Having found a new home after the Second World War, IR has remained what Stanley Hoffmann termed an American social science. US resources, its ability to attract some of the best and the brightest from Europe and farther afield, and the appearance of having influence in the corridors of US power have made American IR look like an especially robust animal compared to its rivals elsewhere, making the USA an intellectual, if not political, hegemon. 23

11 Introduction to international relations International relations and the end of the Cold War Ultimately, it took a seismic event to produce a widespread change in IR. The end of the Cold War was an unexpected and almost entirely peaceful revolution in world politics. We will look at this event in more detail in Chapter 3. For the time being, however, we need to consider its impact on IR as an academic discourse. Activity Stop and read section two of Chapter 4, entitled The end of the Cold War, pp.68 69 Note down keywords in the reading that might indicate the author s theoretical position. Do you think he is a Realist, a Liberal, a member of the English School, a Marxist, or a student of IPE? List the terms and your answer in the space below. 24 The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 shattered the stability of the Cold War international system, plunging IR scholars into an intellectual crisis as they tried to come to terms with the end of bipolarity. Many began to question old certainties and think about the shape of the post-cold War world. This led to a shift in IR s intellectual focus, away from what might be defined as classical security issues (dealing with states, armies, diplomats and spies) towards a whole host of new security issues associated with globalisation. These are qualitatively different from their classical and statist predecessors, and include issues such as human rights, crime, and the environment. It also reinforced a shift towards new kinds of theory and more issues relating to international ethics, some of which we will look at in Chapter 6. To get a sense of this shift, it is worth comparing a standard IR textbook written during the Cold War with one produced after 1991. The former normally begins with a few well-chosen observations about the origins of Cold War following the Second World War, continues with a lengthy discourse on the foreign policies of the two superpowers, talks about key concepts, such as sovereignty and polarity, spends some time on the balance of power and the role of nuclear weapons, and probably concludes with a general discussion about why the world will not change much over the longer term. A textbook written after 1991, on the other hand, generally has very little to say about the Cold War except in an historical background context. Thus, the USSR and superpower rivalry will not be included (for obvious reasons), while new topics globalisation, failed states, the role of religion, and non-state actors give the subject a new feel. In some of the more theoretically daring studies authored after the Cold War, the focus has shifted away from the study of states and the notion of a well-structured international system whose laws can be discovered by careful analysis. Instead, many now emphasise the role of non-state actors and the apparent absence of a coherent international structure in the new, uncertain, post-modern world of the 1990s and early twenty-first century.

Chapter 1: The twentieth century origins of international relations The other obvious change is to IR more broadly. After fighting for many years to get recognition as a subject in its own right a fight it continues to wage in many countries in continental Europe IR in an age of globalisation has become increasingly popular with students in the twenty-first century. It is not clear whether this is because the end of the Cold War brought increasing opportunities for travel, greater international contact between academics and students, or because it brought a growing recognition that what happens in one part of the international system is bound to impact on every other part. Whatever the reason, there is little doubting the growth of the discipline. IR in the twenty-first century, with its many world-class departments, recognised international associations, plethora of journals, global league tables, and intellectual superstars, has never looked in better shape. In many universities today, we see that traditional subjects like political science which normally studies domestic affairs are experiencing tough times. Meanwhile, IR which looks at the state of the world today is on the rise. One thing, however, remains unchanged. Academic IR still revolves around an American axis. Interest in the USA as the last superpower remains high, and American scholars continue to exert an enormous some would say disproportionate influence on the field. Of course, one should not exaggerate. Other centres of IR in the UK, Scandinavia and Germany have made their presence felt. Moreover, there is a rising number of major powers in the world for scholars to consider, including the EU a focus of much lively discussion since the 1990s and China forever on the rise. But because of its staying power and its position at the heart of the international system, the USA continues to demand everybody s attention. Whether this interest, sometimes bordering on the obsessive, is likely to go on forever is not entirely certain. Ultimately, it will depend on many factors, the most fundamental being America s power in the world, an issue to which we shall return later in the concluding section of this course. However, as the first decade of the twenty-first century has given way to the second, the USA and its academics have continued to exert a powerful pull on all those around them. Activity Place the appropriate letter (a-d) in front of the theory that corresponds to each of the following descriptions of the Cold War: Realism Liberalism The English School Marxism a. The Cold War was a competition between US and Soviet institutions, with each side trying to make their preferred behaviours and norms the accepted bases of international society. b. The Cold War was the result of insufficient interdependence between post-war US and Soviet spheres of influence. c. The Cold War was an expression of the deep power ambitions that continue to define competition between states in the anarchic international system. d. The Cold War was a means by which dominant socioeconomic classes imposed their economic and political dominance on less economically developed groups around the world. 25

11 Introduction to international relations A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: discuss what is meant by the twenty years crisis describe the influence of twentieth-century crises on the development of IR illustrate some of the fundamental differences between Realist, Liberal, English School and Postcolonial approaches to IR discuss the subjects with which IR should be concerned define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary anarchic international system appeasement balance of power bipolar Cold War containment critical theorists English School globalisation great powers hegemony institutions interdependence International Political Economy (IPE) international society isolationism Liberalism multipolarity permanent five (P5) Realism revisionist states Security Council states status quo superpower transnational twenty years crisis United Nations (UN) unipolarity Sample examination questions 1. Why has IR been dominated by Realist ways of thinking about the international system since the end of the Second World War? 2. What are the main challenges to Realism? 3. In what sense was the Cold War a long peace? 4. What is the proper subject matter of IR? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 26

Part 2: Foundations Part 2: Foundations 27

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 28

Chapter 2: Europe and the emergence of international society Chapter 2: Europe and the emergence of international society By 1900 the peoples of Europe and European stock overseas dominated the globe. They did so in many ways, some explicit and some implicit, but the qualifications matter less than the general fact This was a unique development in world history. For the first time, one civilization established itself as a leader worldwide. Roberts, J.M. The Penguin history of the world. (London: Penguin, 2007) [ISBN 9780141030425]. p.789. Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: introduce you to the importance of international history for the study of IR show how IR can be employed to make sense of the past critically assess Europe s impact on the rest of the world. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain some of the reasons why Europe emerged as the main driver of world politics by the end of the nineteenth century discuss competing explanations of the Long Peace in Europe between 1814 and 1914 evaluate different explanations of the causes of the First World War assess the impact of the First World War on IR in the twentieth century define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Armstrong, D. The evolution of international society. Further reading Bull, H. International theory: the case for a classical approach, World Politics 18(3) 1966, pp.20 38. Buzan, B. and R. Little Units in the modern international system in Buzan, B. And R. Little International systems in world history. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780198780656]. Darwin, J. The Eurasian revolution in Darwin, J. Tamerlane: the global history of empire. (London: Penguin Books, 2007) [ISBN 9781596913936]. Gellner, E. Plough, book and sword: the structure of human history. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) [ISBN 9780226287027]. Grader, S., The English School of international relations: evidence and evaluation, Review of International Studies 14(1) 1988, pp.29 44. 29

11 Introduction to international relations Introduction Little, R. The English School vs. American Realism: a meeting of minds or divided by a common language?, Review of International Studies 29(3) 2003, pp.443 60. McNeill, W.H. The rise of the West: a history of the human community. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) [ISBN 9780226561417]. Meadwell, H. The long nineteenth century in Europe: reinterpreting the concert system in Cox, M., Dunne, T. and Booth, K. Empires, systems and states: great transformations in international politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780521016865]. Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 27(5) 2001. Morris, I. The Western age in Morris, I. Why the West rules for now: the patterns of history, and what they reveal about the future. (London: Profile Books, 2011) [ISBN 9781846682087]. Roberts, J.M. The European world hegemony in Roberts, J.M. The new Penguin history of the world. (London: Penguin Books, 2007) fifth edition [ISBN 9780141030425]. Schroeder, P.W. The 19th century international system: changes in the structure, World Politics 39(1) 1986, pp.1 26. Sofka, J.R. `The eighteenth century international system: parity or primacy?, Review of International Studies 27(2) 2001, pp.147 63. Tilly, C. Coercion, capital and European states AD 990 1990. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) second edition [ISBN 9781557863683]. As discussed in Chapter 1, the years between 1914 and 1991 were disturbed, even dark, ones that had a very marked impact on the way in which IR developed as an academic subject. But how did the international system arrive at that point? Was it an inevitable outcome of historical events? And what forces produced an international system that, by the outbreak of the First World War, was dominated by Europe and Europeans? In this chapter, we will try to answer some of these questions by looking at the history of IR a branch of history called international history (IH). We will not be able to cover the whole of IH in one chapter. Nor do we need to. Instead, we will focus on a few specific instances that will inform your understanding of current events. It is vitally important to look at the present through the prism of the past. This is partly because we need to understand the deeper sources of what became the extended crisis of the twentieth century, and partly to alert students of world politics to something they should never lose sight of: although nothing stays the same forever, some of the key problems in world politics have remained remarkably durable. Rethinking the international : the English School and international history Stop and read section 1 of Chapter 2, pp.36 37 What distinguishes the English School s approach to IR from that of the Realist approach? 30 Before looking at a few events from international history, we first need to think about the notion of the international itself. At what point in time and where did the international actually emerge as a way of thinking about a specific kind of relationship? There are two rather different answers to this fundamental question.

Chapter 2: Europe and the emergence of international society The first, more traditional response argues that it is impossible to conceive of something called the international without there being something national against which to define it. Both terms are therefore intimately connected to ideas of the nation and the state. According to this line of historical reasoning, we can only begin to think of the international and IR after the rise of sovereign states in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe. According to this definition, the international can therefore be understood as a description of the state system, first developed in post-reformation Europe, inhabited by autonomous political units, and organised according to a collection of shared principles and practices such as sovereignty and non-intervention. These principles and practices known as institutions by members of the ES bring some level of order to IR in what is otherwise an anarchic system. This institutional order, based on shared principles and practices, is what Hedley Bull refers to as international society. As we will see later, this view of international history has much to recommend it. However, we need to be sensitive to the fact that other forms of interaction and exchange existed between all sorts of political, social and economic groups tribes, clans, ethnic groups and cities long before the fifteenth century and well outside the boundaries of Europe. Complex systems of interacting groups developed as far apart geographically as imperial China (a civilisation stretching back 5,000 years), the Middle East (whose civilisations stretch back even further), and Africa (the most likely cradle of our species). If we accept orthodox wisdom that homo sapiens came out of Africa more than 100,000 years ago, we might argue that something loosely defined as IR developed between small human bands when our ancestors first decided to migrate across Africa, Eurasia and, subsequently, the planet. International relations did not emerge, fully-grown, with the birth of the modern European state system around in the sixteenth century. States as we shall argue throughout this course are crucial to explaining much of what has happened in world politics for the last 500 years. However, world history clearly shows that, for many centuries, it was not sovereign states that engaged in diplomacy, warfare and economic exchange. Rather, this role was often filled by great empires like the Egyptian, the Persian, the Roman, the Mongol, and even the Mayan and the Aztec. In fact, the more we discover about these empires complex histories, the more we notice how late in the day states actually emerged as serious players on the world stage. Moreover, when states did finally emerge out of the shadow of these empires, they did so with the help of those who had gone before; not just from the Greeks and the Romans, but also from many parts of the non- Christian world. Islam, in particular, has played a crucial role in the rise of Europe s state system both negatively by threatening it and positively by preserving and translating the learning of the ancient world that formed the basis for the European Renaissance following the medieval period. Activity Stop and read sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 2, pp.37 41 Each of the international societies described in these readings Greek, Indian, Chinese, Roman, Christian and Islamic include a set of institutions that define who can act legitimately in international society and how these actors are supposed to behave. Follow the example as you complete the table below to keep track of these societies different international institutions. Make a special note of institutions that develop in a number of different international societies. 31

11 Introduction to international relations International society Greek Indian Institutions of international society Who? City-states, Oracles How? Arbitration, Diplomacy (proxenia), Rules of War, Sanctity of Treaties Chinese Roman Christian Islamic European expansion We should be more than a little critical of the ways in which some writers have traditionally thought about IR: largely through European eyes, and mainly as something that only became seriously interesting when states emerged as the main actor in world affairs. IR does not begin and end with the rise of European states. Students of world politics must nevertheless confront an incontrovertible fact: that at some point between the late fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries, Europe initially around the Mediterranean and later in states bordering the Atlantic (Portugal, Spain, the UK, Holland and France) began to evolve in ways that changed the course of European and world history. In a very important sense, there was no such thing as a truly interconnected world before 1500. Only after the period of European exploration and expansion beginning at the turn of the sixteenth century can we begin to conceive of such an entity emerging. As one of the great historians of world history, J.M. Roberts, has argued, the age of a true world history and by implication the history of global IR starts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and continues for another 400 years, by which time European domination of the globe was complete. The sources of this dynamic expansion have been hotly debated. Some explanations are technical: from Europe s medieval agricultural revolution, to the advances made in learning during the Renaissance, to technological improvements that made oceanic shipping safer and their captains better able to navigate. Some have suggested a more economic reason: the rise of capitalism. According to this thesis, it was no coincidence that as feudalism began to break down and capitalism began to rise in its wake across Western Europe, it was this region rather than China or the Islamic world that broke free from the pack and pushed outwards in an extraordinary bout of expansion. Debates about the driving force behind the rise of the West will, no doubt, continue. Of one thing we can be certain: whether for cultural, religious, political or economic reasons (or some combination of all four), the states of Western Europe no longer simply waited for things to happen to them. Instead, they went out to make things happen to others. 32

Chapter 2: Europe and the emergence of international society The consequences for the world were immense. Not only did imperial expansion make European states rich, it also made their citizens feel distinctly one might say naturally superior to everybody else. It spawned a vast commerce in African slaves that spelled disaster for millions and created vast fortunes for the few who lived and prospered from the unpaid labour of others. Like many of the historical processes that came before it, Europe s expansion simultaneously created wealth, poverty, technological progress and moral barbarity. It fostered invention and innovation, revolutionised communication, gave birth to modern geography and cartography in fact to much of modern science itself. Its consequences were certainly not neutral from the point of view of global relationships. In terms of the distribution of power, it reinforced existing global inequalities. The world was both made and then refashioned by the European powers, primarily for economic gain though justified on grounds that made European conquest sound at least to most Europeans enlightened (in terms of raising the level of the natives ), religiously necessary (spreading Christianity) or racially preordained (with inferior races being destined to be ruled by those of the supposedly superior white variety). Significantly, few Europeans of the day opposed expansion and colonialism. Even liberals and more than a few socialists were counted among their supporters, arguing well into the early part of the twentieth century that there was something distinctively progressive about an economically and culturally superior Europe helping those less fortunate to join the modern world. European hegemony Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 2, pp.41 45 According to Hedley Bull in The anarchical society, international societies require agreement on three fundamental principles in order to operate effectively: 1. a means of formal communication between parties 2. a means of enforcing agreements between parties 3. a means of recognising one another s property rights. 1 As you read the assigned pages of the textbook, use the table below to note down institutions that fulfilled these roles at various points in the emergence of modern international society. Communication Historical institutions 1 Bull, H. The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics. (London: MacMillan, 1995) second edition [ISBN 9780333638224] pp.4 5. Enforcement Property rights The assault on the world by Europe s rising states had, by the late nineteenth century, created European world hegemony, albeit a contested one. There was opposition first when the 13 American colonies defeated and expelled the British Empire in the late eighteenth century, and again when many of the nations of Latin America expelled the Spanish and the Portuguese empires in the nineteenth century. However, 33

11 Introduction to international relations these challenges did not upset Europe s dominance. The USA made its revolution in the name of European (even English) ideals, and thereafter only welcomed immigrants from Europe into the New World. Meanwhile, in Latin America, liberation from Spain and Portugal did not lead to the end of Europe s influence over the continent. Indeed, its revolutions left the old European ruling class intact and states such as the USA and the UK more deeply involved in Latin American affairs than they had been before the expulsion of Iberian power. Dynamic expansion made Europe the centre of a world. This revolutionary transformation like any great revolutionary transformation did not occur without a great deal of organised violence, initially directed against those who were being subjected to European rule and then against competing European powers. Spain and Portugal may have been able to come to a gentleman s agreement over the distribution of colonial possessions in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), but no such agreement seemed possible elsewhere. Indeed, from the sixteenth century onwards, the Europeans fought a series of bitter and prolonged wars to see who would, in the end, get the lion s share of these spoils. Great Britain and Spain, for instance, were bitter enemies throughout the sixteenth century. Their long war, which concluded rather dramatically with the destruction of the Spanish Armada in 1588, was followed by struggle between the Dutch and the English. This only ended when the Dutch Stadtholder at that time the Netherlands head of state ascended to the British throne in 1688 as King William III. The Anglo Dutch commercial conflict was overtaken in the eighteenth century by a long struggle between Great Britain and France. This struggle continued on and off for just under a century, was fought across three continents, and only came to a close after their extended struggle for European (and thus world) domination ended with the defeat of Napoleonic France at the hands of a grand coalition comprising Russia, Prussia, Austria Hungary and Great Britain in 1814. Activity It has been argued that European imperialism led to two distinct international societies: one within Europe and the other covering the rest of the world. Complete the table below thinking about how international institutions differed when applied inside and outside of Europe during the era of European imperialism. Social function Communication Institutions among European states Diplomacy Institutions between European and non-european actors Enforcement Treaty making, war Property Mutual non-intervention, sovereignty 34 From the Long Peace to the Great War This extended period of competition to determine the dominant actor in world politics, stretching from around 1500 to 1814, continues to exercise a great deal of fascination for IR scholars. We might argue that some of the discipline s key concepts such as the balance of power not to mention

Chapter 2: Europe and the emergence of international society its preoccupation with war and its interest in diplomacy derive from this extraordinarily turbulent period. Following 1814, however, something equally extraordinary occurred: a form of great power peace broke out and lasted with only a few interruptions until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Different explanations have been advanced to explain this period, often referred to as the Long Peace. These have ranged from the diplomatic efforts put in by the major powers at the peace conference at the Congress of Vienna; through war weariness (a believable hypothesis given that at least five million died across Europe between 1789 and 1814); to the notion that, whatever else might have divided them, the major powers after 1814 shared some common values and interests that drove them to resolve most of their differences through diplomacy rather than costly wars. Others have tried to apply the very modern idea of hegemonic stability to explain the nineteenth-century s Long Peace. In this analysis, the key factor is not so much the existence of a balance of power between European states though that was highly significant in Europe itself but the structural imbalance that grew up between Great Britain and the rest of the European powers. Unlike France, or so the hegemonic stability argument goes, Britain never sought to control mainland Europe, focusing instead on increasing its influence in the non-european world. It did so by doing what Britain seemed to do best: pushing ahead industrially; exporting increasing sums of capital to all corners of the globe; underwriting world trade through its overwhelming naval superiority; and teaching others the benefits of commerce and industry over more dangerous and less profitable pursuits such as war and conquest. Learning question In one or two sentences, do you think that the presence of a hegemonic state makes international society more or less prone to war? What examples would you use to justify your argument? How long the nineteenth-century s Long Peace (or what hegemonic stability theorists prefer to call the Pax Britannica) could have lasted remains a hyperthetical question, and has led to more than a few books and articles being written by international historians and IR scholars alike about its collapse with the First World War (often called the Great War) in 1914. Several different schools of thought exist. One sees the Great War as an inevitable consequence of change in the European balance of power following the unification of Germany in 1871 and its rapid emergence as a serious economic and military challenger to the status quo. It remains a commonly held view especially influential in IR that the rise of new powers will lead to increasing tensions between great powers, which over time are more likely lead to war than anything else. Others have broadened this thesis by arguing that Germany s less-than-peaceful rise on the back of Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck s three wars of German unification (in 1864, 1866 and 1870) made armed conflict between Europe s states more likely. Others argue that the breakdown of the Long Peace could only occur within a larger set of changes that were taking place in the international system. According to this thesis, we should focus less on power shifts 35

11 Introduction to international relations brought about by the rise of a single state, and more on the by-products of the global struggle for influence between the various great powers. In other words, the key to understanding the collapse of the old order may be found in the processes of capitalism and imperialism. This remains the view of most Marxists, espoused in a pamphlet Imperialism (1916) by the great revolutionary V.I. Lenin. In it, he argues that peace had become quite impossible by the beginning of the twentieth century because of capitalists determination to carve up the world in a zero sum game, in which one actor s gain means another actor s loss. In some ways, this is also the view of orthodox Realists, who see politics as an arena in which winner-takes-all. Though they reject Lenin s economic explanation of the First World War, they agree that the odds of the Long Peace surviving under conditions of increased competition were slim. The end of the Long Peace was therefore no accident. Rather, for Marxists and Realists alike, it was the tragic result of conflicts inherent in an international system which could not be contained by deft diplomacy, carefully worded treaties, or states adherence to a shared set of practices and norms. Finally, there are many in IR who insist that the Long Peace was only possible so long as weapons technology remained relatively primitive. The coming of the industrial revolution, and with it new naval technologies, improvement in munitions and a rapid acceleration in the destructive capacity of arms, changed the way states fought, making new forms of war possible and, by definition, more destructive. This thesis claims that technology made war far more likely as one state after another began to invest heavily into these new weapons of death. This arms race may not, in and of itself, explain what finally happened in 1914. Nevertheless, the rapid build-up of modern military technology, in a world where war was still regarded as noble and heroic, made armed conflict more likely, increasing the insecurity of states great and small. Activity One of the goals of this chapter is to show how IR theory can be used to make sense of the past. Using what you have learned about Realism, Liberalism, International Political Economy, and the English School, how do you think each school of thought would account for the beginning of the First World War? Provide a brief (one- or twosentence) thesis statement for each of the following approaches. IR theory Explanation of the First World War Realism Liberalism International Political Economy English School Stop and listen to the podcast IRs many explanations for the Great War on the VLE 36

Chapter 2: Europe and the emergence of international society The First World War These explanations of the roots of the First World War all point to one self-evident truth: that when nations set out to kill each other in very large numbers, analysts are unlikely to agree about the causes behind the conflict. Some have even wondered whether the First World War need ever have happened at all. This approach going under broad heading of counter-factualism makes one major theoretical claim: that just because things happen in international affairs, it does not mean that they were inevitable. Even as we look for the causes of certain events, we need to remain sensitive to the fact that we are doing so after the events in question. Inevitability only exists in retrospect, and any claim that any event had to occur as it did should be viewed with a highly sceptical eye. This issue has been raised in relationship to the First World War by Niall Ferguson who has been especially controversial in terms of rethinking 1914. 2 Avoiding the structural explanations described above and highly critical of those who argue that the war had to happen because of historical inevitability, he suggests that the whole thing was an avoidable tragedy, brought about not by German plans for European hegemony, the nature of the alliance system, or larger imperial ambitions the normal fare of IR analysis but by British miscalculations about the meaning of German actions in late 1914. Whether Ferguson is right or is merely being mischievous is an issue that cannot be settled here. However, he does raise a crucial question that we will explore further in the chapter on war: namely, how IR should set about explaining the outbreak of wars and what methods we should employ to best understand why wars happen. Of one thing we can be certain, however, and here we can agree with Ferguson: the First World War marks the end of one epoch in world politics and the beginning of another. As we saw in the first chapter of this subject guide, the First World War was only the first of three great wars that came to define the twentieth century. In many ways, however, it was the most significant, not because it was the bloodiest (the Second World War lays claim to that dubious distinction) or the longest (the Cold War was 10 times as long), but because of the dramatic changes that it left in its wake. The list is long: the outbreak of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the creation of the USSR; the emergence of the USA onto the world stage; the shift of financial and economic power from London to New York; the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires; the first major stirrings of nationalism in what later came to be known as the Third World; a bitter sense of betrayal in Germany that helped bring Hitler to power 15 years later; new opportunities for Japan to expand its holdings in Asia; and a disastrous economic legacy that made it nigh on impossible to restore the health to the world economy. Furthermore, though some may not have realised it at the time, the devastation wrought by the Great War unleashed a series of changes that finally brought the age of European global dominance to an end. All of these were outcomes of a war whose fingerprints can be found all over the century that followed. The First World War, more than any other event, was the mid-wife of the modern world. 2 Ferguson, N. The pity of war: explaining World War One. (London: Penguin, 1998) fi rst edition [ISBN 9780713992465]. 37

11 Introduction to international relations A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain some of the reasons why Europe emerged as the main driver of world politics by the end of the nineteenth century discuss competing explanations of the Long Peace in Europe between 1814 and 1914 evaluate different explanations of the causes of the First World War assess the impact of the First World War on IR in the twentieth century define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary arms race balance of power capitalism empire feudalism hegemony hegemonic stability institutions international history international society Long Peace nation state states-system zero sum game Sample examination questions 1. How can international society be both ordered and anarchic? 2. What historical processes were responsible for the evolution of the state as the primary actor in IR? 3. Which best describes the current international situation: a balance of power, or hegemonic stability? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 38

Chapter 3: The end of the Cold War Chapter 3: The end of the Cold War Whatever else might be said about the cold war, the one thing it cannot be accused of is having failed to engage the interest of the western intellectual community It was nearly the most important relationship we all had at the time. Cox, M. The end of the Cold War and why we failed to predict it in Hunter, A. Rethinking the Cold War. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: explain why different experts failed to predict the end of the Cold War outline some alternative theories dealing with the end of the Cold War discuss its consequences. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain what is involved for IR in the debate about the end of the Cold War explain how competing theories of IR explain the end of the Cold War differently explain how and why the end of the Cold War helped reshape the international system define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Cox, M. From the Cold War to the world economic crisis. Further reading Bennett, A. The guns that didn t smoke: ideas and the Soviet non-use of force in 1989, Journal of Cold War Studies 7(2) 2005, pp.81 109. Collins, R. Explaining the anti-soviet revolution by state breakdown theory and geopolitical theory, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.575 90. Cox, M. Another transatlantic split? American and European narratives and the end of the Cold War, Cold War History 7(1) 2007, pp.121 46. Cox, M. The uses and abuses of history: the end of the Cold War and Soviet collapse, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.627 46. Cox, M. Why did we get the end of the Cold War wrong?, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11(2) 2009, pp.161 76. Deudney. D. and G.J. Ikenberry The international sources of Soviet change, International Security 13(3) 1991/2, pp.74 118. English, R.D. Merely an above-average product of the Soviet Nomenklatura? Assessing leadership in the Cold War s end, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.607 26. 39

11 Introduction to international relations Risse, T. Ideas, discourse power and the end of the Cold War: 20 years on, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.591 606. Snyder, J. The domestic political logic of Gorbachev s new thinking in foreign policy, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.562 74. Wohlforth, W. No one loves a Realist explanation, International Politics 48(4/5) 2011, pp.441 59. Introduction As our discussion of the causes of the First World War makes evident, the theories that we use to organise our knowledge about the world play a determining role in how we perceive and understand history. Thus, while a structural Realist might point to Germany s rising power as a destabilising factor in the anarchic international system of the early twentieth century, a liberal might look to the absence of formal international organisations capable of managing interdependence between states to avoid armed conflict. Marxists focus on the role of the class system and control of the means of production as defining characteristics, while the English School (ES) points out that war was still a completely acceptable means of conflict resolution in early twentieth-century Europe, making it a key institution in European international society in the years before the First World War. Theory frames the way that we see the world around us, highlighting and masking different aspects to produce contrasting sets of explanations. This use of theory separates IR from associated subjects like international history (IH). While IH generally tries to accumulate empirically-verified facts about the past, IR is more interested in weaving those facts together to produce analyses and explanations of past and present. Given the vast some might say infinite complexity of human history, this weaving requires that we select some facts to include and some to exclude, trimming our empirical evidence to manageable proportions. This is the function of theory: to simplify the world around us to such an extent that we can make general comments about IR based on a limited number of cases. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the ways in which IR understands one of the most crucial moments of the late twentieth century: the end of the Cold War. Just as Europe s imperial expansion from the fifteenth century laid the groundwork for the emergence of contemporary international society, the end of the Cold War played a vital role in shaping its practices and principles in the twenty-first century. The end of the Cold War was a tipping-point, transforming both the international system and IR as an academic subject. The way we think about the two decades that have elapsed since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 owes much to what happened before and during those key events. Indeed, many in IR continue to think about the post- Cold War world in terms of the bipolar global conflict that preceded it, using a variety of theoretical models to understand different aspects of this important period in international history. This chapter will look at a number of issues related to the end of the Cold War. First, we will consider the difficult problem of prediction, ably illustrated by the fact that not a single expert in IR anticipated the events of 1989 and 1991. We will then ask who, if anyone, actually won the Cold War; and why IR has produced so many different explanations of its end. Finally, we will examine the consequences of the end of the Cold War for the international system and IR. 40

Chapter 3: The end of the Cold War The failure of prediction The social sciences have long grappled with the problem of prediction. Some see prediction as central to the success of the social sciences, an indispensible tool if we want to control what happens in the world around us. In this sense, prediction is an unavoidable part of IR. Others argue that the complexity of human civilisation and our limited ability to accumulate and process knowledge make accurate prediction impossible. Though it provides interesting food for thought, we do not need to get too involved in this debate to see the difficulties of prediction. The most immediate evidence is the failure of anyone in IR to see the end of the Cold War coming. Instead, the vast majority of IR scholars and writers were in thrall to theories that failed to account for the possibility that the international order could or would change so completely. One reason was the tendency of scholars in IR to reify international actors and structures treating dynamic, contested, and evolving systems as if they were static, unified and fully developed. The problem of reification continues to plague many subfields in IR. This is particularly true with reference to states, which are often treated as stable, cohesive and fully developed actors on the world stage, akin to an individual human being in its ability to speak with a single voice on any given issue. This assumption simplifies the state and allows us to make generalisations about state behaviour, a key goal of IR. At the same time, it underestimates the likelihood of change, leaving analysts surprised and shocked when states are transformed by events going on inside and outside their borders. In the late 1980s, reification led many academics and policy-makers to believe that Mikhail Gorbachev s reforms of the Soviet Union would have little influence on either the USSR or the international system. His reforms, it was assumed, would not lead to a Soviet withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, much less to the collapse of the Soviet system. For a student just starting out in IR, it should be comforting to know that even the experts are sometimes embarrassingly wrong. There are many more specific explanations of why the experts failed to see that the end was nigh in 1989. One of these argues that because many in the discipline saw orderly virtue in the bipolar structure of the Cold War international system, they were deeply reluctant to contemplate its collapse. This was particularly true of structural Realism discussed in Chapters 1 and 5 of this guide which assumed that the structural stability of the international system would block any large-scale systemic change. This analysis, located at the systems level of analysis, focused on the constraints imposed on actors autonomy by the international system itself. By assuming the stability of these constraints, IR blinded itself to the possibility of their passing between 1989 and 1991. Another explanation of IR s failure to predict the Cold War s end emphasises the way in which the West understood or misunderstood the USSR as a system of power. This explanation, carried out at a unit level of analysis that focuses on the actors that make up international systems, overestimated the power and threat of the Soviet Union while at the same time ignoring its many weaknesses. Until very late in the day, the working assumption of most policy-makers (and academics) was that while the Soviet state contained many flaws, these would not threaten its stability. They assumed that its planned economy would continue to muddle along and that the Kremlin would never surrender control of its satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe. Why should it? By maintaining a cordon sanitaire between its Western borders and those of 41

11 Introduction to international relations the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Soviets kept Germany divided, NATO on the defensive and the USSR safe from a surprise attack by the Western powers. Analysts reification of the USSR therefore masked its internal weaknesses and contradictions, leaving IR unable to grapple with the possibility of its collapse in 1991. At the heart of the debate is the complex figure of the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. A strong case has been made that it was nearly impossible to predict the end of the Cold War because it was nearly impossible to predict that a figure like Gorbachev could emerge. Experts carrying out research at this individual level of analysis did not anticipate how far he would go along the path of political reform. Moreover, Gorbachev may not have been master of his own domain. There is a great deal of evidence to indicate that he was less in control of events than his apologists would claim; and that what happened in 1989 was largely an unintended consequence of his policies. Given all of this, how then could anybody have predicted the end of the Cold War? Even those with the greatest access to information the American intelligence community missed the boat. They argued that the USA should take advantage of Gorbachev s reforms to extract as many concessions as possible from the Russians, but they could not assume that the USSR would continue along its reformist path. Indeed, there was every chance that Gorbachev would be overthrown by hard line critics within the Soviet state, who would then turn the political clock back to more adversarial days of the Cold War. Activity Using the table below, list a few possible explanations for the 2008 global financial meltdown at the systems, unit, and individual levels of analysis. More specifically, who would analysts blame for the crisis at each level? Once you have filled in the table, identify the level that you think best explains international events. Keep track of this as you think about other events in this course, from the end of the Cold War to 9/11 to the Arab Spring. Level of analysis Systems Cause of financial crisis Who is to blame? Unit Individual Who won the Cold War? If IRs failure to predict the end of the Cold War has been controversial, so too has its inability to generate a single, generally-accepted explanation of the event since 1991. In the USA, there has been a concerted effort within the conservative wing of the Republican Party to claim credit for the end of the Cold War, with special accolades falling to President Ronald Reagan. Reagan, they claim, won the Cold War by being bold, tough and decisive in effect competing aggressively with the Soviet Union by increasing US military spending and confronting the USSR in the Third World. Eschewing the weak policies hitherto pursued by his predecessors including one or two other Republicans Reagan is 42

Chapter 3: The end of the Cold War thought to have showed the way: forcing the USSR to the negotiating table in the second half of the 1980s and compelling the Soviets to retreat around the world thereafter. Reagan s advocates argue that it was not just the economic strength of the West or the appeal of democracy that defeated communism, it was US leadership and the tough, no-nonsense policies pursued by its strong conservative leader, who refused to appease America s enemies. It is a theoretical position heavily influenced by Realism and its emphasis of the distribution and use of power within the international system. The view that Reagan won the Cold War by pursuing a strategy of peace through strength has not gone unchallenged. Critics note that during his second term, Reagan achieved more as a result of engagement with Gorbachev than through his earlier policy of confrontation. Nor was it the USA alone that helped bring the unrest to an end. Its European allies played a vital role in bringing the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion, from the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher who initially suggested in 1984 that Gorbachev was someone with whom we could do business to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who energised German foreign policy in October and November 1989 by pushing for German unification. The Reagan won it school of thought is also attacked on the more general grounds of focusing too much on one individual and ignoring the larger structural forces at play in the international system. Many members of the ES agree with this attack, preferring systems-level explanations that focus on the sustainability of Western institutions including as capitalism and representative democracy over their Soviet rivals which included centrally-planned economics and popular democracy in the Soviet style. Learning question In the previous paragraph, we looked at an explanation for the end of the Cold War that emphasises the importance of Western engagement with the Soviet Union over the role of military and political confrontation. In a short paragraph, explain which of the theories mentioned in Chapter 1 best captures this argument. Be sure to include a thesis statement at the beginning of your paragraph that sums up your argument. You can post this paragraph to the course section of the VLE for feedback from your peers and the academic moderator. IR theory debates the end of the Cold War Within academia, the debate about the end of the Cold War has today assumed a somewhat different character. Reagan and US policy are still given their place in the hierarchy of causes, but the focus has moved from the role of individuals to what might be termed objective factors operating at higher levels of analysis. There are a wide variety of narratives from which to choose. These range from internalist explanations that stress the extent of Soviet economic decline by the 1980s and fall squarely into unit-level analyses; to systems-level explanations that focus on the ability of Western capitalism to globally outcompete its centrallyplanned economic rival. Many contemporary Realists have become attracted to this type of explanation. According to the most interesting of these William Wohlforth, Dartmouth College the events of the 1980s can readily be explained in basic material terms. The Cold War was caused, he argues, by the rise of the Soviet Union and the extension of its power after the Second World War. Logically, it came to an end when the economic bases of that power began to decline in the 1980s. 43

11 Introduction to international relations Though it has its fair share of academic supporters, this interpretation also has its critics. It may be true, its critics accept, that the Soviet economy was in deep trouble and the USSR overstretched. But, as they point out, the economy was hardly collapsing when Gorbachev took over in 1985. Moreover, though Soviet foreign policy came with a very high price tag, it was not so high as to force the collapse of the entire Soviet system. Instead, these alternative analyses insist that the active role played by ideas led to an important shift in Soviet thinking over the course of the 1980s. Gorbachev s new thinking was meant to take the USSR beyond its traditional theories of a global class struggle between two international camps. Some of Gorbachev s new ideas came from within the USSR itself, especially from its various think tanks. Several others came from within the larger leftist and socialist movement around the world. Even Western peace movements, which had grown up in the 1970s and early 1980s, played a role in helping Gorbachev rethink Russian security within a larger, pan-european context. His idea of a new European home, in which all states could achieve security without military blocs, arose within the context of ongoing debates that he and his advisers were having with Western thinkers and writers. True, these debates were only one factor that helped Gorbachev develop his world view before and after taking power in 1985. Yet the evidence seems clear. Ideas, domestic and international, mattered a great deal in the USSR and helped persuade the Soviet leadership to break out of its old security dilemma in order to find another way of doing business with the rest of the world. Stop and reread the subsection Social constructivism on pp.5 6 of the Introduction The role of ideas in bringing the Cold War to an end has been championed by a group of thinkers whom we first read about in Chapter 1 and will discuss in more detail in Chapter 6: the Constructivists. As an influential school of thought in IR, Constructivism has its roots in the events that took place between 1989 and 1991. Constructivists accuse Realists of having neither a theory of historical change nor any understanding of the active role played by ideas in bringing about the end of the Cold War in other words of material determinism. Each is certainly a powerful way of attacking Realism, echoing the concerns of other critical theories within IR. Constructivists in particular argue that because of Realists theoretical attachment to Cold War bipolarity, they were ill-equipped to explain, let alone predict, its unravelling. Consequently, Constructivists argue that Realists became mere onlookers with nothing of importance to say about the end of the Cold War. Such attacks on Realism have continued from a variety of quarters ever since, with one after another being published in a series of influential articles and books which appeared from the early 1990s. These have gradually worn away the once impregnable Realist edifice. In fact, so successful have these attacks been that even though Realism has retained many important followers, Constructivism and other alternative conceptions of the international have now established themselves as intellectually powerful currents within the discipline. By the end of the 1990s, it would be fair to say that Constructivism, alongside Liberalism and Realism, become one of the subject s more influential theoretical approaches. 44

Chapter 3: The end of the Cold War Activity Different theories are intended to answer different sorts of questions. Use the table below to think about the sorts of questions that Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and the English School are best suited to answer in relation to the end of the Cold War. Theoretical approach Realism Question Example: What role did the distribution of power within the international system play in the collapse of Cold War bipolarity? Liberalism Constructivism English School The international system after the end of the Cold War As we have suggested throughout this course, the period from 1989 to 1991 was one of incredible importance to IR. Like the three great crises of the twentieth century that gave birth to IR (see Chapter 1), the end of the Cold War was a transformational moment that changed international society including the world economy forever. Naturally, critics of this view argue that change is ever-present in world politics and that other events have been just as important in shaping international affairs. There is something to this argument. However, it is difficult to think of another event between 1947 and 1991 that has had the same impact on the world as the end of the Cold War. Certainly, none altered the balance of power and the structure of the international capitalist system in anything like the same way. The question is not whether the end of the Cold War was a critical juncture in the longer history of the twentieth century. It obviously was. Rather, we need to consider the impact it actually had. The best way to do this is to focus on what actually happened to specific countries and regions. Communism after Communism The immediate consequences of the end of the Cold War were felt first in communist states and varied widely from place to place. Some communist governments simply collapsed, most obviously those which had been taken over by the USSR in the wake of the Second World War. These states, such as Poland and Hungary, reoriented their foreign policies westwards, in effect becoming part of the West through membership of NATO and the European Union (EU). Others followed a different trajectory. Yugoslavia descended into a bloody civil war. Fortunately, the breakup of the Soviet Union was comparatively peaceful, though conflicts did break out on its periphery, most notably in the Caucasus and parts of Central Asia. The experiences of the former Soviet republics have been mixed. The three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania managed to anchor themselves within the Western, democratic camp. Other states such as Belarus, Uzbekistan and Russia itself followed alternative paths. 45

11 Introduction to international relations The Russian Federation, which succeeded to the bulk of Soviet territory and population, is an especially interesting and important case. For a short while, it looked as if Russia was moving into the Western camp. With the election of President Vladimir Putin, however, it became clear that the transition in Russia was not moving in the direction originally mapped out for it by the West and its Russian allies. This will probably not lead to a new Cold War as some have speculated. However, it has left Russia s relationship with the West in a delicate state, subject to regular misunderstandings and always liable to veer out of control. Other communist states followed an even less predictable trajectory. Far from the end of the Cold War in Europe leading to the wholesale collapse of communist power around the world, some communist states stabilised and even widened their control over people and territory. This is most obviously true in China, where the communist party reasserted its control following the bloody suppression of protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989. But it was also true in other states such as Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea where the grip of ruling parties has proved tenacious. This has had disturbing consequences in North Korea. Whereas China and Vietnam and more recently Cuba have progressively deepened their integration into global market by liberalising their economies, North Korea has sought security by developing its own nuclear arsenal as deterrence against international intervention. Thus, the end of the Cold War made North Korea more of a danger to the stability of the international system even while it opened space for the integration of other communist states into mainstream international society. Whatever happened to the Third World? We can trace an equally complex set of results in what became known during the Cold War as the Third World. In these largely postcolonial states, the anti-imperialist promise of national liberation and justice gave way after 1989 to something quite different. In some cases, socialist experiments simply abandoned talk of planning and equality in favour of far-reaching market reforms. In India, this produced impressive socioeconomic results. In other countries, the end of the Cold War led to socioeconomic disaster, with regimes once justified in the name of Marxism giving way to tribalism and banditry. This process has been especially brutal in sub-saharan Africa, particularly around the Horn of Africa Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, southern Sudan and northern Kenya. Here, longstanding rivalries that had once been masked by Cold War alliances percolated to the surface of international affairs. In some cases, this ended in victory for one of the dominant factions fighting for control of all, or part of, the state. For example, in Angola and Mozambique, former Marxist rebels defeated their opponents and became the new ruling class. In places like Somalia, the state simply imploded with terrible consequences for local populations and the international community alike, and each must now face down immense challenges posed by rampant poverty, piracy, terrorism and persistent food shortages in a country without a state. Political change after 1991 was accompanied by far-reaching economic reform of the Third World. In the next chapter we will look in more detail at globalisation: a process whose acceleration has arguably been one of the more important outcomes of the end of the Cold War. While the end of the Cold War may not have been the primary cause of the new global economy that emerged in the 1990s, it made the case for market-oriented reforms almost irresistible. After all, how could one argue for a non-capitalist, 46

Chapter 3: The end of the Cold War planned road to economic development in less developed countries when that very model had just collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Prior to 1991, it could be claimed that, whatever its many faults and weaknesses, central planning was a viable approach to development located outside of the world market. After 1991, it was no longer possible to make this case with any degree of seriousness. The alternative had been tried and it had failed, leaving former communist states to implement fundamental liberal economic reform at home including the privatisation of state assets and allowing firms to go bust while at the same time opening up their once closed economies to the wider world market. The economic costs were high. The social consequences were certainly problematic. But, at the end of the day, there seemed to be no other way. Europe Although the end of the Cold War produced deeply ambiguous results in the Third World, its effects were far more positive in Europe. There is now widespread agreement that, however difficult the transition from the Cold War turned out be, the results have generally been economically and politically beneficial for the continent. Germany did not start acting like the Germany of old, as some pessimistic Realists thought it must do in order to steady the balance of power against America s newfound status at the top of the international system. Outside the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, Europe did not descend into the nationalist conflicts that defined the first half of its twentieth century. Instead, in spite of a rocky economic and political start, most of Central and Eastern Europe made a reasonable transition towards the liberal marketplace and the relative security of the EU. Later in this course, we will discuss ways in which to think about Europe as a special kind of power in the international system. For now, we will look at another, equally interesting, problem: how and why did Europe manage the transition out of communism with such success? At least three answers have been suggested. The first involves identity. For decades after the Second World War, the peoples of Eastern Europe were compelled to live under what many of them regarded as foreign rule. This alienated them from the USSR and reinforced their admiration for the West. When the Cold War finally ended, these former Soviet satellite states could return home to Europe and the West from which they had been separated since at least 1945. This sense of a common European identity was reinforced by the fact that only a few of the USSR s former satellites had been fully and completely locked away behind the iron curtain. East Germans, for example, clearly knew what life was like in West Germany. More generally, Eastern Europeans were aware of (and attracted to) what they imagined life to be like in Western Europe. Sometimes their fascination with all things Western bordered on the naïve. Still, it meant that when they finally had the chance to join the object of their fascination, they did so enthusiastically. Europe s transition was made easier by the success of the European project, particularly its organisational embodiment: the European Union. Formed after the war as a means of reconciling the aspirations of previously warring states Germany and France in particular Europe s common market gradually evolved from a narrowly defined economic body towards something like a genuine political community. As it grew numerically, it also expanded its functions. By the time the European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) in 1992, it had the support of the overwhelming majority of Europeans, who associated 47

11 Introduction to international relations their prosperity and democratic rights with the existence of an integrated Europe. Gorbachev himself was much impressed with what had been achieved in Western Europe since the late 1940s, and was a great admirer of the EC particularly the central part it played in integrating the once fragmented continent. The role the EC/EU played in persuading the USSR to give up its hold over Eastern Europe is an important, though understudied, part of the story of 1989. Regardless, the EC/EU played an enormous role in holding the European states together at a time of great turmoil, and facilitating the economic and political transition of the post- Communist East. There is no way of knowing what might have happened without the EC/EU, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that without it, the end of the Cold War would have created many more problems for Europe and the wider world. Finally, Europe was especially fortunate in that it is home to the world s most successful collective security alliance: NATO. Formed in 1949 with what its first Secretary-General termed the triple purpose of keeping the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down, NATO was critical in holding the West together through the Cold War and in helping Europe negotiate its way through the security problems that followed 1991. In all of this, the USA was a crucial player. It is easy enough to be critical of America s foreign policies during and after the Cold War. However, during the critical years of transition it successfully reassured allies and former enemies alike. Hegemons are not always popular, and in Europe especially in France many dreamed that the continent would soon be able to look after its own security needs without American assistance. However, as the Cold War gave way to the 1990s, one thing became abundantly clear: the USA remained an indispensable part of Europe s security architecture. A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain what is involved for IR in the debate about the end of the Cold War explain how competing theories of IR explain the end of the Cold War differently explain how and why the end of the Cold War helped reshape the international system define vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary Constructivism deterrence European Union individual level of analysis iron curtain material determinism reification systems level of analysis Third World unit level of analysis 48

Chapter 3: The end of the Cold War Sample examination questions 1. Why has the end of the Cold War been the subject of so much debate in IR? 2. What role did individuals play in ending the Cold War? 3. Would you place more emphasis on ideas or economics in explaining why the Cold War came to an end? 4. Why have post-communist states been impacted differently by the end of the Cold War? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 49

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 50

Chapter 4: Globalisation: the past and present of international society Chapter 4: Globalisation: the past and present of international society Aim of the chapter The aim of this chapter is to: place current debates surrounding globalisation in their historical and political context. This will involve understanding the stages of evolution of globalisation and, in particular, the progress of the concept since the end of the Cold War. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: assess key empirical and theoretical claims made for globalisation distinguish between notions of globalisation as a descriptive tool and those that see it as a normative policy doctrine identify the positions of IR s main theoretical school on globalisation define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Baylis, J., S. Smith and P. Owens Introduction. McGrew, A. Globalisation and global politics. Further reading Armstrong, D. Globalization and the social state, Review of International Studies 24(4) 1998, pp.461 78. Cha, V.D. Globalization and the study of international security, Journal of Peace Research 37(3), 2000, pp.391 403. Doyle, M. A more perfect union? The liberal peace and the challenge of globalization in Booth, K., T. Dunne, and M. Cox How might we live? Global ethics in the new century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780521005203]. Ferguson, N. Sinking globalization, Foreign Affairs 84(2) 2005, pp.64 77. Garrett, G. Global markets and national politics: collision course or virtuous circle?, International Organization 52(4) 1998, pp.787 824. Held, D. and A. McGrew Globalization and the end of the old order in Cox, M., T. Dunne and K. Booth Empires, systems and states: great transformations in international politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780521016865] Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 27(5) 2001. Jellisen, S.M. and F.M. Gottheil Marx and Engels: in praise of globalization, Contributions to Political Economy 28(1) 2009, pp.35 46. Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye Globalization, what s new? What s not? (And so what?), Foreign Policy 118 2000, pp.104 19. Mann, M. Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation state?, Review of International Political Economy 4(3) 1997, pp.472 96. Morton, A. New follies on the state of the globalization debate, Review of International Studies 30(1) 2004, pp.133 47. 51

11 Introduction to international relations Introduction Rosenberg, J. Globalization theory: a post-mortem, International Politics 42(1) 2005, pp.3 74. Scholte, J.A. Global capitalism and the state, International Affairs 73(3) 1997, pp.427 52. Strange, S. The westfailure system, Review of International Studies 25(3) 1999, pp.345 54. Weiss, L. Globalization and national governance: antinomies or interdependence in Cox, M., K. Booth and T. Dunne The interregnum: controversies in world politics 1989 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780521785099] Note: This is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 25(5) 1999. Weiss, L. Globalization and the myth of the powerless state, New Left Review 225 1997, pp.3 27. Using some of IR s theoretical tools, the preceding chapters have examined three important periods in international history: the crises of the twentieth century that led to the emergence and evolution of academic IR, the often violent global expansion of European states that spread the continent s principles and practices around the world, and the end of the Cold War. This chapter will try to make sense of this transition from a divided international system to one in which nearly all actors were increasingly compelled to play by a similar set of economic and political rules. Traditionally, IR has had very little to say about economics. The end of the Cold War changed this, as strategic issues came to be seen as less important than economic ones. In the 1990s, this translated into the view that the Cold War ended because the West s economic system had outperformed that of its opponents. Having apparently won the war, the West faced the task of absorbing centrally planned, largely closed economies back into the capitalist world system. The economic consequences of the end of the Cold War were immense. Though it would be wrong to suggest that the collapse of communism determined subsequent changes in the international economic system, it played a central role in its development. If nothing else, the failure of the Soviet economic order meant that it no longer made sense to talk about the world as if it was geographically split between what had once been the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. The distinction was unnecessary when nearly all domestic economies were beginning to operate according to the same liberal rules. Even states still under the control of officially communist parties as in China and Vietnam felt that they had no alternative other than to implement far-reaching economic reform at home while associating themselves more and more with the capitalist world system abroad. 52 The term used to describe this economic shift and the world system it created is globalisation. The first thing to note is that there are many different meanings attached to the word. Indeed, so much has been written about globalisation that it would be impossible to summarise the whole of the debate here. We can only examine some of its main issues. In this chapter, we will first look at where to place globalisation in the broader history of the world. We will then explain why globalisation became so central to the political, economic, and social zeitgeist of the 1990s. Sections 3 and 4 will look at the current state of the globalisation debate and examine the views of critics and supporters. Finally, we will try to assess the seriousness of twenty-first century challenges to globalisation, paying special attention to the economic crisis of 2008 and its likely consequences for IR.

Chapter 4: Globalisation: the past and present of international society Stop and read sections 1 to 3 of Chapter 1, pp.16 20 Note down the definitions provided for globalisation on pp.16 17 (Box 1.1), and 18 (bullet points). After finishing the assigned readings, compose a two- or threesentence definition for globalisation: As you work your way through this subject guide, you should regularly return to this definition, making adjustments as necessary. The history of globalisation As Marx observed, capitalism has long been influenced by international events. In this very important sense, given capitalism s importance to Europe s imperial expansion, globalisation is not a new phenomenon at all. This point is often made by one of the modern gurus of globalisation, Thomas Friedman, in his influential study The world is flat. In this book, Friedman identifies three stages in the history of globalisation. The first, which he calls Globalisation 1.0, extends from the early sixteenth to late eighteenth century and involves the increasing interconnectedness of states through policies of colonialism and mercantilism. In this period, economic self-interest led major powers to exploit resources beyond their borders in ways they had not done before. This involved exploration, transoceanic territorial annexation, trade agreements, warfare and the conquest and displacement of non-european populations. This first stage of globalisation, Friedman notes, shrank the world from a size large to a size medium, creating the foundations for a single, global economic unit where there had once been many separate and discreet regional systems. Friedman s second stage, Globalisation 2.0, runs from 1800 into the post-second World War era and was driven by the Industrial Revolution first in Britain and then throughout the European world. Steam power and the telegraph reduced the costs of transportation and communication. Global companies became major players in their own right, connecting materials, products, capital and labour across the world. Underwritten for much of the period by the British Empire, whose dominant position enabled it to unilaterally open markets and insist on highly advantageous trading terms with its colonies, this second stage of globalisation shrank the world to a size small. World exports and foreign investment soared, gold became the standard of currency exchange, and London became the world s financial centre, issuing financing and loans around the globe. By the First World War, this phase of globalisation had created such levels of interconnectedness, supported by mass migration from Europe to the Americas and Britain s self-governing dominions, that authors such as Norman Angell argued that war between states had been rendered obsolete by the depth of ties in modern economic civilisation. Such beliefs were dashed by the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Globalisation 2.0 turned out to be more fragile than Angell and his contemporaries had believed. This fragility was compounded by the war, which left in its wake a series of highly competitive states whose leaders had no real interest in cooperation. As one writer noted, after the war there was simply no basis for a stable, interactive global order. 1 The situation was made all the worse by three other factors: the failure of any of the major powers (Britain in particular) to impose some form of hegemonic order over the international economic system; the collapse of the world economy 1 Robertson, R. The three waves of globalisation: a history of a developing global consciousness. (London: Zed Books, 2003) [ISBN 9781856498616] p.156. 53

11 Introduction to international relations 54 following the Great Crash of 1929; and the slow descent, yet again, into war. By 1945, there was effectively no functioning international economy at all. 1945 proved to be a turning point when the USA took on Britain s role as the global economic hegemon. Yet, according to Friedman, it was not until the 1970s that globalisation entered into its next phase: Globalisation 3.0. This was, in part, stimulated by the communications revolution, in part, by a major shift in economic policy caused by the economic crises of the 1960s and 1970s and, in part, by the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies by Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in the UK. Deregulation and privatisation now became the order of the day. Capital markets were freed up. Governments, which since the end of the Second World War had been seen as necessary partners for the market, were viewed as part of the problem holding back economic development. Theoretically, markets were now in the strongest position to organise and manage the international economic system. These changes in the world economy prepared the ground for what happened in 1989. The collapse of the Soviet system gave Globalisation 3.0 added impetus as the centrally planned economies of the communist world were reintegrated into the capitalist world system. This is what Friedman means when he suggests that the world had become flat. According to his reading of history, the end of the Cold War brought the world to the highest stage of capitalism, an era in which the world shrank from a size small to a size tiny, with an accompanying flattening of what had been a very uneven playing field. Secured by American hegemony, underwritten by a vast expansion of financial services, and propelled by the communications revolution from the advent of the internet and cheap air travel to the container revolution in global shipping the world had at last become truly global. The Zeitgeist of the 1990s Following the end of the Cold War, academics, politicians and commentators sought to make sense of the New World Order first proclaimed by President George H.W. Bush at the UN in 1990. In this strange race to define the age, victory was claimed by an odd alliance between a third-generation Japanese American political philosopher and the small-town governor of an unfashionable southern American state. More than any other US president, Bill Clinton championed the idea of globalisation. He did so on the back of ideas espoused by Francis Fukuyama, whose writing gave coherent expression to Clinton s goals. The main thesis of Fukuyama s The end of history (1989) is clear. He argues that the world had been divided between two competing ways of thinking for 200 years: one that saw the future in terms of the collective and one that saw it in terms of the individual. This struggle had its ups and downs but, by the 1970s and 1980s, had begun to tilt decisively towards the liberal individualism championed by the West. The end of the Cold War confirmed rather than created this shift, which Fukuyama argued was not merely strategic or political, but profoundly ideological. In his view, the events of 1989 marked the end of not just the Cold War, but the end of the dialectic between the individual and the collective that he defined as history. In his opinion, the fall of the Berlin Wall meant that the two-century struggle between these competing ideologies had finally reached its conclusion. Liberalism, Fukuyama asserted, had triumphed, setting the world on a course from which there could be no escape.

Chapter 4: Globalisation: the past and present of international society Fukuyama s characterisation of a world inexorably moving in the direction of liberal democratic government and open markets found a political champion in Clinton. Unencumbered by Cold War foreign policy thinking that saw the world in terms of threats and more than happy to shift the national security debate onto the terrain where he felt most comfortable namely the economy Clinton seized the moment. Globalisation, he proclaimed, was the new world order. There was no escaping its logic. America, he continued, could not retreat into counterproductive and pointless isolationism. It had to compete economically and show the way to others. Ever the brilliant politician, Clinton managed to link America s continued international engagement with the forces of globalisation, promising the renewal of the American economy and of America s role as the leader of the free world. The result was an intellectual framework for the conduct of American foreign policy that sought to enlarge the community of free market democracies, while promoting progress towards the historical endpoint that Fukuyama claimed to be inevitable. Clinton s focus on market enlargement was more than just a slogan. Under his leadership, the USA sought to drive globalisation forward through a series of bold policy measures. These included a series of free trade agreements, most notably the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Meanwhile, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was replaced with the more extensive and all-inclusive World Trade Organization (WTO), whose goals included the integration of less economically developed countries (LEDCs) including China in 2001 into the international economic system. At the same time, the powers of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were enhanced, allowing it to play a key role in the integration of former communist and emerging economies. Globalisation and the international political order Though it is intimately linked to the production and distribution of goods around the world, globalisation is not a purely economic process. It describes the widening and deepening of many forms of international interaction, and is therefore also an important source of political order. Clinton went so far as to argue that globalisation was the only foundation upon which one could create functioning democracies, aligning America s goals of democracy promotion with its pursuit of economic openness. There was even an IR theory on hand to support this policy objective: Democratic Peace Theory. The condensed version of this particular theory is short and to the point: democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states. It was therefore in the national security interest of the USA to promote democracy while at the same time supporting the new global technologies that would speed up the pace of economic interactions, thereby extending the zone of democratic peace around the world. As this political connection suggests, globalisation is much more than just a description of the integrated world economy. In many respects, it has virtually become an ideology in its own right. Indeed, like all effective ideologies, it not only describes reality, but shapes reality in its own image. So obvious were the benefits of globalisation to its supporters that, by the mid-90s, those who questioned or doubted its desirability were seen as dinosaurs hanging on to antiquated ideas of autonomous national economies. If the world was becoming as flat as Friedman argued, then those who questioned the logic of globalisation were the IR equivalent of the Flat Earth Society, living in a dream world that had no connection to the unfolding realities around them. 55

11 Introduction to international relations Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 1, pp.23 29 Use the table below to think about globalisation s impact on three institutions of Westphalian international society. First, use the readings to describe the Westphalian institution listed in column one. Then, assess the impact of globalisation on the institution in question. Westphalian institution Sovereignty Description Impact of globalisation State-centric geopolitics State autonomy Thinking about globalisation As we have argued, the claims made for globalisation (at least by its more fervent advocates) are anything but modest. Strong advocates argue that the increasing extent, intensity, speed and depth of global interconnectedness constitutes nothing less than a fundamental shift in human social organisation. To them, the entire world is becoming a shared social space such as has never been before, breaking down national boundaries and linking hitherto distant communities. As we shall see later in this subject guide, these rather inflated claims have not gone unchallenged even by globalisation s supporters. As David Held points out, there has always been more than one theory of globalisation and more than one view of its significance. There are those who talk as if borders no longer exist and as if sovereignty has been done away with completely. There are others who insist, with equal conviction, that globalisation is impossible without the sovereign state to manage relationships and forcibly open the world. It was the British state that drove globalisation (in the guise of free trade) in the nineteenth century. Following the Second World War, the USA became essential to the recreation of an operational international trading system. Even in the most economically integrated of all organisations the EU sovereign states negotiate and manage the process of regional integration. Behind all of its talk of trade cooperation and shared monetary interests, the states of Europe continue to think and act differently with regard to their political, economic, social and military relationships. Even if we do not accept the claims of the hyper-globalizers, globalisation itself is serious business. According to one of its leading theorists Anthony Giddens globalisation is not just a description of the world economy, but is a means of understanding the runaway world in which most of us now live. Giddens comes as close as any writer to making some very strong claims in favour of globalisation. Its successes before 1989, he argues, initially helped undermine the credibility of communism. Thereafter, following well-established patterns, it transformed world politics both by making all threats global, and by accelerating interactions to such a degree that events in one part of the world would quickly impact on areas and countries in other parts of the globe. Giddens sees globalisation going on at several different levels of analysis. It cannot, in his view, be thought of as something that comes only from 56

Chapter 4: Globalisation: the past and present of international society the top implemented by, and for, states and multinational organisations. There is, he argued, a form of globalisation from below, involving millions of individual people as well as organised groups. He characterises this non-state group as an emerging global civil society, connected to one another in growing numbers via thickening networks of information. This change, he concludes, is leading to new global politics based on individualism and a new set of global universal values very similar to the argument championed by Fukuyama. Yet, the new technologies that have made all of this possible have also made the world more vulnerable, first to those who would use such technologies to undermine civil liberties, and second from the instabilities that such high speed technologies are able to generate in the global financial system. Finally, Giddens makes the important point that, for all its liberating potential, globalisation carried within it several problems. These range from the spread of privatised security companies who feed off the insecurities generated by globalisation, through to the ease with which highly mobile multinational corporations can quickly shift their base of operations to state jurisdictions with lower levels of labour or environmental regulation. Globalisation helps to spread the material benefits of the market to previously isolated parts of the world. It also helps to destroy communities who are unable to compete in a globalised world. Globalisation may not produce a world as flat as Thomas Freidman would like to suggest. Sceptics Though Giddens is obviously aware of some downsides to globalisation, he is nevertheless one of its strongest advocates. There are others of a much more sceptical persuasion. Globalisation sceptics focus their critiques around a number of core themes. The first is empirical, and casts doubt on the empirical claims made by advocates of globalisation. The world is not, sceptics argue, as integrated as many theories emphasising globalisation suggest. In many respects, the international economy is little more integrated now than it was in the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, the overwhelming bulk of this trade is concentrated in very few relatively wealthy countries and tends to be conducted either regionally or between established allies and trade blocs. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows also tend to be controlled by a few advanced economies and multinational corporations are still essentially tied to their home state, to which their profits flow. Thus, while financial markets have, to a large extent, become integrated and truly globalised, the bulk of world economic activity is carried out at the inter-state level between states that remain distinct, national economic units. In the political sector, states remain the sovereign arbiters of political activity. While there are certainly issues that are genuinely global such as climate change efforts to address them are mediated by states through treaties and the establishment of institutions and organisations that reflect the state-based international order. Even where civil society plays a role, it does so in relation to and in cooperation with state governments and international institutions, not by operating directly in a global social space where state power is absent. Many aspects of globalisation, sceptics conclude, are less global than they are national or regional, be they trade disputes, migration flows or security cooperation on counter-terrorism. In the social and cultural sectors too, the claims for globalisation might prove to be overstated. The vast majority of the world s population still spends its life in one country, even one village, town or region. People s 57

11 Introduction to international relations identity remains framed by geographically and culturally specific experiences. New forms of communication have allowed us to become more aware of, and concerned by, the rest of the world. However, that does not imply that all humans participate in it globally. On the contrary, many of our social, cultural and economic relationships remain resolutely local, and new forms of communication have only served to increase the depth of material and information flows along established social and cultural lines. Critics What, then, of globalisation critics? They come in all ideological shapes and sizes, though the most vocal tend to be those on the political left. These view globalisation as a new form of imperialism, made more palatable by means of a simple name change. Globalisation, these critics argue, masks the fact that contemporary IR is driven by neoliberal policies emanating from the capitalist world system, dominated by Western states and elites intent on maximising profits. Behind this process lies not the invisible hand of the marketplace, but the not-so-hidden hand of the USA. Critics are more or less united on this point. Globalisation, they insist, is tantamount to Americanisation and, however much apologists try to disguise the fact, there is no escaping the fact that globalisation is an expression of US power, which it is likely to reinforce over the long term. Critics also focus on the distributional consequences of globalisation, leading to an extended and heated debate between its supporters and opponents. The former insist that globalisation generates wealth, reduces poverty and gives everybody, regardless of where they live, a reasonable chance of achieving success. Critics look at the same set of statistics and arrive at a completely different conclusion. Globalisation, they argue, excludes millions from socioeconomic development, denudes the planet s ecology, undermines democracy and leads to the vast and growing gap between the planet s super-rich and the rest. It keeps the poor nations poor with one or two notable exceptions and keeps the rich nations rich. Globalisation is, in this argument, just another word for imperialism and exploitation. Stop and read section 5 of Introduction, pp.10 12 In a paragraph of no more than 500 words, identify yourself as a globalisation supporter, sceptic or critic. Your answer should include a one-sentence thesis statement that clearly states your position, followed by the main points on which you base your position. The arguments for and against globalisation on pp.10 12 will provide you with several starting points for your response. The double crisis of globalisation? Although there were many critiques of globalisation theory and some public resistance to its practices in the 1990s, these did not become internationally influential until the twenty-first century, when two events challenged it in a far more serious way. First, the al-qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 struck at the heart of the US hegemonic underpinning of Globalisation 3.0. Aimed as they were at the symbols of American economic, military and political power, the attacks revealed the extent of resistance to modernity in parts in the Islamic world. They also succeeded in temporarily shutting down the arteries and veins of global trade. Admittedly, the terrorists did not succeed in doing so for very long. 58

Chapter 4: Globalisation: the past and present of international society However, their actions were not without consequence. If nothing else, terrorism has made world travel and world trade more difficult. 9/11 has also added to the costs of globalisation. More importantly, the panic created by the attacks forced US policy-makers to loosen their already weak controls over the global money supply. In the short term, this fuelled an economic boom and helped steady markets nerves. As many have pointed out, policy-makers may have gone too far down this road, creating an expectation of permanent growth that, as we all found out in 2008 and again in 2011, proved illusory. This brings us to the global financial crisis that has unfolded since 2007: an event as unexpected and potentially disturbing to world order as the end of the Cold War. Its origins have been much discussed by economists and economic historians. The narrative, if not the deeper causes of the crisis are well known. A housing bubble in the USA, inflated by low interest rates, burst to reveal the exposure of US and European banking systems to vast quantities of sub-prime debt. The balance sheets of financial institutions were subject to massive write-downs, and the US government having allowed Lehmann Brothers to fail in September 2008 stepped in to bail out what they saw as a crumbling financial system. As banks sought to assess their losses, the supply of credit the lubricant of capitalist economies shrank severely. US real gross domestic product (GDP) shrank for four consecutive quarters to midway through 2009, wiping out all US growth since the end of 2005. Unemployment rose to its highest levels since the early 1980s, and the cost of preventing a more serious economic meltdown left the US facing a budget deficit in 2009 equivalent to 13.5% of GDP. Even as the US economy faltered, the crisis represented something far more fundamental than a banking event. The loss of confidence in the free-market system so lauded at the end of the Cold War placed the future of global capitalism under the microscope. To this degree, the financial crisis dealt a serious blow to American influence by undermining the ideological power of its economic model. The crisis also raised various spectres about the past and, in particular, about what it should be compared to most easily. Unhappily, the only previous moment in economic history that seemed to bear any comparison was the Great Depression of the 1930s. This was the deeply worrying conclusion drawn by most US policy-makers, like Ben Bernanke of the US Federal Reserve. A student of that particularly disturbing period of history, Bernanke was in no doubt that, if left unattended, the financial meltdown could easily precipitate a worldwide depression. While lessons drawn from history might have helped the US prevent another Great Crash, they could not prevent the crisis from impacting on the global economy. In less competitive parts of Europe, the impact of the global financial crisis has been dramatic. With unemployment on the rise and several countries like Ireland, Greece, Italy and Portugal looking for economic support from the EU to stave off default on their sovereign debts, the European project looks to be in a difficult state only 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism on the continent. So critical had the situation become by 2011, that even more sober analysts were beginning to wonder whether the EU probably the most successful organisation in post-war international politics could survive in its current form. 59

11 Introduction to international relations Globalisation 4.0? While the economic crisis has damaged the global economy, it certainly seems that globalisation has survived. However, there are strong indications that the balance of economic power in the world has not. This is a subject to which we will return in the concluding chapter of this guide, when we will critically examine the now fashionable argument that a great international tilt is underway, leading to the decline of the West (especially the USA) and the rise of Asia (especially the People s Republic of China). We do not now need to address this issue in any great detail. Suffice it to say that since the crisis of globalisation in 2008 and in large part because of it the USA and the West look less and less bound to lead and China and Asia appear far more self-confident. Whether this adds up to what in IR terms is called a power shift is uncertain. What cannot be doubted is the impact of this first major globalisation crisis on the way people around the world think about world politics while China appears to have emerged with enormous self-confidence from the crisis, the USA and its traditional Western allies have not. It might even be that we have now entered the fourth stage in the history of globalisation: Globalisation 4.0. Activity Stop and read section 3 of Introduction, pp.7 8 Use the table below to identify each of the following theoretical schools as globalisation critics, sceptics or supporters. In the third column, list any evidence that supports your position. Theory Critic/sceptic/ Justification supporter Realism Liberalism Marxism Constructivism Poststructuralism Postcolonialism 60 A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: assess key empirical and theoretical claims made for globalisation distinguish between notions of globalisation as a descriptive tool and those that see it as a normative policy doctrine identify the positions of IR s main theoretical school on globalisation define the vocabulary terms in bold.

Chapter 4: Globalisation: the past and present of international society Chapter vocabulary capitalist world system communications revolution Democratic Peace Theory free trade globalisation global civil society globalisation critics globalisation sceptics Globalisation 1.0 Globalisation 2.0 Globalisation 3.0 hyper-globalizers less economically developed countries (LEDCs) The end of history World Trade Organization (WTO) Sample examination questions 1. Is globalisation a new process or does it have deep roots in international history? 2. What challenges does globalisation pose for international society and the anarchic international system? 3. Does Democratic Peace Theory mean that IR is becoming more peaceful? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 61

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 62

Part 3: Theories of international relations Part 3: Theories of international relations 63

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 64

Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism Theories enlighten. A theory is a set of related propositions that help explain why events occur the way they do. A theory is an abstract, conjunctural or speculative representation of reality. Thus one does not ask of a theory whether it is true or false; rather one asks whether it is enlightening. To theorize is to speculate with an intention to explain or understand. Knutsen, T. A history of international relations theory. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) p.1. Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: explain why and how scholars make use of theory outline the core mainstream theoretical approaches to IR, namely Realism and Liberalism illustrate ways in which these approaches might be used to better understand certain events or global phenomena through the presentation of examples. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain what a theory is and why IR scholars use them explain the core ideas used in Realist and Liberal theories of IR make use of these theories in analysing real world examples define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Dunne, T and Schmidt, B. Realism. Dunne, T. Liberalism. Lamy, S. Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neoliberalism. Further reading Dodge, T. The ideological roots of failure: the application of kinetic neoliberalism to Iraq, International Affairs 86(6) 2010, pp.1269 86. Griffiths, M. Introduction: conquest, coexistence and IR theory in Griffiths, M. Rethinking international relations theory. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011) [ISBN 9780230217799]. Hill, C., 1939: the origins of liberal realism, Review of International Studies 15(4) 1989, pp.319 28. Ikenberry, G.J. The future of the liberal world order internationalism after America, Foreign Affairs 90(3) 2011, pp.56 68. 65

11 Introduction to international relations Lebow, R.N. The long peace, the end of the Cold War and the failure of realism, International Organization 48(2) 1994, pp.249 77. Moravcik, A. Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international politics, International Organization 51(4) 1997, pp.513 53. Scheurman, W.E. Why (almost) everything you learned about Realism is wrong in Scheurman, W.E. The Realist case for global reform. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) [ISBN 9780745650302]. Schweller, R. and W. Wohlforth Power test: updating Realism in response to the end of the Cold War, Security Studies 9(3) 2000, pp.60 108. Walt, S.M. International relations: one world, many theories, Foreign Policy 110 1998, pp.29 47. 66 Introduction So far in this course, we have skimmed over the surface of several IR theories. The time has come to delve into them more deeply, beginning with IR s dominant approaches: Realism and Liberalism. One of IR s distinguishing features as opposed to an empirically-rooted subject is its focus on generalisation and the search for broad patterns of behaviour in international affairs. History, on the other hand, tries to avoid speculation by weaving facts into a coherent narrative. This is not to say that historians are atheoretical meaning that they work entirely without theory. In the end, scholars in all disciplines employ some kind of theoretical framework to understand the world around them. The real world, when considered without a theoretical lens to prioritise evidence and highlight general patterns, is a baffling, even incomprehensible place. Theory allows us to discover causes, make useful generalisations from a limited number of cases, and look for broad patterns in world politics. Without theory to order our observations, the empirical world is reduced to a series of isolated events with neither pattern nor discernable links of cause and effect. It is certainly possible to analyse an event or action without being conscious of the theoretical assumptions upon which the analysis rests. Many go through their lives without taking the time to reflect on the assumptions that shape their world views. It is possible, but hardly desirable. Regardless of one s intentions, analyses depend on theories that assume answers to some big questions about how the world works. Are material necessities, like natural resources, more important than political ideologies in driving states actions? Do fears about physical security always override the desire for economic profit? Does the makeup of a country s government play a role in understanding its decisions, or do external pressures determine state policy? The purpose of theoretical thinking is to draw one s assumptions out into the open. The real choice for any student is not whether there will be any theory in their analyses. That is unavoidable. Rather, the choice is whether your theoretical assumptions will remain implicit and unanalysed, or whether you will choose to think about them explicitly, clearly and consistently. In this chapter, we look again at two of the dominant schools of theoretical thought in IR: Realism and Liberalism. In the first part we look at Realist theory in all of its complexity, followed by a few case studies that explore the ways in which Realism can be used to make sense of international affairs. We then do exactly the same for Liberalism, reviewing its fundamental assumptions before looking at some of the issues it is best equipped to address. Realism and Liberalism serve different purposes. The goal of this chapter is to think more systematically about the different ways these different theories can be deployed by students of IR.

Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism Realism: the basics Stop and read section 1 of Chapter 5, pp.86 89 What do Realists mean by anarchy? Why is it so central to how Realism understands the international system? Could the lessons of Realism hold true without an anarchic international system? In earlier chapters we have made several direct and indirect references to a particular school of thought that goes under the broad heading of Realism. As we have shown, Realism which has many variants is one of the oldest and most influential theories of IR; and is influential quite because it focuses on big issues such as power and its distribution, the notion of interests and why states claim to have them, the idea of anarchy (which in the field of IR points to a lack of an overarching global authority) and the inescapability of competition. Realist thought can also claim a pedigree that dates back centuries, encompassing the ancient Greek historian Thucydides and the seventeeth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. In the era of modern IR scholarship, however, it owes more to twentiethcentury authors such as Hans J. Morgenthau, E.H. Carr and George F. Kennan. This generation of classical Realists came to prominence in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s partly in response to the dangerous times in which they lived, and partly as a reaction to Liberal attempts to build a new world order around international organisations after the First World War. To Carr and Morgenthau, these attempts had deeply problematic consequences. In their view, the great crisis of the 1930s and 1940s was, in part, the result of earlier statesmen s naive belief that a harmony of interests between states could be achieved by gathering nations together in the spirit of cooperation and diplomacy. Such misguided idealism, Carr and Morgenthau claimed, had to be replaced by a more Realistic appreciation of the world as it was, rather than how some hoped it might become. According to classical Realists, states naturally tend to serve their own interests and aggrandise themselves at the expense of others. Fundamentally, the top priority of every state is its own survival. This is best guaranteed by ensuring that its strength is sufficient to ward off either alone or in alliance with other states those who might seek to dominate it. Sensible statesmen, according to Realists, avoid putting their trust in paper agreements or goodwill to guarantee peace. The language of international politics is the language of power: how great are your military capabilities and how strong is the resource base that sustains them? Peace, which Realists define narrowly as the absence of war, can be expected only when there is a balance of power, where adequate power exists to resist the efforts of any one state to gain hegemony over all, or part, of the international system. Classical Realists tended to attribute much of this pattern of behaviour to the natural tendency of people and states to be selfish and greedy. Stop and read to the end of Classical realism in section 2 of Chapter 5, pp.89 91 Would it be true to say that classical Realism relies on a pessimistic understanding of human nature to justify its conflictual understanding of IR? Why or why not? 67

11 Introduction to international relations In more recent decades a new strand of Realism, called structural Realism, has placed more emphasis on the structural context in which states find themselves. Thinkers like Kenneth Waltz argue that the anarchic international system is itself responsible for generating state behaviour. To use a well-known phrase, in the international arena, when you call 999 (or 911), nobody answers. As a result, even if states have the best of intentions, they are forced into the suspicious, selfish and power-oriented behaviour as portrayed by classical Realists. The international system portrayed by Waltz is unforgiving, and will punish states foolish enough to behave in open, cooperative and trusting ways. In this anarchic world, states are victims of what has been termed the security dilemma or security paradox. As Waltz argues, the only rational course of action for a state in an anarchic international system is to invest in armed strength so as to be able to defend itself against aggression. If a state identifies the most likely sources of such threats within the system, it might seek alliances with others who, on the basis of a common threat, might come to its aid in a crisis. From the perspective of the states against whom such preparations are targeted, these rational efforts at self-defence can appear threatening. The rational response of a state so threatened is to invest in its own material capabilities and, perhaps, form its own alliances. As a result of this dynamic, states attempts to safeguard their independence contribute to making the international arena less secure for everyone. However unfortunate it may be, Realists believe that this paradox is endemic to the anarchic international system. In the absence of a world government, states are condemned to exist in an environment of mutual suspicion. Moreover, any state s declaration that it is seeking armed strength for purely defensive reasons is bound to be met with suspicion. Not all Realists agree about everything. As we noted in Chapter 1, some saw the Cold War as being inherently dangerous while others thought it contained the seeds of a new and more stable international order. A few Realists welcomed the end of the Cold War; others feared it would make the world less orderly. Realists remain divided by some fairly important theoretical differences too. Some adhere to the traditional notion that a balance of power is both possible and the most likely basis upon which some form of global stability can be constructed hence their hopes for a new balance of power today to limit US power. Others think that such a balance is highly improbable on the grounds that any normal great power will try to break free from the constraints of the system by becoming a hegemon. This analytical approach, normally called offensive Realism (as opposed to defensive Realism) has been most recently on display in the current debate on China a subject we will return to shortly. Defensive Realists make the simple but important claim that states seek security and nothing more. They therefore argue that China and the USA will approach each other with great caution, as neither will want to antagonise the other and risk a threat to its own security. Offensive Realists see things very differently. To them, a rising China will necessarily seek hegemony in its region and is therefore bound to clash with the USA, whose hegemonic position it will threaten. States competition for power, rather than their competing ideologies, are the roots of Realist international conflict. 68

Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism Stop and read section 2 of Chapter 7, pp.117 20 Activity Now is the time to think about what differentiates classical Realism from the four neo- Realisms discussed in Chapter 7 of the textbook. Using the table below, consider how each thinker would respond to the following question: What impact will China s rising economic and political power have on the anarchic international system? Classical Realism (Morgenthau) Structural Realism (Waltz) Neo-Realism (Grieco) Offensive Realist (Mearsheimer) Defensive Realist (Jervis) What sorts of things might Realist ideas help to explain? Activity Stop and read section 3 of Chapter 5, pp.93 96 In each of the sub-sections that follow, use the tables provided to consider how three of Realism s most important concepts (statism, survival and self-help) influence its answers to the questions posed below. Let us now concentrate on the way Realist theory might be applied in practice by looking at five key questions that it seeks to address: 1. Why don t international organisations work as idealists want them to? Many see international organisations as forums where states come together and set aside narrow self-interest to cooperate for the greater good. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), for example, is supposed to address threats to international peace and security and enforce international law. In reality, however, it has often been impossible for states to agree on what security and the law require in particular cases, especially when the states making the decisions at the UN are directly involved in the cases under consideration. Realism tells us that we should begin with low expectations for international organisations. States will never surrender their autonomy. To do so would be tantamount to surrendering their sovereignty and, with it, their independence. Realists argue that states use international organisations to further their own power and interests, and as barriers to obstruct others when they try to do the same. For example, the UNSC has often been unable to act in response to important events, such as the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 or Russian incursions into Georgia (South Ossetia) in 2008. Realism explains that this is because in each case the major powers were divided over what course of action to take. Without a clear 69

11 Introduction to international relations harmony of interests, the UNSC s efforts to mediate were effectively stymied by the security dilemma. Realist assumption Impact on Question 1 Statism Survival Self-help 2. Why do promises made by states often fail to translate into reality? Realists have drawn many lessons of their own from the unfortunate fate that befell the international system between the two world wars. As they point out, several international agreements were fashioned in which states promised to refrain from war and aggression, most famously the Kellogg Briand Pact. Adolf Hitler gave personal written assurances to the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938 that Germany s ambitions would be satisfied by acquiring a part of Czechoslovakia. In the end these promises proved worthless, as a state with growing strength (Germany) launched a war to pursue wider territorial gains. Near the end of the Second World War, the Russians acted similarly, making agreements and promises that pledged free and democratic elections in Eastern Europe. In reality, the USSR under Stalin imposed its own preferred governments on Eastern and Central Europe. Realists are not surprised by such doubledealing activity. To them, the driving forces behind states are not their signatures on paper, but their thirst for power. While agreements may be signed and adhered to in the short term, many Realists claim that they will collapse if, and when, they come into conflict with hard interests. When states have the power to do so, we should expect them to ignore their promises. As Kenneth Waltz would argue, only coercive power can guarantee obedience. Realist assumption Impact on Question 2 Statism Survival Self-help 70 3. Why does international cooperation often fail to occur, even when it seems in everyone s interests? There are numerous issue areas in which it seems as though a big problem can only be addressed through collective, cooperative action. The problem of climate change, for example, clearly demands binding agreements under which all states agree to sacrifice some aspect of their short-term gains (i.e. the profit that comes from ecologicallydestructive economic activity) for a greater long-term benefit (reducing the damaging effects of anthropogenic climate change). To choose another example, many over the years have sought universal nuclear disarmament by all nations, or the placing of nuclear weapons under

Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism international control. In each case, Realists tell us that the chances of success are remote, because states cannot or will not trust one another enough to sacrifice their own interests in the hope that others will do the same. Those with an advantage will always strive to keep it, and will always fear that sacrifice on their part will be taken advantage of by others. This dynamic is captured by the Prisoner s Dilemma, a thought experiment described in Box 18.3 on p.302 of the textbook. Realist assumption Impact on Question 3 Statism Survival Self-help 4. Why do states broaden/narrow the scope of their foreign policy over time? As we have now read, many neo-realists think of states as functionally similar, meaning that each carries out identical functions regardless of where or when it exists. In the anarchic international system, only states material capabilities differentiate them from another. States that have limited material capabilities tend to define their interests narrowly. States that are stronger think bigger. That is what being a great power entails. Uruguay will have different views to Brazil on how widely its interests extend and what constitutes a threat to its security. This is largely because of Uruguay s more limited capacity to mobilise power on the international stage. American foreign policy, unsurprisingly, provides a convenient case study for this argument. As the USA went from being a relatively weak and peripheral power in the eighteenth century to a global superpower in the twentieth, it underwent a parallel transition from isolationism which frowns on international entanglements to interventionism. Realists generally agree that this was predictable because the USA s increasing material capabilities allowed it to pursue an increasingly active foreign policy. Looking to the future, such a Realist would predict that current Chinese attitudes towards sovereignty and intervention will inevitably shift as its capacity for intervention grows. Powers that lose relative power and status over time, such as Britain or Spain, might likewise be expected to gradually narrow their horizons. Realist assumption Impact on Question 4 Statism Survival Self-help 5. Why do states engage in balancing behaviour? Realists believe that the world order is defined by its most powerful states the great powers. Lesser powers, unable to compete openly with their more capable neighbours, will organise around the great 71

11 Introduction to international relations powers in the international system. Hence, during the Cold War, the world s states clustered around the two poles of greatest power in the system: the USA and the Soviet Union. On the level of pure imagination, it is possible that in such circumstances the two dominant powers might ally themselves together to dominate all others. However, most Realists believe that states instinctively react to the possibility of a dominant (hegemonic) concentration of power in the world by balancing against it. They argue that it was inevitable that the USA and USSR would end up in an antagonistic balance after the Second World War, because each feared that the other was capable of achieving a hegemonic position. In the first decades after the collapse of the USSR, Realists argued among themselves about whether or not new groups of states were likely to balance against the USA in order to curtail its dominance, or if the scale of the US lead would deter any challenge. Realist assumption Impact on Question 5 Statism Survival Self-help Activity Read the following statements. Which ones would Realists consider true? Which would they consider false? T/F It doesn t matter if our neighbours are better armed, so long as we know their intentions are friendly. T/F When it really comes down to it, states can depend only on themselves. T/F Statesmen happily quote the law when it backs their own case, and go quiet when it doesn t. T/F So long as our cause is morally right, we can be confident in our ultimate victory. T/F The main barrier to abolishing war is that there are too many bad men and bad governments in charge of states. T/F If our goal is to be the dominant power in the world, we can expect others to oppose us regardless of our ideals. 72 What is Liberalism in IR? If Realism is defined by its pessimistic vision of lonely states trapped in a system that locks them into antagonistic power-games, Liberalism serves as a useful counterpoint, highlighting the interconnectedness of the world and the potential for successful cooperation. While it shares some of Realism s starting points, Liberals tend to be more optimistic about the sort of world that can emerge out of international anarchy. Liberals have a long intellectual history that extends back to the European Enlightenment. Many credit the eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant with several important contributions to Liberal thinking about IR, particularly his focus on the establishment of peace between states. A summary of his proposal for a Perpetual peace can be found in Box 6.2 on p.104 of the textbook. In the modern era, notable Liberal scholars in IR have included Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane and John Ikenberry.

Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism Stop and read section 2 of Chapter 6, pp.104 08 Activity In one or two sentences, summarise how each of the following Liberals would establish peace within the international system. 1.Immanuel Kant 2.Richard Cobden 3.Woodrow Wilson 4.Robert Keohane Like Realists, Liberals do not agree on everything. Over the spectrum of Liberal writing, however, some recurring themes emerge: 1. Interdependence In its discussion of sovereign states wrestling for power, Realism can sometimes overestimate the extent to which states are truly autonomous. Liberals often note that in reality states have become ever more connected to one another, increasing their interdependence. As a result of the expansion of international trade, dramatic developments in communication across borders, and our deepening dependence upon one another for economic, political and social goods, states have very limited freedom of manoeuvre. States autonomy, and therefore sovereignty, is constrained by the system in which they exist. This is also true for other international actors recognised by Liberal theory: MNCs, NGOs and IGOs. Liberals believe that these constraints have important implications for IR insofar as actors cannot afford to engage in aggressive behaviour towards those on whom they rely. By limiting sovereignty, Liberals argue, interdependence raises the costs of conflict and thereby makes it less likely. 2. International organisations, norms and regimes Realists see international organisations (IOs) as vehicles through which states can pursue their own narrow self-interest. Liberals see IOs very differently. Over time, they argue, states get into the habit of abiding by international rules and norms and of dealing with problems through discussion rather than the use of force. By facilitating cooperation and reinforcing reciprocity, international organisations and the shared norms they support are capable of influencing states actions. This can happen on a global level as is the case with the rules that shape the global economic system or among subgroups of states who can develop security communities within which the use of force is unthinkable because of the extent to which they have embraced shared norms. Combinations of formal international organisations and their associated norms are called regimes. These are often thought of according to the issue areas they tackle, such as the international 73

11 Introduction to international relations 74 human rights regime or the international trade regime. Regimes therefore bear a strong resemblance to the institutions of international society described by the ES in Chapter 2 insofar as they regularise relations between international actors, bringing some level of order to the anarchic international system. For example, the contemporary international trade regime includes formal organisations (e.g. the WTO) and the rules by which the regime operates (e.g. the removal of trade restrictions and state subsidies). 3. Rational cooperation Realists believe that, under conditions of anarchy, states are trapped by the security dilemma in a cycle of action and reaction that leads to antagonism, tension and conflict. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to believe that if states can focus on the benefits to be had from cooperation and security, they can get beyond the Hobbesian world of Realist conflict to produce benefits for all. To do this they need to stop focusing on the relative gains to be had at the expense of others, and focus on the absolute gains to be had from cooperation. Liberal s preference for absolute gains stands against Grieco s neo-realist position, which retains a central place for relative gains and therefore competition in IR. 4. The importance of Liberal democracy It would be an exaggeration to say that all Realists think that states domestic affairs are entirely irrelevant to their foreign policy. However, neo-realists often argue that states operate in response to a national interest that is unaffected by domestic politics, and that the pressures of the international system force states to behave according to the same rationality regardless of whether they are democratic, authoritarian or theocratic. Many Liberals disagree, believing that liberal democratic societies tend to be less belligerent in their approach to IR than their authoritarian and theocratic neighbours. This is especially true when it comes to their relations with other democracies. Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), discussed briefly in the previous chapter, has roots that stretch back to Immanuel Kant s proposals for a perpetual peace. As we have already seen, DPT claims that liberal democracies do not go to war with one another, although they will fight against non-democratic states. The implications of this argument are that: a fully democratic world would necessarily be a peaceful one the most likely flashpoints for international conflict exist where democratic and a non-democratic states collide. 5. Soft power Realists tend to define power as the ability to get others into doing things they would prefer not to do. This may involve military force, or may take on more subtle forms of extreme economic and political pressure. Whatever tools are used, the key feature of power is its ability to have others do things that they would normally be unwilling to do. This idea of power-as-coercion is often called hard power. Liberals, and some classical Realists, often emphasise the importance of soft power, a phrase coined by the political scientist Joseph Nye. As we will discuss at greater length in Chapter 10, the notion of soft power focuses less on coercion and more on the ability of a society to be attractive to others through its culture, its ideas, and its political and economic systems. This attraction may lead others to emulate the

Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism society they admire, and buy in to its agenda more broadly without the need for coercion. 6. Non-state actors Realism focuses almost exclusively on the state, which it claims is the only effective actor in IR. Liberal theorists have never denied the importance of the state. Indeed, some of the most influential Liberals have given states an especially important role underwriting the functioning of a successful global economy. Nevertheless, in some Liberal writing there has been a tendency to look beyond the state to emphasise the importance of a variety of non-state actors, including companies, charities, citizens groups, religious movements and political movements outside government. This is a major departure from Realism, one of whose central tenets is the unique international quality of the state. What might Liberal ideas help explain? Activity Stop and read section 3 of Chapter 6, pp.108 11 In each of the subsections that follow, use the tables provided to consider how three of Liberalism s most important concepts (interdependence, international regimes, DPT) influence its answers to the questions posed below. 1. Why have other powers not done more to balance against the USA? Most Realist theories imply that following the establishment of American hegemony in the international system at the end of the Cold War, other states should have formed alliances or built up their own armed forces to counterbalance against US power. Liberals have pointed out that this ignores the special qualities of American hegemony and the mutually beneficial world order it has promoted. The USA has usually displayed restraint (when compared with, say, the USSR or Nazi Germany) in its conduct towards weaker powers. It is an open society that allows outsiders to have ongoing insight into its decisions and the processes by which it makes them. The USA also possesses a great deal of soft power thanks to the appeal of its political system, its economic abundance and its cultural produce. The world order it has helped to create over the past two decades, involving relatively free trade and a Liberal architecture of international laws and institutions, is one that many international actors states, firms, NGOs and so on find attractive. Thus, it can be argued that the USA stirs less hostile balancing against itself because of the Liberal character of its domestic system and of the international regimes that it has helped to create. Interdependence Impact on Question 1 International regimes DPT 75

11 Introduction to international relations 2. Historically Europe was one of the most war-prone parts of the world. How has it become one of the most peaceful? The second half of the twentieth century has brought enormous changes to European IR. Since the end of the Second World War and the Cold War, commentators have noted a general decrease in levels of state competition and conflict. Liberals chalk this up to a number of factors. National economies have become much more interdependent, thanks to free trade and shared economic governance. The EU has created a set of political organisations, legal structures and norms that have reshaped the behaviour of European states towards one another. Military relations between its most powerful members have been made more entangled through NATO and the EU. Liberals argue that Europe has become peaceful thanks to the combined effects of these factors, creating a security regime in which European states agree not to engage in hostile actions towards one another. Interdependence Impact on Question 2 International regimes DPT 3. Why is it now a rarity for states to use force as a tool for advancing their self-interest? States still go to war and national interest still plays a part in that decision. But, whereas major powers once regarded it as their right to declare war and use force in pursuit of territorial gain or political advantage, they now tend to justify their actions in terms of the rules and norms laid out in international law. Look, for example, at the significant efforts made by the USA to argue that its invasion of Iraq in 2003 was legally justified, or at how intensely Israel and the Palestinian Authority struggle to portray their positions as legally justified and refute accusations that they use aggressive force against one another. Even when norms are not fully honoured in practice, Liberal principles of non-aggression have been established in the international system. It is a norm to which states must at least appear to conform. This, Liberals argue, shows that something has changed in the world. Interdependence Impact on Question 3 International regimes DPT 76 4. Why might a rising China be managed peacefully? Finally, Liberals have made a very distinct contribution to the debate on China and how the West should deal with its rising wealth and power. Realists tend to view China as a problem to be contained. Liberals share some of their concerns, most obviously about China s record on human

Chapter 5: Mainstream theories: Realism and Liberalism rights. However, in policy terms they place more stress on integration than containment. More optimistic Liberals even point to at least two reasons why the West should remain optimistic. First, so long as China is tied into the existing economic order, it will be very difficult for it to launch an aggressive push for domination without harming its own economy and political stability. Second, as it becomes richer and its young people experience contact with, or even life in, other parts of the world, there will be irresistible pressure for the liberalisation and democratisation of Chinese society. Interdependence Impact on Question 4 International regimes DPT Activity Imagine that you have been tasked with establishing the necessary arrangements to prevent wars between a collection of neighbouring states. In a short paragraph, describe how you would go about achieving this objective if you were a Realist. In a second paragraph, do the same again from the standpoint of a Liberal. What are the main differences between these ideal types? For a closer examination of the place of the ES in mainstream IR, visit the VLE and search for the appropriate podcast listed under this chapter. A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain what a theory is and why IR scholars use them explain the core ideas used in Realist and Liberal theories of IR make use of these theories in analysing real world examples define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary absolute gains anarchy autonomy balance of power classical Realists defensive Realism Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) great powers hard power harmony of interests interdependence interests interventionism international organisations isolationism non-state actors norms offensive Realism regimes relative gains power 77

11 Introduction to international relations Prisoner s Dilemma security dilemma/paradox security communities soft power sovereignty states structural Realism Sample examination questions 1. Explain the security dilemma. Do you think it is possible for states to get past it? 2. How convincing is democratic peace theory? 3. What do you think are the key points on which Realists and Liberals disagree? 4. Do international organisations have the power to change the way nations behave? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 78

Chapter 6: Alternative theories: Marxism, Constructivism and gender theory Chapter 6: Alternative theories: Marxism, Constructivism and gender theory Theory is always for someone, and for some purpose. Cox, R. Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations, Millenium: Journal of International Studies 10(2) 1981, p.128. Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: outline some alternative theoretical approaches to IR, namely Constructivism, Marxism, gender theory and Poststructuralism illustrate ways in which these approaches might be used to better understand international events and phenomena. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain why many scholars question mainstream approaches to IR explain the core ideas used in the theories of IR named above make use of these theories to analysing events and concepts in IR define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Barnett, M. Social constructivism. Hobden, S. and Wynn Jones, R. Marxist theories of international relations. Tucker, J.A. Gender in world politics. Hansen, L. Poststructuralism. Further reading and works cited Adler, E. Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics, European Journal of International Relations 3(3) 1997, pp.319 63. Ba, A. and M. Hoffman Making and remaking the world for IR101: a resource for teaching social constructivism in introductory classes, International Studies Perspectives 4(1) 2002, pp.15 33. Campbell, D. On dangers and their interpretation in Campbell, D. Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) [ISBN 9780816631445]. Checkel, J.T. The constructivist turn in international relations theory, World Politics 50(1) 1998, pp.324 48. Halliday, F. A necessary encounter: historical materialism and international relations in Halliday, F. Rethinking International Relations. (London, MacMillan, 1994) [ISBN: 0774805080]. Sterling-Folcker, J. Realism and the constructivist challenge, International Studies Review 4(1) 2002, pp.73 100. Tickner, J.A. You just don t understand: troubled engagements between feminism and IR theorists, International Studies Quarterly 41(4) 1997, pp.611 32. 79

11 Introduction to international relations Wendt, A. Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics, International Organisation 46(2) 1992, pp.391 425. Youngs, G. From practice to theory: feminist international relations and gender mainstreaming, International Politics 45(6) 2008, pp.688 702. Introduction Realist, Liberal and ES analyses of IR have been around for many decades, and have come to be seen as the theoretical mainstream of the discipline. Each has had an enormous impact on the way policy-makers look at the world. Nevertheless, there has been opposition to their intellectual domination. A number of voices have complained that the Realist Liberal spectrum does not cover a sufficiently wide range of possible perspectives on IR. Although they disagree on some important issues, Realists and Liberals have reached a consensus on many points. This consensus others contend now serves to exclude a range of other potential avenues for exploring the subject. The emergence of alternative ways of thinking has not happened overnight. As noted earlier, the end of the Cold War forced the pace of intellectual change in IR. However, new theories about world affairs have much deeper roots: as response to the radical politics of the 1960s, as a reaction to the obvious inequalities found under capitalism, or simply because certain writers wished to develop ways of looking at the world without always having to go to the USA to find out what was important. Some theories, such as the ES, amend and synthesise the Liberal and Realist paradigms. Others reject these mainstream narratives outright. It is these to which we now turn. In what follows we deal with several new approaches in turn, including Constructivism, Marxism and critical theory, gender theory, and Poststructuralism. After sketching the outlines of each theory, we will illustrate with some useful examples the sorts of questions that these very different approaches can address. 80 Constructivism Realism and Liberalism both assert that the international environment is anarchic, and that it is rational for states to respond to that anarchy in certain ways. Indeed, the anarchic structure of the international system is one of the bases of the mainstream consensus in IR. Realists believe that antagonistic competition is the natural outcome of this anarchy. Liberals hope for cooperation between actors. Constructivism argues that this mind-set, which thinks that the international system objectively is anarchic and that only a particular logic follows from that reality is misguided. Constructivists derive their name from their belief that much of the environment in which we live is not objectively fixed but rather is socially constructed. International actors are not mere puppets of the systems they inhabit, because they themselves create and constitute those very systems. From a constructivist perspective, Realists are wrong if they believe that states have no alternative to mutual suspicion, selfishness and the security dilemma. Likewise, Liberals are wrong if they believe that international anarchy generates any objective need to build a Liberal order. Rather, to use a phrase coined by Alexander Wendt, one of the most famous constructivist theorists, anarchy is what states make of it (see Box 9.2 in the textbook, p.157). The way states define their national interest within that anarchy is not dictated by the system they inhabit, but is socially constructed by human beings.

Chapter 6: Alternative theories: Marxism, Constructivism and gender theory Stop and read section 2 of Chapter 9, pp.150 53 Why do Constructivists disagree with Realism s and Liberal s materialist understandings of the international system? What do they mean when they call the system socially constructed? Constructivists therefore tend to focus chiefly on two issues. First, there is the question of identity. Constructivists believe that the way states define their interests is derived from the way that they see themselves. To understand their interests, we must therefore understand the key attributes and core values states imagine themselves to have. Interests will also be affected by the identity states project onto others, be it harmonious with, or antagonistic to, their own. Second, there is the matter of intersubjective understandings. By this, Constructivists refer to ideas about reality and appropriate international behaviour, the latter being similar to Liberal regimes and ES institutions in their ability to shape state behaviour. If states construct a set of understandings to the effect that dialogue and cooperation will prevail in IR, they probably will. If, on the other hand, states accept the Realist logic of conflicting interests and rivalry, that outcome will result. This is what Alexander Wendt meant when he said that anarchy is what states make of it. Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 9, pp.154 59 While you read this section, consider how Realist structures, Liberal regimes, and ES institutions can be constructed by international actors. Are all actors equally responsible for the nature of these constructions or do some actors have more influence over their development than others? All constructivists believe that the identities, interests and intersubjective understandings arrived at by states are socially constructed, but they differ over the implications of this belief. Some think that despite their socially constructed status, identities, interests and intersubjective understandings are deeply engrained and therefore difficult to change. This branch of Constructivism argues that we can therefore study them as relatively stable features of the world, even though they are prone to humaninduced change. More radical Constructivists follow the same thinking further, concluding that if the nature of the international system is a social construction, then we can and should use that knowledge to pursue major changes. Activity Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 9, pp.160 63 Using the table below, explain the role that each of the following terms plays in the development of a socially constructed norm. Institutional isomorphism Socialisation Norm internalisation Another important idea in constructivist thought is securitisation, formulated by a group of scholars known as the Copenhagen school, whose most prominent members are Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. Securitisation theory argues that there is no objectively true answer to the 81

11 Introduction to international relations question of whether an issue is or is not a security issue. Rather, we use the language of security as a way of talking about certain issues in order to signal that they are more important than ordinary political issues, and that extraordinary measures outside the normal limits are permissible to address them. Traditional issues, such as war, obviously qualify for the use of such language, but other political issues, such as immigration, infectious disease or crime can potential be securitised. This can be achieved if those with social power decide to apply the language of security to them, and manage to persuade the majority that this is a legitimate move. There is debate over whether securitising issues is always helpful, because it bestows higher priority and attention upon an issue, or whether it may cause new problems by militarising a political issue, and producing a heightened atmosphere that actually gets in the way of dealing with the problem effectively. Does it help the fight against poverty to declare war on it? Was it useful for the USA to declare the War on Terror after 9/11, or should they have pursued the perpetrators through established criminal procedures? Securitisation may raise the profile of an issue, but not without cost. Activity Marxism Think of a particular political issue other than those just mentioned and describe what you would do to securitise it. Do you think that this would help or hinder dealing with the problem? List some reasons for and against securitisation. As noted earlier, several different approaches to IR consider themselves critical in the sense that they think critically about the assumptions and conclusions of IR s mainstream approaches. Many of these insights have their roots in Marxism, a powerful analytical tool that continues to play an important role in the social sciences. Similarly to Constructivism, Marxism argues that much of what we consider objective knowledge about how the world works is in fact human and social in origin. Society is a human invention, and can be changed if we have the will to do so. Traditional theories of IR are guilty of portraying social arrangements as if they are objective, natural, and unchanging. As a result, mainstream IR is ruled by a conservative mindset that serves the interests of the powerful by focusing on problems set by the establishment, with the goal of entrenching the (often unjust) status quo. This is what Marxists object to most vociferously. They note that the present international system devotes an enormous amount of resources to the priorities of the rich and developed world, while billions suffer from the effects of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment. This, they argue, is largely due to the nature of the global economic system, rooted in the ideology and practice of capitalism. The dominance of the economic elite the bourgeoisie is bolstered by the unwillingness of conventional IR theory to recognise its own role in supporting the system. Neither Realism nor Liberalism, the argument goes, is aware of the way in which its guiding assumptions prejudge the outcomes of its research. The goal for theory, according to Marxists, should be to oppose established power within the capitalist world system, and instead to pursue the emancipation of those currently disadvantaged by the world order broadly defined as the international proletariat. 82

Chapter 6: Alternative theories: Marxism, Constructivism and gender theory Stop and read sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 8, pp.133 37 Activity In a short paragraph of no more than 250 words, explain why Karl Marx is considered an economic determinist. Then, on the map at the back of this subject guide identify regions in the core and on the periphery of the capitalist world system. Is there a geographical pattern to their distribution? Can one state include parts of both the core and the periphery? Marxist scholars believe strongly in a vision of the future where those who suffer under the status quo can be emancipated by radical, even revolutionary change. All theory they argue should be judged according to whether or not it contributes to progress towards this emancipatory goal. Marxist approaches to IR are therefore special in combining a view of reality that seems highly anti-objectivist e.g. arguing that the status quo is a human creation and that it is within our power to change it with strong views on the optimal direction for socioeconomic, political and moral progress. Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 8, pp.137 40 How does Antonio Gramsci s concept of hegemony relate to Constructivists concept of socially constructed reality? Have Realism and Liberalism contributed to Western hegemony in the Gramscian sense? Poststructuralism Poststructuralism is perhaps the most unconventional alternative approach in IR. It radically challenges the foundations of the discipline, using ideas rooted in the work of French philosophers like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. This work is often highly complex and written in a way that defies simple understanding or interpretation. Its central purpose is to draw into question both the possibility of objective knowledge, and our ability to use language as a reliable means of communication. Poststructuralists reject the possibility of imposing grand narratives on world events. This puts them in opposition not only to Realist, Liberal and ES approaches, but even to Constructivists and Marxists who believe that we can still find some sort of stable truth by systematically studying human society. For Poststructuralists, the narratives that we construct about the international system are merely products of our use of language. They are inherently temporary and unstable, and may run alongside other, contradictory narratives, with no objective basis for evaluating the relative truth of each position. The deconstruction of these narratives is the main goal of poststructuralism, with the goal of revealing contestable and unstable elements contained within them. By uncovering the power of discourse to create and recreate meanings, we can empower ourselves to challenge established claims to knowledge and certainty. Activity Stop and read section 3 of Chapter 10, pp.169 73 In the table provided below, explain how each of the following concepts can be used to produce new knowledge about the world of IR. 83

11 Introduction to international relations Discourse Deconstruction Genealogy Intertextuality In IR, poststructuralist work serves to draw into question the reality and stability of basic concepts such as the state, the nation and the inside/outside distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. Poststructuralism is often criticised, sometimes angrily, for destroying all existing routes to knowledge and truth without providing an alternative. As such, it undermines the possibility for engaged political action, and reduces us to a position where one story is as good as any other when it comes to establishing truth. While this infuriates many, numerous poststructuralists would say that this is precisely the implication of their reasoning and they are unwilling to compromise. They are also often accused of deliberately using opaque and confusing language in their writing. Poststructuralists tend to regard this as unfair, while admitting they do use technical terms that require an initial period of acclimatisation. One of the most well-known pieces of writing on foreign policy from this perspective is David Campbell s Writing security, which focuses on the construction of American national identity through discourses of danger, such as the construction of a sinister and foreign other against which an ideal American national character can be defined. Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 10, pp.173 78 Given the centrality of statism to its worldview, how would Realism s image of the international system be changed by taking on board the poststructural critique of state sovereignty summarised in this reading? 84 Gender theory Given the extent to which concepts of gender pervade the world s societies, it should be no surprise that their influence extends into the realm of IR and foreign policy. This branch of scholarship, which highlights the influence of gendered thinking on human ideas and behaviour, has found a fertile seam in IR. For the uninitiated, an absolutely vital distinction must be drawn before we set off down this road of analysis. This is the difference between sex and gender. The former refers to the physical differences between men and women. The latter refers to the much wider and more complex set of socially constructed ideas about the differences between what is masculine and what is feminine. These vary widely across the planet, and often seem far from perfect in their correspondence with men s and women s actual abilities. In the Western world, masculinity has long been associated with a set of idealised values including bravery, strength and leadership. Classically imagined feminine virtues include tenderness, kindness and empathy. Similar mirror-images of negative attributes associated with each category could also be listed, making men unkind and women weak. Clearly these amount to stereotypical images of what men and women are really like, but it is nevertheless clear that our society is deeply permeated by assumptions based on these images. It is on

Chapter 6: Alternative theories: Marxism, Constructivism and gender theory the basis of such widespread if not conscious associations that society has tended to exclude and marginalise women when it comes to positions of political and military leadership. Gender theory suggests that war and high politics (diplomacy, treaty-making) have long been associated with masculine values, making it more difficult for women to rise in these areas. There is considerable variation in the use that gender-focused scholars make of their deconstruction of these social attitudes. For some, a key concern is the unjustified exclusion of women from traditionally masculine areas. As a result, it is important to demonstrate that women are entirely capable of possessing the attributes required for, say, military service or tough political leadership. For this variety of gender theorist, victory can be declared when we achieve a world in which women are as free as men to pursue jobs from which they are currently barred by unjustified assumptions about gender roles. More radical gender theorists disagree. They think that this outcome would actually be a disastrous victory for masculine values. From this perspective, the problem is not that women do not have sufficient seniority in the current world system, but that the international system as presently constituted fixated on war, conflict, balances of power, etc. embodies the dominance of idealised masculine values. We might be able to build a better international system, and a better world, if we use the insights of gender theory to stop privileging an idealised, out-dated, and unhealthy idea of masculine virtue. The goal for radical gender theorists is not to create a world in which women play leading roles by becoming more like men, but a world where values currently associated with masculinity are no longer so dominant in our thinking. It is a matter of overthrowing, rather than joining, the patriarchy. Activity Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 16, pp.265 67 Using the table below, explain gender theory s critique of the following approaches to IR. Liberalism Constructivism Marxism Although keen not to confuse the study of gender with the study of women, another important part of this school s study of IR is the often hidden role played by women in conflict. Men engage in the most public and obvious aspects of war: bearing weapons, wearing uniforms and engaging directly in conflict. There are many instances of women doing likewise, but such activities are still overwhelmingly dominated by men. Women, meanwhile, play a supporting role: producing the soldiers of the future, maintaining life at home while men fight, and representing something to be protected in the minds of those at war. In reality, however, women have often suffered as badly as men in war, experiencing maltreatment and systematic sexual abuse at the hands of enemy troops or their own countrymen. Scholars researching the topic have argued that the particular forms of suffering faced by women in wartime deserve more attention than they currently receive. 85

11 Introduction to international relations Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 16, pp.268 70 How do gender theory s understanding of security and violence differ from that of Realists? How do you think this difference will affect their definitions of war and peace? Activity In the space provided, draw up a list of the qualities that you think a good military leader needs to have. Now go through your list asking whether each is a masculine or feminine quality. Explain why you think so. What questions do these alternative perspectives address? Activity Following each subsection, identify the alternative approach(es) most likely to address the given question. 1. Why might a state s foreign policy change after a political revolution? If identities precede interests then a major change in how a state sees itself and how others see it might result in a substantial change in its foreign policy interactions. For example, Iran went from being one of the USA s closest allies to being one of its most implacable enemies after its Islamic revolution in 1979 until the present day. This would seem to make little sense if one believes that a state has interests that are unaffected by considerations of ideology. At the same time, other writers have pointed out that after an initial period of opposition revolutionary states often reintegrate into international society and abide by its shared behaviours and principles. Either way, it appears that states domestic arrangements have some effect on their goals and the means by which they pursue them. This question is of interest to: 2. Why are issues securitised in some parts of the world and not in others? Mexico wants to treat drugs as a security issue, while the Netherlands wants to treat it as a public health matter. Which is it? If things either are or aren t security issues, then someone must be in the wrong. Securitisation theory explains that there is no right or wrong. Rather, Mexico has chosen to securitise the issue, and succeeded in doing so, thus placing a higher priority upon it and addressing it in a more 86

Chapter 6: Alternative theories: Marxism, Constructivism and gender theory militarised way. This does not, of course, mean that Mexico is more likely to make progress in resolving the issue. Indeed, a comparison of Mexican and Dutch drug policy indicates the reverse may be true. Whether this is because of their very different domestic circumstances or their different securitisation decisions is an open question in IR. This question is of interest to: 3. Why do female leaders have to try so hard to prove themselves on national security issues? Everything about our societies has led us to expect that the virtues required to take control of matters related to war and security are connected to masculinity. It is only natural, therefore, that we should find it harder to envision a woman occupying a security-oriented role. Female heads of government such as Margaret Thatcher and Indira Gandhi have demonstrated that women can be successful war leaders. Nevertheless, aspiring female leaders continue to have to work that little bit harder. For example, Hillary Clinton had some success portraying herself as tougher on national security issues than Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential primaries. This might be used as evidence that the concepts of masculine and feminine can be detached from the concrete reality of men and women, with Obama being cast in the feminine role in Clinton s masculine attacks. This question is of interest to: 4. Why aren t states always brutally selfish in spite of the existence of an anarchic international system? If states really are self-interested security seekers and there is no higher power to prevent constant war and conflict, one might think that there is a surprising amount of order and civility in the world. The ES tells us that this is because states and non-state actors feel bound to abide by a number of established traditions of appropriate behaviour, evolved over time and expected of members of international society. This does not mean that the logic of self-interest is not at work. Rather, self-help is one of the behaviours expected by the international society in which they exist, and can exist alongside other more cooperative forms of institutional behaviour. This question is of interest to: 5. Why do political leaders talk about their people in exaggerated, idealised ways while simultaneously demonising their enemies? Poststructuralists tell us that societies are fighting a constant battle to hold together in the face of an ever-changing world. Part of how they achieve this is through the construction of us versus them dynamics, whereby a society is called upon to unite against the threat of the evil and foreign other. This is not simply propaganda used cynically by leaders to mobilise the populace for war. It is actually the process whereby societies produce and reproduce their identities, helping to explain Charles Tilly s well-known claim that war made the state, and the state made war. This question is of interest to: 87

11 Introduction to international relations 6. Why is so much time in IR spent talking about the security of the safest, richest countries on Earth? It might seem odd that IR students and scholars spend as much time as they do discussing the security of those states that seem safest, and the threats posed to them by hypothetical threats such as terrorism and war which kill only tiny numbers of their citizens each year. Meanwhile, millions suffer premature death and severe suffering every year in the less developed world due to inequalities in wealth, education, security and healthcare. Critical security studies tells us that this is all too understandable: IR is a discipline concentrated in the rich and privileged world, and that serves the interests of power and wealth accordingly by helpfully focusing on their preferred problems and turning its eyes away from the suffering of the poor and the radical solutions required to emancipate them. This question is of interest to: A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain why many scholars question mainstream approaches to IR explain the core ideas used in the theories of IR named above make use of these theories to analysing events and concepts in IR define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary bourgeoisie capitalism capitalist world system Constructivism deconstruction discourse emancipation gender identity intersubjective understandings Marxism patriarchy Poststructuralism proletariat securitisation sex socially constructed reality the inside/outside distinction Sample examination questions 1. Do you think it is true that anarchy is what states make of it? 2. What does emancipation mean, and is it the appropriate goal of IR scholars? 3. If we take poststructuralist approaches to IR seriously, we are left with the conclusion that nothing is really true, and so nothing really matters. Discuss. 4. Do you think that masculine ideas dominate conventional approaches to IR? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 88

Part 4: Central problems in international relations Part 4: Central problems in international relations 89

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 90

Chapter 7: War Chapter 7: War The social institution known as war survived the agrarian revolution of c.6000 BC and the industrial and scientific revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It should be a safe prediction to expect war to adapt, or be adapted, to whatever changes technologies, economies and social and political mores will lay up for us in the future. Gray, C. Another bloody century. (London: Phoenix, 2006). Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: understand the meaning of war in IR explain its causes at different levels of analysis differentiate between forms of interstate and intrastate war evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of just war theory explain how Liberal foreign policy can lead to warfare. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: describe different kinds of inter- and intra-state war assess the contribution of IR to debates on the nature and character of war explain actors motivations for waging in warfare relate the ethical questions concerning war to the Iraq War, nuclear war and the War on Terror define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Sheehan, M. The changing character of war. Reus-Smit, C. International law. Further reading Bellamy, A.J. Is the war on terror just?, International Relations 19(5) 2005, pp.275 96. Bull, H. War and international order in Bull, H. The anarchical society. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) third edition [ISBN 9780333985878]. Freedman, L. The age of liberal wars, Review of International Studies 31(S1) 2005, pp.93 107. Glaser, C. Will China s rise lead to war?, Foreign Affairs 90(2) 2011, pp.80 91. Horborn, L. and P. Wallensteen Armed conflict, 1989 2006, Journal of Peace Research 44(5) 2007, pp.623 34. 91

11 Introduction to international relations Houweling, H. and J.G. Stevens Power transition as a cause of war, Journal of Conflict Resolution 32(1) 1998, pp.87 102. Kaysen, C. Is war obsolete?, International Security 14(4) 1990, pp.42 64. Khong, Y.F. War and international theory: a commentary on the state of the art, Review of International Studies 10(1) 1984, pp.41 63. Singer, P.W. Corporate warriors: the rise of privatized military industry and its ramifications for international security, International Security 26(3) 2001 2, pp.186 220. Suganami, H. Explaining war: some critical observations, International Relations 16(3) 2002, pp.307 26. Van Evera, S. Offense, defence, and the causes of war, International Security 22(4) 1997, pp.5 43. Van Ham, P. The power of war: why Europe needs it, International Politics 47(6) 2010, pp.574 95. Waltzer, M. Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations. (London: Basic Books, 2006) [ISBN 9780465037070]. Works cited Blair, T. Doctrine of the international community. Speech delivered at the Economic Club of Chicago (April 1997) Chicago, IL. Brown, C, T. Nardin and N. Reggger International relations in political thought: texts from the ancient Greeks to the First World War. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780521575706] p.109. Burchill, S. Realism and Neo-Realism in Burchill, S., Linklater A, Devetak R et al. Theories of international relations. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009) fourth edition [ISBN 9780230219236]. Chomsky, N. The new military humanism: lessons from Kosovo. (London: Pluto Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780745316338]. Halliday, F. The Middle East in international relations: power, politics and ideology. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) [ISBN 9780521597418]. Kaldor, M. New wars old wars: organized violence in a global era. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) second edition [ISBN 9780745638645]. Lebow, R.N. Why nations fight: past and future motives for war. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780521170451]. Organski, A.F. and J. Kugler The war ledger. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980) [ISBN 9780226632797]. Tilly, C. Coercion, capital, and European states AD990 1992. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) second edition [ISBN 9781557863683]. Walt, S. Revolution and war. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.vii. Waltzer, M. Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations. (London: Allen Lane, 1978) [ISBN 9780465037070]. Westad, O.A. The global Cold War: third world interventions and the making of our time. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) [ISBN 9780521703147]. Introduction 92 As we have seen in the first three parts of this subject guide, the birth of the modern international system and academic IR is very much linked to war. War has been a mainstay of world affairs for so long that some writers see it as a natural condition in foreign affairs. The classical Realists described in Chapter 4 go so far as to suggest that war is not a consequence of states imperial ambitions or the anarchic character of the international system causes located at the unit and system level of analysis respectively. Instead, they locate its causes at the level of the individual, seeing war as symptomatic of flawed human nature.

Chapter 7: War Whether or not we seek to locate its deeper causes in human nature, the fact remains that war used here to mean organised violence carried on by political units against each other is as old as recorded history. It would be comforting to think that more reasonable ways might be found to settle our differences. Yet the evidence points to the uncomfortable conclusion that wars, in their many forms and admittedly interspersed with long periods of peace, have long been part of the human condition. As the distinguished writer on war, Sir Michael Howard, observes, those who yearn for peace probably assume that war is deeply abnormal. Those who study the world in all its complexity, however, soon come to realise that war is a deeply ingrained part of our social lives. War takes many forms. They can, moreover, be fought by a wide variety of different actors, with the state playing an especially important role. It would be wrong to think of war as an activity engaged in only by states. However, as US sociologist Charles Tilly observes, states and wars have an intimate relationship that goes back at least 1,000 years in large part because states are the only organisation capable of mobilising the necessary material resources to fight wars successfully over the long term. That is why, as he says, war makes the state and the state makes war. Others point out that wars are often fought between non-state actors. According to these thinkers, the only thing one really needs to fight a war is an army or group of armed people ready to do battle. Deciding where to draw the line between war and some lower-level form of armed conflict remains a challenge for contemporary IR. This points to something fairly self-evident for students of IR: it is absolutely vital to take war seriously and not turn away from the subject because it involves one set of human beings killing another. War is an uncomfortable reality in IR, and must be tackled head-on if we are to gain any understanding of its dynamic processes. In this chapter we will deal with some of these difficult issues, focusing first on some competing explanations for the causes of war in general before moving on to discuss particular motives for going to war. The chapter then moves on to a discussion of intrastate and liberal wars before concluding with some reflections on just wars and the ways in which we justify them. Activities Stop and read sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 13, pp.216 18 Although he died in 1831, Carl von Clausewitz s writings on war remain central to our understanding of the phenomenon. Use the table below to organise his definitions of war and its purpose. Definition of war Purpose of war 93

11 Introduction to international relations Now, thinking like Clausewitz, organise the terms in the glossary below by placing them in the appropriate box based on whether they describe war s enduring nature or its particular forms. Nature of war Form of war Glossary battlespace, bombing, chance, citizen armies, communication, guerrilla, political goals, siege, trench, uncertainty, violence Wars in theory If we accept that there are many different kinds of war, it logically follows that there can be no single reason to explain them all. As such, there can be no single universal theory of war. However, if we assume that wars represent rational means to achieve desired ends, we should at least be able to explain why they happen in particular instances. IR has made a distinct contribution to this study by identifying two separate causes: one connected to the structure of the international system itself, the other to changing power dynamics among its constituent units. Let us deal briefly with each. The IR scholar most readily identified with what has been called a structural theory of war is Kenneth Waltz. The central figure in structural Realism, Waltz wrote two IR classics: Man, state and war (1959) and Theory of international politics (1979). War, he argues is not inherent in human nature. Rather it is a product of an international system lacking an overriding authority. As discussed in Chapter 4, Waltzian anarchy generates a security paradox, forcing states to ensure their own survival through preparations for war. This did not mean that states will go to war at all times and under any circumstances. There are mechanisms to prevent this, one of the most important being nuclear deterrence neatly summed up by the Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Indeed, so successful was MAD that, at one point, Waltz argued that deterrence would be enhanced and war made less likely by increasing the number of nuclear states. However, while MAD has deterred war between nuclear-armed states, it has not undermined the system s propensity towards conflict. War, in Waltz s view, is hard-wired into the structure of the international system we inhabit. According to another IR scholar, A.F. Organski, war is most likely to occur when there is a decisive shift from one great power to another. We do not delve too deeply into Organski s idea here. We need only register his main argument. This claims that there is a fundamental problem that can very easily set the whole [international] system sliding almost irretrievably towards war. Organski identifies this problem with the differential rates of growth among the great powers. Over time, their uneven development leads to some powers falling behind while others surge ahead. The point 94

Chapter 7: War at which a rising power overtakes another in the system especially one that has recently been hegemonic is the most dangerous in terms of international peace and stability. It is at this transitional moment, Organski concludes, that wars are most likely to break out. By now, it should come as no surprise that IR scholars remain deeply divided over these general theories of war. In the view of some like Niall Ferguson, mentioned in Chapter 2 they are mere theories that can easily lead to gross oversimplifications of reality. Others simply state that they are far too general focused on what Clausewitz calls the nature of war rather than its more transient forms. As a consequence, these critics claim that neither Waltz nor Organski can deal with the multitude of reasons for states to initiate and join wars. According to the Austrian American political scientist John Stoessinger, war is neither impersonal nor structurally determined. One cannot simply blame events. Wars, in the end, are made by men and women whose knowledge of the world is necessarily imperfect. This means that we are never in full possession of the facts and, as a result, make mistakes especially on the eve of a major conflict. Indeed, Stoessinger argues, most wars start because of miscalculation, misperception, an underestimation of its costs, and an overestimation of one s own capability to carry the fight through to a successful conclusion. Otherwise, how do we explain Germany s decision to launch a war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, or Japan s even riskier attack on the USA in December 1941? Equally irrational seems the North Korean decision to invade South Korea in 1951. The North may have assumed it would win quickly likely with significant Soviet aid and, on this basis, felt confident enough to attack. As it turned out, this was a massive miscalculation based on incomplete intelligence about the strategic position of the South, an underestimation of the international community s opposition to aggressive warfare, and an overestimation of the support it would gain from its Soviet neighbour. The complicated question of why nations fight has been addressed more recently by Richard Ned Lebow, a leading American scholar. He has advanced a novel if controversial way of thinking about war. He asserts that there are many theories of war, nearly all of which suffer from an excessive dependency on rationalist and structural explanations. Rather than looking for causes at the systems or unit level of analysis, he argues that it would be more useful to explore the motives of those who initiate a conflict. He identifies four motivations long attached to discussions on war: fear, interest, standing and revenge. Using an original data set he then goes on to show that in most cases wars happen either in an attempt to improve one s standing or to get even with states who have made successful territorial grabs. There is no easy way of making a quick and easy assessment of these theories and arguments. Each should be weighed on its own merits; their value measured not in purely abstract terms, but according to how useful they are in explaining different kinds of conflict. While Waltz and Organski provide us with theories that make broad brush generalisations about large-scale wars as a generic phenomenon in IR, they are less useful in explaining the motives and perceptions that propel leaders into conflict. Writers like Stoessinger and Lebow permit us to get up close to real people making foreign policy decisions under highly stressful circumstances: a strategy with its own costs and benefits. The argument has been made that they sometimes get so close to the actors that they lose sight of the structural context in which their decisions are made. Put in everyday terms, Waltz and Organski are very good at describing the shape and 95

11 Introduction to international relations nature of the forest, but tell us very little about the individual trees. Stoessinger and Lebow, meanwhile, might be great at describing trees, but are not so good when it comes to telling us about the larger forest of which they happen to be a part. Different theories tell us different things about the world. As a result, they cannot always be judged as better or worse than the alternatives. Activity Using the table below, revisit the theories of war outlined above and try and apply each of them to explain the outbreak of the First World War discussed in Chapter 2. Theory of war Waltz Explanation of the First World War Organski Stoessinger Lebow Wars in particular Activity Stop and read sections 3 to 5 of Chapter 13, pp.218 24 As you work your way through the readings, use the table below to organise terms associated with modern and post-modern warfare. Two examples from the readings are provided. Modern war Industrialised warfare Post-modern war Media warfare General arguments about the causes of war are useful and intellectually suggestive, but we still need a more exact taxonomy of why wars happen. This section will discuss three causes with deep historical roots: profit, faith and revolution. Profit Wars are sometimes fought for honour, occasionally for glory, and often for profit. In any list of the many causes of war, material gain will receive an important spot. Material gain may be measured in terms of additional territory acquired (think of the Norman Conquest of England in 1066), access to potentially profitable markets (think of the wars waged by Western states to pry open the markets of China during the nineteenth 96

Chapter 7: War century), or access to vital commodities and resources, from gold and spices to slaves to oil. Even the brutal wars of aggression launched by Nazi Germany and imperial Japan in the 1930s and 1940s had underlying economic rationales. More democratic states generally prefer to explain their international behaviour in more noble terms, but even the USA arguably the most liberal of great powers has gone to war for reasons of material profit. This is not to say that America s every military action had an immediate economic rationale. This was definitely not true in the Cold War, when its main purpose was to contain the USSR. Nor is it true today as it wages war in Afghanistan against the Taliban. Nevertheless, the desire to keep the world safe for capitalism and the free enterprise system remain a central driver in US foreign policy, indicating the deep connections that link politico-military and economic considerations in the international system. Faith and identity Wars have also been waged and justified in terms of a specific set of ideas and values, from Europe s wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to the ideological struggle between the USA and USSR between 1945 and 1989/91. Religion has been an especially potent source of conflict. Two of the world s most influential faiths Islam and Christianity have witnessed many wars over the centuries. Most were fought within their respective faiths (as in Reformation Europe), though others have been fought between them (as during the Crusades). Interreligious war is not inevitable. After all, both Islam and Christianity are religions of the book, part of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition of Abrahamic faiths. Both openly preach a doctrine of harmony while proclaiming their belief in the same monotheistic God. That said, one s beliefs can breed intolerance toward those holding a different faith. However, one should take care not to generalise. As Fred Halliday has pointed out, Islam and Christianity managed to co-exist for centuries, and have had important roles to play in each other s evolution. For long periods of time, however, the relationship had been problematic. Because both are evangelical, they are both well suited to imperial expansion. It is no coincidence that each religion has proved extraordinarily successful in laying the foundation for great empires. Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to argue that the very identity of Europe and the notion of the West was forged in terms of Christendom s extended conflict with Islam. The same is true of Christianity s influence on the Muslim world. The importance of religion in shaping the modern world and its wars has become the subject of recent scholarship in IR. The reasons for this resurgence of interest are many, though clearly the most important has been the recent rise of religion as a global political phenomenon, and IR s increased interest in the politics of culture and identity. However, the field has proved to be a most contentious one. This became only too obvious when in 1993 the well-known US political scientist, Samuel Huntington, published his hugely influential essay, The clash of civilizations. In this, Huntington drew special attention to what he felt was the growing cultural gap between Islam which he characterised as a deeply traditional, almost pre-modern religion and the modern, secular West. Heavily criticised at the time for both oversimplifying the complex character of two of the world s great faiths, and underestimating the many ways in which Islam and modernity could co-exist, his thesis again became the focus of heated debate following the attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001. Naturally, his original critics continued to assail him, now adding that his analysis is, in fact, fuelling the very clash he purports 97

11 Introduction to international relations to describe. However, he has his followers too. Huntington, they insist, is not arguing for conflict any more than he is making a theological case for Christianity. Rather, he is drawing attention to something that has until very recently been ignored by secular scholars: the importance of thinking seriously about faith and identity as one (and only one) of the possible causes of war. Activity Stop and read A clash of civilizations? in section 3 of Chapter 25, pp.420 21 Search online for a map showing the civilisational divisions described in Samuel Huntington s work. Would you subdivide any of the civilisations that he identifies? Would you group together two or more civilisations that he has decided to separate? What other critiques might you level at his division of the world? 98 Revolution If faith and ideology have been one immediate source of conflict in the international system, revolution and the rise of revolutionary states have been another. As American neo-realist Stephen Walt puts it, revolutions intensify the security competition between states and sharply increase the risk of war. The French Revolution serves as an exemplary case study of how revolutions especially in potentially powerful states can increase the likelihood of conflict. Believing that there could be no order in Europe or security for France without the forceful destruction of tyranny and feudalism across the continent, revolutionary France launched a twodecade long war after being attacked by counter-revolutionary forces from Hapsburg Austria. France s enemies saw the conflict as a dangerously destabilising war of emancipation directed against the European status quo. Soviet Bolsheviks pursued a similar strategy with regard to its enemies in the years immediately following the October Revolution of 1917, leading to the Civil War that raged until 1921. Soviet leaders like Leon Trotsky insisted that the only true foundation for peace was the creation of an entirely different economic order. Admittedly, this would involve the use of revolutionary violence to achieve their goals. For Trotsky and his followers, international revolution was a means to an end the elimination of what Soviet leaders saw as the fundamental causes of war in the world: capitalism and imperialism. This ideology of revolutionary war came to an abrupt end following Trotsky s exile and Stalin s rise to dominance in the late 1920s. Throughout most of the twentieth century, nationalist revolutions and the belief in the need for revolutionary violence to overthrow Western domination have been principal sources of war. It was the folding of these nationalist struggles against the West into the wider Cold War that according to Norwegian scholar Arne Westad made conflict in the Third World so bloody. Wars of national liberation were fought over three continents for the better part of 40 years after 1945, forcing Europeans to withdraw from their colonies in Africa and Asia, and handing the USA its most important military defeat of the post-second World War era. Fighting in what is today the Socialist Republic of Vietnam began in the Second World War as a war of resistance against Japanese occupation. Following Japan s defeat, France was reinstated as the imperial master of the region, which was part of French Indochina. Supported by the Soviet Union which saw it in its interests to oppose capitalist imperialism fighting continued between Vietnamese nationalists and French troops

Chapter 7: War until France was forced to withdraw in 1954. The USA then entered the fray as the main ally of South Vietnam, the anti-communist authoritarian government that claimed sovereignty over the southern half of the country. Following two decades of escalation and retreat, the war in Vietnam ended in 1975 when the country was finally united under the communist North. By then, the longest war in post-second World War international history had claimed tens of thousands of French and American lives, led to the death of over one and half million Vietnamese, spawned a major anti-war movement in the West, and deepened an already important split in the communist world between China and the USSR. Vietnam may not have been a major war between great powers, but its impact on international affairs should not be underestimated. Activity Compare the motivations behind the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and NATO s 2011 intervention in the Libyan civil war. Is it possible to identify a single dominant motive in these interventions, or must we deal with a collection of different motivations that drive international behaviour? How would you prioritise them? Intrastate wars If wars of national liberation fought against Western imperialism were most common before the 1990s, wars caused by the break-up of failed states have become far more common in the years since. Many writers argue that military competition prior to 1989/1991 was either between different kinds of states like the USSR and the USA or for the establishment of new states like Vietnam s extended struggle against Japan, France and the USA. A key characteristic of both types is their location within disintegrating states. The world has witnessed many civil wars over time. The USA experienced a brutal internal war of its own between 1861 and 1865, which killed nearly 650,000 of its own citizens (more than in all the foreign wars the US has fought since). Since the end of the Cold War, these civil or more precisely intrastate wars have become more normal. They are, in part, by-products of longstanding domestic conflicts that were papered over by the Cold War until the superpowers withdrawal of economic and political support from their various clients around 1989/1991 caused the latter already traumatised and brutalised to implode. The resulting intrastate wars have made life quite literally nasty, brutish and short for the millions inhabiting failed states. These wars take many forms as different factions, clans, tribal groups, nations and politicians seeking financial gain attempt to secede from pre-existing states (as with the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Chechens in Russia), gain control of state power (as in Angola and Mozambique), or acquire access to lucrative commodities such as diamonds and other valuable raw materials (as continues to happen in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo). These new wars, as Mary Kaldor defines them, have several characteristics. Their victims are more likely to be civilians than armed soldiers, they are fought by groups with little in the way of a universal message of emancipation, and they are often very local in character. That said, new wars also have the capacity to draw international players into what look like intrastate conflicts, leading to highly complex internationalised civil wars with a variety of local and foreign participants. New wars may be fought locally, but because of globalisation they tend to involve what Kaldor terms a myriad of transnational connections as well. As a result, they are often conducted 99

11 Introduction to international relations with the world s media present and more often than not local forces can count on some forms of external support. In spite of appearing local rather than international, new wars are anything but, drawing in members of international society who can ill-afford to stand idly by while one of the system s constituent states falls apart. Activity Stop and read section 6 of Chapter 13, pp.224 26 Use the table below to organise terms from the readings associated with post- Westphalian warfare. Are they similar to the characteristics of modern and postmodern war that you observed at the beginning of section 2? Post-Westphalian warfare 100 That said, the West has not been especially enthusiastic about being drawn into these conflicts, especially when they are not seen to be important to states interests. Indeed, immediately after the Cold War, the last remaining superpower the USA was reluctant to expend its blood and treasure in foreign interventions. But indifference proved to be no policy, especially when a number of conflicts first in former Yugoslavia, and then in Somalia and Afghanistan threatened wider instability. Afghanistan in particular is a fine example of how a war fought in a poor and insignificant failed state in the 1990s (following the expulsion of the Russians in 1989) compelled the West to intervene militarily. As Mary Kaldor observes of new wars in general, Western states did not intervene in Afghanistan out of any deep humanitarian instincts. They did so but because Afghanistan had become the safe haven for non-state actors, like Al Qaeda, intent on disrupting the normal functioning of the international system. Liberal wars When thinking about the min causes of war in the modern world, we have to consider the role played by the liberal West. Having triumphed in the Cold War, the West viewed its post-communist mission as largely benign. Its strategic purpose, if it could claim to have one, was to do as little as possible on the assumption that there was no serious enemy to fight, and to spread the political and economic values that had been so successful in seeing off the Soviet adversary. However, herein lay a contradiction. If, after all, there were governments out there who refused to accept this Western definition of order, what should be done about rogue states who insisted on playing by their own rules? This has proved to be an especially vexing problem for the USA. Having slain the Soviet dragon, a post-1991 USA found itself confronted by a series of smaller rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. These certainly did not have the material capabilities of the USSR. Neither did they seem to pose much of an ideological threat. Still, in America s

Chapter 7: War view, these states not only denied freedom to their own people but more importantly threatened the liberal international order more generally by supporting terrorism, seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or simply flouting the institutions of international society. The scene was set for an extended conflict that flared on and off throughout the 1990s. It featured a number of Western manoeuvres against these four states, including the 1991 war to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This extended set of Western interventions culminated in the Anglo-American decision to launch a liberal war against Saddam Hussein s Iraqi Ba ath regime in 2003 a war aimed at dragging the rogue state back into compliance with Liberal international systems. A member of the ES would describe it in slightly different terms as a war to force Iraq back into international society by punishing the country for breaching its (liberaldominated) principles and practices. The 2003 Iraq War proved highly controversial, and certainly has not ended the ongoing debate about what kind of foreign policy the West should have vis-à-vis non-liberal and non-western actors. Is it justifiable for the West to intervene into the affairs of other countries for broadly liberal reasons, such as to protect human rights or to end genocide? Critics on the left, like the American radical Noam Chomsky, regularly argue that Liberal posturing and talk about humanitarian intervention is only a pretext for justifying Western domination of the world and a cover for continued imperialism. Others are not quite so certain. Foreign policy always involved difficult choices. Furthermore, though one should be suspicious of the grand and benevolent claims made by powerful states, they are often the only actors capable and willing (no doubt for their own reasons) to ensure that civil and human rights are protected. As former British Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted when he made the case for Liberal intervention on no less than five occasions after coming into office in 1997, the West cannot be guided solely by hard-headed calculations of the national interest. Neither should it be constrained by the dogma that nobody under any circumstances intervene in the domestic affairs of other states. In a world where many states were killing their own people and slaughtering whole ethnic groups as Blair argued was happening in Kosovo and Iraq the West was faced with a simple choice: either to intervene and protect the weak or to close its eyes and allow the oppressors to continue doing harm. There was no third way. In the interests of protecting Liberal norms, war became the preferred outcome. Activity In March 2011, the UNSC passed resolution 1973, permitting international intervention in the Libyan civil war to set up no-fly zones and implement any other necessary measures needed to protect civilians from the Gaddafi regime. Is this a Liberal war? If so, what international regimes (see Chapter 5 of this subject guide) is the West trying to protect through its intervention? Just wars: right and wrong in battle The issue of whether the West should defend Liberal values through the barrel of a gun and the blast of a bomb leads us to our last problem: is there any such thing as a just war? The question of justice in battle is a very old one. Alex Bellamy calls it a two-thousand year old conversation about the legitimacy of war. The question still resonates in the modern era, as policy-makers discovered during the 2003 Iraq War. As we have already suggested, this was an especially interesting war of choice with both sides claiming that justice was on their side. The USA and its various 101

11 Introduction to international relations allies appeared to be in no doubt that right was on their side at the time. Iraq, they argued, had ignored the UN for over 10 years. It threatened the integrity of other states and, as Tony Blair insisted, made prisoners of its own people. As was made clear in the protests that followed, many millions around the world clearly did not agree. They insisted with equal vehemence that the war was not only unnecessary but unjust. Iraq, they argued, did not present an immediate and direct threat to its neighbours. It was sufficiently contained by UN resolutions and no-fly zones. There were, moreover, alternatives to invasion. Opponents went on to point out that the US-led coalition of the willing had no UN mandate, and involved the armies and air forces of mainly powerful states intervening forcefully in the internal affairs of a rather weak state. In other words, the Iraq War not only contravened the basic international principle of state sovereignty one of the bases of the international system but also violated the very principles of international law that the coalition claimed to defend. The specific issues posed by the 2003 Iraq War point to a more general set of questions that have been debated for centuries by moral philosophers, diplomats, politicians and theologians. This concerns the ethics of war and what kinds of war may or may not be deemed to be just. Some IR thinkers, particularly those of the Realist school, find the musings on the justice of war beside the point. Wars happen and that is that they insist. They see no point worrying about morality. The main aim, they say, is to win the war and not worry too much about its causes or the means employed to win it. According to a very different set of critics, the problem with the idea of just wars is that it makes certain wars more likely by providing its participants with a moral cover story. Pacifists in particular have been critical of the just war tradition, arguing that wars are by definition barbaric and can therefore never be justified by morality or ethics. It is often assumed that the just war tradition derives from a Western essentially Christian discourse, most famously popularised by one of the West s most influential mediaeval Christian theologians, St Thomas Aquinas. This is not strictly true. Just war theory draws on many traditions and can be found in many civilisations, from the Holy Quran to the Bhagavad Gita. Just war traditions therefore come in many shapes and sizes. In its Western guise the theory embraces two sets of criteria. The first, ius ad bellum, sets criteria to judge whether an actor s choice to go to war is justified. The second set of criteria, ius in bello, sets criteria to determine whether a war is being fought in a just manner. In broader terms, the just war tradition attempts to reconcile three things: the notion that taking human life is seriously wrong; the idea that states have a duty to defend their citizens and to defend justice; and the position that protecting innocent human life and defending important moral values sometimes requires the use of force. There is, however, one important point to keep in mind. Deciding that a war is just does not mean that it is good. A just war is permissible in international society because it is the lesser of two evils, but remains an evil nonetheless. Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 17, pp.287 89 How has our understanding of ius ad bellum and ius in bello changed over the past century? 102

Chapter 7: War The just war tradition raises many difficult questions. For example, can a justifiable war be waged in an unjust manner, yet still be just in terms of its goals? Alternatively, can a war begun unjustly be fought in a just fashion? Can a war be deemed just when it is almost certain that vast numbers of innocent civilians will be killed as a result? Indeed, in purely quantitative terms, how many deaths does it take to conclude that a war originally seen as just is just no more? These are not easy questions, and only become more difficult over time. Take the question of proportionality, a classic case of ius in bello. Should a war be fought using maximum firepower and causing maximum casualties in the hope of bringing it to the earliest possible end? Alternatively, should those waging war adopt a more cautious approach, reducing the number of casualties in the shortterm with the attendant risk of increasing the duration of the conflict? As British academic Chris Brown points out, in spite of its many difficulties and inconsistencies, the just war tradition plays a critical role in our thinking about armed conflict, providing a way of thinking that is relevant in all circumstances where force is used or its use is being contemplated. As we conclude our just war debate, two other issues need to be mentioned: nuclear weapons and terrorism. Nuclear weapons present an especially difficult problem. For many policy-makers and writers, nuclear arms can readily be justified on the not entirely immoral grounds that they have deterred war between the great powers since 1945. In doing so, they have saved millions of lives perhaps even saving human civilisation. But what if deterrence fails? Would nuclear war be justified if it were being conducted against an unambiguously aggressive, irrational state led by insane leaders? As political theorist Michael Waltzer grimly remarks in his landmark 1977 study, Just and unjust wars, it is never easy to work out what constitutes a just war; but given their destructive, indiscriminate character, nuclear weapons would seem to explode the theory of just war altogether. Just war theory has also been part and parcel of the more recent debate on international terrorism. Liberals normally make the case that Western societies should fight their enemies even those willing to undertake indiscriminate attacks against civilians using morally sustainable means. The tools used to prosecute war should be proportionate to the threat, employing means that are authorised by the international community. As the so-called War on Terror has unfolded, however, a number of Western states have decided to remove their moral gloves in order to combat the terrorist threat using morally dubious means. The USA, for example, has used torture to acquire information that we are told has saved thousands of lives. How are we to judge such actions? Are they wholly justified because the West is under attack from ruthless opponents who cannot be deterred? Are they totally unjustified because they undermine the very values that the West is claiming to defend? It is these difficult questions that the just war tradition is needed to answer. Activity How do you think the following approaches to IR would deal with the causes of war and the just war tradition? What sorts of causes would each identify? What sorts of conflicts, if any, would they consider just? Use the table below to address their positions on the causes and justice of war. 103

11 Introduction to international relations Approach Causes of war? Just wars? Realism Liberalism Marxism Constructivism A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: describe different kinds of inter- and intra-state war assess the contribution of IR to debates on the nature and character of war explain actors motivations for waging in warfare relate the ethical questions concerning war to the Iraq War, nuclear war and the War on Terror define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary clash of civilisations deterrence failed states internationalised civil wars intrastate wars ius ad bellum ius in bello just wars mutually assured destruction (MAD) new wars profit rogue states structural theory of war wars of national liberation Sample examination questions 1. How would you define war? 2. How many different types of war can you identify? 3. Critically assess two structural theories of war. 4. Is it ever possible to justify war? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 104

Chapter 8: Peace Chapter 8: Peace I prefer the most unfair peace to the most righteous war. Cicero Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: familiarise you with different definitions of peace explore various theories associated with it understand the political forms that peace has assumed assess whether or not the world is more at peace today than at other points in its history. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain why some peace settlements succeed and others fail assess the impact of the peace movement in the Cold War evaluate the significance of peace processes since the end of the Cold War assess the evidence supporting the thesis that the world is becoming less warlike define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Baylis, J. International and global security. Galtung, J. Violence, peace and peace research, Journal of Peace Research 6(3) 1969, pp.166 91. Taylor, P. and C. Devon The United Nations. Further reading Adler, E. Condition(s) of peace in Dunne, T., Cox, M. and Booth, K. The Eighty Years Crisis: international relations 1919 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780521667838]. Ayres, R.W. A world flying apart? Violent nationalist conflict and the end of the Cold War, Journal of Peace Research 37(1) 2000, pp.105 17. Dorussen, H. and H. Ward Trade networks and the Kantian peace, Journal of Peace Research 47(1) 2010, pp.29 42. Gaddis, J.L. The long peace: elements of stability in the post-war international system, International Security 10(4) 1986, pp.92 142. Kivimaki, T. The long peace of ASEAN, Journal of Peace Research 37(5) 2000, pp.635 49. Sheehan, J. The monopoly of violence: why Europeans hate going to war. (London: Faber, 2008) [ISBN 9780571220854]. Note: especially Part III, States without war pp.147 221. 105

11 Introduction to international relations Works cited Angell, N. The great illusion: a study of the relation of military power to national advantage. (London: Obscure Books, 2006) [ISBN 9781846645419]. Gartze, E. The Capitalist peace, American Journal of Political Science 51(1) 2007, pp.166 91. Human Security Report Project Human Security Report 2009/2010: the causes of peace and the shrinking costs of war. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780199860814]. Ikenberry, G.J. After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780691050911]. Kende, I. The history of peace: concept and organization from the Late Middle Ages to the 1870s, Journal of Peace Research 26(3) 1989, pp.233 47. Luard, E. War in international society. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987) [ISBN 9781850430124]. Powell, J. Great hatred, little room: making peace in Northern Ireland. (London: The Bodley Head, 2008) [ISBN 9780099523734]. Richmond, O.P. A post-liberal peace. (London: Routledge, 2011) [ISBN 9780415667845]. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI yearbook. 2010: armaments, disarmament and international security. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780199581122]. Stringham, E. Commerce, markets, and peace: Richard Cobden s enduring lessons, The Independent Review 9(1) 2004, pp.105 16. Thompson, E.P. Beyond the Cold War. (London: Merlin Press and END, 1982) [ISBN 9780850362862]. Introduction In Chapter 7 we examined notions, causes and varieties of war, as well as looking back at issues associated with the just war tradition. In this chapter we look at peace, often defined simply as the absence of war. Peace and war are obviously connected. In fact, it is difficult to think about one without thinking about the other. Though the modern world has undoubtedly been shaped by war, peace has been just as important to its evolution over time. States claim to prefer peace. It does not kill their citizens, it allows economies to function and interact unhindered, and is generally less expensive than conflict. Instinctively, peace seems morally superior as well. Indeed, because peace is deemed socially positive, there is a great deal of admiration for figures in history including Mahatma Gandhi and Dr Martin Luther King Jr who have fought for their causes by non-violent means. By the same measure, there is little sympathy for war mongers. Being labelled warlike in the modern world carries political risks. It can lead to accusations of war crimes; note the fate of Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević who was brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 2001. Even when prosecution is out of the question, the label can gravely damage one s political reputation, as both Tony Blair and George W. Bush have found out since leading the coalition of the willing into Iraq in 2003. In the chapter that follows we will explore a few of the problems associated with the idea of peace, beginning with a few basic definitions. We will then examine Realist and Liberal theories of peace before moving on to three important practical expressions of peace in the contemporary international system: 106

Chapter 8: Peace 1. peace treaties or settlements 2. peace movements 3. peace processes. We will wrap up by considering whether or not the world is becoming a more peaceful place. The meaning of peace The first problem we need to address is what exactly is meant by the term peace? Usually it is often taken to mean the opposite of war an absence of conflict. This commonsense approach is fine for starters, but what about periods of peace that are mere interludes between wars? Think of the period between 1919 and 1939 in Europe. States can be at peace while preparing for war, as was the case in the interwar and Cold War international systems. When the Cold War came to an end bringing peace in its wake many states continued to spend vast amounts on national security while looking for external enemies to fight. Peace, in this case, was no more affordable than had been the conflict that preceded it. A second issue revolves around the desirability of peace. As we have already indicated, peace is invariably perceived as something worth having and war as something worth avoiding. However, the case could be made that peace is not always unambiguously positive. For instance, when faced with the rise of Imperial Japan in the 1930s, was it better for China to seek some form of peace or to take measures that made full-scale war with Japan that much more likely? Is it better to accept an unjust order and thus preserve the peace or to take up arms to oppose injustice? In human terms, and other things being equal, peace is preferable to war. However, because other things are never equal, peace at any cost is sometimes a road block to progress. Finally, there are ways of thinking about peace other than in purely military terms. This particular problem was originally raised by Norwegian peace researcher, Johan Galtung (see the Essential reading for this chapter). In his view, peace must be considered as more than just the absence of overt personal violence. It implies something far more active. Under the heading of peace, Galtung includes positive measures undertaken by states, individuals and civil society groups to further mutual understanding and create what he terms a culture of peace that excludes not only war, but also forms of structural violence that limit an individual s ability to fulfil their potential. Peace, in Galtung s view, requires not only an absence of war which he defines as negative peace but also an absence of the social injustice caused by structural violence which he defines as positive peace. As long as people are starving in Somalia and unable to go to school for reasons of gender, class, ethnicity or identity, we will only ever be able to achieve peace in its negative form. Indeed, so long as these structures of violence persist, we will be unable to speak of peace in any meaningful sense. Stop and read Galtung, J. Violence, peace and peace research, Journal of Peace Research 6(3) 1969, pp.167 68, 183 86 Activity Use the table below to organise the glossary terms below as forms of personal and structural violence. 107

11 Introduction to international relations Personal violence Structural violence Glossary bombing, child labour, economic exploitation, illiteracy, murder, poverty, racism, rape, sexism, social exclusion, suicide, theft, torture Theories of peace Galtung s is but one of the many contributions made by different peace researchers over the years. Despite decades (even centuries) of intellectual labour, they continue to grapple with basic questions, particularly how peace be it positive or negative can be achieved. For the most recognisable answers, we turn to Realist and Liberal theory. In the first camp are those Realists who accept that peace may be a good thing, but argue that the only ways to achieve it are by preserving some kind of balance of power between the various states, by maintaining one s own military capabilities, or by supporting the retention of nuclear weapons to deter interstate war. Resolutions against war and the weapons of war are all very well, they say. The Nobel peace prize is a very fine thing. However, at the end of the day, Realists maintain that the most effective way to ensure peace is through deterrence raising the costs of war for those who might be tempted to start one. In this view, the more resolute, tough and unambiguously strong you are as a state, the more likely you are to enforce peaceful relations with potential aggressors. The worst possible thing that Realists believe a state can do is to give an impression of weakness, which would only encourage other actors to be more aggressive. This dynamic, Realists argue, allowed the Second World War to happen when none of the Great Powers proved willing to oppose Germany s, Japan s or Italy s revisionist ambitions. For Realists, peace must be built from a clear position of strength and supported by significant military capacity. Stop and read sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 14, pp.234 36 Why do Realists claim that trust is a limited commodity in the anarchic international system? How does their argument relate to the Prisoner s Dilemma discussed in Chapter 5 of this subject guide? 108 The Realist view has been much criticised. In public discussions, pacifists who are opposed to violence in any form object to the contradictions implicit in Realism s programme of arming for peace. Liberals who as we saw in the last chapter can and do go to war point out that hoping for peace while preparing for war makes others in the international system feel insecure, leading to the security dilemma at the heart of mainstream IR. Finally, there exists a relatively loose coalition of scholars who argue that there is a more sustainable way of creating a peaceful world order. Although they accept that power is and will remain important in world politics, they argue that military power alone is not a sustainable basis for long-term peace.

Chapter 8: Peace As discussed in Chapter 5, eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant describes his proposed peace programme in some detail. This includes, among other things, opposition to secret treaties and to states intervening to alter the constitution or government of another state. More interesting still is his stated view that perpetual peace can only be guaranteed when the civil constitution of every state should be republican. In plain English, Kant argues that peace will only be achieved after every European state undergoes major domestic political reform, leading to the creation of non-monarchical forms of government that will be disinclined to fight fellow republics. By linking the idea of peace to states domestic systems of government, Kant lays the foundation for what is now known in IR as Democratic Peace Theory (DPT). As discussed in Chapter 5, this is the belief that while democracies might go to war with other kinds of state, they will rarely go to war against another democracy. DPT has also come to be associated with an analytically different notion that stresses the pacifying logic of markets and the role played by increased economic relations in promoting cooperative behaviour between states. It is an economic version of DPT s political argument. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this free trade theory of peace was advanced by a variety of influential thinkers. The nineteenth-century English writer Richard Cobden believed that increased commerce would weaken the case for war. In 1909, Norman Angell published The Great Illusion, in which he argued that war in the early twentieth century was becoming increasingly unlikely. In an era of interdependent economies, he claimed that it was in nobody s interest to go to war. The great Austrian-American economist Joseph Schumpeter insisted that the modern, integrated capitalist economy made states inherently peaceful and, by definition, opposed to conquest. Although the idea that market capitalism increases the likelihood of peace between states was dealt a blow in 1914, advocates of peace did not give up the cause. As the First World War continued, those making the case for peace found a powerful advocate in the US President, Woodrow Wilson. Wilson remains a controversial figure, one much ridiculed by his more hard-headed critics. But he was no simple-minded utopian. The world, he insisted, had come to grief in 1914 because statesmen continued to think it was possible to achieve peace by accumulating arms and maintaining a highly unstable balance of power. At the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson argued that it was time to create a world where manmade international law would replace the law of the jungle, allowing international organisations like the League of Nations to constrain states tendency to resort to violence as the means of achieving security. Activity Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 14, pp.236 37 Now that you are familiar with both Realism s and Liberalism s programmes for peace, use the table below to organise your views of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Strengths Liberalism Strengths Realism Weaknesses Weaknesses 109

11 Introduction to international relations As noted in the opening chapter of this subject guide, the Liberal turn in international affairs after the First World War failed to stop another war, and President Wilson himself lost credibility. Still, Wilsonianism lives on. In fact, a strong case has been made by John Ikenberry that current peace between Western powers is based on the Liberal ideas we have been discussing. Not only was the post-second World War order in the Western world created by a quintessentially liberal power the USA it also built on earlier theories of the importance of free trade (now called an open world economy), democratic governance and the critical role of collective bodies like the UN. After the Second World War, a relatively successful peace was constructed not because the USA had more tanks, planes and submarines, than its enemies though that may have helped but because the USA in particular and the West in general could draw on its shared Liberal tradition of peacemaking, speeding up the West s reconstruction after years of profound disturbance. Peace treaties Wars end. When they do, it is up to those left behind to construct sustainable peace. This is never an easy job. Often, the winners want to punish the losers; as they did after the First World War. More often than not, war itself leaves behind a terrible legacy of broken economies, resentment and suspicion that makes a stable international system far more difficult to achieve. Finally, although wars end, the causes that give rise to them do not necessarily go away. This is why some peace settlements and again we return to those made after the First World War proved to be so spectacularly unsuccessful. The best way to ensure peace following an extended war remains hotly contested in IR, with every theoretical approach proposing its own roadmap. In fact, the treaties that have been signed following lengthy wars have been as much written about as the original wars themselves. There is a vast literature on the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648 to end the Thirty Years War (and lay the legal foundation for the institution of state sovereignty). The Congress of Vienna (1814 1815) has been the subject of an even more extensive discussion, with special attention being paid to its illiberal, great power character. The events leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 have also been the subject of intense debate, as have the various treaties and settlements that finally brought the Second World War and the Cold War to their very different conclusions. Activity Stop and read Box 17.2 in Chapter 17, p.282. Box 17.2 in the textbook lists six of the most important legal treaties in international history. What do these short summaries tell you about: the relationship between wars and international law the evolution of principles and practices in European international society since 1648? 110 Treaties are a form of agreement entered into by sovereign states. As agreements between consenting parties, they also assume a legally binding character. This gives any treaty a very special importance in international law. Treaties can create serious problems too for politicians, especially US ones. In part, this is because the upper house of the US Congress, the Senate, has to ratify any treaty by a two-thirds majority and, thanks to domestic pressures, often refuses to do so. This was the ironic outcome of the Paris Peace Conference, which the Senate refused to ratify given the treaty s provisions concerning US membership of the League of Nations.

Chapter 8: Peace Since George Washington s farewell address, there has been a suspicion of international legally binding agreements that might limit US sovereignty or entangle it in distant disputes. This had political consequences when Congress refused to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol governing climate change and then revoked the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed with the Soviet Union in 1972. There is no single theory of treaties any more than there is a single lesson that can be drawn from them all. Three general points, however, are worth keeping in mind. First, if a treaty s purpose is to make peace, this is more likely to happen when its signatories agree on core values and principles. The failure of the Allies to agree on such common ground helps to explain why the peace talks between the USSR, the USA and the UK failed after the Second World War. Likewise, the growing harmony between the superpowers in the late 1980s helps to explain why the treaties that ended the Cold War such as that which reunified Germany were more successful. It also explains the achievements of the EU a treaty-based organisation that brings together like-minded states to cooperate in their mutual interest. Yet even when states share the same values, they can still disagree. This was certainly the case in 1989, when Britain and France disagreed strongly about the future shape of Europe and the leading role to be played in the new Europe by NATO (Britain s preferred organisation to ensure peace) and the European Community (France s organisation of choice). This raises the larger question of why some peace settlements lay the foundations for peace while others fail to do so. It is easy to make sweeping generalisations. After all, even with the best intentions in the world, some treaties will fail to tackle the problems they face. That said, one might argue that successful peace settlements tend to be inclusive, drawing winners and losers alike back into a shared international society. Unsuccessful settlements are often deliberately exclusive, barring the losing side from full membership in the international system. At Versailles in 1919, the victorious Allies failed to show magnanimity towards defeated Germany, excluding it from the League of Nations, imposing punitive reparations and forcing it to accept full responsibility for the outbreak of war. The decision to exclude Germany from the post-war peace had consequences that later proved to be disastrous. By 1945, both the USA and the UK had learned some lessons of 1919 and set out to rebuild and reintegrate a prosperous Germany into Western international society. The result was a prosperous and engaged Federal Republic of Germany, which acted as a bulwark of the post-war international system. The third issue worth thinking about relates to diplomacy and the ambiguous wording often deployed in peace agreements in order to get everyone on board. Ambiguity is at the heart of diplomacy. It is why diplomats and their legal advisers come into their own during the drafting and signing of treaties. Over the long term, ambiguity can also create all sorts of disputes. Such was to be the problem following the final agreement over German unification and the new Germany s membership of NATO in 1990. The USSR, and later Russia, assumed that the agreement implied that NATO would not extend its reach beyond the new German borders. The Americans read the agreement very differently. The results have been problematic from the point of view of the post-cold War order in Europe. They have created a situation that has left the Russian Federation feeling betrayed and increasingly distrustful. Initially, this did not matter too much. However, once NATO began enlarging in earnest, bringing the organisation right up to the borders of the Russian Federation 111

11 Introduction to international relations itself, the dangers of ambiguity began to ripple through the international system. The short and brutal war in Georgia in 2008 was one of the unfortunate, if indirect, consequences. Peace movements Peace treaties are formal agreements made between official state representatives. Peace movements are rather informal affairs that can spring up spontaneously from below with the aim of challenging authority, explaining why governments tend to be suspicious of them. This was certainly the case during the Cold War, when unofficial peace movements in the West emerged to challenge conventional thinking by questioning the extent of the Soviet threat to the free world and the necessity of nuclear weapons to contain it. How effective such appeals were in slowing the arms race or thwarting any given military policy remains unclear. Not very would seem to be the most obvious answer. Still, the amount of time Western governments invested in combating peace movements indicates that they were not regarded as entirely irrelevant by those in power. Movements for peace go back much further than the Cold War. One peace researcher, Istvan Kende, has shown that the philosophical roots of contemporary peace movements can be traced back many centuries. The first Nobel Prize for peace was awarded in 1901, long before either world war. Indeed, it was to be the appalling carnage of the First World War that led to the first mass peace movements. These assumed a number of forms, perhaps most coherently expressed in the creation of thousands of League of Nations Union branches in the 1920s and 1930s, dedicated to the ideal of peace through disarmament and collective security. In the USA, meanwhile, there was an equally strong response to the war. In the 1930s, this took the form of a variety of the Neutrality Acts, pieces of legislation motivated by the country s isolationism. Opposition to war spawned its own literature in the interwar years. One of the best-selling books of the that period was All quiet on the western front, written by Eric Maria Remarque, a German veteran of the Great War. It describes, in graphic detail, what the author saw as the futility and brutality of war. The novel, first published in 1928, went on to sell 2.5 million copies in its first 18 months, and was later made into a popular Hollywood film. Significantly, after seizing power in 1933, the Nazis both banned and burned it. Peace movements during the Cold War arose at different moments, but were driven by a shared fear of nuclear war. The first great popular movement arose in the late 1950s, reaching a climax with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The movement tended to fade away as relations between the two superpowers improved during the period of détente, but emerged again in the late 1970s and early 1980s following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the election of US President Ronald Reagan and the deployment of a new generation of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. This second movement tended to be more diverse than the first, which had been more anti-american in its assumption that the USA, more than the USSR, bore responsibility for international instability. In the 1980s, this argument was qualified by a more balanced approach the English historian Edward P. Thompson, for example, spoke of a shared superpower responsibility for the Cold War, drawing the political conclusion that the conflict would continue until both the USA and the USSR removed themselves from a still-divided Europe. 112

Chapter 8: Peace In the wider IR literature on peace movements, two issues remain important. One concerns the role the peace movement played in bringing the Cold War to an end. Here, opinion is divided between those who view it as having been virtually irrelevant a position popular with Realists and Marxists and those who feel it changed the international atmosphere in Europe, paving the way for the thaw in relations that led to 1989. Activity Take a second to consider which mainstream and alternative approaches to IR would sympathise with the role of peace movements in ending the Cold War. Write them down in the space below. The other issue concerns the legacy of the peace movement. Views are split. Some view the movement as a mere footnote in the history of the Cold War, without much purpose in the post-cold War world. Others feel that the underlying issues that spawned the movement nuclear weapons and the dangers of war have not gone away, leaving space for the movement to have a continuing role in international affairs. There is no easy way to resolve this particular debate. One legacy, however, seems certain to continue: the institutionalisation of peace research in a number of established centres in Europe and the USA. The movement as it was originally constituted may have lost some of its appeal in the post-cold War period. However, the serious research on peace that it spawned still goes on. Peace processes A third way of thinking about peace and its political significance in international affairs is to look briefly at what has generically come to be defined as peace processes. Peace movements have faded since the end of the Cold War. The same cannot be said of peace processes, which have become a permanent feature of the post-cold War international landscape. The exact number of peace processes since 1989 remains unclear, and their success in bringing about real peace is hotly disputed. However, one thing seems clear. There have been lots of them, from the Middle East to Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland to South Africa. Although it is impossible to summarise all that has been written about these many examples, a few generalisations are in order. The first has to do with definition. Like the word peace, peace process can be defined in many different ways. Here, it is used to mean a political process in which conflicts are resolved through negotiation and nonviolent means. Peace processes operate at several different levels and involve a mixture of diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation, confidencebuilding measures, mediation and lengthy dialogue between the various parties, sometimes official and sometimes off the record. Second, peace processes normally stretch over many years. As British negotiator Jonathan Powell points out in his reflections on his time in Northern Ireland in the 1990s, peace does not happen overnight. It is 113

11 Introduction to international relations necessary to first establish whether or not the parties to the conflict actually want peace. It is then essential to win over as many intransigents as possible, particularly groups dedicated to continued conflict. Only then can you get everybody sitting around the negotiation table. Still, you cannot be sure that you will achieve a sustainable peace. In the case of Northern Ireland, British and Irish diplomats had to exercise an enormous amount of patience and diplomatic skill. They also had to sort out various outstanding problems common to most peace processes. These include the shape of post-conflict policing, the representative character of new political institutions, and the very difficult issue of disarmament. It was this last issue that nearly destroyed the peace process in Northern Ireland. Our third general point regards the indispensable part played by thirdparty mediators and external actors in helping push these processes along. If the parties to a conflict want to exchange war for peace, an external voice is essential to encourage the parties and guarantee their agreements as a way of building trust between them. An outside actor must therefore be seen by all sides as an honest broker, willing to mobilise material and ideational resources to support all sides in the peace process. Real problems can arise where the outsider is not seen as a disinterested referee. This is one reason why the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been stalled for so long. While the USA should be the key third party, it is perceived by many in the region to have what it itself calls a special relationship with one of the parties to the conflict: Israel. Consequently the USA is no longer regarded as a disinterested referee. There is a fourth issue relating to what peace processes can deliver. At best, even when processes are successful, nobody is going to be entirely satisfied. As Roger MacGuinty has shown in his comparative analysis, peace processes can fail entirely, leaving the situation more volatile than before. This may now be the case following the collapse of the talks between the Palestinians and Israel. Indeed, one of the main arguments against relaunching the peace process in 2008 was that another failure would likely poison the conflict to such an extent that there was every chance of things getting worse. Like any international action, peace processes are not without risk. Finally, there are many situations in the world today where the best one can hope for is an armed truce or stalemate, managed however imperfectly by international peacekeeping forces provided by the UN. This is the situation in many deeply divided societies from sub-saharan Africa to parts of the Balkans. Today, UN peacekeepers undertake a variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of global governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. Despite imperfections in the system, there is no indication that demand for the UN s services will wane any time soon. In 2005, the organisation had just over 60,000 peacekeeping personnel in the field. Today there are nearly 100,000. On this basis alone one can argue that if the UN did not exist, the international community would have to invent something similar to do the difficult and often thankless jobs that most states would prefer not to do themselves. 114

Chapter 8: Peace Stop and read sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 19, pp.317 21 Define each of the following terms and indicate what kind of peace (think of Johan Galtung) it is trying to achieve. Peacemaking: Peacekeeping: Peacebuilding: A more peaceful world? The previous discussions lead us to think more generally about peace in the modern world, and to ask whether or not the world is becoming more peaceful? The answer one often gets is a resounding No. Deep instability in the Middle East, insurgencies in Afghanistan, nearly 30,000 dead in an ongoing war against drug gangs in Mexico, potential state failure in Pakistan, terrorist bombs going off around the world all embedded within a wider War on Terror seem to point to a world sliding over the edge. Furthermore, how can we talk of peace when so much continues to be spent on arms? As the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research has shown, worldwide military expenditure in 2010 totalled an estimated $1.5 trillion, a 6% increase since 2008 and up just under 50% since 2000. Not all the evidence points in this direction, however. More recent research into war suggests something rather less gloomy: far from becoming more frequent and bloodier, wars are becoming less common and less costly in terms of human lives. This is certainly not the impression one gets from reading, watching or listening to the news. Nevertheless, the numbers indicate that the regional wars fought before the 1990s were much more devastating than those since. Naturally, there are exceptions. The ongoing war in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been especially deadly. From a statistical point of view, however, it is the overall averages that count. These tell us that whereas a standard international conflict during the Cold War killed around 20,000 people a year, that average has fallen to 6,000 deaths per year in the 20 years since. In the twenty-first century, the number drops to only 3,000. It is not an insignificant reduction. Another important indication of this pacific trend is the decline in the number of wars fought between states themselves. Here again the statistics tell a very different story to the commonsense view that the world is becoming a bloodier place. Whereas in the 1950s there were, on average, just over six interstate conflicts around the world each year, that number had dropped to just one by the turn of the century. Moreover, none of these were fought between the great powers. In fact, looked at over the longer term, there has not been a single war fought between major Western states for 60 years, which is almost unprecedented. As Evan Luard points out, this is a change of spectacular proportions: perhaps the single most striking discontinuity that the history of warfare has produced. This situation has been neatly summarised in the Human Security Report for 2009 2010. It points out that, although relatively little scholarly 115

11 Introduction to international relations 116 attention has been directed at the issue perhaps because it is far less exciting talking about wars ending than wars continuing the decline in both the number and intensity of wars since 1989 has been striking. In the 10-year period between 1992 and 2003, conflicts in general fell by 40%. Wars defined as high intensity conflicts resulting in over 1,000 more battle deaths a year dropped by 78% between 1988 and 2008. Nor should we discount the significance of peace processes in bringing about this reduction. It is true that some new and appalling wars either began or continued after 1989. Nevertheless, the general trend in terms of casualties and conflicts indicates that the international system is not as hopelessly gloomy as some journalists, academics and politicians would have us believe. Explaining peace in an age of terror How, then, do we account for our present situation? There are several explanations. One stresses the growing difficulty of holding onto conquests and of economically exploiting territories after one has invaded them. Another looks at the scale of destruction caused by even conventional modern wars. The view expressed by some theorists of the post-war peace puts great store on the important part played by public opinion in undermining states inclinations to go to war again. The end of the Cold War also played a critical role in reducing the incidence of war by cutting off or reducing the supply of arms and support to states and insurgencies alike. There is certainly a strong correlation between the conclusion of the superpower conflict and the reduced number of wars in many parts of the world. To this list, we should add two other explanations of the movement away from war in the international system: the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons and the pacifying role played by globalisation. Neither of these explanations are without their problems. Those who stress the pacifying role of nuclear weapons appear to forget that the possession of nuclear weapons helps to drive the very security dilemma that Realists blame for the durability of war. Meanwhile, globalisation as we shall see in a later chapter can just as easily cause competitive anxieties as it does cooperative behaviour. However, even sceptics have to concede something here: weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can make states act cautiously, as has been the case with relations between India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, growing economic ties provide material incentives for states to resolve their differences peacefully. The economic argument is an especially interesting one. Growing trade did not prevent the First World War from breaking out. Nearly 100 years later, the advance of capitalism in the most integrated parts of the world here taken to mean the EU, the Transatlantic Region and East Asia has led states in these areas to resolve their differences by means other than armed force. Whether this will eventually remove all sources of tension in international society is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, it may, in time, lead the international system farther down the road towards peace. Activity Using the following link, access Figure 1.1 (Average number of international conflicts per year, 1950 2008) of the Human Security Report 2009 2010: www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/overview.aspx Consider a few reasons why some people continue to believe that the world is becoming a bloodier place.

Chapter 8: Peace A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain why some peace settlements succeed and others fail assess the impact of the peace movement in the Cold War evaluate the significance of peace processes since the end of the Cold War assess the evidence supporting the thesis that the world is becoming less warlike define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary deterrence diplomacy free trade theory of peace global governance honest broker Immanuel Kant negative peace peace peacekeeping peace processes positive peace reparations structural violence United Nations Sample examination questions 1. Should peace be defined as the absence of war? 2. Is there any single theory of peace that you find convincing? 3. Can nuclear weapons be seen as weapons of peace? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 117

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 118

Chapter 9: The state Chapter 9: The state Perhaps the most telling number [between 1495 and 2003] is the dramatic growth in the number of states [from 18 to almost 200]. Holsti, K.J. Taming the sovereigns: institutional change in international politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p.311. To talk of global politics is to recognize that politics itself has been globalised and that as a consequence there is much more to the study of world politics than conflict and cooperation between states. Baylis, J., S. Smith and P. Owens The globalization of world politics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) fifth edition, p.24. Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: explain the rise of the state and the associated concept of sovereignty assess the significance of the Treaty of Westphalia discuss the success of the state in the twentieth century outline the role and significance of non-state actors assess some of the main criticisms of state-centrism. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain the development of the sovereign state since 1648 differentiate between different forms of legal, interdependence, domestic and Vatellian sovereignty describe some of the challenges and opportunities facing states in an era of globalisation evaluate the role of non-state actors in international relations define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Reus-Smit, C. International law. Willetts, P. Transnational actors and international organisations in global politics. Linklater, A. Globalization and the transformation of political community. Further reading Beyond hypocrisy? Sovereignty revisited Special issue of International Politics 46(6) 2009, pp.657 752. Brown, C. Reimagining international society and global community in Held, D. and A. McGrew Globalization theory: approaches and controversies. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) [ISBN 9780745632117]. 119

11 Introduction to international relations Buzan, B. and R. Little Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the fall in Cox, M., K. Booth and T. Dunne The Interregnum: controversies in world politics 1989 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780521785099]. Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 25(5) 1999. James, A. The practice of sovereign statehood in contemporary international society, Political Studies 47(3) 1999, pp.457 73. Krasner, S. Rethinking the sovereign state model in Cox, M., T. Dunne and K. Booth Empires, systems and states. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780521016865] Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 27(5) 2001. Krasner, S. Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780691007113]. Note: especially Chapter 1, pp.3 42. Osiander, A Sovereignty, international relations and the Westphalian myth, International Organization 55(2) 2001, pp.251 87. Wallace, W. Europe after the Cold War: interstate order or post-sovereign regional order in Cox, M., K. Booth, and T. Dunne The Interregnum: controversies in world politics 1989 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780521785099]. Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 25(5) 1999. Works cited Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years Crisis. Edited by M. Cox. (New York: Palgrave, 2001) [ISBN 9780333963777] p.xxxi, p.209, p.212. Held, D. Cosmopolitanism: ideals and realities. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780745648361]. Khanna, P. How to run the world: charting a course to the next renaissance. (New York: Random House, 2011) [ISBN 9781400068272]. Krasner, S. Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) [ISBN 9780691007113]. Rousseau, J.J. A lasting peace through the Federation of Europe. Translated by C.E. Vaughn. (ETH Zurich: ISN Primary Resources in Security Affairs, 2008) http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/files/isn/46089/ipriadoc_doc/a47ec448- BD7D-48AA-9CE4-BC0C64C7E062/en/5014_Rousseau_A_Lasting_Peace.pdf Wheeler, N.J. Saving strangers. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780199253104]. 120 Introduction As has been suggested at many points in this subject guide, it is important to take a wide view of what we mean by the notion of the international and to think carefully about who and what constitutes an actor in the international system. Since the end of the Cold War in particular scholars in IR have thought a great deal about this issue. Some have remained resolutely state-centric in their approach. Others have not. A few writers entirely reject the state-centric approach to the study of world politics, arguing that because the global security environment has changed so much since 1989 primarily because of globalisation and the emergence of new transnational threats we should think of the world less in terms of states, and more and more in terms of non-state actors. Some have pushed this new approach to its limits. A recent work of popular IR by Parag Khanna discusses world politics as if states hardly matter at all. He argues that it is not these formal units of power that really matter in IR, but rather an assortment of bodies and individuals from transnational corporations (TNCs) and NGOs to celebrities, entrepreneurs and communities of faith. Khanna argues that this new global reality bears little resemblance to the traditional view of IR as the study of how states

Chapter 9: The state make policies, determine strategies, protect their citizens and organise, plan and fight wars. The main purpose of this chapter is to assess these radical claims by setting them alongside the more traditional view that states continue to matter a great deal. It looks first at how our international system based on the sovereign state emerged, and why. We will then explore why the state has been so successful as an international actor, especially in the twentieth century. We then discuss the roles played by non-state actors, suggesting that important though they undoubtedly are, we should be careful not to conclude that they are either replacing or becoming more important than the state in world politics. Finally, we will look in some detail at recent criticism of states and state sovereignty. The rise of the sovereign state Activity Stop and read section 2 of Chapter 20, pp.328 30 Using the material in the readings and the glossary, define each of the following terms, noting especially the differences between them. Country: Nation: State: States have existed for several centuries, forming such a familiar part of the furniture of IR that we rarely question their presence. As a result, we often take it for granted that they have always been, and always will be features of the international system. This is a historically flawed position. Though states are an extremely well-established form of political community, they have not always existed in a form that we would recognise today. Moreover, there is no reason that they must remain so central to the international system. Our first task therefore is to explain how they initially came into being. As Kal Holsti has pointed out, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, Europe remained dotted with hundreds of different polities, overlapping jurisdictions, a low degree of differentiation between private and public realms, and divided loyalties. 1 Until a few hundred years ago, states and the principle of sovereignty that defines their rights and responsibilities were at best marginal players in international society. When the term sovereign was used prior to the mid-seventeenth century, it signified a superior or individual ruler, be it a king, a prince or a pope. The political communities of the day, then, were seen largely as the personal fiefs of their sovereigns, often arranged as parts of an overlapping system of local, regional and continental authorities. Thus, a peasant in fifteenth-century 1 Holsti, K. Taming the sovereigns: institutional change in international politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) [ISBN 9780521834032] p.31 121

11 Introduction to international relations Saxony held allegiance to their local lord, the Elector of Saxony, the Holy Roman Emperor, the Pope and a dizzying variety of other interrelated political communities. Only a number of major changes in and around the sixteenth century transformed this medieval international system into one that is recognisable today, replacing overlapping communities with the exclusive sovereignty of the territorial later national state. The first change saw the rise of royal power, made possible by a ruthless campaign that, over time, undermined political communities that might challenge royal authority. This was accompanied by the separation of royal authority from external systems of power, creating autonomous political communities centred on the person of the monarch. This is nicely illustrated by King Henry VIII s rejection of papal authority in the 1534 Act of Supremacy, which made the king instead of the pope supreme head of the Church in England. Centralised royal power was also bolstered through the establishment of the principle that what pleases the prince has the force of law and what the king wills, the law wills. These centralised legal authority in the person of the king and his court, the latter becoming synonymous with the state s judicial institutions. Finally, the transition to modern statehood was made possible by money. Statebased political communities proved uniquely capable of raising revenue and credit, mainly in order to fight the many wars in which Europe was embroiled at the time. Sovereignty is the main principle with which the state is associated. The question of which came first is immaterial insofar as one is inseparable from the other. It is as impossible to imagine the modern state without sovereignty as it is to imagine sovereignty without reference to the modern state. Defining sovereignty is never easy. It is both an aspiration and an institution, identifying both who can legitimately act in international society (the sovereign state) and how they should act towards one another (mutual non-intervention). Sovereignty itself consists of at least two main characteristics: 1. the notion that the state itself should not be subject to superior external authority 2. the idea that the state constitutes the supreme authority within a given jurisdiction. The rise of sovereignty as an organising principle in international society did not go unchallenged, most obviously by alternative political communities like the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire who had the most to lose from the creation of legally autonomous states. Establishing the principle of sovereignty in international society therefore involved a good deal of struggle and bloodshed. What we now call the wars of religion in Europe conducted between the newly formed Protestant churches and the established Roman Catholic one were in large part about determining what kind of political community would dominate the European system. The burning question of the day was to whom populations and territories owed their loyalty: their local lord, the Pope in Rome, the Holy Roman Emperor or their principality s monarch. Peace of Westphalia It was as a result of the longest and bloodiest of these wars The Thirty Years War, fought on and off in Central Europe between 1618 and 1648 that sovereignty was finally established in international society by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. There are many myths surrounding 122

Chapter 9: The state Westphalia, and possibly too much importance has been attached to the peace settlement s provisions in terms of establishing sovereignty on a sound footing. Sovereign states had, after all, developed in England and France as early as the mid-sixteenth century. Nevertheless, the Westphalian settlement is important in several respects. First, Westphalia formalised the important principle that the religion of the sovereign would also be the religion of his subjects (cuius regio, eius religio), first enshrined in the Peace of Augsburg (1555). Second, it helped reinforce the legal equality of sovereign political communities. In doing so, it laid the foundations for a system of international law based on treaty obligations rather than some rather vague emanations from God or Nature. Finally, Westphalia enshrined its provisions in a pair of multilateral treaties (the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster (both signed in 1648)), to which all the major powers of Europe consented. In this sense, it was truly a watershed moment. As the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau observed over a 100 years later, the Westphalia settlement will perhaps for ever remain the foundation of our international system. Rousseau s enthusiasm for Westphalia had nothing to do with the progressive enlightenment principles with which his name is now associated. Rather, it was his recognition that Westphalia established a degree of social order at the international level. The international society it created was not especially progressive from today s point of view. Although it provided for increased religious freedom, the Peace of Westphalia did not seek to protect individual rights. It did not seek to promote justice. It certainly did not have anything to do with the promotion of democracy. It simply enshrined the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Moreover, not even this principle was regularly adhered to in practice. According to the American scholar Stephen Krasner, the principle of sovereignty has created a system of organised hypocrisy, to which all states pay lip service, but regularly ignore when it comes to dealing with weaker and more vulnerable neighbours. Krasner points out that those who talk so piously about sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention the only bases on which the state system can operate with any degree of certainty are the same states that, in the nineteenth century, conquered vast swathes of the globe with little or no worry for the sovereign rights of others. Instead of dealing with sovereignty as a single concept, he divides it into four components: vatellian sovereignty, encompassing states ability to determine their own domestic political structures; interdependence sovereignty, which describes states ability to control the flow of ideas, goods and people across their borders; international legal sovereignty, which describes the recognition of a state s sovereign claims by other states in international society; and domestic sovereignty, which describes the state s ability to control the populations and territories over which it claims jurisdiction. By breaking sovereignty up into several components, Krasner hopes to more accurately describe the sovereign status of different states around the world. Some, like the USA, have very high degrees of vatellian, legal and domestic sovereignty, but have voluntarily sacrificed some of their interdependence sovereignty by joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). Others, like the Democratic Republic of Congo, only have firm claims to international legal sovereignty. Taiwan, meanwhile, does not have full international legal sovereignty, but does possess some degree of vatellian, interdependence and domestic sovereignty. 123

11 Introduction to international relations Activity Use the table below to consider each of the following states, the type(s) of sovereignty that they are able to claim and the extent to which they are able to claim it (full, partial, minimal, none). Legal: Germany Interdependence: Domestic: Vatellian: Legal: North Korea Interdependence: Domestic: Vatellian: Legal: Columbia Interdependence: Domestic: Vatellian: Legal: Somalia Interdependence: Domestic: Vatellian: State success Krasner s point about sovereignty as hypocrisy is well taken. As an institution a shared principle and behaviour of international society, it is regularly flouted by the very states who claim to protect it. What Krasner fails to explain is why such a morally flawed and duplicitous idea has become so popular in the twentieth century. If the measure of something is the degree to which it is imitated and copied by others, then the sovereign state has to be seen as the great political success story of the last 100 years. One measure of the state s success has been its appropriation by actors who, theoretically at least, seem opposed to the international system itself. In the Cold War, this part was played by the Communist world. Though opposed to many of the principles and behaviours that defined international society during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies were vocal supporters of states sovereign rights, especially the principle of sovereign independence vis-à-vis the states of the Western bloc. A strong state, they argued, was the only firm bedrock upon which socialism could be constructed insofar as sovereignty was the most obvious political principle to defend the socialist experiment against external, capitalist threats. Even as late as the 1970s and 1980s, the USSR was arguing that Western powers should stop interfering in its domestic affairs in the name of Western-defined human rights. Significantly, China continues to use the same Westphalian (Krasner would say vatellian) argument today. 124

Chapter 9: The state A second index of sovereignty s success in the twentieth century was the extraordinary increase in the number of states over that period. The figures tell their own story. In 1900, there were nearly a dozen European empires, but only a few dozen sovereign states. By 1919, the number of empires had diminished considerably while the number of states recognised under international law had risen enormously, largely as a result of the peace settlements following the First World War. By 1948, this figure had risen to 58 and continued its rise in the 1960s and 1970s as former colonial possessions achieved independence. Neither did the popularity of states as a form of political community end there. Indeed, following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power, the tally of states rose once more, and by 2010 numbered 194. Of course, not all these states were particularly successful as political communities. At least a few proved incapable of meeting the most basic requirements of sovereignty, collapsing into failed or quasi-states. Many of these possess, at most, one of Krasner s four aspects of sovereignty normally of the international legal variety. At the other end of the spectrum, at least one successful political community Taiwan has not been able to become a state because of competing sovereignty claims stemming from the People s Republic of China. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that states have never been in such demand. Stop and read sections 1 to 3 of Chapter 32, pp.530 34 As you work your way through the readings, consider each of the following questions: Why have states proven to be such a successful form of political community? What capabilities do states possess that non-state actors do not? Can suprastate political communities like Samuel Huntington s civilisations compete with states power in the modern international system? This brief survey begs the question why states and the principle of sovereignty have proven to be so successful. The most obvious answer is that states can do things that no other actor can. States, and states alone, have the power to raise taxes, issue passports, print money, pass laws, allow you in and out of countries, put you in prison, and in some jurisdictions kill you. In competitive terms, there is no non-state actor out there who can match the state in terms of its competences and authority. States also remain the most effective instrument for making foreign policy. As we will discuss shortly, non-state actors do lots of important things. However, these pale into insignificance when set alongside those done by states. Internationally, only states can formally declare war and make peace. Only states are permitted to vote in the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Only states can make treaties and recognise other states. They therefore hold a special place in the international system as the only legitimate representatives of territories and populations on the global stage. Sovereignty is particularly desirable because it affords some degree of legal protection to weaker actors in the international system. As we have already said, the principle of non-intervention provides an imperfect guarantee. However, sovereignty can at least be referred to by less powerful states to protest the actions of their powerful neighbours on the grounds that it may undermine their independence and autonomy. Sovereignty was an important shield against foreign interference when many new states were coming into international society in the 1950s and 125

11 Introduction to international relations 1960s as a way to escape the foreign domination of their colonial past. It remains so today. Another reason for a state s success is the unique ability to build a relationship with citizens and subjects. Indeed, the whole point of being a citizen of a state (note that it s impossible to be a citizen of anything else) is that citizenship allows you to make demands of your state that you cannot make of a corporation, NGO or any other non-state actor. States are supposed to have the capacity to deliver public goods that their citizens demand such as security and education and are judged on the basis of those deliveries. This helps to explain why even authoritarian states like China are viewed in a relatively positive light by their citizens, who repay the state s public goods with their personal loyalty. Whether or not any non-state actors, such as the EU may prove themselves willing and able to provide these goods remains to be seen. Finally, states have been successful because they are the actors best suited to function in the modern global economy. Globalisation can have both favourable and unfavourable consequences and many scholars today spend their time describing how inadequate states capabilities are when dealing with problems generated by globalisation. Other analysts point out that globalisation would have been impossible without the state, which has been primarily responsible for creating the conditions in which globalisation can spread. Moreover, the most successful and powerful states in the system have benefitted greatly from globalisation. The case of China is instructive. China, as we have already mentioned, has a strong attachment to the principle of sovereignty, with which it protects its domestic society from foreign intervention. Yet, this self-same state had no problem joining the world economy during the 1990s. Since then, it has been deriving enormous material legitimacy from its participation in the global economy, giving it the material capabilities to further strengthen its sovereignty claims. Activity Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 32, pp.534 37 Use the table below to describe the challenges posed by Westphalian sovereignty by each of the following terms. IR term Globalisation Challenge to sovereignty National fragmentation Cosmopolitanism Neo-medievalism 126

Chapter 9: The state Non-state actors The state performs tasks that no other actor is capable, willing or permitted to do. As many writers have pointed out, however, there are many actors in the international system beside the state. Multinational corporations and financial markets Thanks to the phenomenon of globalisation, national economies are more interconnected than ever, with an unprecedented level of trade in goods and services crossing international borders. In our contemporary capitalist world system, many large corporations operate in several countries at once, moving people, goods and capital around between countries while remaining within their company s own structure. These transnational or multinational corporations (TNCs or MNCs) are based in one state, but conduct operations in a range of others as well. Meanwhile, vast sums of private capital move around the world every day, trading in corporate shares, national currencies, government bonds and other financial instruments. The size of these financial movements and multinational corporations is enough to dwarf the national economies of most small and medium-sized states. This leads some to wonder just how much autonomy states can realistically claim in the face of modern economic forces. Can the average government really do as it pleases, even if it means acting against the wishes of some of the largest corporations operating on its soil, or defying the will of the market? Standard and Poor s downgrade of US government debt in April 2011 and the financial turbulence that followed indicate that state autonomy may be more limited than sovereignty would have us believe. Activity Stop and read section 3 of Chapter 20, pp.330 32 Use the table below to consider examples in which MNCs and states limit one another s ability to act as they please in the global economy. Two examples are given. State power over MNCs e.g. enforce environmental regulations MNCs power over states e.g. regulatory arbitrage Non-governmental organisations A large number of NGOs exist to provide aid and services across borders. Examples include Amnesty International, which campaigns for human rights, and the Red Cross, which provides emergency relief to those in urgent distress, especially in conflict zones. Some NGOs seek to minimise their association with political issues and focus exclusively on helping individuals in need. Others, such as the environmental campaigning group Greenpeace, are more explicitly political in their aims. Taken collectively, the scale of NGOs operations and of the resources at their disposal especially when compared with those of poor and underdeveloped states in whose territory they often operate can make them very significant 127

11 Introduction to international relations local, regional and international players. In some parts of the world, this uneven distribution of NGO and state capabilities has led these non-state actors to take on some of the state s responsibilities, raising the question of how dependent some governments may be on the services provided by the non-governmental sector. Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 20, pp.334 36 When an NGO provides citizens with aid and services, is it undermining those citizens relationship with their state? Do you think this is positive or negative? Why? Terrorist groups Since the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC on 11 September 2001, terrorism has become a matter of intense focus for states around the world. Whereas the prevailing sentiment had been that terrorism was a serious but manageable problem, it has now assumed a much greater significance in the eyes of the world s states. The new terrorists, as they are now referred to in the IR literature, combine several elements: a powerful ideology, an element of surprise in their attacks, and an understanding of modern technology. The nightmare scenario for counterterrorism planners is the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), i.e. nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, by one of these non-state groups. The WMD threat is all the more frightening because the familiar concept of deterrence whereby states deter attacks through the threat of severe retaliation is hard to apply against individuals. Mutally assured destruction (MAD) is of little use against an actor who doesn t have any strategic resources to threaten with destruction, allowing terrorist groups to circumvent the normal constraints placed on interstate violence in the international system. Transnational criminals and their political impact One type of non-state actor that has been studied with great interest since the collapse of communism includes the many transnational groups who engage in criminal behaviour for material gain. The activities of these groups should not be confused with the petty crime of small gangs and lone individuals. What we are looking at here is a multitrillion dollar industry trafficking in black market arms, drugs and increasingly people. These activities have global implications. First, criminal financial flows can be so big and the profits involved so enormous that those wielding these surpluses can engage in a number of activities such as bribing officials or killing policemen that threaten the integrity of the state. There is a close correlation between organised crime and failed states around the world. Secondly, such is the nature of this activity that by definition it is bound to threaten the ability of states to control the flow of peoples into, and out of, their territory, endangering a cornerstone of the Westphalian system. Activity Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 20, pp.332 34 Think of three ongoing situations in which a state s sovereignty is constrained by the activities of terrorists and criminals. What effect has the situation had on the state involved? Use the space below to note down your ideas. 128

Chapter 9: The state 1. 2. 3. International law In our earlier discussion, we mentioned state s unique capacity to enact laws governing the behaviour of its citizens or subjects. This power, once the state s sole preserve, now sits alongside a whole body of law that is more precisely defined as international. International law can be traced back many centuries, though it is mainly in the twentieth century that we have seen the rise of legal codes and law-making institutions, such as those associated with the UN and the EU. The legal agreements reached in these intergovernmental organisations are then enforced on states and individuals by systems of supranational courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). International law in itself is not a non-state actor. Nevertheless, it is supported by some very powerful international organisations. Moreover, once accepted, it clearly has consequences for how states act in international society. Laws against torture deem it illegal for states to engage in such activity, as do the international laws governing the rights of minorities and individuals. Significant conventions perhaps the best known being the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide also play an important part in determining what states are and are not allowed to do. This does not mean that all states will obey the law (note what happened in Rwanda in 1994). States can and do break it. That said, the existence of laws and conventions means that states can no longer do whatever they want to their own citizens without creating some very real problems for themselves in the eyes of the international community. Stop and read sections 2 and 6 of Chapter 17, pp.280 81 and 289 91 Activity As you consider the readings, think about how each of the following theoretical approaches would react to this statement: International law provides states with a viable alternative to the use of force. Use the table below to note down your responses. 129

11 Introduction to international relations Realism Liberalism English School Marxism 130 Problems with sovereign states So far, we have looked at the rise and the success of the sovereign state as an institutional actor in international society. In what follows, we will look at some of the problems that writers have identified with state centrism and the state itself. One problem has already been mentioned: by looking at states and states alone, one is only going to get a very partial picture of what constitutes the totality of contemporary IR. Another obvious limit to the state centric approach is that many of the non-state actors we have looked at can be a good deal more influential and powerful than the states in which they operate. Take, for instance, some of the giant oil companies or the massive agri-businesses that dominate world trade. When pitted against the economic resources of much poorer states, one hardly has to be a rocket scientist (or tenured IR professor) to guess that the MNC is likely to win in a battle of influence. MNCs might not have the same legal authority as most states, but in terms of power (a concept we will look at in the next chapter) they almost certainly have more. There is an even more critical argument against the state that focuses less on what states do and more on what they are incapable of doing. David Held does not think that our current international order based on a system of sovereign states is really up to the job of managing international crises. He argues that the post-1945 international order is threatened by an intersection and combination of humanitarian economic and environmental crises going from bad to worse. Self-regarding states, he continues, have neither the resources, nor the will, nor the imagination to deal with these problems alone. The world we now live in is deeply interconnected, but all of the tools that politicians have at their disposal operate in the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Held calls this the paradox of our times. The collective issues we must grapple with are increasingly global he notes, yet the means for addressing them are national and local, weak and incomplete. The idea that the state is not fit for purpose is by no means new. It was a main point of concern for E.H. Carr, who came to a similar conclusion on the eve of the Second World War. In The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919 1939, Carr was most prescient, noting that neither the problems facing the world economy nor those confronting Europe could easily be solved on the basis of the nation state. In time, we would have to move towards a radically new international order composed of large, functionally more efficient units within a new European federation where sovereignty would be pooled or shared. Carr argued that the idea of sovereignty had been

Chapter 9: The state invented after the break-up of the mediaeval system and was in a process of transition. Although this was unlikely to lead to the total disappearance of the state, some sort of change to the traditional international system was clearly on the way. What Carr termed a new international order was in the making. This critical view of the state remains very much at the heart of a number of post-war discussions among policy-makers and academics. It provided the basis for rethinking Europe after its three-decade-long crisis between 1919 and 1945. This period had been marked by a profound failure of the nation state to deliver prosperity and order. In the new Europe, states would still constitute the foundation of an emerging European community. Indeed, two states in particular France and Germany were the main drivers behind the European project. Still, to achieve its long-term ambitions of peace and economic growth, some loss of sovereignty would be inevitable. As we know, certain states have been prepared to trade in some of their constitutional independence in return for the benefits that flow from closer association. Others, like the United Kingdom, have proved far less happy to do so. Yet every state, to some extent, takes part in this sort of sovereignty bargain, sacrificing one aspect of its sovereignty in order to reinforce another. The sovereignty debate was not limited to post-second World War Europe. It has continued to rage following the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of states in many parts of the world. As Nicholas Wheeler argues in Saving strangers, the world faced a stark choice in the 1990s. It can either accept the traditional rules of an order that banned any interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states even to save thousands of lives or attempt to create a new set of rules that would permit such humanitarian interventions in the interest of humanity. There is little doubting where Wheeler stands on the issue, given the difficult questions levelled at him by his critics. Where would all this interventionism end? Who decides to intervene, and for what reasons? Is there not a danger that in the name of defending human rights in foreign territory with a different culture and completely different set of values one will end up undermining the principle of sovereignty that has served the international system reasonably well and to which there was no obvious alternative? Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 32, pp.538 41 How has globalisation problematised the state s relationship with its citizens? What does this mean for the state s ability to maintain its position as the dominant form of political community in international society? Security and the state Analysts have criticised the state-centric approach to IR on the grounds that it leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of security in the modern world. The traditional approach to security focuses on the security of the state and its capacity to resist destruction or subjugation, usually at the hands of another state. This has put a lot of emphasis on a state s military capabilities, the economic base upon which it can, and the strength of the state s apparatus needed to channel the latter into the former. According to a new generation of writers, this line of analysis is misconceived. The real object of security, they argue, should not be the state but rather individual human beings who make up its population. Indeed, looked at in these terms, the state could as easily be seen as a cause of disorder as a source of international peace and stability. 131

11 Introduction to international relations First, there are many cases in which states themselves are sources of insecurity to their own people. In many, North Korea and Zimbabwe for example, the governing regime regards its own grip on power as its first priority. This means that the most likely source of violence, arbitrary detention and denial of basic necessities stems not from some foreign threat or outside force, but from one s own state. Where this is the case, increasing the strength of the state will serve only to increase its capacity for oppression, rendering at least some of its people less secure. Bolstering state power does not always lead to improved security conditions for ordinary citizens. A second reason to be wary of placing undue emphasis on the state as the object of security is that it may result in giving undue priority to narrow elites who hold positions of power. Governing classes often prioritise high levels of military investment, even when the threat of external invasion appears to be small. An obsessive focus upon the security of the state in scholarship provides this stubbornly defiant thinking with intellectual justification. Given that the most likely sources of danger to ordinary human beings stem from poverty, ill health, lack of education and economic underdevelopment, a focus on meeting the needs of individuals may be a more effective route to security than boosting the size of one s cannons. The continuing importance of the state In spite of these challenges, the state survives as a central institution of international society and it seems likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. While the state may face an array of challenges to its sovereign authority and autonomy from above and below, it remains the only institution capable of assembling the resources, legitimacy and organisation needed to remain uninvolved against international competition while at the same time oversee the situation. MNCs, NGOs, terrorists, criminals and lawyers can affect states through their actions. Nevertheless, they each operate in an environment structured around states political, economic and social power. A diverse array of other actors may play the game of international affairs, but states are the ones who set the rules and punish those who break them. That being the case, it seems unlikely that the state will disappear anytime soon. Activity Assess the various criticisms made of the state and sovereignty. Do they convince you that we have to move beyond the state and establish some form of world government? A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain the development of the sovereign state since 1648 differentiate between different forms of legal, interdependence, domestic and Vatellian sovereignty describe some of the challenges and opportunities facing states in an era of globalisation evaluate the role of non-state actors in international relations define the vocabulary terms in bold. 132

Chapter 9: The state Chapter vocabulary autonomous black market capital domestic sovereignty failed state humanitarian intervention interdependence sovereignty international law international legal sovereignty jurisdiction non-governmental organisation (NGO) non-intervention non-state actors Peace of Westphalia (1648) political community quasi-state sovereign state sovereignty sovereignty bargain state-centric terrorist transnational/multinational corporation (TNC/MNC) vatellian sovereignty Sample examination questions 1. What does it mean for a state to be sovereign? 2. What do you think represents the greatest challenge to the primacy of the state as the leading actor in IR? 3. Do you think that there will ever be a world government? 4. It is impossible for states to be properly sovereign with a globalised economy of the sort the world has today. Discuss. After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 133

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 134

Chapter 10: Power Chapter 10: Power We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman past, present, or future has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself. Morgenthau, H.J. Politics among nations. Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: look at different meanings of power assess the importance of geography in determining power explain how the notion of power can be used to explain EU and US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: suggest why power is central to the study of world politics explain distinctions between hard and soft power, and between power and authority explain the different kinds of power that drive EU and US foreign policy define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Best, E. and T. Christiansen Regionalism in international affairs. Hirst, P. The Eighty Years Crisis, 1919 1999 power, Review of Additional International Studies 24(5) 1998, pp.133 48. Further reading Baldwin, D. Power analysis and world politics, World Politics 31(2) 1979, pp.161 94. Brooks, S. and W. Wohlforth Power, globalization and the end of the Cold War: re-evaluating a landmark case for the study of ideas, International Security 25(3) 2000 1, pp.5 54. Buzan, B. A world order without superpowers: decentred globalism, International Relations 25(1) 2011, pp.3 25. 135

11 Introduction to international relations Cox, M. Power shift and the death of the West? Not yet!, European Political Science 10(3) 2011, pp.416 24. Ferguson, N. Empire falls. Vanity Fair (October 2006) www.vanityfair.com/ politics/features/2006/10/empire200610 Hindness, B. On three dimensional power, Political Studies 24(3) 1976, pp.229 333. Hoge, J.F. A global power shift in the making, Foreign Affairs 83(4) 2004, pp.2 7. Kagan, R. Power and weakness, Policy Review 113 2002. http://homepage. univie.ac.at/vedran.dzihic/kagan.pdf Kennedy, P. The First World War and the international power system, International Security 9(1) 1984, pp.7 40. Layne, C. Impotent power? Re-examining the nature of America s hegemonic power?, The National Interest 85 2006, pp.41 47. Organski, A.F. et al Power transition theory tested in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Abdollohian M., C. Alsharabati, B. Efird et al. Power transitions: strategies for the 21st century. (Chatham House: Seven Bridges Press, 2000) [ISBN 9781889119434]. Parmar, I. and M. Cox (eds) US foreign policy and soft power: theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives. (London: Routledge, 2010) [ISBN 9780415492041]. White, D.H. The nature of world power in American history: an evaluation at the end of World War II, Diplomatic History 11(3) 1984, pp.181 202. Debate Cox, M. Is the United States in decline again?, International Affairs 83(4) 2007, pp.643 53. Williams, M. The empire writes back (to Michael Cox), International Affairs 83(5) 2007, pp.945 50. Debate Singh, R. The exceptional empire: why the United States will not decline again, International Politics 45 2008, pp.571 93. Buzan, B. A leader without followers? The United States in world politics after Bush, International Politics 45 2008, pp.554 70. Works cited Clark, I. Legitimacy in international society. (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2005) [ISBN 9780199219193]. Flint, C. Introduction to geopolitics. (London: Routledge, 2011) second edition [ISBN 9780415667739]. Kagan, R. Power and weakness, Policy Review 113 2002. http://homepage. univie.ac.at/vedran.dzihic/kagan.pdf Kennedy, P. Preparing for the twenty-first century. (New York: Random House, 1993) [ISBN 9780006862987]. Mackinder, H. The geographical pivot of history, The Geographical Journal 23(4) 1904, pp.421 37. Spykman, N. Geography of the peace. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944). Waltz, K. NATO enlargement: a realist s view, Contemporary Security Policy 21(2) 2000, pp.23 38. 136

Chapter 10: Power Introduction In mainstream IR, sovereignty defines what states are in the international system. Power loosely defined determines what state and non-state actors are capable of doing. There are many definitions of power and ways of thinking about it in terms of economic resources, military strength and moral influence. Often, it is not power itself, but its distribution among actors in the international system that is of interest. On this point, one thing is clear: power has never been distributed equally. As a result, its measurement has long been a goal of IR and its intellectual predecessors. Thus, as far back as the fifth century BC, the Greek historian Thucydides focused on the use and distribution of power among Aegean city-states and empires in his epic History of the Peloponnesian War. This chapter begins by looking at some definitions of power before moving on to discuss some connections between geography and power in the international system, before examining the notions of relative power, soft power and smart power. It will then turn to two case studies, focusing on the very different kinds of power used by the EU and the USA, with special focus on how the latter has exercised its influence since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a US-dominated unipolar system. The concept of power There are many different ways of thinking about power. A good startingpoint is through the work of Paul Hirst, a British sociologist. According to Hirst, the dominant concept of power in the social sciences has three main aspects. First, it describes a relationship between actors that enables one of the actors to prevail over another. Second, it points to a quantitative capacity, suggesting that one actor prevails because it has more power, forcing the other actor to submit. Finally, power is a zerosum game in which any gains by one actor are offset by the losses of its opponent. All gains are therefore relative rather than absolute. Activity Which theoretical approach is best described by these three aspects of power? What key words and concepts give it away? Theoretical approach: Keywords: Hirst is quick to point out that although this approach to power has its uses, it also has several weaknesses and problems. First, it suggests that a more powerful actor will prevail over weaker opposition. History shows that this is not always the case. The defeat of the USA in Vietnam and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan are two examples of superpowers being vanquished by technologically and materially weaker opponents. The same happened in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which the smaller and less populous state of Israel exploited training and tactics to overcome the more powerful Arab armies pitted against it. Second, Hirst argues that we should not think of power as something tangible and measureable, much less the sole preserve of international actors. There are forms of power that we cannot see, such as the power of an idea like nationalism or the mobilising power of something like faith. 137

11 Introduction to international relations Neither nationalism nor faith is an object we can easily measure. Their power cannot be easily quantified. Nevertheless, both have demonstrable power to influence what actors do. The same is true of what Liberals called norms and what members of the ES call institutions : sets of beliefs that govern social behaviour. Norms and institutions constitute a form of power in world politics, as Peter van Ham shows in his book Social power in international politics. 1 In the traditional understanding of power in IR, actors are compelled or forced to do something against their will. By using the social power locked in norms and institutions, van Ham argues that actors can be persuaded to act against their immediate interests. Ian Clark comes to much the same conclusion. The world is more than just a jungle without agreed or accepted rules of the game. It is a society in which some behaviours are regarded as legitimate and therefore acceptable by the other members of society while other are not. Establishing and maintaining the institutional rules of the game is therefore a variety of power in IR. Finally, there may also be forms of power embedded in the wider systems in which we are entrenched. These systems do not have a physical form, like a tank or a rocket. Their influence on human behaviour is nonetheless real. They create important incentives and disincentives that shape actors behaviour. Take the example of the world market. Despite the wishes of New York, London and Hong Kong, the market isn t located anywhere. It is not an empirical fact. Nevertheless, it exercises enormous power over the behaviour of firms and states alike, punishing those who go against its rules and rewarding those who successfully play by them. The same is true of the international system. You cannot take photographs of it, yet it provides incentives for states to behave in particular in specific ways. A structural Realist will chalk this up to the system s anarchic structure forcing states into self-help. A Marxist will point to how core-periphery relationships in the capitalist world system reinforce relationships of dependence and exploitation. Both agree that systemic power affects the ways in which we interact. 1 van Ham, P. Social power in international politics. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) [ISBN 9780415564229]. Activity What kind of system does each of the following IR approaches stress and what sort of behaviour does that system encourage? Dominant system: IPE Preferred behaviour: Dominant system: Gender theory Preferred behaviour: Dominant system: Postcolonialism Preferred behaviour: 138

Chapter 10: Power Geography as power This more theoretical debate about how we might think about power is a necessary reminder that there are different ways of thinking about the same phenomenon. This should not take away from analysing the foundations of power in the real world. The starting point for our present discussion will be very concrete indeed: geography. The importance of geography to IR is commonly associated with a branch of the discipline known as geopolitics. This has been defined in many different ways, but for our purposes we can take it to be the study of the links and the causal relationships between political power and geographic space. In the late nineteenth and for part of the twentieth century, this particular approach to the analysis of world politics was especially influential and popular. Its various theorists from Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Haushofer, Rudolf Kjellen through to Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman were at different times influential figures in the various corridors of power. Some unfortunately (notably the first three) often laced their more serious insights with asides about the survival of the fittest, racial hierarchy and the requirement of healthy organic states to take over the less healthy. It was Ratzel no less who invented the idea of Lebensraum, a notion which later came to influence German foreign policy in the first few decades of the twentieth century. And it was the Swedish writer Kjellen who argued, among other things, that no state should be merely defined by its legally constituted boundaries. Indeed, in his 1916 study on The state as a living form, he argued that it was in Germany s interest to acquire as much territory in Europe as possible in part, he believed, for fundamental economic reasons. To be dependent on international trade, he opined, made Germany economically vulnerable and dependent. To achieve true security therefore it was essential for Germany to build its own autarchic economic empire stretching from the Reich s borders in the West to the borders of Russia in the East, and even perhaps beyond. Mackinder and Spykman were of a rather different intellectual and political persuasion. Mackinder more or less invented the study of geopolitics in Great Britain following the publication of his 1904 paper The geographical pivot of history. Spykman then gave it an enormous boost in the USA just before and during the Second World War. Both Mackinder and Spykman believed that geography was the fundamental factor in foreign policy because it was, in Spykman s words, the only factor that was permanent in character. They disagreed, however, about how to assess the impact of geography on international politics. Mackinder was clear. The crucial geographical axis or pivot area around which the future of the world would be determined was Eurasia. As he noted in a much repeated statement, one that certainly influenced British foreign policy thinking until the 1950s: Who rules Eastern Europe rules the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island. Who rules the World Island rules the World. It was therefore crucial for Britain, and later the USA and Britain together, to prevent a hostile power from controlling the whole of the European subcontinent. Spykman agreed with Mackinder on several issues, the most important point of agreement being that international politics should be viewed not in terms of morality, ideas or ideologies, but instead in terms of a permanent struggle between states in which control of various geographical assets would prove crucial. However, Spykman argued that control of the Eurasian heartland was not the key to world order. Rather, IR would be dominated by competition for the Rimland, which ran along 139

11 Introduction to international relations 140 the coastal edge of the Eurasian continent. This led him to a relatively optimistic conclusion about the post-war period. The capitalist West, led by a geographically invulnerable state (the USA), bordered the main oceans and therefore had better access to trading routes than their main Soviet opponent. As a result, there was every chance, from a purely geographical perspective, that the West would emerge triumphant. It is not necessary to agree with everything that Spykman and Mackinder (let alone Kjellen, Haushofer or Ratzel) said. Still, geography matters a great deal in determining how power is distributed in the international system. At the most basic level, a state with limited territory and few resources is likely to be a rather weak. By the same token those controlling expansive lands and rich natural resources are likely to be powerful. According to this line of thinking, it is no accident that Benin and Austria are relatively powerless within the international system. At the same time, it is hardly a coincidence that the two superpowers of the Cold War were territorially huge. As long as the state can exercise sovereignty over its landmass, size matters. But size alone does not determine the amount of power that any single state or non-state actor exercises in the international system. Some very large states can be very poor and, therefore, relatively powerless. Think of China in the 1970s or the Democratic Republic of Congo today. By the same measure, relatively small states such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have been able to exert an influence on world politics far beyond that which might have been predicted given their land mass. Other factors must therefore play critical roles. Among these we have to include population, levels of economic development, technological innovation, quality of education, the role of women in society, political stability and the neighbourhood in which the actor happens to be located. In this last respect, fate seems to favour some states and not others. Poland, for instance, has had the misfortune of being surrounded by powerful and unfriendly states for most of its existence, resulting in its being carved up on no less than five separate occasions between the late eighteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. The USA, on the other hand, could not have had greater geographical luck. Not only does it have extraordinary resources at its disposal, but its power is enhanced by its location, with weak states north and south (Canada and Mexico respectively) and vast protective oceans east and west. Even without the benefits of a dynamic capitalist economy and a stable political order, American geography has made it security rich. Activity Look at the world map at the end of this guide. Which states would you consider security rich in geopolitical terms? Which would you consider security poor? What are the main differences between the two types? Relative power The limitations of geopolitics illustrate an important point about power: however much we try to lay down absolute criteria for objective measurement, power must also be understood in relative terms. Here again, the USA can be deployed as a useful and suggestive illustration. As we have noted, geography clearly favours the USA. On the other hand, its rise to superpower status between 1800 and 1945 was not determined by geography alone. There were dramatic changes in the rest of the world that worked to its relative advantage. A quick look at its position at the

Chapter 10: Power turn of the twentieth century makes the point rather well. In 1900, the USA was clearly a formidable economic power. Compared to the imperial states of Europe, however, it was still far from being the superpower it became four decades later. Its move to superpower status was based on transformations in the US economy and a huge spurt of growth in the 1920s, but also depended on the terrible impact of two world wars, which undermined European empires and left the relative power of the USA greatly enhanced. The notion of relative power also provides us with important insight into how wars are conducted and concluded. Take, for instance, the Cold War. Here, the case can be made that the USA was able to win the Cold War because, in relative terms, it was more powerful than its Soviet adversary. This was self-evident in the area of comparative economics, where the capitalist economy of the USA consistently outperformed the planned economy of the Soviet Union. It was equally true in the military sector, however. As research at the time and since has shown, the USA was a more formidable military power than the USSR, largely thanks to the fact that its economy was larger, more efficient, and more capable of sustaining high levels of military spending. It also had one other relative power advantage as well: its allies in Europe and Asia-Pacific were generally richer and better positioned to support their superpower ally than the relatively poor states of the Eastern bloc. The importance of power in determining international outcomes does not of course explain everything in IR. As we have already mentioned, apparently weak states are sometimes able to compensate for their weakness in other ways possibly by shrewd diplomacy and winning powerful allies to its side. These small yet influential states are said to punch above their weight. Potentially powerful states can sometimes throw away their advantages by adopting incorrect and even irrational policies. The Soviet Union in the 1930s provides a very good example. Having made some impressive economic steps forward at enormous human cost during his first two Five Year Plans (1928 1932, 1933 1938), Stalin began a series of savage purges in 1936, including mass repression aimed at the leadership of the Red Army. This seriously impacted the security of the USSR, leaving it a good deal weaker vis-à-vis its neighbours. Indeed, Stalin s purge of the officer corps helps to explain why Hitler s initial attack on the USSR in June 1941 achieved such stunning successes. The People s Republic of China before 1980 is another example of a self-defeating state. In the first few decades of its history, Chairman Mao seemed indifferent to the negative impact that his domestic policies were having on China s international position. As we now know, the Cultural Revolution that he launched in 1966 against supposed class enemies did huge damage to the economy and social integrity of the state; so much so that Mao was compelled to open up relations with the USA in order to relieve pressure that his own disastrous policies had placed on his government. Because his policies proved so damaging, Mao s successors opted to implement a series of far reaching economic reforms that began China s integration into the international economy, putting it back on the road to becoming a serious power in the international system. Authority, soft power and smart power Before moving on to our final case studies, we should take the time to make three other points. The first concerns the distinction between power and authority. Though the terms are often used interchangeably, they are not synonymous. As we have already discussed, power can be loosely 141

11 Introduction to international relations defined as the ability to influence somebody to behave in a manner that they would normally reject. Authority refers to an actor s legal right to behave in a particular way. This is the essential difference between a murderer and an executioner. They both have the power to kill, but only the executioner has the legal authority to do so. Though the distinction might not matter to the person whose life is being cut short, it matters very much to the executioner, who would himself be at risk without the legal authority to exercise power over life and death. The second point refers to the forms that power actually assumes in the international system. Writers on world politics tend to talk about power in two ways. Power can be discussed according to the sectors of human relations with which it is entangled be it ideological, military, economic or political. Power can also be thought of as having different degrees of hardness and softness. The distinction between hard power and soft power was first raised in Chapter 5 of this subject guide, during our discussion of Liberalism. Indeed, the terms were first coined by a wellknown Liberal thinker, Joseph Nye. 2 His aim in Bound to lead is to combat the then-popular view that the USA was facing a long-term relative decline in its power position. Nye argues that this view popularised by Paul Kennedy in The Rise and fall of great powers 3 underestimated America s hard power position, which he measured in terms of its economic and military capabilities relative to other powers in the international system. Nye goes on to claim that the relative decline thesis also ignored American soft power: its ability to attract and be attractive to other international actors. How a state goes about making itself attractive remains open to debate, though Nye insinuates that it is more likely to happen when a state is open and democratic, economically successful and possesses a domestic society that other actors want to copy. The hard power soft power distinction took on increased importance following the US response to the attacks of 11 September 2001. As the conflict escalated, many (including Nye) argued that George W. Bush s foreign policy response to the terrorist threat was diminishing America s soft power advantage. The one most obvious measure of this decline was the rise of widespread anti-americanism, even among some of America s closest European allies. As Nye noted at the time, if your friends drift away from you and your enemies seem to be telling a more convincing story than you are which looked to be the case in the Middle East then any plans you have of leading the international system are in trouble. This was deeply worrying, Nye concluded. Not only did it make the terrorist threat that much greater, but it contributed greatly to America s declining ability to attract other actors to support it. It was up to George W. Bush s successor to take the necessary measures to restore American standing and influence in the international system. With the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, the debate about power in the USA took yet another turn in which Nye once more played a significant role both in the run-up to the election and after his victory. Hard and soft power, he argued, had to be combined in US foreign policy. Given the country s position in the international system, such an approach which Nye calls smart power would make the USA a more effective international actor, able to mobilise support from allies and deter competition from rivals. From a domestic standpoint, it was important for the new president to stress that while he appreciates the importance of soft power he will not be too soft. In a dangerous world, it is essential to reassure the US people that the president will not shrink away from his duties as commander-in-chief. President Obama would 2 Nye, J. Bound to lead: changing nature of American power. (New York: Basic Books, 1991) [ISBN 9780465007448]. 3 Kennedy, P. The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military confl ict from 1500 2000. (Waukegan, IL: Fontana Press, 1989) [ISBN 9780006860525]. 142

Chapter 10: Power in short exercise power in a smart way, combining hard and soft power into a winning strategy that offers incentives and punishments in equal measure. What this strategy actually means in the Middle East or China remains unclear according to the Obama s critics. Nor is it certain whether the notion of smart power was anything more than a ploy to make the Bush administration s use of power look inappropriate. Nevertheless, the formulation of a smart foreign policy using all the hard and soft power resources at America s disposal remains at the heart of the Obama administration s international policies. Stop and read Hirst, P. The Eighty Years Crisis 1919 1999 power, pp.138 43 Activity In this article, Paul Hirst uses a sectors approach to discuss different forms of power. How is each used in contemporary international society? Illustrate your answers with an example from contemporary current events. Military power Economic power Power over opinion Europe: the limited superpower The ongoing debate about how best to exercise power has had an ongoing influence on the relationship between the USA and its European allies. The discussion was initiated by a supporter of the G.W. Bush administration, Robert Kagan. In what became one of the most influential foreign policy articles published in 2002 Power and Weakness Kagan suggested that the American European alliance was drifting apart, not because their values are very much different, but because the two sides understood and used power in very different ways. Kagan argues that the USA has far more hard military power than the Europeans. This means that Americans will view the world very differently, seeing it in terms of strategic threats that have to be contained and defeated. Europe, on the other hand, will take a rather different approach. Having abandoned war as a means of settling its differences after 1945, Europe has become a zone of peace with little to contribute to international security other than the soft power of its diplomatic, economic and cultural influence. Kagan sums up these differences saying that in IR at least Americans come from Mars (named in honour of the Roman god of war) while Europeans come from Venus (named in honour of the Roman goddess of love). Activity What would a gender theorist say about Kagan s description of the US and Europe? What assumptions does it make about gender roles? The Kagan thesis has not gone uncontested. It points out important differences between European (at least EU) and US foreign policy. It also touches a raw nerve in Europe about how actors should best exercise 143

11 Introduction to international relations influence in the international system. This, in turn, raises deeper questions about what kinds of power Europeans actually possess. Several answers popped up through the course of the 1990s, described by a variety of terms, including civilian power, economic power and institutional power. None are entirely satisfactory, but all accept the fact that in terms of power at least Europe is not another USA in the making. Nor is it ever likely to become one given the fact that it is a supranational organisation without a coherent foreign policy. Rather, the EU is composed of different political communities with widely varying views on the role of hard and soft power. Germany, in particular, is opposed to the former. Europeans seem to prefer spending money on welfare and pensions than on tanks and rockets. After a bloody twentieth century, the continent has quite understandably lost the taste for war. This still leaves Europe in a difficult position. After all, if it does not have any serious collective firepower, is it entirely dependent on the USA for protection? Does Europe s relative lack of hard power render its voice less likely to be listened to in a military conflict? Finally, with only two military powers of any importance (France and the UK), is the EU s relationship with the USA under increasing stress because Europe has so little to bring to the table in terms of its military capabilities? Stop and read section 4 in Chapter 26, pp.438 40 How has the structure of the EU affected its ability to project different forms of power in the international system? What does this say about the inside-outside distinction at the heart of classical and structural Realism? The policy implications of this military imbalance were first apparent in EU actions towards the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Here, it soon became glaringly obvious that the only serious military player in the Euro-American partnership was the USA, even when operating under the cover of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The problem has cropped up again in Afghanistan, where a lengthy war which continues at the time of writing tells its own sorry story of European military incapacity. Though more than capable of training Afghan policemen, building schools and establishing the sinews of a new civil society all clearly important in terms of security European states (with the usual exception of the UK) have shown themselves to be distinctly gun-shy. Of the 150,000 NATO forces on the ground in 2010, nearly two thirds of these were American. Moreover, they have done the lion s share of NATO s fighting and dying. In terms of NATO cohesion, this poses all sorts of problems. One stands out more than most: if the USA is doing the bulk of the fighting and determining military strategy on the ground, what exactly is NATO and the broader Euro-American alliance actually for? 144

Chapter 10: Power Activity In the box below, consider what it will take to make Europe a superpower. What changes will be required at the level of individuals, units, and the international system? America and the unipolar moment Following the 2008 financial crisis and its subsequent worries over sovereign debt, there is little chance of Europeans seriously increasing their military capabilities. The USA, meanwhile, is engaged in a very different kind of discussion. Here the issue is not a shortage of hard power (in 2010, the USA spent nearly $700 billion on national security) but how, where and why it should use its formidable military assets. Even with the War on Terror, the USA faces no existential international security threats. What, then, is its mission? Why does it have all those guns? These are significant questions. The Soviet Union may have posed a very real obstacle to US security, but it proved a most useful enemy. The Cold War, after all, helped the US define its role in the world. It united America s allies. It made it easier for America s foreign policy elite to mobilise international support for their large, global role. Finally, it forged what turned into a remarkably stable foreign policy consensus. The loss of the Soviet enemy may have shifted the balance of power to America s advantage, but it also caused confusion and uncertainty. As Paul Kennedy wrote in 1993, the relief that the Soviet Union was no longer an enemy was overshadowed by uncertainties about the United States proper world role. The disappearance of the Soviet Union removed the structural limits on US power, reconstructing the international system according the rules of unipolarity. First coined by conservative writer Charles Krauthammer to define the post-cold War international system, it implies an opportunity to remake the global order. Oddly, unipolarity was not a term that IR scholars took to readily. For one thing, it has very little in common with historical systems of power distribution. These had been multipolar and bipolar, but never unipolar. If true, its implications would be enormous in terms of international politics. Some celebrated unipolarty, suggesting that even if the world was now out of balance, nothing untoward was likely to happen because the USA was a liberal hegemon. Others were much less convinced, including the neo-realist Kenneth Waltz. 145

11 Introduction to international relations 146 Waltz is certainly not an anti-american. However, he knows his international history and has warned that there is little chance of unipolarity lasting for very long. Other states, he argues, will not acquiesce to a system in which they remain forever inferior. More worrying still, he thinks that unipolarity is likely to make the USA behave much more aggressively. In an interesting and lengthy interview in 2000, Waltz claims that the dangers inherent in such an imbalanced system had been observed long before the 1990s. Indeed, as described by a powerful French cleric, the world has never known a country disposing of overwhelming power to behave with forbearance and moderation for more than a very short period of time. In good Realist fashion, Waltz contends that what has been true, remains true possibly becoming even more true given how much power the USA has in the world relative to other actors. Stop and listen to Kenneth Waltz s interview on the Conversations with history website of the University of California, Berkeley: http://conversations.berkeley.edu/content/kenneth-waltz From 1991 to 2000, these dire warnings sounded like so much background chatter. Unipolarity was much less interesting than debates about globalisation and its benefits, the spread of market democracies, and the foreign policy of President Bill Clinton. The main attack on Clinton at the time was not that he was misusing or abusing US power, but that he was not using it enough. Far from taking advantage of unipolarity, Clinton according to his right-wing critics, many of whom later went on to take up positions in the Bush administration after 2000 appeared to ignore it altogether, opting instead to build alliances while embedding (and thus containing) American power in a series of international organisations. If, as many think tanks and academics were saying, the USA had the opportunity to build a new empire on the Potomac, it seemed that nobody had bothered to inform the cautious President Clinton. Unipolar in theory, imperial in practice Much of what was said against Clinton s foreign policy in the 1990s would have been of only theoretical consequence but for two major events: the election of the conservative George W. Bush, who surrounded himself with hawkish advisers who believed that the USA should exploit its power advantage; and the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), which opened a new chapter in US foreign policy history. Much has been written about Bush s foreign policy, most of it critical and the bulk of it highly personalised. What most fail to point out, however, is how much of what Bush did and said was conditioned by his advisers understanding of the international system and of the USA s unique role within it. This understanding took three very important things for granted, and all revolved around the issue of power. The first was that the USA had won the Cold War, and had done so, arguably, because it had not been afraid to assert its power in a forceful manner. The second was that, as a result of the collapse of the USSR, the USA had become even more powerful in relation to the rest of the international system. Finally, it argued that Clinton as a liberal had failed to employ American power effectively. The result was drift and indecision and according to many Bush-ites possibly even 9/11 itself. Here, Bush deployed the past to good rhetorical effect. When enemies threaten, as they had threatened European democracies in the 1930s, the worst thing to do was to appease one s adversaries. The result of appeasement in the late 1930s, he argued,

Chapter 10: Power had been the Second World War. Times had changed, but the lessons to be drawn from history were the same. Bush and his handlers argued that Clinton pursued a policy of weakness and indecision in the 1990s that left America s enemies feeling that they had nothing to fear. 9/11 might not have been predictable, but by failing to show the world that the USA had overwhelming power and was willing to use it with or without the permission of the international community it had only encouraged aggression. If the Bush administration is best understood in terms of power, then as students of IR we are bound to get a much better understanding of the conditions that allowed him to act as he did. Operating in an international system without an obvious rival, where allies were more or less dependent and enemies were relatively weak, the Bush foreign policy of pre-emption and power projection made perfect theoretical sense. Whether or not this assertive strategy could actually have delivered to Bush what he wanted victory after victory and, what some of his more robust supporters were now openly calling, a new American empire is unclear. Opinion remains divided. His few defenders argue that, faced with an enormous range of new threats, Bush had no alternative but to deploy US power in a forceful manner. His many critics have arrived at very different conclusion. By unleashing hard power without first using soft power alternatives, they argue, Bush dealt a major blow to America s position in the world. Its position at the time of writing would seem to support at least some of their criticisms. If the history of world politics teaches us anything, it is that power is a very complex concept and the international system an even more complex place, whose problems are not going to be solved by military power alone. It also teaches us that even the greatest powers should deploy their capacities with care, caution and whenever possible a large amount of international support. Otherwise, they can easily end up facing as USA now faces a sceptical and suspicious world, less willing to follow its example and certainly less inclined to listen to what it has to say. A reminder of your learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: suggest why power is central to the study of world politics explain distinctions between hard and soft power, and between power and authority explain the different kinds of power that drive EU and US foreign policy define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary appeasement authority bipolar empire geopolitics hard power multipolar power relative power sectors smart power social power soft power systemic power unipolarity zone of peace 147

11 Introduction to international relations Sample examination questions 1. Is there an agreed definition of power? 2. What do you understand by geopolitics: is it of value today? 3. Explain the difference between hard power, soft power and smart power. 4. Can the Bush foreign policy be explained in terms of power alone? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 148

Part 5: Challenges to international order Part 5: Challenges to international order 149

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 150

Chapter 11: The new world of security Chapter 11: The new world of security Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: understand the relationship between the traditional concept of security and more contemporary definitions relating to human security explain some of the non-traditional security threats facing international society assess their potential impact on the principles and practices of IR. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: distinguish between traditional concepts of national security that focus on the state, and the new challenges of human security identify new transnational threats that are non-military in nature explain the significance of these new security challenges define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Acharya, A. Human security. Further reading de Alcantara, C.H. Uses and abuses of the concept of governance, International Social Science Journal 50(155) 1998, pp.105 13. Higgott, R. Contested globalization: the changing context and normative challenges in Booth, K., T. Dunne and M. Cox How might we live? Global ethics in the new century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) [ISBN 9780521005203]. Higgott, R. Governing the global economy: multilateral economic institutions in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley Issues in 21st century world politics. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524]. Ikenberry, G.J. A crisis of global governance, Current History 109(730) 2010, pp.315 21. Krahmann, E. National, regional and global governance: one phenomenon or many?, Global Governance 9(3) 2003, pp.323 46. Pelletier, N. Of laws and limits: an ecological economic perspective on redressing the failure of contemporary global environmental governance, Global Environmental Change 20(2) 2010, pp.220 28. Doyle, M. A more perfect union? The liberal peace and the challenge of globalization in Booth, K., T. Dunne and M. Cox How might we live? Global ethics in the new century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) [ISBN 9780521005203]. Weiss, L. Globalization and national governance: antinomies or interdependence in Cox, M., K. Booth, and T. Dunne The Interregnum: controversies in world politics 1989 1999. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [ISBN 9780521785099]. Note: this is the book form of a special issue of the Review of International Studies 25(5) 1999. 151

11 Introduction to international relations Works cited Malthus, T. An essay on the principle of population. (Boston: IndyPublish, 2009) [ISBN 9781404302273]. Painter, D. The Cold War: an international history. (London: Routledge, 2005) [ISBN 9780415341103]. UNAIDS Global report: UNAIDS report on the global AIDS epidemic 2010. www.unaids.org/globalreport/global_report.htm Introduction The first three sections of this subject guide have focused on the evolution of the modern international system, some of the theoretical approaches that you can use to understand it, and four of the discipline s main concepts. They have been designed to give you critical tools with which to tackle some of the big questions facing the world today. In the concluding part of this course, we turn our attention to some of the broad, systemlevel questions that define contemporary IR. In this chapter, we look at a range of topics that have been repackaged as security issues over the past two decades. Many of these have been securitised over the years, using the process described by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in Chapter 6 of this subject guide. Review the discussion of securitisation before continuing. As we have suggested throughout this course, the end of the Cold War led to novel ways of thinking about international issues and threats. Though states remain key players in the international system, and the great powers maintain their lofty relative positions, security has become less and less concerned with classic, Clauswitzian interstate wars. Instead, a new security agenda has evolved, driven by IOs, NGOs and MNCs, who emphasise transnational threats to international peace and security. This shift was formally recognised with the publication of the UN Human Development Report in 1994, which made policy-makers aware of the fact that some of the most serious risks in the modern world arise from transnational problems such as poverty, famine, disease and environmental degradation. Not everybody agrees that these issues constitute a security threat in the traditional sense, particularly state-centric Realists. Still, the new security agenda has undoubtedly influenced the way that states and non-state actors around the world act. In what follows, we will explore the new security agenda by looking at some of the threats it identifies. There are many, not all of which we can deal with here. We will therefore focus on some of the best known and most discussed: climate change, human health, resource scarcity, energy security and problems arising from changing demographics. 152 Climate change The ecological consequences of human-induced climate change represent perhaps the most worrying item on the new security agenda. Humans have affected the environments in which we live for millennia. A quick look at the natural world around you will make this plain. Apart from the most inhospitable deserts and tundra, our planet bears the hallmarks of humaninduced ecological change. Over the past 500 years, this has focused mainly on the expansion of agricultural land use, a reduction in forests and wetlands, and a rapid rise in the amount of fossilised carbon released back into the atmosphere through the burning of fossil fuels. Until the past few decades, however, only a few scientists were willing to commit to the theory that human resource use particularly the burning of coal, oil and

Chapter 11: The new world of security gas is having an immediate and appreciable effect on the Earth s natural systems. Though a few writers, often in the pay of oil and gas companies, continue to reject the idea, anthropogenic climate change is an accepted fact among the overwhelming majority of scientists and experts in the field. Increasing levels of carbon in the atmosphere are leading to rising global temperatures, bringing with them a host of potential threats to states, communities and individuals. Rising sea levels caused by the melting of land-based polar ice caps threaten coastal areas from the Netherlands to the small atolls and islands of the Pacific Ocean. Rising sea temperatures are affecting weather patterns, increasing the likelihood and intensity of storms, while shifting rainfall patterns have led to unusual droughts and flash floods. A major concern is that climate change will lead to conflict over scarce resources, sparking large-scale human migrations as once-fertile regions are left parched, flooded or even submerged by our changing planet. For IR, the key question in this debate is not whether climate change is anthropogenic or the result of some unobserved natural cycle. That is a matter for ecologists. IR needs to deal with international consequences. There is a very extensive literature on the efforts that culminated with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This tends to focus on the important parts played by the UN and the EU; the forms of political resistance, led by the USA, Canada and Australia; and why we seem no nearer to finding any answers than we were in 1992, when states gathered at the Rio Earth Summit to address the same issues. Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 21, pp.356 59 How has the free rider problem obstructed international efforts to deal with anthropogenic climate change? How does it relate to the Prisoner s Dilemma, discussed in Chapter 5 of this guide and in Box 18.3 of the textbook? IR can contribute to the climate change debate by identifying aspects of the international system that have constrained actors ability to deal with the coming environmental crisis. One relates to the great divide that still separates the economic haves from the have nots. In theory, everyone can agree about the facts of climate change. However, economically developing states fear that efforts to curb carbon emissions will limit their ability to catch up with the developed world. China and India maintain that targets should not be imposed on them while they remain so far behind the West in terms of their per capita income and gross domestic product. In a competitive and growth-oriented economic environment, it is hardly surprising that many states remain wary of efforts to regulate what they can and cannot do. This is less of a concern for the EU and Japan, given their already-high levels of economic development. It has proved a more difficult issue in the USA, however, where MNCs have privileged access to Congress, allowing them to mobilise political opposition to environmental regulation, and where suspicion of international agreement that limits the country s freedom of action remains a potent national urge. Activity Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 21, pp.359 60 Use the table overleaf to consider how each of the following theoretical approaches might solve the climate change crisis. Think about the causes identified by each approach, and formulate a solution using concepts familiar to that theory. 153

11 Introduction to international relations Causes: Liberal Solutions: Causes: Marxist Solutions: Causes: Realist Solutions: Health In spite of these obstacles, climate change is fast becoming a key international issue. Louder cries of warning from the international scientific community, obvious signs of increasing instability in the planet s natural systems, and growing calls from non-state actors and individuals have pushed China and the USA the world s two biggest polluters to jump on the climate change bandwagon. The USA changed its policy following the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, stating that climate change has risen up to the top of the US national security set of priorities. At last, it looks as if the issue has arrived on the international agenda. Activity Stop and read sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 29, pp.480 82. In the table below, note important differences between ideas of traditional security and the more novel concept of human security that is gaining popularity in IR. Traditional security Human security Human health, long an issue of concern on the international agenda, has joined climate change as a new form of human security threat. Around the world, people s lives are blighted by diseases, as globalisation and climate change carry pathogens and parasites to new parts of the world. Thanks to shifts in rainfall and temperature, regions once free of mosquitoes, ticks and other parasites are free no more, threatening human life and challenging states capacity to respond to health crises. As study 154

Chapter 11: The new world of security after study shows, there is a close correlation between disease in general and state failure in particular. Given the additional connection between climate change and disease migration, such correlations certainly bolster the case for a new, more widely-defined security agenda. One disease has been the subject of an enormous amount of intense research: HIV/AIDS. Driven by the inability of poor states to provide their citizens with information and medical care, this pandemic has made itself felt across the less developed world. In sub-saharan Africa, it has achieved terrible proportions. This area holds just over 11% of the world s population, but more than 68% of all HIV infections 22.5 million cases. A 2010 UNAIDS report records highly troubling statistics for the region. In 2009, it saw around 1.8 million people die of HIV-related illnesses, 72% of the global total. Southern Africa is at the epicentre of the ongoing epidemic. The 10 countries of the region, which have around 2% of the world s population, are home to around 32% of people with HIV and over 40% of women with HIV. Not surprisingly, analysts have tended to stress different causes for the pandemic, ranging across the levels of analysis and sectors of interaction. These range individual-level explanations, stressing sexual promiscuity and a lack of contraceptive use among African men, through unit- and system-level explanations linked to poverty, colonialism and the failure/refusal of Western companies to supply needed drugs at affordable prices. On one point, however, there seems to be general agreement: states and societies are more likely to be unstable and less likely to function so long as this disease continues. The past decade has witnessed a spike in the number of global health scares, with nearly annual warnings of potential pandemics caused by one of the many strains of influenza. Here, the world has at least one important historical example from which it can draw some lessons: the Spanish influenza outbreak in 1918. Not only did this pandemic kill more than five times as many people as the war itself accounting for just over 50 million lives there was very little that the international community could do about it. Admittedly, no pandemic of the same scale has been experienced since. However, that is no guarantee against the future. People are generally healthier than they were in the first half of the twentieth century, and medicines are more powerful and more plentiful. Moreover, the world is not coming out of a terrible four-year conflict that drained it of manpower and money. What worries many in the field of public health is that with more people and goods travelling around the world every year a consequence of advanced globalisation the possibility of another pandemic remains. Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 29, pp.484 87 How does human security link health and environmental threats to the likelihood of armed conflict? What does gender theory tell us about the relationship between human security and gender in the international system? Resources The notion that one day the world will run out of the necessities of life was advanced in the late eighteenth century by the English political economist, Thomas Malthus. In An essay on the principle of population, first published in 1798, he hypothesises that human numbers tend to increase at a geometric rate, while our ability to feed ourselves only increases arithmetically. This, he says, is bound to lead to profound human and economic crises when our numbers outpace our supplies. Malthusian 155

11 Introduction to international relations theory has not gone unchallenged in the centuries since. Advances in technology, improvements in productivity, and the opening of new agricultural lands have thrown much of what Malthus says into doubt. However, his approach to thinking about population and resources has never quite gone away. Over the past 20 years, it has enjoyed something of a comeback among writers concerned with the direction of human development and what they see as a scarcity crisis approaching our civilisation. This Malthusian turn in IR expresses itself in a series of well-publicised debates on resource scarcity. One of these revolves around the dangers posed by further rises in the world s population. Another looks at how unequal distributions of power and wealth can produce sociallyconstructed hunger by failing to distribute food to poor parts of the population. A third focuses specifically on water scarcity and fears that shortages will give rise to new conflicts between and within states. Some experts even believe that oil will become increasingly scarce over the next few decades. According to this theory, known as peak oil, the discovery and exploitation of fossil fuel reserves will reach their peak by the middle of the twenty-first century. If and when this occurs, it will likely give rise to intense competition between states seeking access to a resource upon which, at least for the time being, our international economic system depends. Activity Stop and read section 4 of Chapter 28, pp.470 74 Use the table below to consider the differences between nature-based explanations of hunger and society-focused explanations. What causes each? Who is likely to suffer? What solution is possible? Nature-based explanations Society-focused explanations Resource scarcity is a problem with which states, empires and even pre-historic hunter-gatherers have had to cope. More novel indeed, maybe unique to our modern international society is the problem of a resource curse. This occurs when high-value resources oil and diamonds are the most common examples have a detrimental effect on the societies in which they are found. Under normal circumstances, states benefit from being endowed with high-value natural resources. These add to a state s store of wealth, can be used to promote balanced economic growth, and tend to improve people s living standards while helping to support the formation and maintenance of viable governments. The resource curse theory stands this argument on its head. In many states, particularly those with weak institutions and corrupt elites, highvalue resources will actually distort development by redirecting scarce investment away from socioeconomic development in favour of increased resource extraction. This can undermine the political process and cause domestic conflicts over the distribution of resource wealth. Even in wellgoverned countries, the curse might apply. Thus, the problem does not just impact places like Nigeria, but has consequences for the oil-rich states 156

Chapter 11: The new world of security of the Middle East and even some substate actors, such as the province of Alberta in Canada. In these places, an abundance of oil might fill state coffers in the short term, but it also creates uneven development and potentially undermines democratic practices. As the old saying goes, too much of a good thing is still too much. Energy security Resource scarcity and the resource curse raise a much wider question about energy security. As any decent historian will tell you, energy has posed a problem for IR since the West became dependent on imported oil around the beginning of the twentieth century. As American writer David Painter shows, two decades of access to cheap oil in the 1950s and 1960s were followed by the production embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s. This led to major price rises and played a crucial and often unexplored role in the conduct of the Cold War. One as-yet-unmentioned theory of the end of the Cold War focuses on the impact of falling oil prices in the 1980s. These put a major squeeze on the already troubled Soviet economy, which received most of its foreign currency through exports of oil and gas, eventually pushing it over the edge. Why does this long-standing security issue seem so important today? There are several reasons. One has to do with Russia, which remains dependent on energy sales for its foreign currency reserves. Under President, then Prime Minster, Vladimir Putin, the state has effectively manipulated its control over the Russian oil and gas industry as a foreign policy tool in its relations with the Ukraine and Europe, an approach called energy diplomacy. This has raised the profile of energy security within and around the EU. A second factor to explain energy s securitisation is the rise of China and the impact that its ascent and its rapidly rising demand for fossil fuels has on oil prices. Finally, energy security cannot be separated from socioeconomic development. Here, critics make the point that development remains dependent on access to a steady supply of oil to drive cars, heat houses and power computers. As a result, energy scarcity will disadvantage those at the lower end of international wealth, obstructing less economically developed countries (LEDCs) attempts to improve their socioeconomic conditions. One factor above all has pushed energy to the top of a very long list of non-military security issues: the terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001. These events changed the way Americans thought about the world. Overnight, it seemed that the country had become far too dependent on Saudi Arabia, from where many of the terrorists had originated. It was this crucial juncture, where fear ran headlong into America s long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia which possesses over 25% of the world s known oil reserves that the debate about energy security began in earnest. Even an experienced operator in the oil industry like G.W. Bush, whose own family has close connections to the Saudi royals, began to utter an idea that had been taboo in conservative Washington: that it was high time for the USA to weaken the link and find alternative sources and forms of energy. Given the depth of their commercial links and the size of Saudi reserves, there was never much chance that the USA was going to abandon Saudi Arabia completely. Nevertheless, the question had been asked and a code of silence had been broken. We will have to wait to see how the USA and the West more generally will try to achieve energy security without becoming ever more deeply embroiled in the unstable regional politics of the Middle East. 157

11 Introduction to international relations Demographics The relationship between demography and international politics is one of the most under-researched issues in IR. Analysts assume that there must be a connection, but remain divided on specific relationships such as that between population and power, migration and stability, or the age structure of a society and the stability of its socioeconomic system. The first of these issues deals in the most general terms with the presumed connection between state power and trends in population. Those who advocate a neat correlation between the two argue that the decline of modern Russia can be observed via its rapidly shrinking population. The USA is deemed to be in reasonably good international shape because its population is on the rise, driven by a combination of domestic growth and immigration. Europe stands somewhere in between. Its domestic population growth is on the decline, but the shortfall is being made up by fairly large-scale immigration. This is a new dynamic for Europe, which for centuries has been a source rather than a destination for immigrants. As evidenced by the headscarf debate in France and rising nationalism in nearly all European states, coping with the multicultural challenges of a diverse, immigrant community is proving to be a real challenge for the continent. Migration raises all sorts of international issues. The world today has never seen so many people on the move, with global migration accelerating over the past two decades. This poses no special difficulty when the migrants in question are relatively affluent and come from similar cultures and backgrounds to that of the host countries to which they happen to be migrating. Historical experiences in the Americas and contemporary Europe indicate that issues can arise when migrants are poor and have little understanding of the cultures and languages of their destinations. Under most circumstances, IR would represent this as a purely domestic problem. Since 9/11, however, it has become an increasingly international issue, with fears rising in many host countries that at least some of their new immigrant communities might represent a threat to state security. Stop and read section 2 and section 3 as far as A clash of civilisations? in Chapter 25, pp.418 20 What role does culture play in the politics of migration? Do you think that pluralism or cosmopolitanism presents a better opportunity to tackle the difficulties of cultural mingling? 158 Finally, the issue of demography has been posed anew over the past few years thanks to a potentially huge problem in many developing states: the enormous rise in the number of younger people as a percentage of the overall population. This has been well documented in the Middle East and North Africa. There, demographic changes have produced a youth bulge, with over 30% of Middle Eastern populations being between the age of 15 and 29. This represents over 100 million people, and is the highest proportion of youth in the region s history. Many of these young people have expectations that cannot be met by the local labour market. Middle Eastern children generally receive a good education relative to other parts of the developing world. Enrolment rates throughout the region are high, with nearly universal access at primary level and around 70% of eligible students in secondary education. This generates expectations that cannot be met by national labour markets. Youth unemployment in the Middle East stands at around 25% the highest of any region in the world. To

Chapter 11: The new world of security make matters worse, the duration of unemployment for new graduates is extremely long, lasting up to three years in Morocco and Iran. Whether or not this youth bulge leads to regime change in the Middle East remains to be seen, but there is every indication that it might. Upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have been led by technologicallyconfident young people, who have used social media and mobile camera technology to coordinate and record the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in January 2011. Of the many demands made by young protesters, that for jobs is among the most consistent. Faced with their own youth in revolt, many Middle Eastern regimes have not been able to contain instability by the usual combination of police brutality and short-term economic concessions. It will be interesting to see how their successors deal with the fundamental problem of too many young people chasing too few jobs in political systems that, over time, will not be able to rely solely on traditional repressive means to ensure state stability. A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: distinguish between traditional concepts of national security that focus on the state, and the new challenges of human security identify new transnational threats that are non-military in nature explain the significance of these new security challenges define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary Arab Spring anthropogenic climate change energy diplomacy energy security HIV/AIDS human security influenza migration pandemic peak oil resource curse resource scarcity securitisation Thomas Malthus Sample examination questions 1. Do mainstream understandings of security pay too much attention to states national security? 2. How would a Realist react to the idea that human security should be the main analytical focus of IR? 3. Why have some states identified climate change as the principal threat to their national security? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 159

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 160

Chapter 12: Global governance and international organisations Chapter 12: Global governance and international organisations Aims of the chapter The aims of this chapter are to: understand the role of international organisations in the international system explain their different goals and structures assess the different organisations and regimes associated with regionalism in different parts of the world. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain the meaning of global governance in the contemporary international system assess the UN s contribution to global governance explain the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the International Atomic Energy Agency analyse the effects of regionalism on different parts of international society define the vocabulary terms in bold. Essential reading Best, E. and T. Christiansen Regionalism in international affairs. Taylor, P. and D. Curtis The United Nations. Willetts, P. Transnational actors and international organizations in global politics. Woods, N. International political economy in an age of globalization. Further Reading Cabalerro-Anthony, M. The new world of security: implications for human security and international security cooperation in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley Issues in 21st century world politics. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524]. Deudney, D. The case against linking environmental degradation and national security, Millennium 19(3) 1990, pp.461 76. Dupont, A. The strategic implications of climate change, Survival 50(3) 2008, pp.29 54. Falkner, R., S. Hannes and J. Vogler International climate policy after Copenhagen: towards a building blocks approach, Global Policy 1(3) 2010, pp.252 62. Haas, M.L. A geriatric peace? The future of US power in a world of aging populations, International Security 32(1) 2007, pp.112 47. Hammerstad, A. Population movement and its impact on world politics in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley Issues in 21st century world politics. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524]. 161

11 Introduction to international relations 162 Introduction Homer-Dixon, T. Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases, International Security 19(1) 1994, pp.5 40. Homer-Dixon, T. On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict, International Security 16(2) 1991, pp.76 116. Korf, B. Resources, violence and the telluric geographies of small wars, Progress in Human Geography 35(6) 2011, pp.733 56. Le Billon, P. The geopolitical economy of resource wars, Geopolitics 9(1) 2004, pp.1 28. Levy, M. Is the environment a national security issue?, International Security 20(2) 1995, pp.35 62. Haas, M.L. A geriatric peace? The future of US power in a world of aging populations, International Security 32(1) 2007, pp.112 147. Pang, T. and G.E. Guindo Globalization and risks to health Science & Society, EMBO Reports 5(1) 2004, pp.s11 16 www.nature.com/embor/journal/v5/ n1s/full/7400226.html Umbach, F. Energy security and world politics in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley Issues in 21st century world politics. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524]. Does humanity have the collective means to deal with our global problems? In our discussions so far, we have considered a variety of threats to international peace and stability. Some of these relate to relations between states: the sort of issue that IR s state-centric approaches are well positioned to address. Others, such as the coming ecological crisis, affect actors across many states, with little regard for border or sovereign jurisdictions. They are transnational issues, whose causes and solutions are not limited to the states system described by Realists. As such, many in IR contend that they cannot be addressed by states alone, regardless of their power. Instead, transnational issues require cooperation and coordination between a range of state and non-state actors, each contributing to a transnational solution. In our previous discussions of ES institutions (see Chapter 2) and Liberal regimes (see Chapter 5), we have already looked at how international society manages transnational problems. In doing so, we have been studying global governance. This branch of IR looks at how we manage issues arising from globalisation, which tend to be transnational in character. According to at least one school of thought, globalisation necessarily leads states to cede power to organisations capable of regulating the international system. This chapter will consider the global governance potential of several of these international organisations (IOs). Criticised by some for being too powerful and by others for not being powerful enough, IOs range from purely technical organisations such as the Universal Postal Union and the World Meteorological Organization to those dealing with much broader issue areas such as security, the world economy and regional integration. In Chapter 5, we looked briefly at how Realism and Liberalism conceive of non-state actors and the importance they attached to IOs. The discussion that follows will draw on that material while providing a brief guide of some of the important IOs around today: the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a number of important regional organisations. IOs have become crucial to the functioning of international society, carrying out jobs that states are unwilling or unable to do. An influential argument suggests that these IOs constitute a system of global governance a loose framework of organisations and institutions that constrain actors and solve specific

Chapter 12: Global governance and international organisations problems within international society. Sometimes incorrectly identified as a form of global government, IOs are essential to the management of the international system. Still, they have their limits. First, they are too many and their responsibilities too overlapping to be thought of in terms of anything so organised as a government. Second, they exist in an international system dominated by states. Sovereignty, after all, remains associated with states (although the EU presents an interesting case of a potentially sovereign regional organisation). Within this system, states have delegated some very real powers to specific IOs, giving these international actors some life and autonomy of their own. While it would be a gross exaggeration to think of international organisations as sovereign actors, it is interesting to consider whether they possess any of the aspects of sovereignty described by Stephen Krasner in section 2 of Chapter 9 of this subject guide. Stop and read section 6 of Chapter 20, p.337 Using your definitions of international systems and international society, consider which term best describes an international organisation? Is the UN, for example, an IR system or society? Why? The United Nations The world wars each led to a desire among statesmen and citizens to create a new kind of organisation, responsible for maintaining peace and security with minimal recourse to the use of force. The first of these was the League of Nations. Founded in 1920 and based in Geneva, the League had a relatively short and chequered history. Though best known for its failures, it dealt with several key international issues from the protection of minorities to the slave trade. It also passed several motions against war, though to no avail. Stirring words did not change the policies of states, and the League lacked any autonomous power to influence international events (largely because the great powers of the day refused to grant it any). It managed to survive the 1920s, doing much good work in the process. The 1930s proved disastrous, however, beginning with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and ending with the outbreak of the Second World War. The League was formally dissolved in early 1947. Its successor, the United Nations (UN) founded in 1945 was different to the League in several respects. Its membership included the USSR and the USA. It also formally recognised the privileged position of the five major powers the USA, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and China (then represented by the Nationalist government). To them it granted veto powers in the Security Council the organ dedicated to preserving international peace and stability. Designed to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, the UN s early idealism soon fell prey to the Cold War divisions that had split the world into two opposed ideological camps by 1950. Still, the organisation continued to grow as new states came into being via decolonisation and the Trusteeship Council. Over time, the UN has given birth to subsidiary organisations dealing with a host of international issues. Significantly, it was through, and because of, the UN that the dangerous threat of atomic and nuclear proliferation was first addressed. Often ridiculed by its critics as being a mere talking shop, a den of corruption, a toothless organisation or a meeting place for dubious non-democratic states, the UN is frequently found guilty of not doing things that it was never designed to do, such as stopping other people s 163

11 Introduction to international relations wars. It also gets blamed for failing to carry out tasks for which it has never been given the mandate or the money. Rather than judging the organisation against impossible goals such as the establishment of world peace, analyses should focus on its successes and failures on the ground : looking after refugees, keeping warring factions apart, feeding starving populations and delivering some kind of hope to the world s most underdeveloped people and groups. In each of its areas of responsibility, the UN s performance has been less than perfect. How much of this is the organisation s own fault depends on how much responsibility one places at the feet of member states who like the USA often attack its funding and mandate if it seems to be assuming a more autonomous role. Activity Stop and read sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 19, pp.312 16 Use the table below to note down the issue areas with which each of the five main organs of the UN system are concerned. General Assembly Security Council Economic and Social Council International Court of Justice Trusteeship Council By the end of the Cold War, the UN acquired a degree of authority among its member states that the League only possessed for short periods and among relatively small groups. Even a government as hostile to the UN as George W. Bush s administration ran up against the authoritative power of the UN when it decided to go to war in Iraq without the organisation s backing. This stripped the war of its legitimacy in the eyes of international society a critical problem ever since. It also made it far more difficult for the USA to represent the war as more than a land grab driven by US oil interests, a president out to finish his father s business, and a variety of neo-conservative advisers keen to spread democracy to the Arab world on the point of a bayonet. Without UN backing, US policy looked more like an exercise in imperialism than one aimed at the maintenance of international peace and stability, delegitimising the actions of the most powerful state in the world. Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 19, pp.322 23 How do the UN s economic and social goals relate to the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations discussed in Chapter 8 of this subject guide? Is it possible to achieve international peace and security without also promoting the economic and social advancement of the world s peoples? 164

Chapter 12: Global governance and international organisations The North Atlantic Treaty Organization While the UN is a truly international body representing the interests of many states across the modern world, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has far more modest claims to fame. It is, at its core, a transatlantic security organisation designed to lock together the interests of Europe and North America. Unlike the UN, NATO does not pretend to multi-task. It is a military organisation that since its foundation in 1949 has had a well-defined hard power role in IR: to deter, plan, fight and win wars. One of the great ironies of NATO is that it never engaged in combat during the Cold War the conflict it was designed to fight. Since 1991, however, it has gone to war many times: first in Kosovo and now in Afghanistan, where it is massively committed. As of August 2011, it was engaged in anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in air operations to protect civilian lives and support the Libyan Transitional National Council against the Gaddafi regime. Composed of two branches a political wing in the form of NATO itself and a military wing known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe) NATO grew out of four post-war fears: of a resurgent Germany of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact that American isolationism might leave Europe without a permanent US presence that Europe itself might revert to old habits of interstate rivalry and war. To paraphrase Lord Ismay, its first Secretary General, NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. If NATO s historic purpose before 1989 was to deter a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, it was very successful. The main problem it has faced since the end of the Cold War is how to define its new role. Its first instinct was to do nothing at all on the reasonable grounds that the Americans had promised Gorbachev that NATO would not push its boundaries eastwards beyond Germany s eastern borders. Once Central and Eastern European states began asking for membership, however, the organisation changed its mind and began to enlarge on the grounds that this is what Central and Eastern Europeans actually wanted. Officially launched as policy following the publication of a 1995 review, enlargement has expanded the alliance to 28 following the 2008 accession of Albania and Croatia. Expansion has led to problems, particularly in regard to the organisation s relationship with Russia. Moscow s suspicion of NATO s intentions, partly a residual fear from the Cold War and partly a result of broken promises to limit NATO to the Oder River, contributed to the Russian war against Georgia in 2009. Since then, discussions around Georgian (and Ukrainian) membership have quietened significantly as the depth of Russian concern has become apparent. Meanwhile, the global security environment had changed out of all recognition following 9/11 and NATO s decision from 2002 to deploy ever larger numbers of its own people to Afghanistan. Many in NATO Americans more than most believe that it is time to rethink NATO s role. This led to the publication of the organisation s new strategic concept in 2010. The document is a restatement of NATO s core commitment to collective security enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which declares that an attack on any one member is an attack on them all. 165

11 Introduction to international relations 166 However, it also recognises that there is little likelihood of an orthodox military assault across the alliance s borders. Most of the threats now facing NATO are unconventional. These include terrorism, rogue states with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), global trade disruption, and cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure such as power grids. Old fashioned notions of static defence are increasingly irrelevant in the modern world, as is a good deal of NATO s equipment. Building on lessons learned from Afghanistan, the strategic concept calls on NATO to further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counter-insurgency, stabilisation and reconstruction. How far this will take NATO away from its traditional military focus, particularly in terms of post-conflict reconstruction, remains to be seen. Talking in grand terms about developing modern capabilities to deal with modern threats was all well and good. As sober voices point out, it is fine to spell out a new security doctrine. It is something else to get member states to pay for it in an age of austerity. This is particularly true as NATO continues to fight an extended and increasingly costly war in Afghanistan, where success is in painfully small increments and retreat looks an everpresent possibility. With NATO s western public showing less inclination to support this particular war, the future of the organisation looks decidedly uncertain as the first decade of the twenty-first century gives way to the second. Activity Imagine yourself as an official in Russia s Foreign Ministry. How would you interpret NATO s eastward expansion? From your point of view, does an expanded alliance make Europe more secure? What might NATO do to reduce Russian suspicions? As you think about these questions, consider the theoretical approaches that best represent Russia s and NATO s positions. How might these contribute to the ongoing tension between them? The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund While NATO is tasked with managing issues of war and peace security by any other name - the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization and the G8/G20 have the narrower, though no less difficult, job of supporting the global economy. This emerged from the Second World War in terrible condition, leading economic policy-makers to the conclusion that without a system of international support and policy coordination, there was every chance that the world would again experience the sort of economic and financial turbulence that had led to the Great Depression and, arguably, the Second World War itself. Over time, interest in the connection between the international political and economic systems has led to the growth of International Political Economy (IPE), a specialised subdiscipline of IR that was discussed briefly in Chapter 1 of this guide. Three new organisations were created after the war as part of the Bretton Woods system, which was meant to promote a new world economic order: the IMF, whose purpose is to ensure a stable exchange rate regime and the provision of emergency financial assistance to states the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development later the World Bank whose immediate goal was to facilitate European post-war reconstruction, but whose longer term job was to provide development assistance more generally

Chapter 12: Global governance and international organisations the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which became a forum for negotiations on trade liberalisation. Underwritten by the enormous power of the USA, whose anti-communist policies were as much economic as they were political, this new multilateral system of economic governance was reinforced over the years by the creation of new agencies. These include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), formed in 1960 to undertake multilateral policy surveillance; the World Trade Organization (WTO), which succeeded the GATT in 1995; and the Group of Eight (G8), established as the G5 in 1975 to facilitate policy coordination among the world s most developed economies. Activity Stop and read sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 15, pp.248 52 Using the table below, note down the Bretton Woods organisations and norms associated with each of the following regimes. International exchange rate regime International development regime International trade regime Organisation: Norms: Organisation: Norms: Organisation: Norms: As Richard Higgott points out, each of these new organisations has undergone some form of mission creep since its creation, progressively widening their responsibilities well beyond original intentions. For the IMF, this happened in the economically turbulent 1970s when its purpose was transformed from the arbiter of global monetary stability, to being the leading advocate of what Higgott calls country macro-economic rectitude. Before the 1960s, the IMF encouraged growth through a combination of state-led and private-sector spending. From the 1970s onwards, their task was conceived in narrower, neo-liberal economic terms. These tied financial assistance to far-reaching economic reforms that were designed to shift client economies away from state-led growth strategies towards the private sector. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) became central to IMF loans, forcing sovereign states to cut back on their spending in order to balance their books. Although SAPs often reduce government deficits, they also reduce the already limited services that states are able to provide to their citizens, undermining the ability of the central governments to exercise sovereign control over their territory. This can have dramatic implications for peace and stability. Further evolution took place following the collapse of communism, as the IMF turned its attention to facilitating the transition of post-communist economies to the market. How are we to judge the impact and success of economic multilateralism? Higgott judges them to have been relatively successful; both in terms of helping the world economy recover after the war, and in providing a form of imperfect governance in an era characterised by increasing levels of economic interdependence. Some thinkers are more critical. As a number of analysts point out, the proliferation of international bodies over the past 167

11 Introduction to international relations few years has done nothing to counter the increasingly uneven distribution of economic power in the world. Indeed, even after recent moves to replace the G8 with the more representative G20, the governance structures behind the world economy are run by rich and developed states. Neither have international economic organisations done much to reduce the number of people living in absolute poverty. Indeed, China almost single-handedly shrank that number between 1990 and 2010, with little help from the international development regime. Economic IOs have also failed to get rid of economic subsidies that work to the advantage of wealthy economies. As David Held shows, the absolute gulf between the richer and the poorer states over the past 30 years has widened, not narrowed. The system of economic governance embodied in the international economic regime now faces its sternest test in at least three decades as it tries to stabilise the world economy following the financial crisis of 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis that continues to wrack states and markets halfway through 2012. Activity Stop and read section 5 of Chapter 15, pp.257 59 Table 15.1 (p.258) summarises the debate about institutions in IPE. Which of these three theories of the global economy do you find most convincing? Do you find the same theory convincing when you think about the international political system? 168 The International Atomic Energy Agency If the management of an increasingly integrated and interdependent world economy has led to the creation of an ever expanding set of global economic regimes, the same is true of atomic and nuclear energy. Since the invention of atomic weapons in 1945, there has been a powerful impulse to create a regulatory framework to control the use of atomic energy and to promote nuclear non-proliferation. To this end, in 1946, the Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan. This drew heavily on the Acheson Lilienthal Report of 1946, and proposed to dismantle and destroy the US nuclear arsenal the only nuclear arsenal in the world at the time. Under this plan, US disarmament would be conditional on two things: the establishment of an international atomic development authority that would own and control all militarily-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and the creation of a system of automatic sanctions to punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material. Under the Baruch Plan, the Security Council would be unable to veto these sanctions. Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) largely because the Soviet Union which was developing its own atomic weapon planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official US policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his Atoms for Peace proposal at the UN General Assembly. This eventually led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Its main principle was to pursue the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear sciences and technology. To achieve this, the IAEA has been tasked with two purposes: to facilitate the spread of peaceful atomic and nuclear power technology, and to oppose its weaponisation. Officially based in Vienna, the organisation was tasked like the UNAEC before it with addressing the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy. It seeks to do so by a two-pronged strategy of ensuring that atomic power

Chapter 12: Global governance and international organisations is used for peaceful purposes, while establishing safeguards to protect compliant states against weapon proliferators who might cheat and evade the international nuclear regime. Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin in earnest until the early 1960s. Although initial efforts stalled, they renewed in 1964 after China detonated its first nuclear weapon. By 1968, after much debate and a lot of disagreement between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have nots, the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was finally completed. In June 1968, the UN General Assembly endorsed the NPT in Resolution 2373 (XXII) and, in July 1968, the treaty opened for signature in Washington, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970. The NPT is a deeply unequal document insofar as it distinguishes between the five governments who are deemed to be legitimate weapons states the USA, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and China and the rest of the world, who are not. Nevertheless, the treaty has gained wide acclamation and has been invested since with a high degree of international legitimacy. It is a very practical document, establishing a specific system of controls, confidence-building measures, and safeguard systems under the direct responsibility of the IAEA. In addition, it promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all states. This two-pronged approach encouraging states peaceful use of nuclear technology while opposing its weaponisation is not without its tensions, particularly as many peaceful uses of nuclear power feature dual-use technologies that are easily adapted to military applications. Only a few states refused to sign on. These included India, who criticised the treaty because it privileged the powerful and undermined Indian sovereignty; Pakistan, who feared India s nuclear ambitions; Israel, who feared its Arab neighbours; and North Korea, who feared South Korea and its Western allies. Still, these were the exception rather than the rule. By the end of the 1980s, the world at large could feel reasonably satisfied with its coordinated efforts to produce a workable non-proliferation regime. The situation has since taken a more ominous turn. First there was the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. This generated new fears that the number of weapons states would rapidly expand and that nuclear materials and scientists would leave Russia to help potential proliferators. The situation deteriorated when it was discovered that North Korea and Pakistan were actively engaged in developing their own nuclear weapons, often in close collaboration with one another. Pakistan exploded its first nuclear weapons in 1998 in response to five Indian nuclear tests earlier that year. Matters did not improve as one century gave way to another. North Korea detonated its first nuclear device in 2006. Pakistan nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan was discovered to be selling nuclear secrets. Meanwhile, according to Western intelligence, Iran began serious enrichment of its own uranium stockpile in 2007. This was taking place in the tense international environment that followed 9/11, with its growing worry that terrorists might get their hands on WMD, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Whether or not international organisations like the IAEA and treaties like the NPT are able to deal with these serious problems remains an open question. Among those who doubt the utility of international regimes, there are powerful voices in the international community especially among Realists in Israel and the USA calling for decisive (military) action to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. One war has already 169

11 Introduction to international relations been fought albeit on the basis of dubious intelligence to prevent Iraq acquiring WMDs. It is possible that similar operations might be waged in the future. If, or when, this happens, it will not only pose a serious risk to international peace and stability in the Middle East, but also to the credibility of international organisations and norms that constitute the non-proliferation regime. Regional organisations Standing halfway between the state on the one hand and globalisation on the other, regions have become a major focus for discussion in IR. How should we think about and identify them? Are regions fixed or do they change over time? How do they differ from each other? Do actors within certain regions think of themselves in regional terms? Each of these questions remains a key issue in a 30-year-old debate on regionalisation one that by definition has major consequences for how we think about regional organisations. Activity Stop and read sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 26, pp.430 32 Using the table below, define the three dynamics that motivate states to combine in regional organisations and provide an example of a current regional organisation. Management of independence Management of interdependence Management of internationalisation 170 Today s regional organisations are many and varied in terms of their purposes and principles. As Shaun Breslin points out, regional organisations come in many forms: from the purely economic to the linguistic, and from the religious to the political and military. There are currently around 76 regional organisations in the world, regulating trade, determining regions relationships with the outside world, defining the terms under which the organisation can intervene into the internal affairs of their member states and even in at least one case passing laws that govern what happens to members citizens. Breslin goes on to point out that many regions who began as economically closed systems have, under pressure from globalisation, opened up to the world economy. Still, only one regional organisation has so far created its own currency. Introduced in 1999, the Euro has become the second most traded currency on global markets. There are many kinds of regional organisation. Geographically, these stretch from the Americas (the Organization of American States (OAS) established in 1945), through Africa (the African Union (AU) formed as a successor to the Organization of African Unity in 2002), to South East Asia (the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) created in 1967). Some, like the EU, have powerful central administrations. Others do not. Some, like the OAS, talk about the rights of individuals. Until very recently, ASEAN steered clear of such references, upholding the traditional Westphalian institutions of state sovereignty and

Chapter 12: Global governance and international organisations mutual non-interference. The African Union, meanwhile, makes it quite clear that intervention in member states is possible if deemed necessary to promote peace, security and stability. Since 2004, the AU has been active in crises in Darfur, Comoros, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Côte d Ivoire and other member states. It has adopted resolutions creating AU peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Darfur, while imposing sanctions against persons undermining peace and security. Through what is called the Peace and Security Council, the AU also aims to establish a standby force to serve as a permanent African peacekeeping body. Activity Stop and read section 3 of Chapter 26, pp.432 37 IOs in different regions tend to support different sets of principles and behaviours. On the basis of these different institutions, to use the language of the ES, how would you describe international society in each of the following regions? The Americas Africa Asia At the apex of all regional organisations is the EU. It is not only the most developed of its kind, but casts a very long shadow over all other organisations calling themselves regional. Since the end of the Cold War, the naïve belief that Europe s example would be emulated in a series of regional unions around the world has proven to be misplaced. The conditions that make the EU possible are simply not to be found outside Europe. That said, the EU has become a model of sorts, inspiring states in other parts of the world to do IR differently: organising their affairs on a cooperative basis rather than simply coexisting in a Realist world of conflict and competition. To this degree, the EU exercises a form of soft power that is generally not given enough credit by critics. Stop and read section 4 in Chapter 26, pp.438 41 As you work your way through the readings, keep the following questions in mind: 1. Which areas of EU responsibility are intergovernmental and which are supranational? What s the difference? 2. What role do you see regional organisations having in the architecture of the international system? A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain the meaning of global governance in the contemporary international system assess the UN s contribution to global governance 171

11 Introduction to international relations explain the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the International Atomic Energy Agency analyse the effects of regionalism on different parts of international society define the vocabulary terms in bold. Chapter vocabulary African Union (AU) Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) authority Bretton Woods system collective security dual-use technologies European Union (EU) global governance international organisation (IO) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Political Economy (IPE) League of Nations legitimacy transnational mission creep non-proliferation Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) United Nations (UN) weaponisation, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Sample examination questions 1. What problems have been encountered in developing an effective international programme for tackling climate change? 2. Are state or non-state actors better equipped to provide the global governance needed to manage transnational issues? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 172

Chapter 13: Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East? Chapter 13: Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East? Aim of the chapter The aim of this chapter is to: give you the opportunity to deploy your new-found IR skills to critically assess the future of international society. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain what is meant by the rise of the East assess the advantages of the West s position in international society describe some of the constraints facing Asia s rising powers analyse arguments for and against a state-centric vision of the future of international society. Introduction As you work your way through this final chapter, you will notice that there are no readings until the very end. This is deliberate. After working through the chapter s largely state-centric arguments surrounding the Death of the West and the rise of the East, you will be asked to compare them to those presented in the final chapter in the textbook. There, Ian Clark makes the case for alternative forms of order at the systems level of international society. Your job after working through both sets of arguments will be to consider whether you see the future of international society in terms of competing and cooperating states, non-state actors, some combination of the two, or something completely different. The following article is derived from a keynote address given at the Third Annual Graduate Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Dublin City University, Ireland, 30 August to 1 September 2010. It was subsequently published as: Cox, M. Powershift and the death of the West? Not yet!, European Political Science 10(3) 2011, pp.416 24. 173

11 Introduction to international relations Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East? Power moves East Three interrelated themes have come together to produce a new consensus about the future shape of the international system. One concerns China and the increasingly widespread belief that China will surge past the USA to head the world s economic league table over the next few decades. 1 A second has to do with the view that the USA is in decline as a unipolar superpower, a decline from which it cannot recover. The third theme argues that the axis of world politics is tilting from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. From Paul Kennedy 2 to Niall Ferguson, Chalmers Johnson to Jeffrey Sachs, the message could not be clearer. Power is shifting from the West to the East. 3 The USA and Europe will now have to pass on the baton. 4 The Western moment that began in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has finally come to an end. 5 It is evident that economic power is shifting towards Asia, particularly China. However, it may be premature to write off the West. After all, it possesses several assets that have stabilised its position in international society. On the one hand, the USA still has many assets in terms of its human, capital and natural resources. It is also linked into a wider transatlantic community, whose organisational hub is centred on organisations like NATO and the G8. Membership in this security community has allowed the USA and Europe to redirect capabilities away from traditional interstate competition within the Western core of international society. Moreover, as China rises, it is unlikely to become the hub of a new, united East. As discussed in Chapter 11 of this subject guide, Asian regionalism is less prone to integration than that of Europe. In many ways, international relations in Asia are more Realistic (in the sense that they resemble Realist theory) than they are in Europe or North America. As a result, when China asserts itself, its many neighbours tend to look to external actors particularly the USA for support. This has led the USA to become more engaged in East Asian regional security than it has been in some decades. Indeed, as China rises, many states in the East might suddenly find it in their best interests to rediscover their relationship with the West. Although pundits have predicted the imminent rise of Asian superpowers for some time, the issue moved to the top of the academic agenda following the publication in 2004 of an article in Foreign Affairs by editor James Hoge. Firing a warning shot across the bows of the West, he wrote of a global power shift in the making which if not handled properly could very easily lead to major conflict. 6 Hoge s somewhat alarming piece is based on the work by A.F. Organski, whose ideas were discussed in Chapter 7 of this guide. 7 It also reiterates points that have been made by a number of other observers one of whom warns that when great powers decline (referring here of course to the USA) and others rise (obviously China), extreme financial dislocation, currency turbulence, and trade friction are bound to follow. 8 Given these potential instabilities, there is every reason to be concerned. In the wake of the 2008 Wall Street crash, China-watcher Martin Jacques made much the same point, though with less concern for the international consequences than Hoge. Jacques argues that because of the 2008 financial crisis, the liberal economic ship is sinking fast, leading to the biggest geopolitical shift since the dawn of the industrial era. This shift 1 In the autumn of 2010 it was announced that China had already become the second largest economy in the world, thus overtaking Japan ahead of schedule. 2 Kennedy, P. Rise and fall, World Today 66(8/9) 2010. 3 Ferguson, N. The decade the world tilted East, Financial Times, 28 December 2012. 4 Sachs, J. America has passed on the baton, Financial Times, 30 September 2009. 5 Morris, I. Why the West rules for now: patterns of history and what they reveal about the future. (London: Profi le Books, 2010) [ISBN 9781846681479]. 6 Hoge, J.F. A global power shift in the making, Foreign Affairs 83(4) 2004. 7 Organski, A.F. World politics. (New York: Knopff, 1958). 8 Plender, J. Great dangers attend the rise and fall of great powers, Financial Times, 21/22 August 2010. 174

Chapter 13: Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East? may see us learning Mandarin in order to compete in a new global order where states around the world emulate the economic systems of Beijing rather than Washington. A new consensus is in the making. 9 According to Jacques, this shift will involve more than just power. China, he argues, was not merely another state, but rather a civilisation with a mission. Hence, as it rises, its ideas about the world and not just its commodities and money will begin to gain traction and, eventually, displace those of the West. 10 Nor have predictions of a difficult future for the West ended there. The financial giant Goldman Sachs has supported Jacques thesis by producing one of the most cited statistical tables of the last few years, the predicted shift in the economic balance of power. This makes a statistical case for Jacques massive power transition. In 2015, it shows that the US economy will still be significantly larger than China s. By 2050, however, it will be at least 10 per cent smaller. At a regional level, the West will lose its primary position in the global economy as China, India, Brazil, Japan and Russia out-produce and out-consume the West. A new age is in the making. 11 Changing places? It is never comfortable raining on somebody else s parade, especially when some of the world s most influential intellectuals happen to be in it. Nevertheless, that is what I would like to do here though not because I want to hang on to the status quo or deny China and Asia their rightful place in the sun. Rather, I think that the case for inevitable Western decline and Asian growth needs to be interrogated more thoroughly than it has been so far. As a long-time observer of the US empire, I have never been attracted to either US apologists willing to forgive the state anything or anti-americanism which condemns the USA as the root of much international evil. To me, the USA is a central fact of international life that I happen to find extraordinarily interesting. As I have discovered before, it is remarkably easy to underestimate its staying power and by implication that of the West. Intellectuals in the West and elsewhere foresaw immanent US decline in the 1970s following its defeat in the Vietnam War and the recession that followed the OPEC oil crisis. We did it again just before the end of the Cold War in 1989, and again ended up eating our words. Perhaps we should be more careful about predicting the end of US power? The danger in this debate is that false ideas can lead to bad policy. Indeed, it may already be doing so. China is now beginning to act more assertively precisely because some of its leaders think that the tide has turned in their favour. The USA, fearing that it may be in decline, appears increasingly defensive. One manifestation of this is its increasingly tough attitude towards China, supported by a growing clamour among conservatives at home to do something about that supposedly communist state across the Pacific. Realists will no doubt argue that this is the necessary consequence of a real and measureable shift in power. However, it might just as easily be suggested that rising tensions are social constructions built on the basis of a very premature reading of the international. West in crisis The last few years have been traumatic for the West and the USA. Time magazine has called the period between 2000 and 2010 the decade from hell. 12 There are several good reasons: 9/11 and its aftermath; The USA s costly imperial adventure in Iraq; the great economic crash of 2008; and the storm now battering the walls of the European project. When taken together, these troubles have done a great deal to sap western 9 Halper, S. The Beijing consensus. (New York: Basic Books, 2010) [ISBN 9780465013616]. 10 Jacques, M. When China rules the world: the rise of the Middle Kingdom and the end of the Western World. (London: Penguin Allen Lane, 2009) [ISBN 9780713992540]. 11 See also Goldman Sachs, Global Economic Paper 192, The long term outlook for the BRICS and N-11 Post- Crisis, December 2009. 12 Serwer, A. The 00s: goodbye (at last) to the decade from hell, Time, 24 November 2009. 175

11 Introduction to international relations self-confidence. The situation has been made it all the more unbearable and traumatic by the extraordinarily high economic growth rates in Asia, particularly in mainland China. Frenetic economic activity in Shanghai and stories of China spreading its wings around the world tell their own story when set alongside images of rioting Greeks and unemployed Americans lamenting their fate in trailer parks. The message seems clear: the West s best days are behind it and the future belongs elsewhere. Even the British Foreign Secretary William Hague implied as much in a summer 2010 keynote speech. There is, he observed, no point in the UK hanging on to a past or a world where the USA and the West are able to run the show. We are living in what Hague calls this increasingly multipolar world. The sooner we get used to this new reality, the better. 13 It is one thing to think about where international society is heading. It is quite another to lose one s bearings completely. A witty headline is no substitute for the facts, and the fact remains that Western powers retain some big structural advantages over their potential Asian competitors. This is especially true of the West s beleaguered leader: the United States of America. Is the US economic star on the wane? The impasse over deficit and debt reduction that led to its credit being downgraded from AAA to AA+ status by the ratings agency Standard and Poor s certainly seems to indicate that it is. Moreover, other economic powers, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), seem hot on its heels. However, they remain a long way behind the USA, whose gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 was still light years ahead of the rest ($14 trillion compared to China s $8.8 trillion) and whose nearest economic competitor with a combined GDP of around $14 trillion turns out to be another member of the fading West the EU. It is also worth recalling how important the relationship between the EU and the USA remains. Reading some accounts of modern IR, we might conclude that the game is up and those in the West should relocate to the Pacific Rim while they can. Before investing in real estate, however, it might be useful to recall a few empirical facts. First, the combined GDP of the USA and the EU is vastly larger than any competitors totalling around $28 trillion per year. Between them, they account for just over half of the global economy, a significant proportion for a partnership in decline. Nor is it just a question of size. In 2010, the USA invested far more in Europe than it did in Asia or China. While it has had ongoing trade problems with its Pacific partners including its mind-boggling trade deficit with China it has had relatively few with Europe. Americans may not see Europe as terribly exciting, and Europeans continue to worry about Washington s fixation on nearly everything except the EU. The fact remains that quantitatively and qualitatively, the US EU relationship remains a central feature of contemporary international society. Nor should we forget the important part played by politics and culture in assessing the presumed West-to-East power shift. The USA is changing fast, to be sure. It is looking across the Pacific with greater regularity, especially since the election of Barack Obama who has sometimes been dubbed (quite wrongly) the first US President with no interest in Europe or European affairs. 14 Still, personal biography and background do not in the end determine US interests. Neither do they change the fact that America s natural political allies remain across the Atlantic rather than anywhere else. 15 13 For further discussion about British foreign policy see The future of UK foreign policy, Special Report, LSE IDEAS, October 2010. 14 Bisley, N. Global power shift: the decline of the West and the rise of the rest in Beeson, M. and N. Bisley (eds) Issues in 21st century world politics. (New York: Palgrave, 2010) [ISBN 9780230594524] pp.66 80. 15 See Quinlan, J. The rise of the rest E!Sharp, July August 2009. 176

Chapter 13: Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East? China: work in progress Of course, other actors like the BRICS are beginning to catch up. Their economies are developing rapidly, changing the balance of economic power in the world. Indeed, one of these emerging economies (China) is having an enormous impact on the international economic order. In 2009, China used twice as much crude steel as the USA, the EU and Japan combined. It devours natural resources like some modern, insatiable behemoth, becoming the world s largest market for many key countries including Brazil (12.5% of its 2009 exports), South Africa (10.3%), Japan (18.9%) and Australia (22%). In its own region, China s economic role is even more significant. It has replaced the USA to become Japan s and Taiwan s largest economic partner. Since the Asian financial turmoil of the late 1990s and even more so through the crisis that has unfolded since 2008 China has become the real economic engine within east Asia, so much so that many are now referring to China (not Japan or the USA) as Asia s indispensable economy. 16 Amid all the justified hype surrounding China, we need to maintain some perspective. China s geographic and demographic size, its careful use of both state and market mechanisms to maintain economic growth, and the socioeconomic policies it has adopted since the late 1970s have transformed it. Yet China remains an underdeveloped economy whose development began from a very low economic and technological level. Today, it can boast a growing middle class, several thousand millionaires, and a few billionaires to boot. At the same time, at least 500 million of its citizens living on less than $2 a day in a country with no welfare system worth speaking of and an appalling environmental record that will take tens of years and billions of Yuan ( ) to sort out. 17 China also faces some huge social problems, as its leaders readily concede. Getting rich quick may have produced results, but it has led to some fearsome income inequalities and regional disparities that pose a very serious threat to the kind of harmonious society that the regime claims to be constructing. 18 Nor, it seems, will China be able to rely on the export-oriented economic model that has driven growth over the past two decades. As its trading partners in the West have made clear with ever increasing sharpness since the onset of the economic crisis they are no longer prepared to accept astronomically high trade deficits with China. In the USA, the mood is turning ugly against what many see as China s unfair economic practices. 19 China remains a massive and, so far, a successful economic experiment that has delivered on its promises to make the state a more important player in the world. However, it is still a work in progress. Moreover, as serious Chinese analysts accept, while the USA might be in economic trouble right now, China is nowhere near catching up with it in per capita terms any time soon. 20 Indeed, amid all the current speculation about US decline and its Roman moment being past, we need to remember that the USA still has some pretty formidable advantages. As Carla Norrlof points out in America s global advantage, it is not the new China with its tight political controls, mass of cheap labour and undervalued currency which has the edge in structural terms. That advantage falls to the USA because of the size of its market, the per capita wealth of its people, and its control over world finance. As Norrlof points out, the fact that the USA can run such huge trade and fiscal deficits is not a sign of decline. Rather, she contends that this is an indication of US strength insofar as its friends and rivals all continue to buy up its debt without worrying much about an imminent financial collapse. 21 16 The indispensable economy, The Economist, 30 October 2010, p.87. 17 Watts, J. When a billion Chinese jump: how China will save mankind or destroy it. (London: Faber and Faber, 2011) [ISBN 9780571239825]. 18 Sang, L. The scale of China s economic impact, East Asia Forum, 23 February 2010. 19 Bendavid, N. Chinabashing gains bipartisan support, The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2010. 20 For a cross section of Chinese views about the world see the useful survey by British writer, Leonard, M. What does China think? (London: Fourth Estate, 2008) [ISBN 9780007230686]. 21 Norloff, C. America s global advantage: US hegemony and international cooperation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) [ISBN 9780521749381]. 177

11 Introduction to international relations China and the West There are those who suggest another narrative point to major changes in the world economy following the 2008 financial crisis. Has the crisis led to a tipping point in the relationship? Once more, we need to be wary. Some in China are feeling increasingly optimistic about their future. The Pew Research Centre recently claimed that the Chinese are the most optimistic people on earth. However, short-term optimism based on high levels of growth in depressed world economy is hardly the same thing as an absolute shift in international power. As many sober voices in China point out, though it may be on the way up, their state has a vested interest in making sure that the West does decline too far, too fast. As has been noted by cosmopolitan thinkers in Beijing and Shanghai, China s own success is bound up with continued Western (and US) prosperity. Without an economically dynamic West, they argue, China s own economic future must be in doubt. There is also the question of currencies. The Chinese might look pretty with Chairman Mao s revolutionary image on it. Yet the US dollar and the much-maligned Euro remain the world s reserve currencies. Given the troubles in the US economy, why have US Treasury bills shown little sign of losing their allure? More generally, why has the Anglo- American economic model remained dominant internationally despite the terrible battering it has taken since 2008? Bankers may be hated and the rich might be oh-so-terribly embarrassed to be rich, but the neoliberal economic model looks as secure as ever. As one seasoned analyst of the Asian scene has noted, obituaries for US power, especially US economic model, have been written before, and might again prove to be premature. 22 Hard and soft power Before concluding our thoughts on shifting power within the international system, we should return to our earlier discussions of hard and soft power. Hard power is sometimes dismissed by those who insist that a man with an improvised explosive device (IED) trumps a fighter plane and that a suicide bomber in Kabul negates America s intercontinental military reach. These sorts of arguments ignore basic military realities. These show that in 2010, the USA spent nearly $700 billion on national security. This is 10 times more than its nearest allies the UK and France and fourteen times more than China. Nor is this asymmetry about to change any time soon. Future projections indicate that the USA will be the only major actor in the world capable of global military power projection for several decades to come. Iraq might have cost the USA dearly, but did not stop it from escalating the war in Afghanistan and by turning it into an almost entirely American operation involving 100,000 military personnel. 23 What about the West s soft power? Isn t the West, after Iraq and war-onterror excesses, among other things, losing out on this count as well? Isn t China acquiring more and more influence while the USA and Europe languish? Both points are valid, but risk overstatement. Despite the soft power disaster that was the 2003 Iraq War, it has only taken three years for Barack Obama to undo much of the damage done to the USA s global reputation. 24 While China continues to spread its economic largesse, few of its clients show much of an inclination to shift their interests permanently eastward. Moreover, China s own citizens do not think of it as a place to live and work when times get tough. China may trade and aid in ever increasing amounts. It can buy oil, coal, and food from an array of potential resource providers. Yet there are still only two great magnetic 22 Higgott, R. Multipolarity and trans-atlantic relations: normative approaches and practical limits of EU foreign policy, GARNET Working Paper 76(10), April 2010. 23 Woodward, B. Obama s wars: the inside story. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010) [ISBN 9781849832205]. 24 On how well Obama has done in restoring US standing in Europe, see Transatlantic trends: key fi ndings 2010, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, http://trends.gmfus.org/ transatlantic-trends/ press-information/ 178

Chapter 13: Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East? points of emigration for the desperate, the needy, and the talented of the world: the USA and Europe. Their continued appeal indicates that the West s soft power may not be as diminished as was once thought. Nor can there be much of a long-term, international future in soft power terms for a state ruled by the largest communist party in history. 25 Much has been said recently about a crisis of democracy, predicting the rise of an authoritarian alternative. Yet no serious states in the world today I think it reasonable not to include Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam are ruled by communist parties. The tide of history is not moving in that direction. China might be run in ways that make it economically dynamic over the short term. It might even be the kind of system that most ordinary Chinese prefer to have. However, it has no international imitators. There is also no guarantee that China s political systems will remain stable. Liberals are wrong to argue that capitalism requires democracy to flourish capitalism did mighty well in the nineteenth century without elections or votes for the working classes. But one does not have to be a liberal to suggest that over time the Chinese model with all its inherent problems might easily become politically unsustainable as its citizens try to convert their increasing wealth into increasing social and political influence. 25 Parmar, I and M. Cox (eds) Soft power and US foreign policy: theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives. (London: Routledge, 2010) [ISBN 9780415492041]. Geopolitical shift? This leads us back to the language of geopolitics. Precisely what is it that we mean by a power shift and how should we think about the West. If we take the notion of the West to mean the Transatlantic region incorporating the USA and the EU then it is reasonable to suggest that states and actors outside this golden circle might be keen to knock on the door. However, we would do well to remember that the principles and behaviours that define membership in the international community were designed by state and non-state actors from Europe and its settler colonies the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The door through which new entrants to international society pass has the word West carved on it. When new entrants get inside, they tend to emulate the behaviour of those already sitting around the table copying rather than replacing the Western principles and behaviours that constitute modern international society. As for China s peaceful rise, the Chinese themselves seem to understand the realities of world politics better than most Western commentators. Like any emerging power operating in a western-designed and dominated system, they seek more influence and more power. Thus far, however, the Chinese as opposed to some of its own commentators have remained cautious. China, they contend has risen for two reasons: its abandonment of Maoism (despite keeping Mao s face on the currency); and its largely amicable relationships with its most important trading partner: the USA. Beijing and Washington both know this all too well, and neither has any reason to dissolve what has been one of the most successful economic partnerships of the past 40 years. For China in particular, any move to balance the power of the USA, or challenge the world economy that has underwritten 35 years of record economic growth would be catastrophic. It would not only damage China s prospects at home by severely constraining its export-led economy, but could unite a still-powerful West against it. Such moves could also scare a number of other powerful states in the region, including India, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Unlike the USA, which is security rich in terms of it geography, China is surrounded by potential rivals and rogues. It shares land borders with Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 179

11 Introduction to international relations Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and North Korea. At sea, it currently has territorial disputes with Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Japan, while the issue of Taiwanese independence continues to destabilise regional relationships. India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan might be thousands of miles away from the USA, but as functioning market democracies whose security needs are intimately entwined, they would soon run to Washington for cover if Beijing were to pose a serious challenge to the status quo. Indeed, if China were to break from the peaceful foreign policy it has been pursuing in order to contest US power, the world would likely be unforgiving (and none more so than the Americans). The reason for this may be as simple as the fact that while China s neighbours live in the East, they do not necessarily view themselves as eastern in the same way that Americans and Europeans feel western. For them, geography is not fate. Their interactions with China need not be predetermined by where they occur on a map of the world. Stop and read Chapter 33, pp.546 57 The final chapter of this subject guide has presented a classically state-centric vision of the future of international society. As you work your way through the final chapter of the, consider the following questions: 1. What alternative forms of international order does Ian Clark argue may emerge from modern international society? 2. What impact would a globalised or world society have on the argument that China and Asia will replace America and the West as dominant actors in IR? 3. Why can international society describe any of the orders in Chapter 33, while the international system is limited to only one of them? 4. Is there any hierarchy in modern international society? If so, is it truly anarchic? Once you have completed the readings, prepare one-paragraph responses to each of the questions. Your answers should not exceed 500 words and must include a thesis statement and evidence to justify your conclusions. These can be shared with peers and academics on the VLE. A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should be able to: explain what is meant by the rise of the East assess the advantages of the West s position in international society describe some of the constraints facing Asia s rising powers analyse arguments for and against a state-centric vision of the future of international society. 180

Chapter 13: Case study: the death of the West and the rise of the East? Sample examination questions 1. China s rise to regional hegemony in East Asia is an inevitable outcome of the anarchic international system. Discuss. 2. Does the rise to prominence of transnational issues and non-state actors make the Rising China debate less important in the twenty-first century? 3. What kind of international order will dominate IR in the coming decades? After preparing your answers, refer to the Examiners commentaries on the VLE for targeted feedback on specific questions. 181

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 182

Appendix 1: Sample examination paper Appendix 1: Sample examination paper Important note This Sample examination paper reflects the examination and assessment arrangements for this course in the academic year 2012 2013. The format and structure of the examination may have changed since the publication of this subject guide. You can find the most recent examination papers on the VLE where all changes to the format of the examination are posted. Candidates should answer FOUR of the following TWELVE questions. All questions carry equal marks. 1. How can international society be both ordered and anarchic? 2. To what extent do war and peace still define the central concern of international relations (IR)? 3. Why has the end of the Cold War been the subject of so much debate in IR? 4. What are the main challenges to Realism in IR theory? 5. How convincing is Democratic Peace Theory? 6. What problems have been encountered in developing an effective international programme for tackling climate change? 7. If the 20th century was American then the 21st century will be Asian. Do you agree? 8. Are states less sovereign now than they were in the past? 9. In practice, is the United Nations Security Council an agency of the Great Powers? 10. In relations between states, what part is played by moral and legal rules? 11. What challenges does globalisation pose for international society and the anarchic international system? 12. Why is theory important to the way we understand IR? 183

11 Introduction to international relations Notes 184

Appendix 2: Sample Examiners commentaries Appendix 2: Sample Examiners commentaries Important note This commentary reflects the examination and assessment arrangements for this course in the academic year 2012 2013. The format and structure of the examination may change in future years, and any such changes will be publicised on the VLE. Comments on specific questions Question 1 Reading for this question The various approaches to studying international society are discussed at length in Chapters 1 and 2 of the subject guide (all reference in this commentary are to the 2012 edition). There is an excellent account of the evolution of international society in Chapter 2 the textbook, Baylis, J., S. Smith and P. Owens The globalization of world politics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) fifth edition [ISBN 9780199569090]. Since the question invites the use of empirical examples to illustrate points, Chapters 3 and 4 will also be useful. There are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. Other useful sources, particularly Hedley Bull s The anarchical society, are presented in the Further reading list. Approaching the question The question makes direct reference to three main concepts, each of which should be defined and discussed: international society, order and anarchy. It would be odd not to mention Hedley Bull s classic text, but a good answer is nevertheless possible without it. A good answer would discuss the lack of central authority and a dense system of rules which is found among states and is implied by the term anarchical society. It would also go into the factors which underpin the rules, such as common principles including cultural factors and self-interest. An outstanding answer will integrate theoretical and historical evidence to support a clear thesis statement and may choose to contrast the English School approach with other theories. Question 2 Reading for this question The question deals specifically with topics covered in Chapters 7 and 8 of the subject guide, though material from chapters discussing other concerns in modern IR, particularly Chapters 11 and 12, will be of use in framing your answer. The Essential readings from Chapters 13, 14 and 29 will provide useful discussions of war, peace and human security, while other chapters in the textbook may be used to illustrate other areas of concern for the discipline. As usual, there are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. The Further reading listed in Chapter 12 of the subject guide may be particularly useful. 185

11 Introduction to international relations 186 Approaching the question As usual, a good answer will need to address the concepts in the question itself, including war, peace and the proper subject matter of IR. You might explain how different theoretical conceptions of war and peace relate to different explanations of the essential features of the international system and the question of who has agency within it. An outstanding answer might situate the question in relation to the history of the discipline of IR and in recent work on the decline of inter-state war. You can consider the value of arguments that war is of declining importance in the international system, and that other topics have become more central to IR post-cold War (e.g. economic globalisation, the environment, human rights, etc.). A good answer will answer the question directly, though outstanding responses will acknowledge the difficulty of identifying the main concerns of a discipline as broad and as varied as IR. Weak answers will not include references to relevant literature and will lack a clear argument. Question 3 Reading for this question IR debates surrounding the end of the Cold War are discussed at length in Chapter 3 of the subject guide. Chapter 1 looks at its influence on the development of the discipline s theoretical tools. There is an excellent account of the Cold War in Chapter 3 of the textbook. Since the question invites discussion of theoretical debates associated with the Cold War, selected approaches from Chapters 5 to 11 of the textbook may also be considered. There are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. Other useful sources, particularly The uses and abuses of history: the end of the Cold War and Soviet collapse and Why did we get the end of the Cold War wrong? by Michael Cox, are presented in the Further reading list. Approaching the question The question makes direct reference to the end of the Cold War, so you will need to show that you understand its historical background and one or more theories about how and why it ended. The levels of analysis may be useful as an organising device. It also refers to debates within the discipline, requiring you to make use of at least two different theoretical approaches in your answers. As discussed in the subject guide, the Cold War affected the development of the main post-second World War theoretical schools. Its end and the failure of IR to foresee it has framed many of the debates since 1991. Outstanding answers will engage with both the Cold War s influence on the development of important concepts in IR and the influence of 1991 on the discipline s subsequent evolution. Question 4 Reading for this question The various theoretical approaches to studying international relations are discussed at length in Chapters 1, 5 and 6 of the subject guide. There is an excellent account of Realism in Chapter 5 the textbook. Since the question invites comparison with other theoretical approaches, Chapters 6 11 are also relevant. Discussion of historical events that influenced Realism and its critics are discussed in Chapter 1. There are also a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. Other sources are presented in the Further Reading list.

Appendix 2: Sample Examiners commentaries Approaching the question The question asks you to consider the main challenges to Realism theoretical and empirical. An outstanding answer will exhibit a good understanding of the assumptions behind Realism and the ways in which the several alternative approaches discussed in the course question those assumptions. A preference for one approach may be expressed. However, an outstanding answer will acknowledge the inevitable difficulty of judging between fundamentally dissimilar theories. An outstanding answer will also include a short discussion of historical developments that have challenged Realism, such as the end of Cold War bipolarity and the rise of non-state actors. Question 5 Reading for this question The question deals with concepts mentioned specifically in Chapters 5 and 8 of the subject guide. These draw heavily on Chapter 14 and 19 of the textbook. Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) was popularised by Michael Doyle s 1983 Article, Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs. This is listed under the Further reading for Chapter 5 of the subject guide. There are relevant materials in the texts by Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. A number of other books and articles have touched on the subject over the years, so select your sources carefully. Approaching the question A good answer to this question could consider the reasons why this theory might be true, such as the involvement of populations in general in the practice of war in democracies, and the accountability of governments for decisions to start a war. Non-democratic states are less restrained in starting a war; are more prepared to fight to protect the interests of leaders above those of the public, and have less need to explain their conduct of the war. However, these arguments do not mean that democracies do not fight wars. Rather, it implies that democracies do not fight each other. An outstanding candidate could ask whether this has been the case in practice, and whether it is necessarily true. It might have happened rarely but could happen nonetheless. You could argue that there are various degrees and kinds of democracy, and that Germany and Britain could both have been called democracies of a sort in the years leading up to the First World War. Nevertheless, they went to war with each other. Leaders in democracies are also perfectly capable of war-mongering like the USA before the invasion of Iraq and there is no reason why two states could not do this and thereby end up at war with each other. Once again, an outstanding candidate could argue that the balance of probability is that the proposition is true up to a point, but it has not always applied, and need not always apply. This will require not only an understanding of DPT itself, but also a grasp of a few historical cases in which it has either held up or in which it has been undermined by events. Question 6 Reading for this question To answer this question, you should show familiarity with Chapter 12 of the subject guide and with Chapter 21 of the textbook, which contains a useful account of the part played by environmental issues, like climate change, in more recent international diplomacy. The list of Further reading for Chapter 8 of the subject guide is an excellent selection of literature relevant to this question, including the article by Falkner, Stephan and 187

11 Introduction to international relations 188 Vogler. However, you can also consult the textbook s index for a range of further references. As usual, there are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. Approaching the question You should set out the various conceivable measures for dealing with climate change. These could include taking steps to reduce carbon emissions by agreeing targets, introducing measures to control the destruction of forests and prevent illegal logging, taking steps to introduce sustainable energy production by harnessing solar energy, building wind farms and exploiting wave energy and well-designed hydroelectric systems, as well as safe nuclear energy production. A good answer would consider the underlying problems affecting agreement on these programmes. These would include the different stages of development reached by states which lead to demands for side-payments by states which are at an earlier stage of development; a reluctance to accept international monitoring by some states, such as China; and the problems of reconciling short-term costs with long-term gains. There is also the issue of the safety and long-term costs of nuclear energy. An outstanding answer would discuss the question of whether there could be a tipping point as climate change gets worse, so that recovery is impossible or whether a recovery might be postponed as the damage caused by climate change increases gradually. Another difficulty could be that new clean technologies could bring considerable rewards for those who develop them. Should these rewards be redistributed in part to countries which are not yet at the appropriate stage of industrial/technical development? Or is this yet another perk for more developed states? Question 7 Reading for this question This question deals directly with material covered in Chapter 13 of the subject guide and Chapter 33 of the textbook. The sources cited in Chapter 13 of the subject guide can also be referred to for a deeper discussion of the Eastward shift of power. A broader definition of China s rise that incorporates a discussion of power in IR will need to incorporate discussions from Chapter 10 of the subject guide and the Paul Hirst article listed under its Essential reading. The historical background for this question is discussed at length in Chapters 1, 3 and 4 of the subject guide. As usual, there are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan available through the Online Library. Approaching the question The assumptions behind the statement are that the twentieth century was dominated by America, and that the twenty-first will be dominated by Asia. A good answer will need to deal with both of these assumptions and come to some conclusions about the extent to which either of them are true. This means defining your terms. Is America synonymous with the USA or with the continents of North and South America? Doesn t Asia include a very wide variety of states and non-state actors, from China and Syria to the Taleban and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)? It will be important to clarify what you re comparing before comparing it. This might involve distinguishing between different dimensions of power (military, economic and political) and different kinds of power (hard, soft and smart). It is important to identify relevant and accurate empirical evidence in relation to the different dimensions of power, including specific examples that might either support or undermine

Appendix 2: Sample Examiners commentaries the claim in the question. For example, can we say that the twentieth century was dominated by the USA while accepting that it was an isolationist power until the Second World War? What about the USSR and the Cold War? A weak answer will assume that the assumptions behind the question are correct without discussing why they are important to the answer that you give. Question 8 Reading for this question The starting point for your reading on this question should be Chapter 9 of the subject guide and its associated Essential reading. There are also a number of useful references in the textbook which may be readily located by consulting the index. Because the question asks you to compare the present with the past, Chapters 2 to 4 of the subject guide will be important to provide historical background for your answer. Chapter 1 of Stephen Krasner s Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy, listed under the Further reading for Chapter 9, will be particularly useful as you define sovereignty. Approaching the question This question tests you understanding of state sovereignty. A good answer will notice the difficulty with the comparative term less, since sovereignty is usually thought to be an absolute it either is or isn t. An outstanding answer would, however, look for the assumptions behind the question. Is sovereignty really an all-or-nothing quality, or is Stephen Krasner right when he says that it can exist in different degrees depending on what kind of sovereignty you re talking about? Does the question enquire about whether involvement in an increasingly dense system of international arrangements and interrelationships means that states are more restricted in their choice of foreign policies than used to be the case? Another possibility is that governments are now more restricted in what they can do within their own state without some kind of intervention from outside. A liberal account of this would hold that governments are in some sense accountable to the international community for protecting the rights of their citizens, and that if they fail in this there may be intervention from outside. The UN doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect makes this claim. The conclusion made by an outstanding answer is necessarily complex, and should identify what varieties of sovereignty may be enhanced or diminished in modern international society. Question 9 Reading for this question Relevant reading for this question includes Chapter 12 of the subject guide, which discusses international organisations. Chapters 1, 5, 8 and 10 also contain relevant discussions. You should familiarise yourself with Chapters 18 and 19 of the textbook which discuss the UN in detail. As usual, there are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. The textbook s index also contains many useful citations. Approaching the question This question contains several contested terms that you will have to grapple with in order to successfully answer it. You will therefore have to explain the structure and powers of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, as well as what and who the Great Powers are. A discussion of the way in which the 15 members of the SC are appointed, 189

11 Introduction to international relations 190 and the voting rules, would suggest that the five permanent members together determine whether a decision can be taken with regard to the SC s most important function, namely deciding actions under Chapter 7 of the Charter to maintain international peace and security. An outstanding answer would ask whether or not this mean that the UN is an agency of those permanent members? Is the word agency too strong when it is recalled there are many illustrations of this in recent years that the permanent members regard a measure of support among non-permanent members as desirable, or even necessary to give their actions international legitimacy? This exam question invites you to comment on whether the current permanent members are, in fact, the current Great Powers. The outstanding candidate could argue that the underlying philosophy of the United Nations, that it should be led by Great Powers, is the correct one, but that not all the present permanent members amount to Great Powers. The proposition in the question is ill-founded because the wrong Great Powers have the reigns. The ongoing discussion about Security Council reform could be put in these terms. A further possibility, which could be proposed by an outstanding candidate, would be that a more fundamental reform is needed to make the SC a representative body by enlarging it and having some system whereby there could be representation of all groups of states in the main executive body of the UN. Only in this case could the SC cease being an agent of the Great Powers and make a claim to being the representative body of the global community of states. Question 10 Reading for this question To prepare this question, you will need to be familiar with discussions in Chapters 7, 9 and 12 of the subject guide. Chapters 17 and 18 of the textbook will also be important sources for your answer, as they discuss the role of international law and regimes in ordering interstate relations. A familiarity with the discussion of shared institutions in international society will also help (see Hedley Bull s The anarchical society in the Further reading list). Because rules may vary between regions, the Krahmann article in the Further reading for Chapter 12 of the subject guide may provide a good starting point. As usual, there are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. Approaching the question An answer should start by giving an indication of what is meant by moral and legal rules. You should give some idea of what makes up moral rules between states and could propose the various conventions to prohibit genocide, torture or slave labour, or the EU s rules prohibiting the use of capital punishment. A good answer could point out that legal rules may be about questions of morality and point out that they are different from informal norms or principles. One view is that rules are formal and agreed statements and that they usually require the consent of an agreed number of governments before they become binding. A good candidate should add that international society is an anarchical one, and that even when a rule is formally binding there is often no way of enforcing it. There may be pressures to comply, but no international policeman exists to see that the law is obeyed. A nuanced answer would argue that most international legal rules are applied most of the time since they are a necessary underpinning of the globalised economy. They are a necessary instrument of interdependence. Moral rules, you might suggest, reflect an emerging preparedness to codify and generalise good behaviour. It is

Appendix 2: Sample Examiners commentaries not that such rules have to be applied by international authorities, but that states recognise that they need to apply such rules to themselves. The part that is played is not as a set of rules to be imposed, but as a reflection of an imperfect international consensus, or as a necessary instrument of interdependence. It is interesting to consider the place of non-state actors in the creation and exercise of international legal and moral rules. Question 11 Reading for this question Chapter 4 of the subject guide deals specifically with globalisation. You should also consult Chapters 1 and 4 of the textbook along with Chapters 32 and 33. As the question refers directly to the impact of globalisation on the English School s international society and Realism s anarchic international system, you may want to refer back to the appropriate sections of the subject guide and textbook to ensure that you have sufficient information to frame your answer. As usual, there are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan available through the Online Library. Susan Strange s article The Westfailure System, listed in the Further reading for Chapter 4, is a particularly useful source of information for this question. Approaching the question This question makes direct reference to three main concepts, each of which should be defined and discussed: globalisation, international society, and the global international system. A good answer will connect the last two ideas to the theoretical schools to which they are connected. In assessing the impact of globalisation on the international system and international society, you may choose to emphasise one or two of its many aspects. In the economic sector, you could discuss the way in which economic problems are unlikely to fit into the sovereign state model associated with the Realist anarchic international system. A very good answer will go beyond the obvious contradiction between state-centric Realism and International Political Economy by raising issues such as whether this really affects states sovereignty or whether it only affects the ways in which it is exercised, pushing sovereign states towards greater cooperation to tackle common economic problems. You might refer to the ongoing global economic crisis for empirical evidence. Another strategy might look at the effects of globalisation on the shared principles that define the institutions of international society. Do global institutions reinforce international society or do the cultural differences between global actors undermine institutions power to bring order to an anarchical society? Whatever aspect of globalisation is discussed, outstanding students will use examples to show their ability to us theoretical concepts to better understand empirical examples. Question 12 Reading for this question The starting point for your reading for this question should be Chapters 1 and 4 of the subject guide. The Introduction and Chapter 1 of the textbook provide excellent overviews of globalisation s impact on international affairs. You may also choose to supplement these readings with selected sections of Parts 1 and 4 of the textbook which discuss the historical background of globalisation and a variety of its impacts on international society. As usual, there are a number of useful references in Griffiths and O Callaghan, available through the Online Library. Keohane and Nye s 191

11 Introduction to international relations article Globalization, what s new? What s not? (And so what?), listed in the Further reading for Chapter 4, is a good starting point for a discussion of whether or not globalisation is really new at all. Approaching the question The assumption which lies behind the question is that globalisation is affecting IR in new ways and thereby affecting its popularity. It is important to clarify what you mean by globalisation, which is a hotly contested term in the discipline. An outstanding answer could also discuss the proper subject matter of IR, arguing that globalisation has broadened the scope of our subject by popularising new topics such as International Political Economy, human rights and climate change. Is globalisation a new process at all? Could it be that the increasing ease and availability of communications and transportation technology has been more influential than the social processes associated with globalisation? Does globalisation make us more aware of our similarities or our differences? A good answer will engage with some of these issues, though it is important to be selective and not to try to do too much in a relatively short examination essay. Pick your points based on what will (i) best support the argument that you choose to make in your statement, and (ii) show off your ability to integrate IR concepts and empirical evidence. A weak answer will make overly general arguments without evidence to justify its position. 192

t 150 O West 120 O West 90 O West 60 O West Longitude West 30 O of Greenwich 0 O Longitude East 30 O of Greenwich 60 O East 90 O West 120 O West 150 O West 180 O BEAUFORT SEA Davis ARCTIC CIRCLE ARCTIC CIRCLE ARCTIC CIRCLE ALASKA (U.S.A.) Reykjavik ICELAND NORWAY Faroe Islands FINLAND (Denmark) SWEDEN Hudson Bay Oslo Helsinki R U S S I A N F E D E R A T I O N 60 O Shetland Islands (U.K.) 60 O Stockholm ESTONIA Gulf of C A N A D A LABRADOR LATVIA Moscow Alaska DENMARK BERING SEA SEA SEA OF UNITED LITHUANIA Minsk OKHOTSK Dublin KINGDOM Berlin Warsaw London NETH. BELARUS IRELAND Astana GERMANY POLAND Sakhalin BEL. Kiev Vancouver Island of LUX. CZECH REP. Paris Island Newfoundland LIECHT. SLOVAKIA UKRAINE AUSTRIA KAZAKHSTAN Ulan Bator ARAL Kuril Islands FRANCE SWITZ. HUNGARY MOLDOVA Ottawa SLOV. SEA (Russian Fed.) St Pierre and Miquelon ROMANIA S.M. CROATIA 45 MONGOLIA O (France) MONACO BOSNIA SERBIA Bucharest 45 O AND H. Nova Scotia ITALY KOS. BULGARIA BLACK SEA UZBEKISTAN VAT. Sofia Bishkek AND. MONT. GEORGIA Beijing Hokkaido Rome KYRGYZSTAN NORTH SEA OF Azores Madrid ALBANIA JAPAN Washington Ankara Tashkent (Peking) PORTUGAL F.Y.R.O.M ARMENIA AZERB. KOREA Honshu (Portugal) Lisbon SPAIN Athens TURKEY TURKMENISTAN TAJIKISTAN Pyongyang (EAST SEA) NORTH Algiers Dushanbe JAPAN Tunis Ashgabat UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GREECE Seoul Strait of Gibraltar MALTA Kabul CYPRUS SYRIA SOUTH Tehran Tokyo Rabat Kashmir C H I N A TUNISIA KOREA Madeira Islands MEDITERRANEAN SEA LEBANON Damascus Baghdad AFGHANISTAN PACIFIC OCEAN Bermuda Islamabad NORTH (Portugal) West Bank IRAN Shikoku (U.K.) Tripoli ISRAEL Kyushu NORTH MOROCCO IRAQ JORDAN PAKISTAN T i b e t 30 O 30 O Guadalupe I. EAST CHINA Canary Islands Cairo KUWAIT NEPAL (Mexico) ATLANTIC OCEAN SEA (Spain) ALGERIA New Delhi BHUTAN LIBYA SAUDI ARABIA Kathmandu PACIFIC OCEAN Gulf of Mexico EGYPT BAHRAIN QATAR T'aipei BAHAMAS TROPIC OF CANCER Havana WESTERN TROPIC OF CANCER Riyadh Abu Dhabi TROPIC OF CANCER BANGLADESH TROPIC OF CANCER SAHARA U.A.E MEXICO Muscat Dacca TAIWAN ARABIAN SEA MYANMAR Hawaiian Islands Revillagigedo Is. CUBA DOMINICAN REP. INDIA (U.S.A.) (Mexico) Cayman Is. Puerto Rico (U.S.A.) (BURMA) Hanoi Mexico HAITI MAURITANIA LAOS (U.K.) Hainan Northern Mariana Is. ST KITTS AND NEVIS MALI OMAN Naypyidaw Port-au- Luzon Sto Nouakchott Vientiane (U.S.A.) BELIZE JAMAICA ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA NIGER CAPE Prince Domingo Guadeloupe (France) Khartoum Bay of Bengal Manila PHILIPPINE SEA HONDURAS VERDE DOMINICA Dakar SENEGAL CHAD ERITREA YEMEN 15 O THAILAND VIETNAM 15 O Martinique (France) Sanaa GUATEMALA CARIBBEAN SEA ST LUCIA Praia Niamey Andaman BARBADOS Bamako Bangkok GAMBIA BURKINA Socotra Islands (India) SOUTH CHINA Guam (U.S.A.) EL SALVADOR SUDAN MARSHALL ISLANDS NICARAGUA CAMBODIA GRENADA ST VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES Ndjamena (Yemen) SEA GUINEA-BISSAU PHILIPPINES GUINEA Ougadougou DJIBOUTI Clipperton NIGERIA Phnom Penh TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Caracas Conakry BENIN Addis (France) COSTA RICA SOMALIA Nicobar Freetown CÔTE GHANA Palawan Abuja Ababa Majuro VENEZUELA Islands (India) Mindanao Koror FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA PANAMA Georgetown SIERRA LEONE D'IVOIRE SOUTH Colombo Accra CENTRAL Coco Island Paramaribo Monrovia Yamous. SUDAN AFRICAN REP. ETHIOPIA Palikir SRI LANKA (Costa Rica) Bogotá GUYANA FRENCH GUIANA (France) LIBERIA CAMEROON Bangui Juba Abidjan Male Kuala Lumpur BRUNEI TOGO Yaoundé Tarawa Malpelo Island COLOMBIA SURINAME PALAU (Colombia) São Pedro Gulf of Guinea EQUAT. GUINEA Mogadishu MALDIVES MALAYSIA e São Paulo UGANDA KENYA C a r o l i n e I s l a n d s EQUATOR Quito EQUATOR (Brazil) SÃO TOMÉ AND PRINCIPE Libreville Kampala EQUATOR SINGAPORE EQUATOR 0 O ECUADOR DEM. REP. OF Galápagos CONGO Yaren Nairobi Celebes PAPUA NEW GUINEA GABON THE CONGO K I R I B A T I (Ecuador) NAURU Fernando de Noronha RWANDA Brazzaville L. Victoria New Ireland K I R I B A T I (Brazil) Sumatra I N D O N E S I A Kinshasa BURUNDI Dodoma Victoria Jakarta Zanzibar JAVA SEA SOLOMON Ascension New ISLANDS Tokelau (U.K.) TANZANIA Flores Britain Luanda SEYCHELLES Dili (N.Z.) INDIAN OCEAN Java Funafuti PERU EAST TIMOR Port Honiara Tokelau Bali TUVALU Am. Christmas I. Sumba Timor Moresby (N.Z.) Cook Islands Samoa Lima BRAZIL COMOROS (Australia) (U.S.A.) (New ANGOLA MALAWI Cocos Islands Wallis and SAMOA Zealand) Mayotte ZAMBIA Lilongwe (Australia) Futuna (Fra.) 15 O (Fra.) 15 O La Paz Saint Helena Lusaka VANUATU Brasília CORAL BOLIVIA (U.K.) MADAGASCAR Harare SEA Port Vila TONGA Niue MAURITIUS Suva (N.Z.) French Polynesia Sucre FIJI Martin Vaz Islands ZIMBABWE Antananarivo Rodrigues (Mauritius) (France) (Brazil) SOUTH NAMIBIA Port Louis New Reunion Caledonia Nuku'Alofa TROPIC OF CAPRICORN Windhoek BOTSWANA (France) (France) PARAGUAY TROPIC OF CAPRICORN TROPIC OF CAPRICORN Pitcairn Gaborone (U.K.) Asunción Pretoria AUSTRALIA Easter Island I. Sala y Gómez San Félix I. Maputo (Chile) (Chile) (Chile) San Ambrosio I. (Chile) SWAZILAND Norfolk ATLANTIC OCEAN LESOTHO (Australia) 30 O 30 O SOUTH AFRICA URUGUAY Santiago Juan Fernández Montevideo Cape of Cape Leeuwin Great Australian North Buenos Aires Island Islands Tristan da Cunha Bight Canberra (Chile) Good Hope SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN ARGENTINA (U.K.) Amsterdam I. (France) NEW ZEALAND Saint Paul I. (France) Gough (U.K.) TASMAN South Tasmania Island Wellington Chiloé Island SEA 45 O 45 O Los Chonos Archipelago A l e u t i a n I s l a n d s 75 O Nunavut Territory C H I L Strait GREENLAND (Kalaallit Nunaat) (Denmark) Denmark Strait GREENLAND SEA Svalbard (Norway) NORWEGIAN SEA North Cape Franz Josef Land New BARENTS Zemlya SEA MOZAMBIQUE RED SEA Mozambique Channel CASPIAN SEA KARA SEA Gulf of Aden North Land LAPTEV SEA New Siberian Islands EAST SIBERIAN SEA Borneo (Japan) Ryukyu Is. 75 O Wrangel Island Moluccas New Guinea G r e a A l e u B a r r i e r R e e f t i a n I s l a n M i c r M d s o n e s i e l a n e a s i a 0 O 60 O Santa Inés Island E C a p e H o Falkland Islands (U.K.) Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego r n South Georgia (U.K.) South Sandwich Islands (U.K.) South Orkney Islands S O U T H E R N O C E A N (U.K.) Cape Anne ANTARCTIC CIRCLE ANTARCTIC CIRCLE ANTARCTIC CIRCLE Prince Edward Islands (South Africa) Crozet Islands (France) Kerguelen (France) Heard Island (Australia) Macquarie I. (Australia) Balleny Islands 60 O AMUNDSEN SEA BELLINGSHAUSEN SEA WEDDELL SEA Cape Norvegia Cape Adare ROSS SEA 75 O A N T A R C T I C A 75 O 150 O West 120 O West 90 O West 60 O West Longitude West 30 O of Greenwich 0 O Longitude East 30 O of Greenwich 60 O East 90 O West 120 O West 150 O West 180 O