CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 1. INTRODUCTION The institutionalisation and the influence of both the existential-phenomenological approach and the humanistic values of the Third Force movement in current psychology leave much to be desired. The lack of outright organisation and an overall theoretical model remain a chief concern of the Third Force or humanistic movement to this day. The historical origins of paradigms and intellectual groupings that culminated in the humanistic movement are testimony to the fragmented history. For example, the existential movement according to Morris (1979), was rather fragmented than organised and so is the status of the Third Force psychology in contemporary psychology. I regard the fragmented history of the Third Force as challenging and fascinating. I maintain that the value of the Third Force movement lies rather in its complex and intriguing history than in its theoretical contribution to psychology. I use the term fragmented to illustrate the epistemological diversity within the movement, reflecting influences from existentialism, phenomenology, humanism, and the American counterculture of the 1960s extending to the early 1970s. It is this tapestry of thought that invigorates my focus on the humanistic movement. The study begins with the epistemological explication of existentialism, phenomenology, and humanism. The three schools of thought contributed to the epistemological diversity of the Third Force. Kierkegaard s existentialism stresses human subjectivity and shall be given parallel attention alongside the theoretical orientation of the humanistic movement. Jean-Paul Sartre s radical views on human freedom are discussed, reflecting on the atheistic approach to the view of man. However, Kierkegaard differs with Sartre in that Kierkegaard is theist: he regards the ultimate stage of transcendence as a union with the Godly.

2 Phenomenology had an immense impact on the development of existentialphenomenological psychology. Edmund Husserl and Martin Heiddegger were the main proponents of the phenomenological thought. Husserl s phenomenology influenced qualitative research and psychotherapy alike. However, the focus of Husserl s influence shall be confined to psychotherapy in this study. He viewed consciousness as intentional and transcendental. Heidegger applied the ontological theme of being-in-the-world to Husserl s phenomenology. Ludwig Binswanger imported Heiddegger s phenomenology into psychotherapy, culminating in the existential-phenomenological paradigm of psychology. The contributions of the existential-phenomenological approach to therapy and the humanistic movement are documented in this study, based on Binswanger s existential analysis. Theories of the eclectic group of founding psychologists (Maslow, Rogers, and May) are presented. Maslow s views of peak experiences are integrated with Rowan s (1983) stages of mystical experiences. Rogers empathy is viewed from the transcendental perspective of Zen meditation. Finally, the contributions of humanistic psychology are discussed, reflecting on the impact of humanistic views on various therapeutic approaches and the applicability of the person-centered approach to education and politics. 1.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS The concepts applied in this study are philosophical as implied in 1.1 above. However, their definitions shall largely reflect how they apply in psychology. Existentialism and phenomenology are defined separately and then as existential-phenomenological psychotherapy. 1.2.1 Existentialism Existentialism is a philosophical movement that emphasizes subjectivity, free will, and individuality (Reber & Reber, 2001). Existentialism has divergent thinkers within its ranks and this makes it difficult to clarify its practical usefulness in psychotherapy (Miars, 2002).

3 Morris (1979) argued that this disarray seems most pronounced in humanistic psychology, which draws most of its philosophical and theoretical concepts from existential sources. 1.2.2 Phenomenology Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline that focuses on human experience. Tyler (1992b) for example asserted that the basic idea of phenomenology is to understand human experience as well as our interactions with the environment, and our relationship with each other. In phenomenology, individuals are considered as conscious subjects who act intentionally and who give meaning to their actions. Phenomenological psychology then, becomes the study of the way in which the individual himself or herself understands what he is doing, and how he feels about it. 1.2.3 Existential-phenomenological psychotherapy Existential-phenomenological psychotherapists have assimilated the ideas of existential and phenomenological philosophers into a system of psychotherapy (Hansen, 1999). According to Worrell (1997), existential-phenomenological psychotherapy has, as its philosophical background, the concepts of intentionality and intersubjectivity. Intentionality refers to the act whereby consciousness reaches out to the world to interpret objects, retrieving them as meaningful things. According to Owen (1994), intersubjectivity is about therapists aims and intentional awareness about clients and their aims; intermingled with clients awareness and aims about therapists. 1.3 Intention of this study The aim of this study is to demonstrate the historical significance of the Third Force and its contributions to psychology. The emergence of the Third Force brought the introduction of the existential-phenomenological approach to humanistic psychotherapies, putting Binswanger s work to light. The dimension of transcendental psychology, pioneered by Abraham Maslow, came to the attention of psychologists. The study thus illustrates that the transcendental approach links psychology with mysticism and Eastern forms of

4 meditation. Also, the person-centered approach brought psychology closer to the issues of society. 1.4 Outline of the study Chapter 2 provides the philosophical background of the study. Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Humanism are discussed, with regard to their relevance in psychology, particularly psychotherapy. Chapter 3 illustrates the combination of existentialism and phenomenology into existentialphenomenological psychotherapy, with particular focus on Binswanger s existential analysis. The contributions of this approach to psychology are indicated as well. Chapter 4 reviews the emergence of the Third Force movement. The controversies and diversity within the movement are exposed. Its contributions to therapeutic psychology are reflected upon. Finally, its current status within contemporary psychology and the implications for the future are indicated.

5 CHAPTER 2 THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 2.1 INTRODUCTION This section aims at explicating the three philosophical influences that contributed to the development of existential-phenomenological psychology, pioneered by the Swiss psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Existentialism and phenomenology were the main influences that contributed towards this paradigm. Humanism had some contributions towards the existential-humanistic approach of the Third Force movement. Brennan (1998a, 1998b) preferred the use of the concept Third Force to denote what was neither psychoanalysis nor behaviourism, which is humanistic psychology. I opted for the use of the same concept in order to reflect on the divergent epistemologies existent within the movement; ranging from existentialism, phenomenology, and secular humanism. The nature and critique of this diversity are presented in Chapter 4 below. Existentialism is presented in this chapter from the early forms as espoused by Kierkegaard. The latter forms are discussed from the viewpoint of Jean-Paul Sartre. Existentialism did not emerge as an organised school of thought. The existential movement had divergent thinkers within its ranks, and this has made it difficult to clarify its practical usefulness in psychological endeavours like psychotherapy. It is more a series of thinkers who reflected on human existence than it is an integrated philosophy (Miars, 2002). Phenomenology is a philosophical trend founded by Edmund Husserl. Ellenberger (1958) described Husserls s phenomenology as a methodological principle: probably because of Husserl s emphasis on subjectivity as consciousness, unlike Heidegger who integrated phenomenology with ontological issues. Martin Heiddegger introduced existential elements in Husserl s phenomenology with his concept of being-in-the-world. Ludwig Binswanger brought the concept of being-in-the-world into psychotherapy in the guise of existential analysis, which is the core formulation of existential therapy.

6 The philosophical foundations of Humanism are presented under Section 2.4 below. According to Hansen (2000), humanism is a philosophical hybrid of existentialism and phenomenology. The emphasis of the humanistic philosophy is on a person s inherent capacity for growth and self-realization. In other words, humanism as a philosophical paradigm had a bearing on the ideology of the Third Force Movement; hence its inclusion as one of the philosophical trends in this study. The concept psychological humanism is used herein to reflect on the influence of humanistic theory on the Third Force Movement. Hansen (2000) asserted that psychological humanism emerged as a reaction to the reductionistic orientation of psychoanalysis and behaviourism, and so did the Third Force. 2.2 EXISTENTIALISM Existentialism is a philosophical movement that emphasises subjectivity, free will, and individuality above theories that stress the role of society and social groups (Reber & Reber, 2001). In the same vein, Ellenberger (1958) defined existentialism as the philosophical trend of thought which takes as its focus of interest the consideration of man s most immediate experience, his own existence. Existentialism sprang up spontaneously in different parts of Europe and among different schools. It has a diverse body of researchers and creative thinkers. Existential thinkers came in two stages, the phenomenological stage and the existential phase. The former was represented by Eugene Minkowski in France, Erwin Straus in Germany, and V.E. von Gebsattel in Germany. The latter comprised of among others, Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, and Roland Kuhn in Switzerland, and J.H. Van Den Berg in Holland (May, 1958b, 1983). These thinkers formulated ideas that contributed to the emergence of existentialism. They disagreed with Freud s psychoanalysis. The contention was that psychoanalysis disregarded issues pertaining to human existence. Foulquie (1947) maintained that existence is not a state, but an act, the actual transition form possibility into reality; to exist is to take leave of what one is (ex) in order to establish oneself (sistere) on the level of that which formerly was possible. To exist, for existentialists, is not merely to be (sein) but to be here or there, (dasein); to be in a situation,

7 in a determinate relationship with the world and with other conscious beings. This is a phenomenological description of existence, akin to Heidegger s Being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962) detailed in 2.3.3 below. In the same vein, May (1958b, 1983) asserted that the term existence comes from the word ex-sistere, which means literally to stand out, to emerge. This portrays the human being not as a collection of static substances or mechanisms or patterns but rather as emerging and becoming, that is, as existing. The approach of existential psychologists and psychiatrists is always dynamic; existence is equivalent to coming into being, becoming. The term being is not used as a static word, but a verb form, the participle of the verb to be. Existentialism is thus concerned with ontology, that is, the science of being. Ontos is a Greek equivalent of being (May 1958b, 1983). Brennan (1998a) described existential philosophy as a paradigm that proposes individual existence as the act of being, which defines a person s essence, so that existence precedes essence. The concept essence was brought into Christian thinking by the scholastic philosophers of the medieval era, and it brought psychology to a synonymous level with the Christian goal of perfection of the essence shared by each person, which is the eternal salvation of the soul. That is, for the scholastics, essence preceded existence. Foulquie (1947) also viewed existentialism in relation to essence. To Foulquie, existentialism is a theory that affirms the primacy, or priority of existence. This priority is affirmed in relation to essence. Essence is what a thing is; for example, I am a man, and I possess the human essence. Foulquie (1947) distinguished between the universal essence and individual essence. The universal essence comprises of those characteristics that are common to all the objects of the same kind. With the addition of those characteristics peculiar to each individual, the universal essence becomes individual essence. However, it should be noted that Sartre s (1964) view that existence precedes essence is not a universally accepted thesis, even to current thinkers. Some thinkers proposed the opposite, that essence precedes existence, as indicated by the scholastic philosophers above. Kierkegaard (1964b) is a typical case in this regard. He maintained that the essence of man

8 lies in his or her authentic communication with God. To Kierkegaard, true communication belongs to those who exist in the isolation of their inwardness, who desire through this inwardness to express the life of eternity. True communication is opposed to direct communication. Kierkegaard (1964b) denounced direct communication because it presupposes certainty; but certainty is impossible for anyone in process of becoming, and the semblance of certainty constitutes for such an individual a deception. The religious individual has learned that human indulgence profits nothing, and therefore refuses to listen to anything from that side, but he or she exists before God. In this regard, essence in communication with God precedes existence. 2.2.1 Antecedent expressions of existentialism: Kierkegaard s concept of subjectivity Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), a Danish thinker and clergyman, is regarded as the main proponent of modern existentialism. Ellenberger (1958) asserted that existential thinking had been implicit from time immemorial in many religious and philosophical systems. Kierkegaard was the first to make explicit its basic assumptions, later elaborated by Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Kierkegaard s ideas on existentialism were in direct contradiction to Hegel s philosophy of rationalism. Rationalism was a philosophical school of thought that shared the assumption that truth was to be ascertained by the use of rational thought. Kierkegaard reacted to the tenets of rationalism by arguing that faith, rather than rational truth, was central to a person s existence (Brennan, 1998a). Kierkegaard s philosophical arguments were mainly around man s acceptance of God as true essence, and the emphasis on the concept of subjectivity. Valle, King and Halling (1989) maintained that for Kierkegaard, philosophy should address itself to the concrete existence of the individual person. It should help to explain the fundamental themes with which human beings invariably struggle (existential themes). Several prominent psychologists (such as Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, Adrian Van Kaam, and J.F.T Bugental) have drawn philosophical strength from the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, hence he was considered by many as the founding father of the existential movement. Central to his thought was the concept of

9 subjectivity. Kierkegaard s subjectivity implied the process of how individuals think and understand the existence they know to be true. For this notion, Charlotte Buhler (cited in Morris, 1979) emphasized the indebtedness of humanistic psychology to Kierkegaard, especially his interpretation of truth as being contained in the nature of the relationship of the subject to reality. Kierkegaard (1964a) distinguished between objective thought and subjective thought. He was critical of objective thought : he argued that the objective thought translates everything into results, and helps all mankind to cheat, by copying these off and reciting them by rote. The subjective thought on the other hand, puts everything in process and omits the result, partly because this belongs to him who has the way, and partly because as an existing individual he or she is constantly in process of coming to be. That is, an existing individual is constantly in process of becoming. According to Kierkegaard (1964a), the actual existing subjective thinker constantly reproduces this existential situation in his thoughts, and translates all his thinking into terms of process. The central theme in his writings is the individual as a free agent in a constant process of becoming. Equally important is the thesis that only as the individual participates in truth, can it exist. Values and end goals are theologically determined and realized ultimately when one is able to move through the aesthetic and ethical stages of existence to the final stage, the religious, where the individual through the leap of faith achieves an existential union with God (Brennan, 1998a; Kierkegaard, 1964b; Morris, 1979). Brennan (1998a) explicates the progressive levels of existence as follows: The aesthetic stage characterizes the childhood stage, where experience is dominated by pleasure and pain. This stage is primitive because the child reacts to external contingencies according to the needs of the moment. The ethical stage requires a person to make choices about the values of life and take responsibility about those choices. The highest form of existence is the religious stage, where the individual transcends the social morals of the ethical stage to choose God, which is an act of faith. According to Morris (1979), Kierkegaard viewed self-actualization ( process of coming to be ) and creativity as expressed in the subjective

10 process of becoming and the individual s creation of personal, existential freedom. Hence he referred to the subject who exists in the isolation of his inwardness (Kierkegaard, 1964b, p. 177): constantly in the process of becoming. Several concepts developed by Kierkegaard were also taken up by Martin Heiddegger to provide a basis for existential thought. One of those concepts was dread, existential anxiety. Existential anxiety is without any real object. In existential anxiety, Kierkegaard theorized that people become conscious of their intentions, choices and actions. Existential anxiety is assumed to be a motivating force which arouses strong defences, in the denial of death anxiety, fear of freedom and the selection of defensive choices, which is an aspect of inauthenticity (Owen, 1994). 2.2.2 Modern expressions of existentialism: Sartre s atheism Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), a French writer of novels, plays, and philosophical essays, was probably the most popular existentialist of the twentieth century. Jean-Paul Sartre deserves credit for having explained in his popular writings the main theses of existentialism in the technical terms of philosophy, while at the same time rendering them accessible to the lay reader. According to Sartre, existence precedes essence. He asserted that existence defines the essence of an individual. He placed radical emphasis on choice, and that each person creates his or her own values and morality (Brennan, 1998a; Foulquie, 1947; Owen, 1994; Sartre, 1964). Sartre argued that man chooses his essence. He distinguished between the universal essence, that which makes us man, and the individual essence, that which makes us this or that particular man timid or brave, honest or dishonest. However, there are things we cannot choose: the social class into which we are born, our height, or our intelligence, but the attitude we adopt towards this crude fact depends upon ourselves. Above all, the choices that we make in the course of our lives depend upon the objectives that we have set ourselves (Foulquie, 1947). Thus, choice making is goal-directed and intentional. Sartre s ideas on existentialism contradicted those of Kierkegaard at the level of theism. Although Sartre strongly believed in human freedom of choice and the subsequent

11 responsibilities, he maintained that human freedom cannot accommodate the belief that there is God (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960; Sartre, 1956, 1964). In Sartre s atheism, God is not the King of mankind, for a human being is free. If God had wanted to rule human beings, He should not have created them as free beings. According to Sartre, man has one law - his own (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960, p.316). Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. According to Sartre, this is the first principle of existentialism: existence precedes essence (Sartre, 1956, 1964). Therefore, freedom consists of a human being as completely independent from God. Sartre saw human freedom as a freedom to choose; the only compulsion in life is to choose. Thus, to live is to choose. These ideas culminated in Sartre s famous dictum; I am condemned to freedom. Being human is fundamentally a choice in the world. He believed the essence of being human is freedom and one s duty of self-determination and self-responsibility. In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom (Marcel, 1948; Owen, 1994; Sartre, 1956, 1964). The aim of Sartre s existential psychoanalysis was to find the essence of the client s life and world, based on the desire to be. The original choice (project) a client makes can be traced to a decision a client has made to structure his or her world by means of some object or viewpoint. For Sartre (1956), an action is on principle intentional, explaining the desire to be. There are different kinds of choices though. We can choose to choose, or choose not to choose. Also, there are things outside the reach of choice. Sartre believed it was possible to deduce the sense of a person s being, by an analysis of the regular types of aims, awareness and choices that a client made (Owen, 1994). 2.2.3 Implications of the Existential Philosophy for Humanistic Psychology Kierkegaard s concept of subjectivity is similar to the humanistic approach in that humanistic psychologists incorporate subjectivity in two ways: Firstly in the justification of their approach towards a new definition of science whose origin is immediate personal subjective experience. Secondly, humanistic psychologists understand the person as subject or self. Kierkegaard dedicated his efforts towards the rediscovery of the subjective, of the

12 individual self (Morris, 1979). Subjectivity is central to Carl Roger s person-centered theory in the form of self-concept. Kierkegaard and humanistic psychologists use the ontological base of existentialism to develop their positions on individuality, freedom, autonomy, decision, responsibility, authenticity, self-actualization, and the self that becomes creative (Morris, 1979). Other existential motifs are intersubjectivity, temporality, individuality, death, anxiety, ethics, guilt, choice, and the search to find the key essence of human nature (Owen, 1994). Similar to Sartre, Kierkegaard believed that freedom is created through decision. Morris (1979, p. 76) listed several features that bring Kierkegaard s existentialism closer to humanistic psychology: A holistic perspective of the person is employed where the sum is greater than its parts. Emphasis is on the client as a unique individual whose phenomenal perspective is as valid as the therapist s. Time is interpreted in relation to the future which is contained in the present. Change is viewed as a continuous process rather than as a simplistic before and after sequence. This model consists of imaginative involvement and intentionality on the part of the client. The therapist serves as an active reflector of subjective thinking. The future evolves within the context of dialogue and mutuality between therapist and client. Similarly, Karl Jasper s existential philosophy emphasised communication as dialogue. Jaspers argued that communication opens thinking space, associated with the freedom of thought (Young- Breuhl, 1981). However, Garrison (2001) expressed concern over the interpretation of human values as done by humanistic psychologists. Garrison suggested that theorists and practitioners of humanistic psychology should work to clarify their definition of the human condition that acknowledges the situation of human being within the larger realities that give human life meaning. He argued that the conception of human values by humanistic psychologists is inward towards the self, rather than relating to the outside world. The romantic tradition

13 of the Third Force psychology drew attention to the individual person s potential for selftransformation, growth, and freedom. What was essentially human was an inner drive towards health, and wholeness, which was often stifled or compromised by society. However, this inner drive could be therapeutically reawakened in the presence of empathy and understanding. Garrison (2001) referred to this kind of theorising as humanistic innerness. He associates them with the drives pertinent to psychoanalysis, due to lack of interaction with society. Adams (1999) proposed an interpermeation between the self and world where the two fuse and relate reciprocally in a co-creation of new meaning. Miars (2002) referred to the self-and-world construct system that gives the client s life meaning. From the deliberations above, it appears that existentialism is a conscious process and subjective. These attributes bring the concept of existentialism closer to phenomenology. Similar to phenomenology, existentialism is immanent (inwardly directed) in terms of Kierkegaard s subjectivity. Kierkegaard theorised that people become conscious of their intentions, actions, and choices. Because people are in the process of becoming, this brings existentialism much closer to the humanistic concept of self-actualization. The existential phrases to emerge, to be, and being are transcendental in description, akin to the ontological phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. This brings us to the view of phenomenology as a transcendental science. 2.3 PHENOMENOLOGY Phenomenology is defined as the philosophical doctrine that advocates that the scientific study of immediate experience be the basis of psychology. Phenomenology was founded by Edmund Husserl with emphasis on events, happenings, occurrences, and so forth, as one experiences them, with a minimum regard for the external, physical reality, and for the scientific biases of the natural sciences (Reber & Reber 2001). Thus, phenomenology is the study of phenomena as they are immediately presented to experience (Foulquie, 1947). Akin to Foulquie s definition of phenomenology, Heidegger (1962) defined phenomenology as the science of phenomena.

14 Moustakas (1994) indicated that the word phenomenon comes from the Greek phaenesthai, meaning to flare up, to show itself, to appear. Constructed from phaino, phenomenon means to bring to light, to place in brightness, to show itself in itself, the totality of what lies before us in the light of day (p. 26). According to Heidegger (1962), the Greek expression of the term phenomenon has the equivalence of the phrase to show itself. The expression phenomenon signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Phenomena are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light. They may be expressed as entities. Segal (1999) defined phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy that attempts to give a direct description of experience as it is in itself without taking into account its psychological origin and its causal explanation. The method used to achieve this is called phenomenological reduction, which implies putting aside all preconceived ideas about the event under focus. The objective reality of events is not denied, but an effort is made to avoid paying a particular focus to them rather than to the way they are perceived and experienced. Moustakas (1994) maintains that phenomena are the building blocks of human science and the basis of all knowledge precisely because subjective experience precedes the natural scientific method. Phenomenology began with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who argued for unbiased observations of phenomena as a means of understanding the world (Hansen, 1999; Husserl, 1931). It was the controversy relative to the existence of the material world or rather the external world as distinct from the internal world of psychic life which led Husserl to the phenomenological attitude. The phenomenological movement comprises of a philosophical method which makes use of descriptions which are phenomenological in the ordinary sense of the word, but which regards them only as a means of reaching that which lies beyond the phenomenon (Foulquie, 1947). Hence, phenomenology is regarded as a transcendental science. Husserl s approach was academic; his goal was to find a philosophy of science that is empirically rigorous but excludes the breaking down of the subject matter into its

15 constituent elements. The implication was that an experience should be perceived as a whole rather than its constituent elements. Hence, Ellenberger (1958) described Husserl s phenomenology as basically a methodological principle, intended to provide a firm basis for the foundation of a new psychology and of a universal philosophy. The implication of the Husserlian phenomenology is the relatedness of a person to his or her world, the physical reality. That is, the subject and the object relate intentionally through consciousness (Husserl, 1931). This approach to rational knowledge differs with Cartesian dualism, emanating from Rene Descartes (1596-1650) who advocated that objective reality can be studied separately by scientific means of identification, measurement, and prediction (Pretorius & Segal, 2001). According to Husserl (1977), Descartes gave transcendental phenomenology new impulses through his Meditations ; their study acted quite directly on the transformation of an already developing phenomenology into a new kind of transcendental philosophy. The aim of the Meditations was a complete reforming of philosophy into a science grounded on an absolute foundation. Luypen and Dondeyne (1960) argued that Descartes accepted from the material world only that which could be expressed in terms of quantity. Cartesian dualism saw objective reality as separate from the experiencing subject, hence, the subject-object dichotomy. Its conception of reality affirms the guiding principles of the natural sciences. Husserl contended that subjective and objective realities are mutually related and reciprocally determined; opposed to the emphasis on objective reality as separate from subjective experience (illustrated by the subject-object dichotomy in Cartesian dualism). Husserl s phenomenology is based on the concept of intentionality. Intentionality here refers to consciousness, that is, the internal experience of being conscious of something. Thus, the act of consciousness and the object of consciousness are intentionally related (Husserl, 1931; Moustakas, 1994). Through intentionality, a person relates with the objective world. The interrelatedness is realised by means of phenomenological reduction.

16 2.3.1 Phenomenological reduction Husserl s phrase: back to the things themselves, is perhaps a simplified description of what phenomenological reduction is (Luypen, 1966; Pretorius & Segal, 2001). The phrase is a formulation of an intention to return to the world of original experience and the wealth of meanings which can be found there. Luypen (1966) maintains that this return must be without any prior theorizing about experience. That is, all preconceptions about an experience must be removed. Luypen (1966) thus describes phenomenological reduction as an instrument by means of which we can filter out the distorting influences of cultural and scientific prejudices (p. 21). Phenomenological reduction implies that one gives a qualitative description of what one sees in consciousness (phenomenon), without any preconceived judgements. The process of suspending the preconceived assumptions is called bracketing. For bracketing to be a definite process, one needs to make clear these assumptions such that they are distinguishable to oneself in order to be set aside. In the presence of a phenomenon, which could be an external object or a state of mind, the phenomenologist uses an unbiased approach; he observes phenomena as they manifest themselves and only as they manifest themselves. This observation is accomplished by means of an operation of the mind which Husserl called the epoche, or psychologicalphenomenological reduction. The observer puts the world between brackets, that is, he or she excludes not only any judgement of value about the phenomena but also any affirmation whatever concerning their cause and background (Ellenberger, 1958; Moustakas, 1994). Ellenberger (1958) asserted that the observer also strives to transcend the subject-object dichotomy; he or she excludes the distinction of subject and object and any affirmation about the existence of the object and of the observing subject. In this manner observation is greatly enhanced: the less apparent elements of phenomena manifest themselves with increasing richness and variety, and previously unnoticed structures of phenomena may become apparent.

17 Valle et al., (1989) argued that bracketing describes a cycle between the pre-reflective thought and the reflective thought. The concept pre-reflective describes something that gives birth to our reflective awareness. Reflective thought refers to the cognitive process where one thoughtfully reflects on a phenomenon as it appears in consciousness. As one brackets his or her preconceptions, more of these appear at the level of reflective awareness. That is, that which was originally pre-reflective becomes accessible at the level of reflective thought. This leads to the emergence and the subsequent realisation of new assumptions. The process continues in this linear fashion to infinity. 2.3.2 Consciousness as intentionality Consciousness itself is intentional (Luypen, 1966; Moustakas, 1994). Consciousness is always and of necessity must be consciousness of something, something which is not consciousness itself. If the something which is not consciousness itself is thought away, consciousness itself also is thought away (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960, p. 20). Thus, consciousness is not just locked up in itself but is ever intentional in relation to objective reality. Consciousness can thus be described as an intercourse with reality. Husserl (cited in Segal, 1999) viewed consciousness as an intentional act through which a person lets the world appear to him or her. Therefore, in Husserl s terms, an individual is able to focus on the things he wishes to know. In this manner, the intended object makes itself known to the individual. From the viewpoint of phenomenology, whether the object actually exists or not makes no difference. Therefore, consciousness is not merely passive but is the active revelation of objects. Intentional acts are acts of consciousness. Moustakas (1994) and Valle et al., (1989) argued that intentionality is equivalent to consciousness, to the internal experience of being conscious of something. When speaking of consciousness, one also refers to its intended object as well. Intentionality resembles the ongoing dimension of consciousness. It is about awareness of and relation to what is beyond an individual. Consciousness is itself intentional. Without consciousness there is no world. However, the word intention in this context holds a different meaning from that in its daily use, where it means that which one proposes or plans to do. In the phenomenological sense, it means consciousness itself.

18 2.3.3 Heiddegger s being-in-the-world Martin Heiddegger (1889-1976) described philosophy as a study of being, whereas Hurssel contended that consciousness is the core theme of philosophy (Brennan, 1998a). Heidegger (1962) argued that being is the most universal concept. The universality of being is not that of class or genus. The universality of being transcends any universality of genus. Being may therefore be designated as a transcendence. According to Heidegger (1962), the concept of Being is indefinable. I probably attribute this fact to the transcendental status of Being. In Heidegger s terms, Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. It cannot be expressed as an entity. Heidegger proclaimed that, the essence of man lies in his existence (Luypen, 1966, p.56). He asserted that a human being is a being concerned with his or her being. A person s concern for his or her being defines what a person is. According to Frie (2000), Heidegger called for the return to the meaning of Being as such. He referred to the human being that questions the meaning of Being as Dasein. The word Dasein does not have a direct English equivalent (often used untranslated) except in the relatively rare passages in which Heidegger himself breaks it up with a hyphen ( Da-sein ) to show its etymological construction: literally Being-there (Heidegger, 1962). Thus, the English equivalent of Dasein is roughly estimated as being-there. Heidegger (1962) argued that Dasein is neither autonomous nor self-contained, but always already situated in the world. Thus, Dasein exists as being-in-the-world. Because Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, it is ontological. That is, Dasein exists within the world of other entities, the world of Being-with-one-another. The concept of falling or thrownness was used to elaborate on this notion. The falling of Dasein referred to the basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness. This term does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is inherently alongside the world of its concern. Dasein has fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the world. Fallenness into the world means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, the latter being guided by curiosity and ambiguity (Heidegger, 1962).

19 Heidegger (1962) associates the ambiguity inherent in fallenness with the concept of anxiety. In the face of which one has anxiety, the It is nothing and nowhere becomes manifest. Because of this nothingness, the world becomes a place in which one has anxiety. Anxiety takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, it throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about its authentic potentiality- for-being- in-theworld. With that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible. The analysis of Being-in-the-world as anxiety ( existential analysis ) is the basis of existential therapy. May (1958a) asserted that one of the major and far-reaching contributions of the existential therapists is the understanding of the person-in-his-world. Similarly, Heiddegger regarded human existence as being-in-the-world, a concept later fashioned by existential therapists into psychotherapy in the form of the three modes of world (Ellenberger, 1958; Ghaemi, 2001; May 1958a). See Section 3.3.1 below. Binswanger (1958) argued that by identifying the basic condition or structure of existence with Being-in-the-world, Heidegger intended to put a message forth about the condition of the possibility for existence. Binswanger asserted that the formulation Being-in-the-world is an ontological thesis, a statement about an essential condition that determines existence in general. As shall be discussed in the next chapter, Binswanger applied Heidegger s formulation into psychotherapy and thus coined the concept existential analysis. According to Binswanger (cited in Frie, 2000), Heidegger s fundamental ontology provided an analysis of the primary structures of human existence and constituted a necessary foundation for the human sciences. Binswanger was interested in the ontological orientation of Heidegger s phenomenology. As interpreted by Binswanger, the notion of Being- in-theworld signifies that we are not isolated individuals, but beings who are always in relation to other humans and the world around us. The implication is that there is neither a subjectobject dichotomy nor a division between subjective and objective experience.

20 2.3.4 Application of the phenomenological principles to psychotherapy According to Owen (1994), Husserl s concept of bracketing is applicable to existentialphenomenological practice. Owen argued that the existential-phenomenological therapy rejects any imposition of a rigid agenda, assumptions, presuppositions and hypotheses by therapists about clients. Owen argued that bracketing can also be used in requesting clients to describe how they see a problematic situation again, and this encourages a search for new information. The existential-phenomenological approach encourages a minimal use of extraneous material to encourage clients constructing their own perception of their circumstances and how they relate to their world. Varghese (cited in Nissim-Sabat, 1995) discussed the value of adopting the phenomenological method developed by Husserl as a means of conceptualising psychopathology and therapeutic change. Varghese conceptualises psychopathological states in epistemological terms as maladaptive paradigms. According to Varghese, paradigms are psychic constructs that enable people to make sense of their experience by viewing judgements as truths known with certainty. Judgements within a paradigm are thus protected from challenge, even when contradicted by experience. However, a paradigm may collapse under weight of a new experience to be replaced by another, more adaptive one. Tyler (1992) described a paradigm as constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on, shared by the members of a given community. Paradigms are invisible and unnoticed and yet they largely determine the way that we interpret our experiences. Phenomenology maintains that these underlying paradigms affect our thinking and our understanding of experience as well as our interactions with the environment and our relationship with each other. Varghese argued that psychopathology impedes the process of growth by rendering paradigms more resistant to change. For Varghese, empathy is a matter of grasping the paradigms, or epistemological constructs, through which patients construe their experiences. The therapist can achieve this by adopting an attitude that is maximally free

21 from bias; otherwise, the patient s paradigm will be filtered through the therapist s and thereby distorted (Nissim-Sabat, 1995). For Varghese, optimal empathy or being with the client is enabled through an epistemological stance that will yield the capacity to encounter the raw data of experience without pre-existing judgements that will distort it. The phenomenologically inclined therapist would thus refrain from attaching any presumed idea to the raw data of the patient s experience. This allows the therapist to be where the client is in his or her suffering as well as in his or her uncertainty. In this manner, the client experiences the therapist as being with him or her and the fear of stepping into uncertainty is averted (Nissim-Sabat, 1995). In a similar vein of grasping the client s paradigm, Ellenberger (1958) argued that we do not understand what the psychotic individual really experiences. Verbal formulations that describe hallucination as a perception without object, or delusion as erroneous judgement which is maintained in spite of contrary evidence, are given. But these formulations are unable to convey to us anything of how a mental patient actually experiences a hallucination or delusion. The task of the phenomenologist is to grasp the subjective experience of the patient more fully than could be done with the older, classical frame of reference. I regard the interchangeability that exists between existentialism and phenomenology as crucial in the prevalence of existential-phenomenology. This tendency is particularly evident in Kierkegaard s conception of anxiety as dread akin to similar postulations by Martin Heidegger. As indicated above, both existentialism and phenomenology apply to humanistic oriented therapies. The goal directedness of the concept of becoming in existentialism and Husserl s epoche as applicable in empathy and psychopathology, bear testimony to the thesis above. Humanism as a philosophy incorporates the elements of both existentialism and phenomenology, in that humanism can be secular, transcendental, and existential. Section 2.4. below (Humanism) demonstrates that fact.

22 2.4 HUMANISM Philosophically, humanism has its roots in phenomenological and existential philosophy. Psychological humanism has much in common with the existential and phenomenological philosophy because of its emphasis on free will and subjectivity (Hansen, 2000). The humanistic tradition has always been concerned with the full development of the person. The discussions below reflect this sentiment. A brief history on the development of the humanistic tradition is presented. The history begins with the European Renaissance period, with emphasis on the appreciation and imitation of Greek and Roman architecture, art, and literature, including stylistic features (Criswell, 2000). The ideological expressions of Humanism are published in The Humanist (a magazine of critical inquiry and social concern), launched by the American Humanist Association (AHA) in the spring of 1941. Over the decades, The Humanist had elaborated on broad human principles pertaining to altruism; spiritual meaning and value of life; creative and aesthetic endeavours; as well as applications specific to contemporary moral, cultural, and social issues (Leuba, 2001). According to Doerr (2002), the AHA did not favour the division of Humanism into categories but opted for an unmodified and holistic approach. In addition to the philosophical explication of Humanism, three categories shall be discussed as proposed by Kendler (1987). These are, transcendental humanism, secular humanism, and existential humanism. The three types are given attention because of the implications they bear on the Third Force psychology. 2.4.1 Philosophical foundations of Humanism The humanistic tradition has always been concerned with the full development of the person. Humanism was the term originally used in the European Renaissance period, which lasted approximately from the 14 th to the 17 th centuries. The word Renaissance is medieval French for rebirth. The Renaissance period marked the transition between the medieval and

23 the modern period. It first appeared in Italy and represented the rediscovery of classical Greek and Roman manuscripts and the values they expressed (Criswell, 2000). Criswell (2000) stated that there was, during the Renaissance period, a flowering of the arts, sciences, and literature, and an appreciation for individual endeavours. Thus, the Renaissance man was considered a man of universal genius: someone with expertise in several areas and broad interests and abilities. In the Renaissance spirit, the humanistic tradition brings together the mind and body, and the arts and the sciences. This reconciliation of dichotomous aspects leads towards a powerful development of human potential for all. Doerr (2002) took the definition of humanism to even broader horizons. Doerr asserts that humanism is a progressive life-stance that affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfilment that aspire to the greater good of humanity. For Doerr, humanism recognizes that life is more than cognitive and appreciates the full range of human emotions, from the varied reactions to life s tragedies to the wonder and awe at our natural self and surroundings. However, Doerr (2002) argued that the modifiers placed in front of the concept Humanism in order to distinguish and clarify it are themselves confusing and unnecessary. The examples of these are scientific humanism in encyclopaedias or secular humanism under vicious attack from the religious right. Doerr s argument is that if scientific humanism exists, then there is unscientific humanism existing elsewhere, and this can be misleading. Hence, the American Humanist Association (AHA), the oldest and the largest Humanist organisation in North America, leaves Humanism unmodified, offering it in its fullness without qualification. Kendler (1987) maintained that the dominant theme of humanism is the exaltation of freedom. People should be given the freedom to decide their own fate (bearing in mind the Italian Renaissance of the fourteenth century) instead of having their future dictated to them by the church or state. With regard to the issues of knowledge, humanism allows individuals the freedom to interpret knowledge in their own enlightened way.

24 Because of the freedom in the interpretation of knowledge, Kendler (1987) asserted that various forms of humanism emerged. Unlike Doerr (2002), Kendler had preferred to elucidate on the three types of humanism, which are transcendental humanism, secular humanism, and existential humanism. I had preferred to discuss the three humanistic categories because of their bearing on the Third Force (Humanistic) ideology and psychology in general. However, the common themes of personal freedom, human values, and respect for classical knowledge remain engrained in these categories. 2.4.1.1 Transcendental humanism The basic assumption of transcendental humanism is that important ideas need not be based on empirical observation. The two possible sources of such ideas are the intuitions of the mind and mystical experience. Therefore, transcendental humanism is more a state of the mind than a systematic philosophy. Transcendental humanism advocates the romantic and idealistic notions that the human spirit is godlike and that the ultimate authority of a person s conduct is his or her own conscience (Kendler, 1987). Maslow (1968/1999) is one of the major proponents of mystical experience as the ultimate in self-actualization. He refers to mystical experiences as peak experiences. Peak experiences resemble self- transcendence. Maslow attributes peak experiences to selfactualized people. For Maslow, peak experiences epitomize a higher level of integration and personal identity. The detailed description of peak experiences and the accompanying arguments are presented under Section 4.3.2.1 below. 2.4.1.2 Secular humanism Secular humanism rejects the religious principle that God created man in his own image and proposes instead that a human being created God in his own image. This view merges with Sartre s atheism (cited in Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960), which stresses human freedom above the existence of God. Therefore, man is not dependent on God. Secular humanism argues that because of their intrinsic freedom, people are capable of arriving at moral

25 principles and a philosophy of life in the absence of any dogmatic claims of some higher authority (Kendler, 1987). Ellis (1996) asserted that secular humanism is opposite to the religious, mystical, and spiritual humanism. Secular humanists view persons as unique individuals who always choose to live in a social group. They try to live together peacefully, fairly, and democratically. The personalities of individuals are an ongoing, constructing and reconstructing process. Secular humanists acknowledge that humans have the ability to imagine, fantasize, and strongly believe in superhuman entities and powers such as gods, angels, spirits, and fairies. However, Ellis (1996) indicated that belief in such spirits may help some people to overcome emotional problems such as anxiety. But devout belief in improbable gods and spirits may create difficulties such as dependency, dogma, and war against believers holding a slightly different dogma. 2.4.1.3 Existential humanism Existential humanism, on the other hand, stresses the principle that the only universe that actually exists resides in human subjective experience. Existential philosophers like Soren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre did enough to popularise existentialism. One basic obsession in existentialism was to break free from the illusion of objectivity of the natural scientific approach and formal systems of philosophy (Kendler, 1987). Living is seen as a conscious process; and ultimate freedom is the freedom to make choices. In order to cope with the chaos of life, the individual must give meaning to his or her own life. One of the existential thinkers who emphasized meaning was Viktor Frankl (1969/1988; 1984). According to Frankl, life holds meaning even in the course of suffering, an assertion that he developed from personal experiences in the death camps of the Second World War. Like secular humanists, Frankl (1969/1988; 1984) viewed humans as conscious beings with a capacity to derive meaning from their existence. However, Frankl maintained that selfrealisation moved beyond self-actualization into self-transcendence, a state he described as akin to experiencing God.

26 I have considered the three types of Humanism because of the applicability to existentialhumanistic approach of the Third Force related psychotherapies and its view of man as a self-actualizing being. Although Secular Humanism is the most influential of the three, Transcendental and Existential Humanisms have a significant stake in humanistic psychology. Rollo May s and Ludwig Binswager s existential analysis had adopted the existential and phenomenological principles into psychotherapy. Transcendental Humanism compares significantly with Abraham Maslow s Transpersonal Psychology, based on mystical experiences and phenomenological principles. The predominant theme of selfactualization in Third Force psychology is based on Secular Humanism, that the potential to achieve lies in the person. The adaptation of Humanism into psychology yields psychological humanism. 2.4.2 Psychological Humanism and the Third Force movement Brennan (1998a, 1998b), preferred the concept of Third Force Movement to denote that which is neither psychoanalysis nor behaviourism. The concepts of Third Force psychology and Humanistic Psychology shall be used interchangeably as various authors use them to denote the same thing. I have preferred the use of Third Force Movement to signify the historical emphasis of its origins and the broad theoretical views that define the movement. The details on the historical development of the Third Force Movement and its contributions to mainstream psychology are discussed in the Chapter 3. The purpose of this section is to illustrate on how the ideas of psychological humanism emerge as the core philosophy of the Third Force Movement. Embodied in the Third Force Movement in psychology, psychological humanism emerged as a reaction to the reductionist orientation of psychoanalysis and behaviourism. Early humanists emphasised treating the client as a whole person and were thus opposed to the prevailing theories of psychology of the time that reduced people to mechanistic collections of psychic parts (psychoanalysis) or discrete behaviours (behaviourism). According to humanists, a reductionist mind-set is an obstacle to apprehending the true experience of the person, a process that is essential for effective psychotherapy (Hansen, 2000).

27 Humanism owes its current form to the thinkers of ancient traditions, the scientific and social reformers of the European Renaissance, and the progressive thoughts of the twentieth century that shaped Humanism and founded the AHA. In familiar usage, the word humanism can mean different things to different people in different contexts. However, the AHA distinguishes the life-stance of Humanism from other usages by uppercasing the word (Doerr, 2002). Hansen (2000) alludes to the fact that Humanism is a complex psychological movement, and theorists have stressed various factors that constitute the humanistic mindset. In a broad sense, Humanism has placed emphasis on the freedom, subjectivity, and will of the existentialist movement and combined it with the optimistic American mind-set. Thus, Humanism is a unique hybrid of existentialism (without pessimism), phenomenology (emphasis on understanding consciousness and human subjectivity), and the postwar American optimism of the 1950 s. Humanistic theorists, therefore, emphasize the inherent capacity for growth and the importance of the therapist grasping and empathizing with the unique subjective experience of clients (Hansen, 2000, p.22). The humanistic tenets espoused by the founders of the Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) are basically creative: that humans behave out of intentionality and values. Humanistic psychologists differ widely in their approaches to application, but share some common elements as elaborated by Criswell (2000, p.75): They focus on the experiencing person and the meaning of experience to the person; they emphasize the human qualities of choice, creativity, values, self-realization, and so on; they are concerned with problems that are meaningful to humans; their ultimate concern is with valuing the dignity and worth of humans and an interest in the development of the potential inherent in every person. Particularly important is the person as he or she discovers his or her own being and relates to other persons and social groups. From that perspective, humanistic psychology adds a first person focus to an essentially third person science. In conclusion, Criswell (2000) asserted that humanistic psychology places its primary value on what facilitates the positive development of human beings within the unfolding universe.

28 Moustakas (1985) sums up when he says that the ultimate goal of humanistic psychology is the preparation of a complete description of what it means to be alive as a human being. Criswell (2000) argued that the post-modern period had so many things in common with the principles of the humanistic tradition. According to Elkins (2000), since the birth of the Third Force Movement in 1964, we have seen the rise of postmodernism with its emphasis on multiple selves and transpersonal psychology and Eastern approaches on the illusion of separate selfhood. Therefore, Criswell and Elkins link the advent of postmodernism with the emergence of the Third Force psychology in the early 1960 s. On the same note, Naudin and Azorin (1998) equated existential analysis with narrative analysis in that they both deal with the history of the client. Naudin and Azorin argued that Binswanger insisted on the narrative unity of one s life and organized his narrative around the linear unfolding of one theme: As in a fictional narrative, there is a beginning, a development, and a close. In his narrative, the beginning and the end are not those of a disease but those of a biography. That is, the history of the patient s disease is always connected with the history of the patient s life. The advent of European humanism has, without doubt, influenced events that shaped and provided impetus towards the development of the American Humanist Association. The adoption of humanistic views into psychology saw the founding of the Association for Humanistic Psychology in the early sixties. At clinical level, humanism appreciates the conscious experience of the client and a refusal to reduce client experience to underlying explanatory structures. Because humanism emphasizes free will, clients must take responsibility for their behaviour and cannot blame underlying conflicts or structures for their choices (Hansen, 2000). Humanistic psychology espouses this ideology. The existential-phenomenological principles are thus prominent in humanistic therapies of the Third Force movement. This is particularly illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4 below. These Chapters illustrate the emergence of existential-phenomenological psychology and its stake in Third Force psychology, particularly the phenomenological principles of wholism (akin to the Gestalt field ) of experience and the principles of epoche in empathy.

29 CHAPTER 3 EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 3.1 INTRODUCTION Existential-phenomenological psychotherapists have assimilated the ideas of existential and phenomenological philosophers into a system of psychotherapy. Like their philosophical counterparts, existential therapists are concerned with the issues of death, meaning and anxiety (Hansen, 1999). The name existential psychotherapy is herein used alternatively with existential-phenomenological to denote the same thing. This chapter is an illustration of how Ludwig Binswanger imported Heidegger s phenomenology into psychotherapy, using existential analysis as therapeutic approach. Existential analysis adopts the notion that man is an inherent part of his or her world. Through consciousness, man reaches out to the world to interpret objects and create a meaning-structure (existential structure) from the self-and-world interaction. Binswanger proposed three modes of world with connotative equivalence of the self, the biological, and the social. This chapter reviews applicability of the three dimensions to psychotherapy and the contribution of the existential-phenomenological approach to the ideology of humanistic psychology. 3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY The two most famous writers who developed existential thought and applied phenomenology to human beings are Heidegger and Sartre. Martin Heidegger s major existential-phenomenological work is titled Being and Time. It is Heidegger who brought together Husserl s ideas on pure psychology and transcendental philosophy (Owen, 1994).

30 Binswanger (1958) adopted Heidegger s concept of being- in-the-world into existentialphenomenological psychology. Binswanger argued that Heidegger, in his concept of beingin-the-world as transcendence, had eliminated the gap between self and world. According to Binswanger, Heidegger had elucidated the structure of subjectivity as transcendence. The German word for transcendence is Ueberstieg, meaning climbing over or above, mounting. An Ueberstieg requires, first, that towards which the Ueberstieg is directed and, secondly, that which is ueberstiegen or transcended; the first, towards which the transcendence occurs, is called the world, whereas the second, that which is transcended, is the being itself. That is, the world and the self constitute themselves in the act of transcending (Binswanger, 1958). Thus, Binswanger used Heidegger s ontological themes of phenomenology to inform the basic conceptualisations of existential-phenomenological psychology. This leads the discussion to the philosophical tenets of existential-phenomenology, and hence existential-phenomenological psychotherapy. Existential-phenomenology is a philosophical discipline that seeks to understand the events of human existence in a way that is free from the preconceptions of our value systems and the intrusions of the natural scientific approach to knowledge (Giorgi, 1971). Existential-phenomenological psychology seeks to explicate the essence, structure, or form of human experience and behaviour as revealed through descriptive methods and disciplined reflection (Valle et al., 1989). Therefore, existential phenomenologicalpsychology has some traces of Husserl s transcendental phenomenology. According to Worrell (1997), Husserl emphasizes consciousness as intentional, that consciousness is always consciousness of something. The descriptive method is effective in explaining that which lies within the experience of the subject. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was one the major proponents of existentialphenomenological psychology. Merleau-Ponty described psychology as a study of individual and social relationships as they particularly link consciousness and nature. Having been influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl, Heiddegger, and Sartre,

31 Merleau-Ponty maintained that a human being is endowed with characteristics of consciousness beyond what is described by the traditional sciences (Brennan, 1998a). According to Merleau-Ponty, a person is the absolute source of existence. He argued that psychology should then be the study of intentionality, and maintained that the primary subject matter of psychology must be experience. As indicated in 2.3.2 above, consciousness is intentional. Intentionality relates to intersubjectivity in which the observer and the observed are both relationally defined, that is, they co-constitute each other (Brennan, 1998a; Worrell, 1997). This assertion reiterates Heidegger s concept of beingin-the-world. Giorgi (1971) described existential-phenomenological psychology that emphasizes human experience as a core determinant of the philosophy. For the person to experience the essence of a phenomenon, all pre-conception about the phenomenon should be bracketed. Husserl s epoche becomes a requirement of true experiencing. The existentialphenomenological psychotherapy adopts similar principles as illustrated in Section 3.3 below. 3.3 EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOTHERAPY Existential-phenomenological psychotherapy has its roots in Heidegger s phenomenology, with the influence of Husserl s ideas on consciousness and phenomenological reduction. Worrell (1997) maintained that existential-phenomenological psychology has as its philosophical bedrock the relational concepts of intentionality and intersubjectivity. The basic proposition is that all mental activity, affect and behaviour, is relationally constituted. The self and world co-constitute each other. Consciousness is held to a relational act; it is consciousness because of objects, other subjects, or ideas in the world. Consciousness reaches out to the world to interpret objects, retrieving them as meaningful things. Consciousness is not separate from the world; consciousness is always consciousness of something. Therefore, human beings are seen as constantly involved in the interpretation of reality both in terms of the perception of objects as well as interpersonal perception. Thus, meaning is regarded as a creation and is relative, and a result of a

32 relational process between human beings (Worrell, 1997). Meaning making is a theme of existential psychotherapy. In applying phenomenological bracketing in existential-phenomenological therapy, Owen (1994) argued that one consequence of phenomenology for existential therapy is to request that people talk from their own experience about things they have personally felt, heard and seen. An assumption of phenomenology is that consciousness can become conscious at some point in life. The material that is hidden in the preconscious can be brought to awareness through an act of pure description. In contrast with the client-centered approach, the therapist-client relationship is not defined by the reflection of the patient s words and emotions. May and Yalom (1989) contended that the process of reflection reduces the client s capacity to experience himself or herself as an individual in his or her own right, thus resulting in an amorphous kind of identity. Consequently, the client cannot stand against the therapist or experience being in an interpersonal world. According to Owen (1994), the therapeutic relationship in existential therapy has an egalitarian character. The relationship in therapy is based around having trust in oneself. Corey (2001) argued that the therapist s trust is important in teaching clients to trust their own capacity to discover a new source of values. In order to engage with the trusting person, the existential therapist eschews any demand for instant healing from a needy client. The locus of control is shared, and therapists may vary their presence in the sessions. Acceptance is a major therapeutic subject. The therapist accepts the client s maps of the world and challenge safely and appropriately and thereby encourages reappraisal and reinterpretation by bracketing and helps the client to imagine different possible worlds. Thus, existential psychotherapy enables clients to change via the exploration of client s worlds and histories. Existential therapy challenges the client to embrace a life which accepts pain, human inevitabilities, death, existential indebtedness without end, and those things that cannot be changed or carried out (Owen, 1994). Provided suffering is unavoidable, meaning is possible (Frankl, 1984).

33 The search for meaning is one of the core essentials of the existential-phenomenological therapy. Corey (2001) asserted that a distinctly human characteristic is the struggle for a sense of significance and purpose in life. According to Corey, the underlying conflicts that bring people to therapy are centered in these existential questions: What do I want from life? What gives my life purpose? Where is the source of meaning in life? Frankl (1984) argued that the meaning of life differs from person to person, and from time to time, in such a way that one cannot have a constantly held meaning. Frankl (1984, 1969/1988) coined the word logotherapy for his approach to existential therapy. Logotherapy emphasizes meaning. Logos is a Greek word which denotes meaning. Logogtherapy focuses on the meaning of human existence as well as the search for such a meaning. This striving to find meaning in one s life is the primary motivational force in man. This meaning is unique in that it can be satisfied by the individual alone; only then does it achieve a significance which will satisfy his own will to meaning. The task of logotherapy is to assist the client to find meaning in his or her life. Logotherapy makes the client aware of the hidden logos in his or her existence; it is an analytical process. In this regard, logotherapy resembles psychoanalysis (Frankl, 1984). According to Owen (1994), the difference between the two is that psychoanalysis relies on inflexible assumptions, while the existential-phenomenological approach includes facilitating clients in interpreting themselves, to make sense of their own world. Frankl (1969/1988) went beyond the uniqueness of meaning to elucidate on values. Frankl maintained that there are meanings which are shared by human beings across society and throughout history. Rather than being related to unique situations, these meanings refer to the human condition. These meanings are called values. Thus one may define values as those meaning universals which crystallize in the typical situations a society or even humanity has to face (Frankl, 1969/1988, p. 56). Therefore, the existential-phenomenological approach stresses the therapist-client relationship and the search for meaning by the client. The therapist does not impose himself or herself on the client, but facilitates the client to interpret his or her own existence. The therapeutic relationship is egalitarian; it is called the I-Thou relationship in existential

34 terms. The section below elucidates on Ludwig Biswanger s existential analysis as explicated in Rollo May s (1958a; 1958b) milestone publication titled Existence. 3.3.1 Binswanger s existential analysis Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) was a Swiss psychiatrist and is known as the founder of existential analysis, yet according to Frie (2000), his work is not commonly studied today. Rollo May (1958) introduced the work of Ludwig Binswanger to the English speaking audiences in his publication of Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology. During the 1960s and into the 1970s, Binswanger gained popularity with the burgeoning movement of humanistic psychology, but he is relatively unknown today. Frie (2000) associated the decline in Binswanger s popularity to the changing nature of therapeutic training and practice. Training in clinical psychology has often become very narrow in focus. Consequently, the philosophical nature of Binswanger s writings is often deemed too abstract or distant from the concerns of contemporary psychology. The compounding factor was that most of Binswanger s writings, including his text on the nature of human interaction, had not been translated into English. What we generally know of Binswanger is almost exclusively based on outdated commentaries and translations that are frequently imprecise. However, the situation is quite different in current-day Germany and Switzerland, where there is renewed interest in Binswanger s work; where it continues to be implemented and expanded on in private practice, clinic, and hospital settings. The full range and importance of Binswanger s work has yet to be appreciated by English-speaking clinicians (Frie, 2000). Ludwig Binswanger used Heiddegger s concept of being-in-the-world to formulate therapeutic principles called existential analysis. That is, Heidegger s fundamental ontology enabled Binswanger to develop a philosophically oriented approach to psychiatry that could account for the human being s total existence (Frie, 2000; May, 1958a). Existential analysis is a therapeutic approach based on the principles of existential therapy emphasising free will and the necessity of individual choice, action and judgement (Reber & Reber, 2001).

35 The concept of existential analysis comes from the German equivalent of Daseinsanalyse. Binswanger coined this term to represent a synthesis of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and existentialist concepts. It is a reconstruction of the inner world of psychiatric patients with the help of a conceptual framework based on Heidegger s phenomenology and Martin Buber s I-Thou concept (Ellenberger, 1958; Frie, 2000). The I-Thou concept shall receive attention later in this section. Binswanger s resembled a shift from psychoanalysis, based on interpretation, to existential analysis based on the exploration of the client s lived-world (environment) and inner experiences. Binswanger (1958) described existential analysis as an anthropological type of scientific investigation; one which is aimed at the essence of being human. Binswanger used the word anthropological in its etymological sense, that is, anthropology as the study of man ( anthropos ) and specifically, the study of the essential meaning and characteristics of being human. According to Binswanger, existential analysis has the ideal and exactness of the phenomenological approach. In a more therapeutic sense, Van Deurzen (1998) explained existential analysis as an approach that helps people to discover how they veil their awareness of limitations in life and how to assist them in the process of the revelation of the underlying truth. May (1958, 1983) described existential analysis as a way of understanding human existence, and one of the chief blocks to understanding human beings is the emphasis on technique. According to May, technique follows understanding. Thus, the central task of the therapist is to understand the client as a being and as being-in-his/her-world. Ellenberger (1958) pointed to some differences between phenomenology and existential analysis. Firstly, he argued that existential analysis does not restrict itself to the investigation of the states of consciousness, but takes into account the entire structure of the existence of the individual. Secondly, while existential analysis emphasises the unity of the individual s inner world of experience, existential analysis emphasizes that the individual may live in more than one world, and sometimes in conflicting worlds. Finally, phenomenology takes into account only the immediate subjective world of experience while existential analysis seeks to reconstruct the development and transformations of the

36 individual s world or conflicting worlds. Therefore, existential analysis departs from phenomenology in that it operates within a larger frame of reference. Binswanger recognized three simultaneous modes of being-in-the-world: the Eigenwelt, the own world of subjective personal experience, the private world of self or the world of relationship to oneself; the Mitwelt, which is the with world of interpersonal relationships, the world of social relations or the world of one s fellow men; and the Umwelt, the surrounding world of natural objects or our environment, the environment within which a person exists (Ellenberger, 1958; Frie, 2000; Ghaemi, 2001; May, 1958a, 1983; Van Deurzen, 1998). Binswanger s three modes of world epitomize how an individual relates to the self and world. May (1958a; 1983) defined world as the structure of meaningful relationships in which a person exists and in the designing of which he or she participates. To be aware of one s world means at the same time to be designing it. With regard to the territory of human experience, van Deurzen (1998) provided a tabular form of the dimensions of experience. Table 1 provides a representation of the fundamental boundaries of human experience and identifies the basic contradictions which are inevitably encountered in the different dimensions, as portrayed by van Deurzen (1998, p. 146): Dimensions of experience Basic purpose Intermediate goal Ultimate concern Natural world Public world Private world Ideal world Pleasure Vitality Strength Success Power Glory Integrity Selfhood Authenticity Truth Ultimate reality Wisdom Health Comfort Wealth Fortune Recognition Fame Influence Respect Idividuality Freedom Specialness Kinship Meaning Understanding Knowledge Faith Illness Weakness Misery Death Failure Defeat Impotence Isolation Disintegration Confusion Dissolution of self Absurdity Groundlessness Void Table 1: The territory of human experience.

37 In terms of Binswanger s existential analysis, the natural world or physical demands in Table 1 denotes the Umwelt; the biological or instinctual world. The public world represents the Mitwelt, which implies social or public challenges. The Eigenwelt is epitomized by the private world, which implies mental or private limitations. However, van Deurzen (1998) added a fourth mode of world, the Uberwelt; it resembles the ideal world, the ultimate provocation by the unknown. The basic purpose of Uberwelt is truth, ultimate reality, and wisdom. In the dimensions of experience (Table 1), Van Deurzen (1998) presented a schematic map of human world relations. The schematic map is a testimony to May s (1983) and Frankl s (1984) views that suffering, anxiety, and guilt are an intrinsic part of existence: they are ontological. Although there is a need to emphasise the positive side of existentialism in the form existential authenticity (to be discussed below), it is worthy to note that human existence fluctuates between the high tide of fulfilment and the low tide of depletion. Both are inevitable and they induce some form of distress. In his later existential analytic studies, Binswanger went on to organize his analyses around a larger frame of reference: the dinstinction of what he termed existential modes. An existential mode is the dimension of Dasein in regard to the Mitwelt (fellow beings). In contrast to classical psychoanalysis, existential analysis takes into account the fact that the self changes according to the various forms of dual, plural, singular, and anonymous existential modes (Ellenberger, 1958). However, only the dual mode of existence shall be given prominence because of its proximity to the I-Thou concept. The dual existential mode corresponds with the concept of intimacy and is an extension of Martin Buber s views of the I-Thou relationship. Buber proposed a dialogical approach, which emphasized relatedness as the central ingredient for change. From the dialogical perspective, what occurs between the client and therapist prepares the client to accept and really engage others (Portnoy, 1999). According to Portnoy (1999), Buber considered the I-Thou relationship to be the most mature relationship. The I-Thou relationship involves full respect and mutuality between

38 two persons. During the I-Thou moments, the therapist must be willing to allow himself or herself to be shaped by the client s subjectivity. Yontef and Simkin (1989) maintained that the role of the therapist goes beyond the traditional client-therapist relationship; therapists are responsible for the consequences of their own behaviour and for establishing and maintaining the therapeutic atmosphere. However, the prominent thing in the I-Thou approach is a shift in attitude rather than an embrace of a specific therapeutic orientation. Portnoy argued that even an analytic therapist can approach a client with an I-Thou stance. What is important is the therapist s willingness, when appropriate, to let the client know how they affect the therapist. The therapist also needs to bracket preconceptions, be open to the genuine encounter between two people and take stock of how he or she impacts on the therapeutic relationship (Portnoy, 1999, p.25). The goal of existential analysis is to have the therapist apprehend the world of the client as it is experienced in the here and now. Ghaemi (2001) regards Binswanger s method as one of the original versions of an empathic approach to psychotherapy. Binswanger emphasized the need to live in the world of Mitsein or being with, where one becomes an equal of the person he or she is analyzing. He believed in experience as it appears in consciousness and that existential analysis should reveal the structures of phenomena as uniquely interpreted by each individual, resulting in a unique context of meaning. That is, the structures of phenomenal meaning describe each person s orientation to his or her world with respect to thought processes, fears, anxieties, and social relations. Although Binswanger accepted instinctual manifestations in childhood as maintained in psychoanalysis, he argued that these are experienced in the present consciousness. The past exists only in the present (Brennan, 1998a). However, Binswanger insisted on the narrative unity of one s life and organized his narrative around the linear unfolding of one theme. The unfolding process follows the structure of a fictional narrative, with a beginning, a development, and a close. In Binswanger s narrative, the beginning and the end are not those of a disease but those of a

39 biography; the history of the client is always linked to the client s life (Naudin & Azorin, 1998). Wilhelm Schapp (cited in Naudin & Azorin, 1998) emphasized the concept of entanglement in his phenomenology. Schapp argued that we humans are always entangled in histories. In every history, one may find someone therein entangled. Personal history and being entangled in histories are closely linked and inseparable. The unity in history is predisposed, with some direction of growth. Thus, the history to come is already predisposed with its specific tinge and texture in conformity with its direction and growth. Schapp s analysis is comparable to narrative analysis in terms of co-entanglement. According to Schapp, our own entanglement refers to the other person s entanglement, to the other person s (hi)stories. We share with the other person the field of the other s (hi)stories. Any other person s entanglement surges on the basis of co-entanglement. In narrative analysis, fictitious narrative and real histories converge in that both are valid in the sense that there is a narrator and a listener, which suggests co-entanglement. Thus, according to Naudin and Azorin (1998), existential analysis is closely linked to narrative analysis. Frie (2000) argued that authenticity is one of the concepts implicit in Binswanger s writings. Miars (2002) defined existential authenticity as an autonomous self-creation of who and what individuals are to become. The source of authenticity is subjectivity, that is, authentic contact with inner experiencing. To become authentic, individuals must transcend enculturation and invent themselves from within. From an existential perspective, the more authentic a person is, the healthier his or her relationship with the world becomes. However, Miars recognizes that achieving authenticity is not an easy task because there are no predetermined road maps. Miars (2002) maintained that authenticity is a basic and a reasonable goal (a foundational value) of existential counselling. Reclaiming authentic contact with subjectivity and using it as a compass for living can greatly reduce distress regarding emotional and interpersonal problems. Although authenticity is never achievable in an absolute sense, clients have some power to choose how they think, feel, and act in the world. The pursuit of such personal

40 choice and responsibility is the essence of authentic being-in-the-world. From the existential perspective, authenticity becomes an ethical demand to discover ways in which the client can be self-directing and self-creating. In order to gain the capacity for an authentic living, clients require an insight that would assist them to navigate their own self-and-world construct system. Miars (2002) defined the self-and-world construct system as the conception each of us holds about who and what we are and how our world operates. In psychotherapy and counselling, the self-and-world construct system is accessed by means of exploring the client s personal meaning structures (beliefs) and self-perceptions because these constitute the client s fundamental way of being in the world. Binswanger (cited in Ghaemi, 2001) used the concepts of existential structure and world-design to denote the self-and-world construct system. Binswanger argued that the real pathology is pertinent to the world-design or structure of existence of a client. Pathology manifests itself when the world-design or the self-and-world construct system is constricted to such a degree that the self is denied an opportunity of maturing. In this case, everything stays as it was before, and some forms of continuity and stability are maintained. If something new happens, continuity and stability are disrupted. Binswanger referred to the disruptive event as suddenness. He described suddenness as a time quality that explodes continuity and stability and destroys them, and throws the earlier existence out of its course. The phenomenon exposes the client to the Dreadful, to the naked horror (Ghaemi, 2001, p. 56). This can only result in catastrophe, panic, or anxiety attack. In order to assist a client to embrace personal change, Miars (2002) suggested some therapeutic values and conditions that would promote authenticity in existential counselling and psychotherapy. Miars argued that these conditions provide a stance for the therapist to help the client relinquish or reduce the hold of constricting self-and-world perceptions. Thus, the agency of therapeutic change involves the opening of perceptual boundaries. The stance entails the following values and conditions:

41 Firmly and consistently challenge the client to view him- or herself as a living being rather than an object to be explained. The approach is person-centered, in that the client s freedom and autonomy are acknowledged even in the phase of resistance by the client to come to terms with his or her vital subjectivity. It constitutes an I-Thou relationship, where there is genuine encounter between therapist and client. Portnoy (1999) maintained that this effect is attained through a dialogical relationship. Consistently challenge the client to expand his or her personal awareness and take ownership of every choice, including explicit or implicit choices that maintain problem issues and struggles. This is a difficult and a painful challenge for the client; it requires the client to relinquish non-authentic choices in favour of authentic ones. There is much emotional pain around this process, and the therapist needs to address this. Respect the client as an autonomous and self-directing individual who has authored his or her life thus far and has the potential to effectively address (re-author) the issues that are presented in psychotherapy and counselling. Although this does not suggest an illusion of omnipotence, the therapist needs to acknowledge the dignity and power of the client to change his or her life through self-authored choices. Assume that the client has and can continue to create self-and-world meaning structures that make human life possible. The therapist should refrain from making value judgements regarding the client s meaning structures, be they adaptive or maladaptive. The therapist should respect the presenting meaning structures as the client s most adaptive response to the inescapable anxiety of being (existential anxiety). They are powerful determinants of the client s subjective psychological experience and inevitably need to be identified and modified for genuine therapeutic change to occur. Recognize that changing self-and-world meaning structures is a significantly difficult task. Such a change requires the client to be conscious, in a deeper and a fuller sense, of the elements of personal choice and responsibility that are inherent in holding to an existing self-and-world meaning structure. This domain requires a

42 diligent focus on process than content by the therapist. Process refers to how the client experiences a given perception and content entails the informational or factual details that explain or justify the perception. Recognize that when constrictions around the world-design and meaning structures of the client are loosened, the client inevitably discovers new ways of perceiving the self and how it is embedded in a personal life world. The client spontaneously begins to construct a new and different way of being (acting) in the world and experiences less distress around the issues and symptoms that brought him or her to therapy. This process epitomizes a genuine therapeutic change in existential terms. Recognize both the therapist and the therapeutic relationship as vital to client change, yet honour that the most essential change process always was (and is) fully, and only, the client s. It is the client s perception(s) of self and world that is the essence of therapeutic work. Affirm that the derived outcomes from the therapeutic process may be different from the initial goals that were set by the client, for example, pain relief or symptom reduction. The desired initial outcomes often can and do change over the course of therapeutic work as clients are challenged to recognize the existential foundations of the issues that brought them into therapy. The core values and conditions of authentic being in existential therapy, as indicated above, are evidently based on the self-perception of the client and the therapeutic relationship. The therapist should acknowledge the world-view of the client as it reveals itself in therapy and thus assist the client to connect with his or her subjective world. A genuine therapeutic change (in existential terms) implies a co-creation of meaning structures by the therapist and the client, although the ultimate change remains with the client.

43 3.3.2 Contributions of existential-phenomenology towards humanistic psychotherapies The fundamental contribution of the existential phenomenological approach to psychotherapy is the understanding of man as being. Existential therapy, for example, does not deny the significance of other interpretations of human nature and behaviour, but contends that these approaches are meaningful within the context of existential structure of the individual we are dealing with (May, 1983). Carl Rogers (1980) applied the personcentered approach to the case-study of Ellen West, presented at length in Binswanger (1958). It is a case that eluded psychoanalysts but improved with Binswanger s existential analysis. The existential-phenomenological approach has helped bring the person back into central focus. It has concentrated on the central facts of human existence: self-consciousness and our consequent freedom (Corey, 2001, p.160). Another credit from the existential approach is the view of death as a positive force, but not a morbid prospect to fear, for death gives meaning to life. Existentialists regarded anxiety, guilt, frustration, loneliness, and alienation as ontological, as inherent entities of existence. They are associated with the failure of humans to realize their potentialities. These shall be discussed in Rollo May s view of human nature below. Therefore, therapeutic themes include wrestling with the problem of personal freedom, dealing with self-alienation and estrangement from others, facing the fear of death and nonbeing, searching for a meaningful life, dealing constructively with guilt and anxiety, and making choices that lead to full personal expression (Corey, 2001). In contrast to psychoanalysis and behaviourism, existential therapy goes beyond instinctual drives, the unconscious, and stimulus-response repertoires, to embrace the meaning of human existence. Frankl (1984) is one of the most articulate in this regard. In logotherapy, the client is presented with an opportunity to determine whether the essence of life is about being responsible to society or to his or her own conscience. Therefore, the logotherapist s role is to widen and broaden the visual field of the client so that the whole spectrum of meaning becomes conscious and visible to him or her.

44 Existential therapy recognizes that each individual has a capacity to organise his or her own world of experiencing and assign meaning to it, whether in an adaptive or maladaptive manner. The self-and-world meaning structures of a client provide an access for the therapist to relate with the client s conception of the prblem. The existential structure (world-design) of a client is epitomized by Binswanger s three modes of world; the natural and biological world (Umwelt), the social world (Mitwelt), and the personal world selfawareness and self-relatedness (Eigenwelt). Binswanger s analysis is a monumental contribution to humanistic psychotherapy in that analysis shifts from the drive theory and determinism of psychoanalysis to how the client relates to his or her world of experience, and his or her perception of the presenting problem in therapy. In humanistic terms, the client is allowed the freedom to explore his or her world of experience and derive meaning from it. The basic limitation of the existential approach is that it is not transcendental, it does not allow for experiences beyond the given reality into spiritual and mystic realms. This debate shall be given emphasis below. The existential-phenomenological approach to therapy transcends the subject-object dichotomy in the form of I-Thou relations between therapist and client. The I-Thou relation encourages the therapist to relate as a person and risk himself or herself as a person in the therapeutic relationship. It is a relationship of mutuality and genuine encounter. The therapist enters the therapeutic relationship as a person rather than an expert. Rogers (1980) pointed out that the 1958 existential symposium organized by Rollo May exposed him to Binswanger s case-study of Ellen West, which helped him present a paper on the personcentered approach, in discontent with the mistakes of the psychoanalytic approach (see paragraph above). Existential therapy integrates various therapeutic approaches in terms of practice. It is not a comprehensive therapeutic system, but a frame of reference from which to view the client s suffering from an existential perspective. The therapist has the liberty to employ any of the large variety of techniques used in other approaches insofar as they are consistent with the existential principles and a human, authentic therapist-client encounter (May & Yalom, 1989).

45 The existential-phenomenological approach addresses concerns emanating from the crosscultural perspective. Existential concepts such as freedom, meaning, responsibility, anxiety, guilt, and suffering are grounded in the universal characteristics of human beings. Corey (2001) argued that existential therapy is perhaps the most applicable of all approaches when working with culturally diverse clients. With regard to Mitwelt, clients can examine the extent to which their behaviour and perceptions are influenced by social and cultural conditioning. Clients may increase their freedom by recognizing the social limits imposed on them, particularly by social institutions. However, the existential-phenomenological approach comes with its own limitations and criticisms. The major criticism is that the existential approach lacks a clear theoretical base with regard to the practices of psychotherapy. Corey (2001) asserted that some therapists have problems with what they perceive as its mystical language and concepts. Scientifically oriented therapists contend that the concepts should be empirically sound, that definitions should be operational, that the hypotheses should be testable, and that therapeutic practice should be based on research results. Concepts such as self-actualization, dialogic encounter, authenticity, and being-inthe-world may be vague and elusive for some therapists. This lack of precision may cause confusion and make it difficult to conduct research on the therapeutic outcomes of existential therapy. Hence, those beginning and advanced practitioners who are not philosophically oriented may find the existential concepts elusive to deal with. The advent of existential-phenomenological approach and humanism in America, have played a part in the emergence and development of the Third Force movement (Existentialhumanistic psychology). Rollo May, the founder of the American existentialphenomenological school of thought, has been one of the most influential intellectual leaders of the Third Force psychology. The next chapter reflects on the historical developments of the Third Force movement and its current status in psychology.

46 CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGENCE OF THE THIRD FORCE MOVEMENT: IMPACT ON PSYCHOLOGY AND BEYOND 4.1 INTRODUCTION The advent of European phenomenology and existential philosophy culminated in the emergence of existential-phenomenological psychology in America, particularly with the publication of a book titled Existence by Rollo May in 1958, co-edited with Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger. The combination of ideas from the existential paradigm, coupled with aspects of humanism, led to the emergence of the humanistic movement ( Third Force ) in current psychology. This chapter focuses on the implications of this development on the value system of existential-humanistic psychology and the way in which humanistic theorists contributed to this trend. Two additional leaders (other than Rollo May) of the humanistic movement are discussed to elucidate this course: Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. While Rollo May contributed the existential-phenomenological component of the Third Force, Maslow contributed to the introduction of the transpersonal theory and Rogers the person-centered approach. I shall focus on Rogers view of empathy for the purpose of this study. I have given prominence to the three theorists for two reasons: firstly, they formed the core group of active intellectuals among the founders of the Third Force movement, and secondly, their theories represent the diversity of paradigms within humanistic psychology. As indicated in Chapter 1, Maslow represented the transcendental aspect, Rogers the phenomenological-humanistic, while May encompassed the existential-phenomenological approach. The history of humanistic psychology is broad and rather complex, or even confusing at times (Wertz, 1998). What is presented here is not exhaustive, but an indication of the

47 major trend of events that brought about the emergence of the Third Force Movement. Wertz raised concerns on how authors report differently on the historical developments of this movement, and hence the confusing aspect. However, I have attempted to reflect on the common elements of these histories. 4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE THIRD FORCE MOVEMENT The Third Force Movement emerged in the United States and is an umbrella name for what is called the American Humanistic Psychology. If depth psychology (psychoanalysis) is regarded as the First Force and behaviourism as the Second Force movement, then, humanistic psychology becomes the Third Force Movement (Brennan, 1998a). Humanistic psychology started with a compilation of a mailing list by Abraham Maslow between the early and mid-1950s with the aim of organising like-minded persons who shared a common goal of helping the individual grow towards fuller humaneness. The project was facilitated by the administrative assistance of Anthony Sutich, who kept custody of the mailing list and communicated with the relevant intellectuals (DeCarvalho, 1990). Maslow s and Sutich s efforts were rewarded by the founding of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (JHP) in the spring of 1961 and the American Association for Humanistic Psychology (AAHP) in the summer of 1963. The first A, standing for American, was dropped some years later, due to the international influence the movement was gaining. Although other names like self-psychology and holistic psychology were brought forward, the title humanistic psychology was finally adopted for the journal (Moustakas, 1985). However, Smith (1990) attributed the beginnings of humanistic psychology to publications in the area of personality by Gordon Allport and Henry Murray in 1937 and 1938 respectively. The emergence of humanistic psychology as a Third Force in American psychology was precipitated by a conference held in November 1964 under the auspices of the American Association for Humanistic Psychology (AAHP). The conference was held at the Old Saybrook Inn in Connecticut, hence the title Saybrook Conference. The purpose of the conference was to re-examine the philosophy of the AAHP and to reconsider themes and directions. The conference was also a reflection of discontent at the dominance of

48 behaviorism and orthodox psychoanalysis (DeCarvahlo, 1990; Elkins, 2000; Greening, 1985; Kendler, 1987; Smith, 1990). Present at the conference were psychologists and individuals from different backgrounds. The eclectic group consisted of Gordon Allport, James Bugental, Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, Rollo May, Jacques Barzun, Charlotte Buhler, George Kelley, Clark Moustakas, Henry Murray, Robert Knapp, and a host of others (DeCarvalho, 1990; Elkins, 2000). Various authors report on varying combinations and numbers of attendants, some fewer, and some more. However, Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, and Rollo May became distinguished intellectual leaders of the movement until their respective deaths. In distinguishing the Third Force Movement, Brennan (1998b) argued that it may be easier to specify what the Third Force Movement is not, rather than what it is. It is not psychoanalysis, nor is it an experimentally based objective psychology. The Third Force Movement draws its intellectual underpinnings from the literature and methodologies of European existentialism and phenomenology. It has found its success mainly in clinical applications, which Brennan (1998b) described as appropriate since it tries to understand the person as an individual, existing in particular contexts and times, wrestling with the choices of life and assuming responsibilities for these choices (p.251). Within a few years (that is, mid-sixties), the humanistic movement was recognized as a third force in American psychology. The focus was on defining a human psychology with emphasis on individual experiences and variability (Brennan, 1999a). To illustrate this variability, Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow embraced self-actualization as an empirical principle and as an ethical ideal. They maintained that human nature is intrinsically good but corrupted by society (Smith, 1990). Rollo May represented the existential aspect of humanism, which espoused existential concerns of human freedom, values, and choices. In response to the question of what the philosophy of the humanistic movement would be, Carl Rogers asserted that the answer would have an existential flavour: man choosing for him- or herself, man the architect of him- or herself. Rogers assumed that the humanistic philosophy would center itself on the individual as the evaluating agent. Rogers simultaneously raised concerns that if deploring and resisting was all the Third Force

49 movement stood for, then they would become a temporary protestant group and be superseded (Greening, 1987). The participation of Rollo May in the Third Force movement probably consolidated the existential component of humanistic psychology, hence the name Existential-Humanistic psychology, as implied by some authors (Portnoy, 1999; Schneider, 1996). Influenced by the philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich, Rollo May brought the current of European existentialism and phenomenology into humanistic psychology (Martinez, 1998; Rabinowitz, Good, & Cozad, 1989; Smith, 1990). With the advent of the counterculture movement of the 1960 s and 1970 s, the humanistic vision moved out into the streets of America as much as it was making inroads into the academic and professional community. The human-potential movement spread through society in the form of encounter groups, growth centres, body therapies, communes, alternative lifestyles, political programmes, and new spiritualities. The humanistic voice emerged within the American society in such issues as women s liberation, civil rights, and the Vietnam war (Elkins, 2000; Smith 1990). The counterculture had a number of psychological features that resonated with humanistic psychology. There was convergence in the area of individualism, a belief in the fulfilment of the individual as the centre of value. That is, people should do their own thing (Smith, 1990, p.10). Other areas of resonance were self-disclosure, which, in the language of counterculture meant to let it all hang out (Jourard, cited in Smith, 1990); an emphasis on here and now; exaltation of hedonism, implying feeling good about what one does; and finally irrationalism, as manifested in reliance on intuition over evidence, uncritical affinity with the occult, and in the celebration of drug-induced highs (Smith, 1990). The major focus of humanistic psychology was on the encounter group movement. Encounter groups and their use in psychotherapy began with the human potential movement. Reber and Reber (2001) described an encounter group as a small group that focuses on intensive interpersonal interactions (encounters). The goal of encounters was to remove psychological barriers and defences, achieving openness, honesty and the willingness to deal with the difficulties of emotional expression. Group members were

50 encouraged to deal with here and now and disregard intellectualization and personal history. Encounter groups were not regarded as psychotherapy. The human growth that they were supposed to promote was unregulated and it was unevaluated scientifically. By the mid- 1980 s, the encounter group movement had faded into a minor component within the psychoculture. However, encounter groups continued into the 1980 s without their quasireligious orientations that characterized their heyday (Smith, 1990). In modern day psychology, some scholars believe that humanistic psychology failed to realize its historical promise and that it now has little voice in the scholarly discourse of our day. Others believe that the humanistic perspective is still cogent and that it is needed in psychology even more today than it was in the 1960 s (Elkins, 2000). Along the same vein, Smith (1990) described humanistic psychology as both a social movement within psychology and an enduring perspective. Adding to the controversies of the Third Force, Rowan (1989) raised a question of whether humanistic psychology comes as an entity or is divided into two. Wilber (1989) responded that there are two humanistic psychologies, one transpersonal, and the other, which is not. Transpersonal psychology emerged from within the humanistic movement in favour of the mystical tendencies emanating from the counter-culture. It is a psychology aimed at connecting human consciousness with the larger spiritual ocean in which people participate. Rowan (1989) viewed transpersonal psychology as a shift from what he called the mental ego (ordinary consciousness) to the subtle self (transpersonal consciousness). Rowan linked Maslow and Rogers to the transpersonal paradigm, with self-actualisation as a transcendental thesis. Pauchant and Dumas (1991) asserted that Maslow challenged the focus of psychology on pathology, and that humanistic psychology needed to be built from the study of the healthiest individual in society. However, society has its ills and pessimisms, epitomised by existential guilt, anxiety, and dread - an aspect complemented by the existential-humanistic psychology.

51 Humanistic psychologists accepted the existential-phenomenological view that an individual should be understood with the fewest possible preconceptions, so that one encounters the individual directly rather than filtered through own theories. They emphasized the role of freedom, choice, decision, and responsibility in human existence. For the purpose of addressing the dualism of humanistic psychology raised by Wilber (1989b), I favour the use of the concept existential-humanistic to reflect on the unity between the existential and the transpersonal aspects. The adoption of the concept is an acknowledgement of the concurrent role of the transpersonal and the existentialphenomenological approaches in the shaping and theoretical development of the Third Force Movement. However, the term humanistic is popularly used to denote the entire movement. 4.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THIRD FORCE TO THERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES OF CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY This section aims at elucidating the role humanistic psychology played in institutionalising the study and views of human experiences. The adoption of existential philosophy and phenomenology into psychotherapy is one of the milestone achievements of the humanistic movement. The establishment of an overriding theory for the Third Force remains a concern. In search of what May (1976) called a new paradigm for humanistic psychology, a new set of metaphors, a new underlying structure (p. 34), he organised a conference of eclectic thinkers in the spring of 1975, including Gregory Bateson and his contextual approach. May was looking for an explanatory model for the Third Force. Arguments in this section are typical of the scenario above. The humanistic view of man is discussed, then, followed by the theoretical contributions of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. Chapter 3 reflected on the contributions of Rollo May s existential approach to humanistic psychology. Rogers conception of empathy is herein used to illustrate the phenomenological-humanistic aspect. It is also demonstrated that Rogers empathy can be transcendental if combined with Zen meditation. Maslow s peak experience is discussed, with the view to demonstrate the transcendental aspect. The last two sections deal with the status and future implications of the Third Force.

52 4.3.1 View of human nature and links with positive psychology Chen (2001) indicated that the fundamental philosophy in humanistic psychology is its recognition of, and focus on the significant role and function of subjectivity in people s living experience. According to Chen, people are purposeful and intentional beings who make sense of the phenomenological world, external and social contexts. The centrality of human phenomenology lies with people s capacity and tendency to discern meanings associated with living experience. Because people are living a holistic and integral life, they are engaged in a continuous process of meaning making and meaning-exploration. Humanistic psychology maintains that individuals are healthy social beings capable of thinking and experiencing in their life journey. Although there may be psychological difficulties associated with the life journey, people have the capacity to experience and cope with such difficulties through resilience, and continue their journey of personal development and growth (Chen, 2001; Strümpfer, 2001). Thus, humanistic psychology focuses on the phenomenology of individual experiences as purposefully guided and meaningful. Above all, the ability of humans to overcome psychological difficulties is indicative of an inherent human nature of resilience and the capacity to overcome what Strümpfer (2001) called inordinate demands. Freedom and uniqueness of an individual are some of the basic tenets of humanistic psychology (Criswell, 2000). Hansen (2000) echoed a similar sentiment that psychological humanism, in line with existential and phenomenological philosophy, emphasizes free will and subjectivity. Criswell proceeded to indicate that the founders of the Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) were psychologists who emphasized the human qualities of choice, creativity, values, and self-actualization. They were concerned with problems that have meaning to humans; they valued the dignity and worth of humans and focused interest on the development of the potential inherent in every person. Hence humanistic psychology, according to Criswell, adds the first person focus to an essentially third person science. Criswell (2000) maintained that humanistic psychology places its primary value on what facilitates the positive development of human beings within the unfolding universe. Criswell emphasized a concern for all persons and their basic human rights: their right to be

53 treated as individuals with worth and dignity, the right to primacy of their experiences, the right to the holistic development of their various talents and capacities, as well as the rights of society to the contributions of all individuals towards what he termed the cultural evolution of mankind (p.75). From this perspective, humanistic psychology extends from the experiential phenomenology of the person to the broader values of society. In integrating the humanistic view of man as expressed in the assertions above, Greening (1998, p. 9) listed five basic postulates of humanistic psychology as follows: Human beings, as human, supersede the sum of their parts. They cannot be reduced to components. Human beings have their existence in a uniquely human context, as well as in a cosmic ecology. Human beings are aware and aware of being aware - that is, they are conscious. Human consciousness always includes an awareness of oneself in the context of other people. Human beings have some choice and, with that, responsibility. Human beings are intentional, aim at goals, are aware that they cause future events, and seek meaning, value, and creativity. The five postulates attribute a positive orientation towards human nature. The implications are that a human being is unique and whole (Gestalt), intentionally conscious, is endowed with responsibility for choice, his or her actions are goal-directed (Strümpfer, 2001) in pursuit of meaning and value. Above all, people are creatively involved in their lives. These assertions about human nature counter May s (1958a; 1983) existential pessimism that anxiety and guilt are ontological, and that psychopathology presents itself as anxiety in the therapeutic process. Humanistic psychologists have not been keen on this thesis, given their limited interest. Sheldon and Kasser (2001) associated the positive attributes of humanistic psychology with positive psychology. Sheldon and Kasser defined positive psychology as an attempt to understand healthy aspects of people, that is, fundamental human strengths and resources. Positive psychologists are thus interested in investigating the good life and the psychological factors that can promote it. According to Sheldon and Kasser (2001), emerging research indicates that there is a growing interest in such topics as altruism, wisdom, growth, creativity, spirituality, hope,

54 and love, to mention but a few. Thus, positive psychology is re-exploring the same questions and issues humanistic psychology has long been interested in. This, in my opinion, would suggest some convergence of the two paradigms although caution should be exercised in that humanistic psychology still needs to recognise positive psychology as a bridge between the phenomenological and natural scientific approaches. The fundamental concern is that positive psychology does not eschew quantitative methods for the purpose of theory verification. This perspective is against the spirit and letter of humanistic psychology although Sheldon and Kasser (2001) equate quantitative methodology with sensitive humanism. The argument is that the two can be in harmony, bringing a new explanatory model for all psychology. Although this is a valuable point, I presume the move would compromise the essence of humanistic psychology and what it stands for, the descriptive nature of experience. In a move to elucidate the scenario, Rich (2001) commented that the scope and meaning of the good life in positive psychology poses a problem. Rich poses the question that if positive psychology is a science of positive subjective experience, positive individual traits, and positive institutions, are these experiences, traits, and institutions the same over time and place, through history and across culture? The answer would probably be no, which would place positive psychology in a precarious position. Resnick et al. (2001) suggested the development of a more positive psychotherapy as a compromise. They argued that humanistic psychologists and psychotherapists have long recognized the value of positive experience. Humanistic psychologists have worked to facilitate higher and more positive emotions like love, courage, pride, and faith. The concern is that even among humanistically oriented therapists, this positive philosophy has not always translated into positive focus in therapy. According to Resnick et al. (2001), we still focus on pain and thus base our therapeutic approach on a problem perspective.

55 4.3.2 Humanistic and transcendental contributions of the Third Force to contemporary psychology. This section discusses Maslow s views on the transcendental aspect of the human potential to grow and self-actualize. The holistic perspective on psychological development and selfactualization contributed immensely to the professions of individual and family counselling and organizational development consulting. The study and quest for peak experiences and self-actualization were popularised as a result (Resnick, Warmoth, & Serlin, 2001). This section aims at explaining the nature of peak experiences and the dimensions thereof as proposed by Rowan (1983) under 4.3.2.1 below. Carl Rogers views on empathy and therapeutic value are discussed. The purpose here is to elucidate both the humanistic and transcendental aspects of an empathic relationship. Rogers (1980) referred to the transcendental state as the altered states of consciousness. The section closes with Ryback s (2001) analogy of the empathic process with musical melody, a confirmation of the transcendental features of the empathic relationship. However, the concepts peak experiences and empathy are not exhaustive of Maslow s and Rogers theories, they merely serve to illuminate on their influence within the Third Force Movement. 4.3.2.1 Maslow s peak experiences and the phenomenology of mystical experiences Abraham Maslow s theory of self-actualization is the most comprehensive and yet complex of all within the humanistic movement. Geller (1982) asserted that theories of selfactualization appealed to the Western mind since Aristotle. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, there has been a resurgence of the concept of self-actualization in the thought of numerous philosophers and psychologists, the foremost of whom include Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Gordon Allport, Rollo May, Carl Rogers, and Abraham Maslow. According to Geller (1982), this theoretical framework has become a permanent part of the Western intellectual landscape.

56 Maslow s interpretation of peak experiences is contained in his theory of human motivation (self-actualization). Maslow (1954/1970) regarded this as a positive theory of motivation and thus conforms to clinical practice. Maslow developed a hierarchy of needs based on an individual s inherent capacity for psychological growth. Basic needs must be satisfied before an individual progresses to more advanced needs. A small percentage of persons reach the highest point, which is self-actualization, characterized by peak experiences and feelings of transcendence. Lowest in the hierarchy are the physiological needs. Rowan (1999) described the lower end of needs as deficiency motivation, that is, homeostatic in nature, almost an automatic mechanism. Homeostasis refers to the body s automatic efforts to maintain a constant state of the bloodstream. Homeostatic regulation is sustained through food, drink, activity and sleep, protection against extreme temperatures, and sensory stimulation (Maslow, 1954/1970; Meyer, Moore, & Viljoen, 1997; Rowan, 1999). Highest in the hierarchy is the need for self-actualization. Having gone through the other levels such as the need for safety, belongingness, and self-esteem, the person experiences the desire for self-fulfilment, the tendency to become actualized in what he or she is potentially capable of (Maslow 1954/1970). The self-actualizing person shares the desire to transform his or her circumstances, realizes his or her potential, and becomes the best person (s)he can be (Lewis, 1998). In the process of self-actualization, Maslow said, we occasionally have a peak experience. For one to know what self-actualization is, one needs to get the feel of the peak experience, to go to the experience of Being. Maslow called this transcendence. He asserted that transcendence succeeded self-actualization. But either way, the process ends up with mystical experiences (Rowan, 1983). This is the highest state of consciousness, or what Rowan called cosmic consciousness or transcendence. Rowan proposed more than one type of a mystical experience, in contrast to Maslow. A description of selected types of mystical experiences is given below, starting with an explication of peak experiences. Rowan (1983) described the peak experience as the unpredictable occurrence of ecstatic experiences, most often triggered by nature, music, or sex, where there is a union between

57 the person and the Whole. On the concept whole, Chauduri (1975) argued that there is only one true ultimate known to humans, and that is the cosmic whole. The cosmic whole cannot be equated with any determinate type of cognition, perfection, compassion, or mystic realization. These are all passing and transient features of the cosmic process. Wilber (1989a) proclaimed that the mystical event is not a proposition but an experience. To this effect, Maslow acknowledged the phenomenological nature of the human subjective experiences. He defined a peak experience as a moment where the perceiver is in cognitive isolation from material reality. In peak experience there is awe, wonder, amazement, humility and even reverence, exaltation and piety (Adams, 1999; Maslow, 1968/1999; Pauchant & Dumas, 1991). Rowan (1983) identified seven stages in the mystical experience, the first being the peak experience leading up to the ultimate. However, I shall selectively discuss those stages that are more congruent to Maslow s views on peak experiences. Having defined peak experiences, three other stages are given prominence; real self, Deity as substance, and Deity as process. The real self is the feeling of getting in touch with one s own center, one s identity, one s true self - the self that lies beyond all self-images or self-concepts. Rowan (1983) described this as an experience of authenticity that consists of self-respect and self-enactment. The stages of Deity as substance and Deity as process provide spiritual dimension to the peak experience. Deity as substance refers to the sense of being in touch with the Deity, the creator and sustainer of all life and being. Deity is here seen as the pure substance of spirit. This sense is developed by worship and commitment to some particular notion of the Deity, be it personal, symbolic or abstract. In the Christian tradition we speak of God the Father, Islam offers Allah, and Judaism Jehovah. The ecstatic end of this process signifies a personal change, giving up our existing identities, and this feels like rebirth (Rowan, 1983). Deity as process shares some similarity with the Deity as Substance; they both consist of worship and commitment. The fundamental difference is that Deity as Process proposes worship in the company of other believers and the intellectual content of what is believed becomes more important. It is the sense of being in touch with the Deity as process, rather than as subject or object; regardless of how fine or abstract. At this stage the person has a

58 choice on what to believe, and these choices must be formed in congruence with theological principles of faith (Rowan, 1983). Contrary to Rowan s views on mystical experiences, the dimension of spirituality is not emphasised in Maslow s peak experiences. Spirituality is hereby defined as a way of being and experiencing that comes about through awareness of a transcendental dimension, and that is characterized by certain identifiable values with regard to self, others, nature, life, and whatever one considers to be Ultimate (Elkins, Hedstrom, Hughes, Leaf, & Saunders, 1988). Similar to Maslow, Elkins et al. (1988) asserted that the spiritual person experiences a sense of awe, reverence, and wonder even in non-religious settings. He or she does not dichotomise life into sacred and secular, holy and profane, but believes that the sacred is in the ordinary. This notion corresponds with Rowan s Deity as process : it is selftranscendental in that the spiritual person goes beyond dichotomy. Maslow (1968/1999) made a similar reference in the form of dichotomy-transcendence. Maslow s views on peak experiences are typical of the ideology of Transpersonal Psychology. The discussion above suggests two major dimensions of mystical experiences; that of the self, and spirituality. The phenomenon of mystical experience is transcendental in that the person in the peak experiences feels a new sense of identity and integration. In this sense, Maslow (1968/1999) argued that peak experiences may and do have some therapeutic effects in the strict sense of removing symptoms. They can change the person s view of him- or herself in a healthy direction and release him or her for greater creativity, spontaneity, and expressiveness. 4.3.2.2 Rogerian empathy Carl Rogers has been one of the outstanding leaders of the humanistic movement although he could not claim sole leadership because of the vastness of the movement and its cultural inclinations (Orlov & Coleman, 1992). Rogers major contribution is the person-centered approach. A major focus shall be given to the concept of empathy, its definition and application in psychotherapy. A brief review of the concepts of congruence and

59 incongruence is made in order to put the client s capacity to grow in place. Finally, the contention by Rogers (1980) and Schuster (1979) that the therapeutic relation is transcendental (to the level of mystical experiences) is also discussed. Similar to Maslow, Rogers viewed the human growth potential along the lines of selfactualization though he preferred to use the concept of actualising tendency. This was an attempt to generalise the phenomenon to the broader population (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981). Rogers regarded the self and the organism as separate, each with its own actualising tendency but linked by the concept of congruence or incongruence (Ford, 1991; Rogers, 1980; Thorne, 1992). Incongruence refers to the discrepancy between the self as perceived and the actual experience of the total organism, that is, incongruence of self with experience of the organism. Incongruence leads to psychological vulnerability that leaves a person anxious and confused. Congruence implies the opposite effect; it is an ideal where a person is open and conscious of all his or her experiences and can effectively incorporate them into the self-concept. Congruent people see themselves authentically for what they are, and have a capacity to realise their potential and live creatively (Ford, 1991; Meyer et al., 1997; Thorne, 1992). Congruence in a client is the objective of the Rogerian person-centered approach embodied in the empathic relationship with the client. Rogers (1980) had several definitions of empathy. I shall present those definitions with implied themes of meaning and the phenomenological-related theme of bracketing. According to Rogers, an empathic therapist points sensitively to the felt meaning which the client is experiencing at this moment, in order to help him or her to focus on that meaning and carry it further to its full uninhibited experiencing. A later definition of empathy implies that the therapist enters the private perceptual world of the client and becoming thoroughly at home in it. The therapist lays down his or her views and values in order to enter another s world without prejudice. This can be done by persons who feel secure about themselves in that they will not be lost in the strange and bizarre world of the other, and that they can safely return to their own world if they wish to (Rogers, 1980).

60 Schuster (1979) argued that empathy can be enhanced by means of mindfulness in Zen meditation. Lesh (cited in Schuster, 1979) conducted a study using the simpler form of Zen meditation involving mindfulness of breathing by counting one s breath. The results indicated that the group who practiced meditation improved significantly in their empathy ability. The more difficult form of Zen meditation is shikan-taza ; a form of meditation that seems most conducive to developing the type of attitude needed in psychotherapy. This kind of meditation is akin to Buddhist Satipatthana: there is no specific object of meditation here. The meditator passively notices the endless flow of ideas, emotions, and sensations that arise in the mind. These are the same phenomena that occur during therapy. The purpose of this exercise is bare attention. Bare attention is the clear and single-minded awareness of what is transpiring in us and to us in each successive moment of perception (Schuster, 1979). It is akin to Husserl s epoche. However, Rogers (1980) did recognize the significance of transcendental experiences in what he called altered states of consciousness. The altered state of consciousness is the transcending experience of unity. The person pictures the individual self as dissolved in a whole area of higher values, especially beauty, harmony, and love. The person feels at one with the cosmos. It is in the slightly altered state of consciousness that Rogers believes to have a healing influence on the other. He argued that his presence in this state was releasing and helpful to the client. Rogers (1980) maintained that this kind of transcendent phenomenon is evident even in groups. Rogers and Schuster confirm by their arguments that the principles of transcendental phenomenology are applicable to psychotherapy. Schuster s mindfulness can be equated to the act of consciousness and intentionality in phenomenology. Chaudhuri (1975) argued that consciousness is essentially a self-transcending act, associated with mystical experiences and the spirituality linked to these experiences. Hence I agree with Elkins et al. (1988) that psychology cannot afford to ignore the spiritual dimension.

61 Along transcendental lines, Ryback (2001) asserted that empathy at its best has characteristics highly similar to improvisational jazz. He quoted Wynton Marsalis to say that jazz music is about communication and connection. According to Ryback, both empathy and jazz have the following: The invitation to improvise, in jazz, among the musicians; in therapy, between therapist and client. In the person-centered approach, the person is free to choose any direction. Progress of possibilities continues until there is a cohesive theme - in jazz, a shared melody; in therapy, an entrainment of body and mind in both persons. The therapist is sensitive, moment to moment, to the changing felt meaning flowing in the other person. Such openness leading to togetherness requires the combination of both skill in technique and a creative openness. In jazz, musical technique; in therapy, the therapist s skill in providing the underlying structure. The process leads to something new rather than mere repetition. In jazz there is mutual creativity; in therapy, the therapist s openness to new learning by listening and reflection goes beyond mere repetition. The analogy to empathy as jazz music affirms its transcendental nature, the mystical dimension. The analogy implies that empathic experience goes beyond the usual levels of consciousness. Rowan (1983) cited music as one of the activating agents of the mystical experience (see 4.3.2.1 above). Thus, Rogers conceptualisation of empathy colludes with the transcendental ideology of the Third Force ; it extends on the I-Thou relation of the existential-phenomenological approach. However, Rogers (1942) stipulated some conditions that he regarded as crucial in an empathic relationship. Topmost is the therapist s warmth and responsiveness, which gradually develops into a deeper emotional relationship. From the therapist s point of view, this is a definitely controlled relationship, an affectional bond with defined limits. The therapist is aware that he is emotionally involved in this relationship and is sensitive to the needs of the client. His emotional involvement is limited for the good of the client.

62 The other important quality is the therapist s lack of judgemental attitude. This allows the client to freely express his or her emotions. A skillful therapist refrains from imposing his or her own wishes, his or her own reactions or biases, into the therapeutic relationship. Advice and suggestion are out of place in Rogerian therapy. This approach provides for the positive ground for personality growth and development, for conscious choice, and for selfdirected integration. These are the qualities that distinguish a therapeutic relationship from the usual relationships of everyday life in the family, the school, and the working world (Rogers, 1942). I express some reservations with regard to Rogerian empathic approach. Rogers (1942, 1980) stipulated qualities that he regarded as necessary for the therapist. This limits the scope of interaction and approach from the side of the therapist. The free expression of emotion in the therapeutic relationship may be misconstrued either by the client or therapist, particularly under seductive circumstances. This poses a serious threat to ethical practice in psychotherapy. Thorne (1992) argued that it is indeed difficult to conceive of a therapist who surrenders power for the sake of a therapeutic relationship. The power gradient needs to be redefined. 4.3.3 Applicability of the Third Force principles to contemporary psychology and beyond The advent of the Third Force psychology moved psychology from the academic and professional confines into society, politics, and spirituality. For example, it was demonstrated in the section above that traditional theories of personality and methods of psychotherapy blended with Zen Bhuddism, translate into transpersonal psychology (Schuster, 1979; Taylor, 1999). Also, the Rogerian principle of person-centered communication has been applied in education and politics with some visible successes (Greening 1987; Rogers, 1980). Humanistic principles have applicability in clinical areas, namely, ecosystemic therapy, career counselling, Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), and Therapeutic Communities in institutional settings. Hansen (1999) did a critical review of humanistic approaches to treating disturbed clients. He indicated that the client-centered approach is beneficial to disturbed clients because the

63 therapist attempts to grasp the full experience of the client and provide a therapeutic relationship that will catalyse the client s natural tendency towards congruence and selfactualization. The person-centered approach deplores the reduction of a client into drives and behaviours as practiced by psychoanalysis and behaviourism respectively. Rogers and colleagues conducted a study of the effects of the client-centered approach on hospitalised schizophrenics. Results indicated that the therapy clients improved slightly over the control group in the areas of positive personality changes and release rate from the hospital. In explaining why the differences between the therapy and control groups did not have greater significance, Rogers argued that all patients were exposed to extensive hospital milieu therapies. The sole difference was the extra two hours of client-centered intervention for the therapy group. An extrapolation of these results to current mental health climate would probably suggest the same (Hansen, 1999). Tyler (1992, 1994) contended that principles of the ecosystemic approach are applicable to humanistic psychology. Tyler argued that Roger s theory is systemic, but is developed with a stronger emphasis on the phenomenological perspective. The reason is that Rogers considers the individual s whole world of experience. The organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived. Rogers saw personality as two subsystems, the conceptual and the experiential - contained within an overarching interpersonal system. In an undeveloped individual, the two systems are highly differentiated and may also function independently of each other. Individual development is seen as the integration of the two subsystems - the self and the organism. This proposition epitomises the concept of congruence discussed in 4.3.2.2 above. The integrative tendencies of an individual can be achieved through empathy after which the person feels part of the larger whole which transcends the boundaries of the individual self. The phenomenological view of the ecosystemic approach regards each system as comprised of a group of individuals who interrelate with one another and reciprocate with the environment they inhabit. Systemic approaches in the past ignored the individual in favour of the system. The humanistic approach considers an autonomous system not as an object but as a phenomenological event - in terms of the individual s own experiences, beliefs and personal meanings (Tyler, 1992).

64 Ellis (1996) asserted that Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) is one of the main humanistic psychotherapies. Based on the ABCD model of the REBT, Ellis argued that it is not events that upset us but the way we perceive these Activating Events (A s). Unfortunately A s influence us, but our B s (Beliefs) about these A s largely bring about disturbed C s (Consequences), such as anxiety and depression. In order to undo the disturbance, we can proceed to D - to actively and forcefully Dispute our self-defeating B s (Beliefs). According to Ellis (1996), the ABCD Theory of emotional disturbance is unusually phenomenalistic (p.71). The ABC s of REBT also stress the meanings and interpretations people give to events and to results rather than the events and results in themselves. Also, there is existential choice in REBT approach; people, even though they may not be aware of this, largely choose their dysfunctional core philosophies and lifestyles. Consciously and unconsciously, they train themselves to feel panicked, depressed, self-hating, and enraged, rather than get conditioned to feel these ways. Ellis (1979) felt that the scientific approach has no inner dimensions. People are objects to be used instrumentally and science holds that values do not exist. For Ellis, REBT is largely a phenomenological view which holds that humans do have inner dimensions; that external events in the universe do not directly disturb them, but instead, they largely choose to disturb themselves. They have the power to choose otherwise and refuse to upset themselves; they have some measure of free will and are definitely not objects to be used instrumentally. Hence Epictetus dictum that Men are disturbed not by things, but by the view which they take of them (Ellis, 1979, p.89). Even with the inherent differences between humanistic psychology and psychoanalysis, attempts have been made to integrate the two theories. Of the four psychologies of psychoanalysis, humanistic psychology is closest to self-psychology and furthest from the drive theory (the others being ego, and object-relations ). Drive psychology is inherently deterministic because it attributes all behavioural manifestations to the sexual and aggressive determinants. Self-psychology assigns great importance to the development of a sense of self throughout one s life. Thus, strengthening the structure of the self is the primary goal of psychotherapy. Self-psychology has many commonalities with humanistic

65 psychology, such as emphasis on subjectivity, sense of self, free will, and a natural human tendency towards growth (Hansen, 2000). Along the same vein, Pauchant and Dumas (1991) compared the work of Abraham Maslow, a founding father of humanistic psychology, and Heinz Kohut, the founding father of self psychology. Similar to Hansen (2000), they asserted that self-psychology can provide an empirical bridge between humanistic psychology and modern psychoanalysis. Pauchant and Dumas (1991) argued that Maslow and Kohut shared a common philosophy of science. Both were subjectivists and stressed that individuals subjectivily construct their reality. They acknowledged that to understand the subjective experience of humans in their entirety, one needed to be phenomenologically attuned to these experiences. Thus, self psychology can provide humanistic psychology with a powerful scientific understanding of the process of therapeutic change to enhance the contributions of humanistic clinicians such as May and Rogers. At laboratory level, Taylor (1999) expressed content about the burgeoning field of neuroscience from which numerous humanistic and philosophical implications are emerging from advances in the biology of consciousness. At the same time, the very concept of consciousness as centered in brain functions is being called into question, with the identification of vast parasynaptic information networks that are not directly mediated by the central and peripheral nervous system. Assertions about information that is not directly mediated by the central and peripheral nervous system have brought philosophical discussions about the relation of the brain to the mind, an elusive issue that had haunted intellectuals for some time. This confirms an argument by humanistic psychologists that a more holistic model of science will be required to understand these processes beyond the epistemology of cognitive behaviourism. Chen (2001) discussed the application of the humanistic principle of meaning-making in career psychology. According to Chen, the content of meaning may vary from context to context but the philosophy of meaning seems transferable between various life and career circumstances. That is, vocational counselling recognises the life context of the person and the meaning structures thereof. Meaning-making in one s vocational enquiry and effort is

66 always connected to the search for meaning in other aspects of life. Hence, it becomes reasonable to assume that one s career needs are closely associated with personal meaning. From the career development perspective, Chen (2001) argued that meanings associated with life career roles and career developmental tasks merge and organise to form the total self-concept. Within the total self-concept is the vocational self-concept which assists one to coordinate one s functioning in various life contexts and career psychology. The selfconcept has several other elements like appearance, abilities, personality, gender, values, and place in society. People generate meanings from these elements of selfhood. Thus in forming a self-concept, we make sense of ourselves and also perceive how other persons make sense of us. This is probably the making of one s value system, values which can be transferred to the interpretation of the larger environment. Kuhn (2001) argued that environmental crises, including the depletion of the ozone; global warming; deforestation; pollution of the air, waters, and land; overpopulation; and loss of biodiversity through species extinction affect us in various forms. Kuhn maintained that self-actualization, awareness, responsibility, and authenticity - can address our environmental crisis through the concepts and practice of empathy, unconditional positive regard, and wider applications beyond humankind to include the natural world. According to Khun, an ecological-humanistic psychology and worldveiw includes humans as part of the environment, not separate from it. Ecological issues, values, and perceptions that promote actualising of potential in both humans and the natural world provide an alternative to the dominant worldview of the most industrialzed countries. Kuhn called for an ecological-humanistic paradigm that promotes a healthy, sustainable human-nature relatioship. A reasonable approach to environmental issues would then require a responsible choice from the human side. These attitudes help to actualise human growth and potentiality (Kuhn, 2001). Humanistic principles are applicable to education policy making and politics and Carl Rogers (1980) theorized around these areas. He worked with clients in individual psychotherapy, then with small groups, and finally with nations (Greening, 1987; Orlov & Coleman, 1992; Rogers, 1980). Rogers argued that education should be person-centered

67 where the values of freedom to choose, trust, and democracy are realised. The traditional modes where teachers are custodians of all knowledge should be abandoned. Learners and teachers should have a say in educational policy in compliance with the democratic principle. In the extreme, Rogers (1980) suggested that learners should have a part in the choice of teaching personnel and the curriculum whereas teachers should enjoy a similar privilege in choosing their administrative officers. Although this notion promotes democratic principles, I have some reservation about the latter suggestions in the choice of personnel because of limited resources (individual and otherwise) in our communities, particularly the developing countries. This privilege may translate into abuse of power. Later in his life Rogers did much work in troubled countries like Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Central America. He visited South Africa and the Soviet Union towards the end of his life (Orlov & Coleman, 1992). Way back in 1948 and 1952 Rogers published papers on social tensions and a hypothetical dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union in the cold war era. By 1965 Rogers had developed a theory of group conflict that he tested by facilitating a group of militant Protestants and Catholics in Belfast, Ireland, documented in the film The Steel Shutter. He achieved appreciable results with his personcentered work in the Soviet Union, to the effect that the Russian message in response to the news of his death was Farewell, dear comrade (Greening, 1987). 4.3.4 Prevalence of the Third Force movement in current psychology and implications for the new millennium Taylor (1999) claimed that humanistic psychology flourished as a distinct movement from the early 1940s to the late 1960s but the literature analysed in this essay revealed that the Third Force as a distinct movement emerged with the Old Saybrook conference of 1964. These are some of the historical inconsistencies I have reflected upon earlier on in this study, which, nonetheless, do not change the reality of the existence of the movement though I would prefer to stick with the latter view. Wertz (1998) noted that a review of the history of psychology textbooks shows that humanistic psychology is in crisis. Although valued and respected by some, it is inadequately understood and dismissed by many.

68 Wertz argued that the value of the movement hinges on the following: whether it faithfully embodies the historical tradition of humanism, provides an appropriate philosophical foundation for psychology, asserts relevant critiques of contemporary psychology, affords the discipline theoretical unity, offers rigorous research methodologies, bridges the gap between psychology and the humanities, and assumes a leading role in the fight against and social reformation of the depersonalising tendencies of modern culture. However, Wertz (1998) attributed the contemporary crisis to sociological factors - inadequate institutional establishments necessary to gain historical impact. Taylor (1999) expressed several concerns about institutional disunity of the humanistic movement in current psychology. He maintained that today, the standing institutions of the humanistic movement in psychology have a curious relation to one another. The Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) for example, largely devoted to issues of counterculture psychotherapy and group experiences, sold the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (JHP) to Sage Publications after suffering a decline in membership and lowered revenue. The original founding organizations - JHP, Saybrook, and AHP-continue to exist in a state of friendly autonomous configuration with regard to their respective policies of operation, vision, and finances. Division 32 within the American Psychological Association (APA), the division of humanistic psychology, whose founding was opposed by the officers of AHP, has always maintained its own center of gravity. It continues its affiliation as one of the smaller divisions of the APA and has a revolving rather than growing membership, with a moderate influence on the affairs of the larger association. Because of the many separate agendas, there has been much wringing over everything having to do with the label humanistic, including proposals to even abandon the name. The movement currently lacks a new generation of visionary leaders; it has been declared heartless because it has conformed so much to the mainstream and consequently lost its prerogative for incisive dissent; and it has been castigated for being still too anti-intellectual. These are concerns expressed by Taylor (1999). The concerns over the current status of humanistic psychology spilled over into psychology as a discipline. Goldberg (2000) for example, contended that today psychology is in crisis.

69 Goldberg asserted that psychology has replaced the former pillars of society science and religion, in that most human problems have been reduced to the level of psychological explanation. This goes against the tide of the post-modern thought where art, architecture, literature and other areas of human expression are reactive to the modern tendencies dominated by rigid theory and reductionism. Goldberg (2000) has hinted on some major problems facing psychology today which I believe would shed some light on the current status of humanistic psychology: Psychologists have been reluctant to tackle the most important social issues facing society today. Evil, for example, is the most important problem humankind has ever faced, yet psychologists have acted as though this problem belongs to theologians and philosophers to safely deal with. Geller (1982) for example, expressed concern that self-actualization as conceived of by Maslow and Rogers does not accommodate evil, which he called the problem of anthropodicy. Psychotherapy is a refuge from the social and moral responsibility of the privileged. Freud s psychoanalytic approach does not place importance to the community and social reciprocity of analytic patients. This, according to Goldberg (2000), has had a subversive impact on our society in that contemporary social theory is more influenced by psychoanalytic thinking than any other authority. However, Rogers humanistic principle had transcended the clinical setting into the realms of education and politics in society (see Section 4.3.3 above). Finally, Goldberg (2000) lamented that psychological reasoning is more often applied to works of literature, drama, and high culture than to address the problems of hatred, prejudice, and intolerance that have permeated our society. Tragically, the audiences for these creative psychological works are the privileged and well educated. I would presume that the emphasis of humanistic psychology on the person s subjective experiences and existential values, should to some extent address this deficiency. Negative evaluations of the humanistic movement levelled by Wertz (1998) proclaim that the movement is more a common sense attitude of valuing and respecting people, resulting in artificial sentimentality than a scientific discipline. The movement s protests outweigh its positive contributions. The movement has had more impact on therapeutic practice than on

70 the explanation of behaviour. The movement is vague in its objectives, fragmented in its achievements, and contains no identifiable principles of unity. Above all, Wertz (1998) claimed that rigorous research has been lacking. I do not entirely agree with these assertions with regard to the work of Carl Rogers. Despite the bleak picture painted on humanistic psychology, there are some recognised positive contributions. These include the introduction into modern psychology of a relevant historical tradition, important social criticism and progressive reform, valid criticism of dominant trends in mainstream psychology, new psychotherapeutic orientations and procedures, and new topics for research (growth, change, self-perception, values, creativity, love, death). That is, research could be extended to existential concepts; into phenomenological knowledge; provide a sophisticated philosophy of science and metapsychology, and set up a fruitful dialogue with the humanities (Wertz, 1998). In the same vein, Resnick et al. (2001) called for Positive Psychotherapy that integrates humanistic principles and positive psychology. Cognitive science incorporates the disciplines of cognitive psychology, computer science, artificial intelligence, philosophy, linguistics, and anthropology. A successful positive psychology will probably require contributions from social and personality psychology, psychology of learning and emotions, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, developmental psychology, and other social sciences, including anthropology, history, sociology, economics, and political science. The dialogue between positive psychology and humanistic psychology can be a fruitful one. Eugene (2001) proposed that positive psychology needs humanistic psychology. Firstly, positive psychology needs to learn from the existential humanist s study of the phenomenology of the scientific method. Phenomenology could become the new standard on which research is conducted. Secondly, humanistic and transpersonal influences could benefit positive psychology from the influences of Jung, May, Frankl, Maslow, Rogers, and Ellis to the Buddhist teachings of the Dalai Lama. Based on the concerns and contributions expressed above, suggestions have been made that would probably carry humanistic psychology into the New Millennium. Criswell (2000) provides a fascinating vision of the humanistic approach that takes psychology out of the

71 bounds of the clinic and the laboratory. Criswell advocates respect for one another and for the environment to allow it to actualise its full, positive potential. We must use the principles of the humanistic tradition in all our endeavours with people throughout society, all ages, all cultures, and even other species. A similar approach is echoed by Kuhn (2001). One of the prime things that Taylor (1999) suggested would enlarge and refresh the humanistic perspective is to renew in people s minds the definition of the field, and the place to begin is the clarification of terms. For example, it should be made clear that the terms humanistic and humanist do not necessarily mean the same thing. Humanism may be defined in terms of a philosophy or social program, but the point is to awaken psychologists to a new view of humanistic psychology using a psychological language specifically relevant to their professional concerns (p. 10). In conclusion, Schneider (1996) proposed a seven point plan for the advancement of the existential-humanistic practice. It is a plan that addresses the larger political and economic targets of our predicament - the future vision of culture. Schneider felt that the following can be done about that vision: Incorporate social and political consciousness into the therapy setting [see Laing s (1967) The politics of experience ]; support socially conscious reform movements; inform managed care clients of deeper therapeutic options; conduct research on existential-humanistic approaches; form coalitions, organisations, and unions (these could probably involve people from all walks of life epitomizing the Saybrook experience); write and speak about all the existential-humanistic practice can contribute in the contemporary climate; and look at our fee-charging practices and clientele served. However, Elkins (2000) felt that the current Old Saybrook II Project is well positioned to rekindle the vision of psychology that was articulated at Old Saybrook in 1964. To that effect: The humanistic vision must be poured from the wineskins of 1964 into the new wineskins of the third millennium (Elkins, 2000, p. 120). 4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The advent of Kierkegaard s existential thought with emphasis on reality as subjective, coupled with Husserl s phenomenology of consciousness, culminated in the emergence of existential-phenomenological psychology championed by Ludwig Binswanger in Europe.

72 However, Binswanger s existential analysis was a reaction to classical psychoanalysis. He adopted Heidegger s ontological approach into phenomenology. Rollo May introduced the existential-phenomenological psychology to the American audience in his 1958 publication titled Existence, co-edited by Ernest Angel and Henri Ellenberger. The emergence of the Third Force Movement at Old Saybrook in 1964 saw Rollo May assuming an intellectual leadership of the Humanistic movement ( Third Force ) along with Abraham Maslow (the founding father) and Carl Rogers. The participation of Rollo May consolidated the existential-phenomenological thought within the Third Force, though Maslow s and Rogers concepts of human growth and self-actualization became the dominant themes of the movement. History indicates that the humanistic movement flourished in the 1960s and early 1970s in protest against orthodox psychoanalysis and behaviourism. Its contribution to the academic sphere has been limited because of its preoccupation with the encounter group movement, which was not scientifically accredited and also got entangled in spiritual matters rather than psychotherapeutic theory. Encounter groups vanished in the 1980s but the human potential thought remained institutionalised in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (founded by Maslow), the Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) and Division 32 of the American Psychological Association (APA). Tragically, these institutions remain fragmented today. This unfortunate history calls for a review of the role of the Third Force in the New Millennium. Various suggestions have been made, ranging from bridging psychology with the humanities and the formulation of a universal theory within the movement. It is a responsibility that has haunted the movement since its beginnings. It is apparent that the richness of the Third Force lies in its inclination towards social ideology than in its academic contribution to psychology. The chronology of events that influenced its ideology, coupled with epistemological diversity as a social movement are testimony to this fact. Maslow s conception of peak experiences is typically transpersonal while, Rogers acknowledgement of the altered states of consciousness translates the person-centered approach into the transpersonal. The works of James Bugental and Irvin D. Yalom in recent times helped consolidate the existential component of the Third Force developing from the introductory effort by Rollo May.

73 Regardless of its unfortunate history, humanistic psychology has made its contributions. The mere fact that the Third Force was a protest movement took psychology to new heights. For example, mysticism and spirituality entered the realms of psychotherapy; the person-centered approach is applicable to issues of society like politics and education; and the existential-humanistic approach has been linked to positive psychology, Heinz Kohutt s self psychology, Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), the ecosystemic paradigm, and career psychology. This renders the Third Force a flexible psychology. The Old Saybrook spirit still lingers with us. Hence the Old Saybrook II Project, which attempts to consolidate the value system of the Third Force into the 21 st century.

74 REFERENCE LIST Adams, W.W. (1999). The interpermeation of self and world: Empirical research, existential phenomenology, and transpersonal psychology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 30, 39-66. Binswanger, L. (1958). The existential analysis school of thought. In R. May, E. Angel & H.F. Ellenberger (Eds.), Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology. New York: Basic Books. Brennan, J.H. (1998a). History and systems of psychology (5 th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall. Brennan, J.H. (1998b). Readings in the history and systems of psychology (2 nd ed.). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Chaudhuri, H. (1975). Psychology: Humanistic and transpersonal. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 15, 7-15. Chen, C.P. (2001). On exploring meaning: Combining humanistic and career psychology theories in counseling. Counselling Psychology Quart erly, 14, 317-330. Corey, G. (2001). Theory and practice of counselling and psychotherapy (6 th ed.). Belmont: Brooks/Cole. Criswell, E. (2000). The humanistic tradition: A vision for the future. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 40, 74-82. DeCarvalho, R.J. (1990). A history of the Third Force in psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology. 30, 22-44. Doerr, E. (2002). Humanism unmodified. The Humanist, 62, 1-2.

75 Elkins, D.N., Hedstrom, L.J., Hughes, L.L., Leaf, J.A. & Saunders, C. (1988). Toward a humanistic-phenomenological spirituality: Definition, description, and measurement. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25, 5-18. Elkins, D.N. (2000). Old Saybrook I and II: The visioning and re-visioning of humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 40, 119-127. Ellenberger, H.F. (1958). A clinical introduction to psychiatric phenomenology and existential analysis. In R. May, E. Angel & H.F. Ellenberger (Eds.), Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology. New York: Basic Books. Ellis,A. (1979). Is rational-emotive therapy stoical, humanistic, or spiritual? Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 19, 89-92. Ellis, A. (1996). The humanism of rational emotive behavior therapy and other cognitive behavior therapies. Journal of Humanistic Education & Development, 35, 69-88. Eugene, T. (2001). Positive psychology and Humanistic psychology: A reply to Seligman. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 13 29. Ford, J.G. (1991). Rogerian self-actualization: A clarification of meaning. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 31, 101-111. Foulquie, P. (1947). Existentialism. Translated by K. Raine. London: Dennis Dobson. Frankl, V.E. (1984). Man s search for meaning: An introduction to logotherapy. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc. Frankl, V.E. (1969/1988). The will to meaning: Foundations and applications of logotherapy. New York: Penguin.

76 Frie, R. (2000). The existential and the interpersonal: Ludwig Binswanger and Harry Stack Sullivan. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 40, 108-122. Garrison, A. (2001). Restoring the human in humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 91-104. Geller, L. (1982). The failure of self-actualization theory: A critique of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22, 56-73. Ghaemi, S.N. (2001). Rediscovering existential psychotherapy. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 55, 51-64. Giorgi, A. (1971). Phenomenology and experimental psychology: Part I, In A. Giorgi (Ed.), Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology, Vol. I. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Goldberg, C. (2000). Toward an ecological humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 134, 677-683. Greening, T. (1985). The origins of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology and the Association for Humanistic Psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 2, 7-11. Greening, T. (1987). Carl Rogers: 1902-1987. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 27, 134-140. Greening, T. (1998). Five basic postulates of humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 38, 9-10. Hansen, J.T. (1999). A review and critical analysis of humanistic approaches to treating disturbed clients. Journal of Humanistic Counseling, Education and Development, 38, 29-38.

77 Hansen, J.T. (2000). Psychoanalysis and humanism: A review and critical examination of integrationist efforts with some proposed resolutions. Journal of Counseling & Development, 78. 21-28. Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. London: SCM Press Ltd. Hjelle, L.A. & Ziegler, D.J. (1981). Personality theories: Basic assumptions, research, and applications (2 nd ed.). Singapore: McGraw-Hill. Husserl, E. (1977). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology. Translated by D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1931). Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. Translated by W. R. B. Gibson. London: Allen & Unwin. Kierkegaard, S. (1964a). Point of view: That Individual. In M. Friedman (Ed.), The worlds of existentialism: A critical reader. New York: Random House. Kierkegaard, S. (1964b). Concluding unscientific postscript. In M. Friedman (Ed.), The worlds of existentialism: A critical reader. New York: Random House. Kendler, H.H. (1987). Historical foundations of modern psychology. Illinois: Dorsey. Kuhn, J.L. (2001). Toward an ecological humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 9-18. Leuba, J.H. (2001). Sources of humanism in human nature. The Humanist, 61, 12-14. Lewis, J. (1998). Self-realisation as a human resource tool. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Luypen, W.A. (1966). Phenomenology and humanism. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

78 Luypen W.A. & Dondeyne, A. (1960). Existential phenomenology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Marcel, G. (1948). The philosophy of existence. Translated by M. Harmri. London: Harvrill. Martinez, T.J. (1998). Anthropos and existence: Gnostic parallels in the early writings of Rollo May. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 38, 95-109. Maslow, A.H. (1968/1999). Toward a psychology of being. New York: John Wiley. Maslow, A.H. (1954/1970). Motivation and personality (2 nd ed.). Harper & Row, Inc. May, R. (1976). Gregory Bateson and humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 16, 33-51. May, R. (1958a). Contributions of existential psychotherapy. In R. May, E. Angel & H.F. Ellenberger (Eds.), Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology. New York: Basic Books. May, R. (1958b). The origins and significance of the existential movement in psychology. In R. May, E. Angel & H.F. Ellenberger (Eds.), Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology. New York: Basic Books. May, R. (1983). The discovery of being. New York: Norton & Company. May, R. & Yalom, I. (1989). Existential psychotherapy. In R.J. Corsini & D. Wedding (Eds.), Current psychotherapies, Itasca Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers. Meyer, W.F., Moore, C., & Viljoen, H.G. (1997). Personology: From individual to ecosystem. Sandton: Heinemann.

79 Miars, R.D. (2002). Existential authenticity: A foundational value for counseling. Counseling and Values, 46, 218-225. Morris, J.E. (1979). Kierkegaard s concept of subjectivity and implications for humanistic psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 19, 67-79. Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Moustakas, C. (1985). Humanistic or humanism? Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25, 5-12. Naudin, J. & Azorin, J.M. (1998). Binswanger and Schapp: Existential analysis or narrative analysis? Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 29, 12-20. Nissim-Sabat, M. (1995). Towards a phenomenology of empathy. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 49, 163-170. Orlov, A.B. & Coleman, M. (1992). Carl Rogers and contemporary humanism. Russian Social Science Review, 33, 89-92. Owen, I.R. (1994). Introducing an existential-phenomenological approach Part 2: Theory for practice. Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 7, 12-20. Pauchant, T.C. & Dumas, C.A. (1991). Abraham Maslow and Heinz Kohut: A comparison. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 31, 49-71. Portnoy, D. (1999). Relatedness: Where humanistic and psychoanalytic psychotherapy converge. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 39, 19-24. Pretorius, H.G. & Segal, A.M. (2001). Phenomenology, hermeneutics and psychotherapy. Unpublished paper. Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University.

80 Rabinowitz, F.E., Good, G. & Cozad, L. (1989). Rollo May: A man of meaning and myth. Journal of Counseling and Development, 67, 436-440. Reber, A.S. & Reber, E. (2001). The Penguin dictionary of psychology (3 rd ed.). London: Penguin. Resnick, S., Warmoth, A. & Serlin, I.A. (2001). The humanistic and positive psychology connection: Implications for psychotherapy. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 73-101. Rich, G.J. (2001). Positive Psychology: An introduction. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 8-12. Rogers, R. C. (1980). A way of being. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Rogers, R.C. (1942). Counseling and psychotherapy: Newer concepts in practice. Boston, M.A.: Houghton Mifflin. Rowan, J. (1983). The real self and mystical experiences. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22, 56-73. Rowan, J. (1989). Two humanistic psychologies or one? Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 29, 224-229. Rowan, J. (1999). Ascent and descent in Maslow s theory. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 39, 125-133. Ryback, D. (2001). Mutual affect therapy and the emergence of transformational empathy. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 75-94. Sartre, J.P. (1956). Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology. Translated by H.E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library.

81 Sartre, J.P. (1964). Existentialism. In M. Friedman (Ed.), The worlds of existentialism: A critical reader. New York: Random House. Schneider, K.J. (1996). Jim Bugental s vision: The next step. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 36, 67-70. Schuster, R. (1979). Empathy and mindfulness. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 19, 71-77. Segal, A.M. (1999). Architectural metaphor in psychotherapy: A phenomenological study. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University. Sheldon, K.M. & Kasser, T. (2001). Goals, congruence, and positive well-being: New empirical support for humanistic theories. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 41, 30-50. Smith, M.B. (1990). Humanistic Psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 30, 6-21. Strümpfer, D.J.W. (2001). A model of interpersonal resilient functioning in adults. Retrieved March 20, 2002 from World Wide Web: http//general.rau.ac.za/psych. Taylor, E. (1999). An intellectual renaissance of humanistic psychology? Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 39, 7-25. Tyler, K. (1992a). The ecosystemic approach to personality. Educational Psychology, 14, 45-58. Tyler, K. (1992b). The development of the ecosytemic approach as a humanistic educational psychology. Educational Psychology, 12, 15-23. Thorne, B. (1992). Carl Rogers. London: Sage.

82 Valle, R.S., King, M. & Halling, S. (1989). An introduction to existential phenomenological thought in psychology, In R.S. Valle & S. Halling (Eds.), Existential phenomenological perspective in psychology: exploring the breath of human experience. New York: Plenum Press. Van Deurzen, E. (1998). Paradox and passion in psychotherapy: An existential approach to therapy and counselling. West Sussex: Wiley. Wilber, K. (1989a). God is so damn boring: A response to Kirk Schneider. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 29, 457-469. Wilber, K. (1989b). Two humanistic psychologies or one? A response. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 29, 230-243. Wertz, F.J. (1998). The role of humanistic movement in the history of psychology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 38, 42-72. Worrell, M. (1997). An existential-phenomenological perspective on the concept of resistance in counselling and psychotherapy. Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 10, 5-15. Yontef, G.M. & Simkin, J.S. (1989). Gestalt therapy. In R.J. Corsini & D. Wedding (Eds.), Current psychotherapies. Itasa IL: Peackock. Young-Bruehl, E. (1981). Freedom and Karl Jasper s philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press.