Can Turkey Consolidate Democracy?

Can Turkey Consolidate Democracy? Introduction The process of democratic consolidation is a matter of great interest to scholars because democratic freedom is viewed as a basic human right. The current research explores the process of democratic transition and the prospects for consolidation in Turkey. There is a voluminous amount of research regarding recent democratic transitions also known as the third wave of democracies; 1 however, comparatively little attention has been given to Turkey. Although Turkey is sometimes discussed as a third wave democracy, it must be noted that Turkey s first attempt at democracy was in 1950 and it is, therefore, both a second wave and a third wave democracy. This is an important factor because Turkey s transition process has continued much longer than other third wave democracies. Furthermore, several countries that began their transition process in the 1990s have already come closer to consolidation than Turkey. Turkey is an interesting case because it has had a cyclical pattern of democracy and authoritarian rule, reverting back to democracy relatively quickly compared to other countries. In addition, Turkey was never a praetorian state in the classic sense 2 like many other authoritarian third world regimes, especially in the past. The military regimes that 1 The third wave democracies refer to the phenomenon of the most recent wave of democratic transitions starting in the 1970s and culminating in the mid 1990s. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991). 2 Although the military is the final arbitrator of power, the ambitions of military leaders have not been those of political entrepreneurs in the sense that they use their positions to obtain unrestricted power and wealth. In the South American states the actors who usurp power are often refereed to a cuadillos and much has been written about their pursuit for personal wealth and power. For a discussion of praetorian states see Paul W. Zagorski, Democracy vs. National Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), ch. 1. Also see Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), ch. 6.

governed Turkey did not do so solely for personal power or political entrepreneurship. This is evidenced by the fact that military regimes were short lived when compared to military dictatorships in other countries. The question, therefore remains, why has democracy in Turkey stagnated for so long? What are the factors that have prevented Turkey from consolidating its democracy? The preliminary research suggests that democratic consolidation in Turkey has failed because of the high degree of factionalism and political polarization between political parties. Turkey s highly ideological and factional political parties are ineffective at negotiating pacts and this has prevented them from becoming progressive political forces of change that can work toward consolidating democracy. An intervening variable is the high level of military autonomy of the Turkish armed forces. Concepts and Definitions Before continuing on it is important to clarify concepts, as there has been a great deal of debate and criticism in the literature regarding the meaning of both democracy and democratic consolidation. 3 In the current case, Turkey is viewed as a hybrid democracy. 4 Transitions to democracy generally happen in two phases. The first phase occurs when an authoritarian regime is disposed and a democratic government is installed, the country then becomes an electoral democracy. Turkey has reached this phase and has since stagnated. It is therefore, in a hybrid stage according to Larry Diamond s classificatory 3 Guillermo O Donnell, Illusions About Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy 7 (April 1996), 34-51. Also see David Collier & Steven Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, World Politics 44 (1997), 430-451. And Samuel Huntington, After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave, Journal of Democracy 8 (October 1997), 3-12. 2

scheme. 5 However, it is in the second phase where democratic consolidation occurs and a liberal democracy is created. The second phase of democratic consolidation occurs when a government becomes an effective democratic regime. 6 As this is somewhat ambiguous, Robert Dahl s definition of a polyarchy is a starting point many scholars take when describing a country in which democracy has been consolidated. Dahl s conception of democracy (polyarchy) requires free, fair, and competitive elections. It also requires the accompanying freedoms that make democracy truly meaningful such as alternative forms of information and institutions that guarantee that government policies will be a reflection of the people s voice. 7 In addition to Dahl s description of the requirements for democracy, it should be added that the democracy makes the country immune from the possibilities of regression to authoritarian rule and makes democracy the only game in town. 8 By only game in town it is meant that democratic means are the only legitimate method of overturning elected officials and actors work within the system to change political policy and/or elect new representatives. Turkey does not meet the criteria for consolidated/liberal democracy. The absence of these features will be discussed below in the analysis. Competing Theoretical Perspectives on Democratic Transition and Consolidation A number of theoretical perspectives have been used to explain democratic transitions, stagnation, regression or the lack of any form of democratic transition at all. Two 4 Larry Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002), 21. 5 Ibid., p. 24. 6 See O Donnell p. 18. 7 Robert Dahl. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 1-5. 3

competing models are structural, and agent/actor centered arguments that develop theories about processes of democratization. Structural arguments often use class structure and the economic system to explain democratic transition or the absence of it. A seminal work in this area is Capitalist Development and Democracy by Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens. 9 The central argument of Rueschemeyer et al. is that the link between capitalist development and democracy is a product of class structure. The class that has the most to gain from democracy, the working class, is the one most likely to support it. On the other hand, the class most likely to oppose democracy, the land owning class, has the most to loose from democracy and will not support it. In other words, capitalist development is associated with democracy because capitalist development weakens the upper class and strengthens the lower class. The working class is empowered by capitalism because capitalism gives the workers the skills necessary for organization and self-mobilization. 10 Workers then mobilize themselves and negotiate with the elite for a larger voice in society. This mobilization is able to occur because capitalism creates a shift in the occupational structure of society in which the urban working class grows in importance and, therefore, has bargaining power against the elites, when effectively organized. The living and working conditions of capitalism create the environment in which workers can organize. This is, of course not the only structural base argument. Several researchers have demonstrated a link between economic development and democracy. 11 Most, however, 8 Andrew Schedler, What is Democratic Consolidation? Journal of Democracy 9 (April 1998), 91. 9 Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development & Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 10 Ibid., p. 6. 11 For a detailed research study on the influence of economic development and democracy see Robert Barrow, Determinants of Democracy, Journal of Political Economy 107 (December 1999), 158-159. 4

have not shown a causal link as Rueschemeyer et al. do. The causal link makes their argument more convincing than the other arguments. However, the structural prescription for the development of democracy is critiqued because the approach is to deterministic (economic structure determines democratic development). 12 On the other hand, actor centered approaches posit that democracy either develops or fails to develop because of actors. 13 Authoritarian rulers may be forced to liberalize in trying to reduce opposition or even co-opt the opposition. 14 Many scholars suggest that actors either on the bottom or the top of the political hierarchy influence liberal change in authoritarian regimes. When pressure is coming from the bottom the regime has two choices, either repress the people or cede some of its power. When it comes from the top, it is the result of a split in the power block. Wherever the influence comes from, authoritarians end up ceding some of their power in order to stay in power or they are overthrown. This can sometimes cause a spiral effect in which the regime continues to loose power 15 especially if it resorts to repression to control oppositional forces. 16 However, Adam Przeworski argues that this model of liberalization may explain some transitions, but for the most part is too crude and simplistic and that decision to liberalize comes from both the top and bottom. 17 His approach posits that successful transitions occur where the actors involved are able to form pacts (negotiated 12 Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, World Politics 49 (April 1997), 176. 13 Ibid. 14 Juan Linz, Transitions to Democracy, The Washington Quarterly 13 (Summer 1990), 150. 15 Adam Przeworski, The Games of Transition, in Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Perspective (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 111-112. 16 Linz, p. 150 17 Przeworski, p. 108. 5

settlements). Przeworski calls this process transition by extrication. 18 Przeworski views democratic transition as a game in which the relevant actors are hardliners and reformers within the authoritarian regime and moderates and radicals in oppositions to the authoritarian regime. Extrication of the authoritarian regime can only occur if a pact is formed between the reformers and the moderates. The reformers negotiate consent with the hardliners and the moderates control the radicals. In this process of negotiation, hardliners are induced to go along with reformers and radicals are discouraged from attempting to extract greater concessions from the incumbent regime. 19 Although at first sight the dynamic seems very simple, it is, indeed, quite complex. Perhaps the complexity of the negotiation dynamic can best be explained in Przeworski s words: If Reformers are a viable interlocutor for the Moderates only when they can control or deliver the Hardliners, Moderates have no political control unless they can restrain the Radicals. As Reformers must negotiate a deal acceptable to Hardliners, Moderates must deliver terms tolerable for Radical. And if they cannot obtain such terms from Reformers, their only solution is to leave enough power in the hands of the apparatus of repression to intimidate the Radicals. On the other hand Moderates need Radicals to be able to put pressure on the Reformers; on the other hand, Moderates fear that Radicals will not consent to the deal they work out with reformers. 20 Figure 1 shows the potential outcomes of this negotiation dynamic. Hardliners Radicals Authoritarian regime survives in old form Reformers Authoritarian regime holds with concessions Democracy without guarantees Democracy with guarantees 18 Ibid., p. 117. Also note that the process of extrication is what Huntington simply calls transformation. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 114. 19 Przeworski, pp. 117-118. 20 Przeworski, pp. 118-119. 6

Moderates (opposition) Figure 1 This dynamic involves strategic choices on the part of both reformers and moderates. Reformers must choose to either remain in alliance with the authoritarian regime or seek democratic alliances with the moderates. While moderates can seek the entire destruction of the political forces represented by the authoritarian elite by allying with the radicals or they can seek to ally with the reformers. 21 However, only one choice for each of them can lead to a consolidated democracy. It is the failure of the Turkish political elite to make the necessary choices that lead to a consolidated democracy that is the focus of the current research. Theory and Method The current research will use the elite actor-centered approach, while taking into consideration the fact that actors make decisions within particular historic context and within the constraints of this context. The model used in the current research is a slightly altered version of Przeworski s Game of Transition as outlined above. The goal of this research is to test Turkey s multiple breakdowns and subsequent transitions against Przeworski s elite actor centered model of transition. See Figure 2 for Turkey s game of transition. 21 Ibid. 7

Hardliners (state elite) Moderates (opposition) Radicals (opposition) Breakdown of Democracy/ Authoritarian regime Electoral Democracy without guarantees (unstable) Figure 2 22 1 Reformers Hybrid Democracy/ State elite remain in power with concessions 2 Liberal Democracy with guarantees 4 Each breakdown/transition is tested against Przeworski s model and the factors leading to each breakdown are compared to see if there are consistent patterns in Turkey s failure to consolidate democracy. Although Turkey is the main focus and a unique and interesting case in its own right, references are made to South American countries for comparative purposes. Many South American countries share similarities with Turkey. First and foremost, several South American countries, at least in the past, were protected democracies. 23 A protected democracy is one in which the military has a high degree of autonomy because the state is a national security state due to some internal security threat. Threats to internal security in South America were typically leftist/communist in nature. Turkey is also a national security state with a high level of military autonomy. Turkey s internal security threats are primarily the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. However, both left wing and right wing groups have been 22 Transition/Breakdown model adapted from Przeworski, p. 117. 8

a threat in the past. However, the main focus of the current research will be to compare the individual Turkish transitions using Przeworski s elite transition model as a guide. Case Study The discussion of Turkey s attempts at establishing democracy will start with the role of the state centered ideology and the military. This section of society, as represented by cell # 1 in the transition dynamic, has been a constant source of power regardless of electoral outcomes. Next, the study will address each one of Turkey breakdowns in democracy and analyze them against the Przeworski elite transition model. Turkey provides an interesting test for Przeworski s game of transition model because of its several breakdowns in democracy. The model shows what is necessary for democracy to consolidate and, therefore, provides insight regarding the features of the Turkish political system that are lacking and have caused it to breakdown so many times. As discussed earlier, transitions toward democracy occur in two phases. It is the second transition, which involves consolidating democracy, that is the primary focus of the paper. Any discussion of Turkish politics needs to consider the role of the state elite/military and the political elite. The state elite is comprised of the military, senior government official and military officers. These actors view themselves as protectors of the official state ideology republicanism, nationalism, etatism, and reformism. 24 The state elite believes in a state-centered rational democracy. While the political elite, on 23 For a detailed description of protected democracies in Latin America see Brian Loveman, Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 36 (Summer 1994), 105-189. 24 Metin Heper, Consolidationg Turkish Democracy, Journal of Democracy 3 (April 1992), 6. 9

the other hand, see themselves as representatives of the people and are thus at odds with the state elite. 25 The role of the state is of paramount importance to the study of Turkish politics. The Turkish republic formed in tumultuous times. The Ottomans had fought a war of independence against the European powers, who were trying to divide Turkey. Shortly thereafter there was a war of independence against the Ottoman regime. During the same era, ethnic nationalism further threatened the state. Elites, therefore, worked toward integration and in doing so, smothered the rights of a large portion of the population. 26 The founders of the republic set goals of Westernization, modernization and most importantly secularization. An important element to this process was democracy. However the founders of the republic believed in a rational democracy that had no place for Islam in politics. 27 The role of the military in the state elite cannot be under-stated; they are a powerful influence in the shaping of public policy. Since the Ottoman period, Turkey s military have been ardent guardians of the state and a major goal of theirs became safeguarding the democratic-secular state. 28 In fact, they have garnered wide support for their interventions and are seen by many as guardians of the state and, in some ways, seen as a necessary to protect the nation form itself. 29 The military view themselves as above the state and above the political parties as protectors of the national will, as determined 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Metin Heper & Aylin Guney, The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience, Armed Forces and Society 26 (Summer 2000), 636. 28 Ibid. 29 George Harris, Turkey Coping with Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 154. 10

by their conception of the state-centric ideology. Some have even described the military as a separate social class or even a state within a state. 30 The first two attempts at forming a multiparty system in Turkey failed. Attempts to form opposition parties came from within the only existing party, the Republican Peoples Party (RPP). The state elite initiated the new parties in 1924 and again in 1930 with the approval of the President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. As soon as the parties began to speak publicly, they drew wide spread political support, and it became clear that people were dissatisfied with the governments secularist and economic policies. 31 In both cases, the parties were promptly disbanded. In terms of the transition model, the state elite/hardliners anticipated this as a reform movement that would keep power in the hands of the state elite (the RPP). In other words, they anticipated a move from cell # 1 to cell # 2 in the transition game outlined above. When they saw that moderates and radicals were aligning, they disbanded the parties within a few months. The next attempt to transition toward a multiparty democracy occurred in 1945. The president of Turkey, Ismet Inonu, agreed to allow a multiparty system and opposition parties quickly formed. Again popular support for the major opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), developed rapidly and relations between the RPP and the DP became strained. 32 Initially the DP was a moderate party and with their 1950 electoral victory there was a smooth transition of power. The DP received 53% of the popular 30 William Hale, The Turkish Army in Politics, 1960-73, in eds. Andrew Finkle & Nukhet Sirma, Turkish State, Turkish Society (London: Routledge, 1990), 54. 31 Arif T. Payasioglu, Political Leadership and Political Parties, in eds. Robert Ward & Dankwart Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 420. 32 Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder: Lynne Rynner, 2000), 15. 11

vote while the RPP received 39% of the popular vote. 33 Because of the design of Turkey s voting and parliamentary system, this was a landslide victory of the DP. They received 416 seats out of the 487 Assembly seats in the parliament. 34 The victory of the DP was unexpected and tensions rose between the RPP and the DP when the DP began to antagonize urban workers, intellectuals and other supporters of the RPP. When RPP began to gain greater support because of the DP poor performance, the DP regime became very oppressive and began to limit freedom. 35 Again the state elite anticipated that the transition to a multiparty system as transition by reform and did not anticipate loosing a significant amount of power. They essentially thought they were making a lateral move in the game of transition scheme as outlined above, a move from cell #1 to cell # 2. Unfortunately, voting patterns did not conform to the hopes of the state elite. The first coup A variety of factors lead the military to seize power in the first coup. The DP drew wide support solely because it was an opposition party to RPP. This support came from many sectors of society including the business class who resented the state managed economy and the religious who resented the RPP s militant secularism. 36 Another problem from the state elites perspectives was that they lost economic and political power during the era of the DP. Furthermore, a large economic crisis developed that brought students into the streets to protest the government s economic policies. As voices of dissent grew louder 33 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.genel_secimler 34 Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963), 7. 35 Dankwart Rustow, Turkey s Travails, Foreign Affairs 49 (Fall 1979), 92. 36 Weiker, pp. 7-8. 12

the DP increasingly turned away from political liberalism and increasingly toward authoritarianism. 37 When the DP was confronted with opposition from the RPP, the DP responded with legislation that restricted freedom of speech and the press. 38 The economic crisis and restricted freedoms led to violent student protests against the DP and the DP tried to use the military to quell protests. When the DP leader asked the Military to step in on behalf of the government against the students, a core of military officers saw this as the final straw. In others words, it looked as though the DP was reverting back to a pre-1950 type of one-party authoritarian rule. 39 The DP government was overthrown by a group of military officers because they were viewed as a threat to the state/national interest. A primary fear was the DP s appeal to those interested in bringing Islam into politics. Again, the state elite initially envisioned making a lateral move by ceding more power to the RPP (cell # 2). However, an alliance between moderates and radicals produced an unstable government as cell # 3 illustrates. As the opposition radicalized even further, the hardliners took control, as cell # 1 in the transition model predicts. Rather than compromising with the reformers who were allied with the state elite, the DP sought allies with radical political groups. This produced instability, as the transitions model predicts in cell #3, and the failure of Turkey s first attempt at democracy. It is interesting to note that in both the pre 1950 attempts to form a multiparty system and in the one that resulted in the 1960 coup, the elite attempted to make a lateral move in the transitional dynamic model to cell # 2. The first two times (pre-1950) the state elite saw 37 Cem Erogul, The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-1971, Irvin Schick & Ertgrul Tonak eds. Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987), 112. 38 Ben Lombardi, Turkey The Return of the Reluctant Generals? Political Science Quarterly 112 (April 1997), 204. 13

that a lateral move in the transition dynamic was not going to happen and stopped the initiative before it was too late. The third time produced the unstable events that led to the coup of 1960. This attempt to make a lateral move on the transition dynamic may be analogous to Pinochet s attempt to stay in power in 1988. He organized a plebiscite to approve his continued tenure as president and to his surprise he lost. 40 In some sense, by organizing a plebiscite he wanted to appear as a reformer or at least change status from dictator to presidents. However, the electorate did not meet his expectations. More important than this similarity is how Pinochet s loss came about. To defeat Pinochet victory required political actors to moderate their ideological differences. Chile had learned from the mistakes of their past hyper-polarization and were able to unify to oust Pinochet. Pinochet was, however able to control the system and secure himself substantial exit guarantees. More will be said below about moderating political ideologies below. It is interesting to note that once the DP came into power, they radicalized and in some sense acted like an opposition party even when they were in power. This was also the case in Argentina where once the opposition (UCR) party was elected, it continued to use the same antagonistic tactics that helped it win the election. This inflexible stance was one of the factors that led to the breakdown in Argentina s democratic government in 1930. 41 Peter Smith suggests two reasons for the UCR s behavior in the Argentina case. First, the long experience of the UCR as the out group created a firm oppositionist 39 Frank Tachau & Metin Heper, p. 21. 40 Arturo Valenzuela, Chile: Origins of Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy, in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn et al. eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin American Second Edition (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1999), 193. 41 Peter Smith, The Breakdown of Democracy in Argentina, 1916-1930, in Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes in Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 22 14

mentality. Second, the new political opportunity offered unprecedented power and the party professionals were unwilling to share this power. 42 These factors could have been responsible for the DP opposition in Turkey as well. Although it is unlikely that the DP s original leaders initially had such a strong oppositionists mentality as they were born from the traditional state elite tradition. However, their constituent base quite likely had an opposition mentality because they were excluded from politics for so long, which may explain their rapid success as an opposition party. The opposition mentality of the masses probably radicalized the leaders of the DP. In terms of the second factor, the newfound power of the DP leaders was probably something they did not want to relinquish. In 1960, the military assumed a guardian role of the state in which it tried to reestablish and preserve the status quo. 43 The coup can be characterized as what Samuel Huntington calls reformist. The junta did not only clean up the government, but also made reforms in political, social, and economic structure. 44 Among these reforms was a new constitution designed to prevent the circumstance that led to the 1960 coup from happening again. Perhaps the most significant change was the development of a National Security Council (NSC). The NSC gave the military a wide range of powers and institutionalized its role in politics. It is of note that the military did not set up a praetorian state in which they used the state for personal entrepreneurship, as was the case in many South American countries. The military regime did, however, establish a much wider base of 42 Ibid. 43 The status quo as outlined by the state-centered ideology, Ibid. 44 Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns in Military Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 32-34 15

power through the exit guarantees they created for themselves. 45 These guarantees included a broad mandate to influence all matters concerning security through the NSC. 46 The NSC interrupts security matters quite broadly and, therefore, has a great deal of influence in government. The constitution created by the junta represented a pact between the military (state elite) and reformers in the RPP. 47 The 1961 constitution established a legal framework that had never been seen in Turkey. Its aim was to restrain the state political institutions and safeguard the basic rights of the people. It broke down the power of the state into legislative (bicameral parliament), executive, and judiciary branches each with independence form one another. 48 It also provided unprecedented political freedoms for the citizens by allowing more freedom of speech, religion, and the formation of unions. It is not uncommon for authoritarian regimes to make liberalizing concessions to pacify and co-opt some of those who were opposed to the regime. 49 These new freedoms in civil society caused a rapid transformation in politics, a transformation the military guardians did not anticipate. Again the plan of the authoritarian regime upon re-establishing democracy was to make a lateral move in the transition dynamic, from cell # 1 to cell # 2. However, the electoral results did not produce the desired outcome. The RPP received only 36.7% of the vote. The DP s successor parties, the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party 45 Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder: Lynne Rynner, 2000), 116. 46 George Harris, The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s, in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 183. 47 Kemal Karpat, p. 142. 48 Cem Erogul, p. 131. 49 Linz, p. 150. 16

(NTP) received 34.7% and 13% of the vote respectively. 50 Since these were the successor parties to the DP, the voters essentially put back into power the party that was ousted by the military in preceding year. 51 This again was not the landslide victory the state elite were hoping for because the JP and the NTP technically had the ability to from a coalition government. The state/military elite, however, did not allow this coalition to occur. The Coup by Memorandum The first parliamentary cabinet after the restoration of civilian rule was established with a forced coalition between the RPP and the DP. The state elite would not let the two successor parties of the DP form a government themselves until the following election. 52 The RPP/JP coalition was short lived and was followed by several coalitions between the RPP and the minority parties. However, by 1965 the JP had over 50% of the popular vote and was able to form the government. During this era splits occurred within the RPP. Those who were more oriented toward the center split off and formed the Reliance Party. While the RPP redrafted their platform to appeal to the more radical left, hoping this would help bring a parliamentary majority in the following election. By 1968 the new multiparty system was out of control. The left became increasing fragmented and radicalized. The right regrouped to counterattack the rise of leftist radicalism and in turn became radical themselves. Violent clashes began to occur between right wing and left wing groups. The government (JP) took an aggressive stance 50 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri. 51 Kemal Karpat, p. 143. 52 Ibid. 17

toward the left and jeopardized the new era of pluralism by taking sides with the right. 53 Political/ideological divisions were wide spread even inside the parliamentary majority party, making the government impotent to mitigate the crisis. 54 In 1971, again the military went beyond its background role and issued a communiqué to the JP which threatened a coup if the government could not put an end to anarchy, which had arose from their impotency. 55 Once again the military s goal was to preserve the secular statist regime. The cabinet was dissolved and the government managed to prevent a full coup. However, instability within the government remained and four separate prime ministers tried to establish a cabinet between the time of the military communiqué and the scheduled 1973 elections. 56 By 1973 the military agreed on a bipartisan caretaker government to oversee the upcoming election and democracy was restored. The RPP received 33% of the vote and the JP 29% of the vote. The game of transition model does not explain this breakdown as well as the previous case. In this case, both the JP and RPP moved toward the right and left respectively. The RPP was increasingly isolating itself from the state elite. At the same time, the moderates and the radical right opposed the state elite, which created the instability that cell # 3 predicts. Furthermore, achieving some sort of negotiated pact to move toward the consolidation was not possible with the fractionalized relationship of the right and the left. Although Przeworski s model does not account for the multidimensional dynamic exactly as they occur in the real world of Turkey, it still retains a predictive benefit. Again, Turkey s politicians failed to establish a viable center 53 Ibid., p. 134. 54 Ibid., p. 136. 55 Dankwart Rustow, Turkey Travails, p. 90. 18

by which they could negotiate public policy decisions and work toward consolidation of democracy. 57 The Third Coup The RPP under the leadership of Bulent Ecivet moved even further to the left and began to ally itself with groups that were against the state centered tradition of the RPP. 58 This was a total shift in the state-centered ideology and a move toward creating a socialist party. 59 The RPP began to push what they called a socialist democratic agenda. While the main opposition party had a conservative market oriented agenda. With this genuine ideological shift of the RPP both parties began to look toward the periphery to find allies. In doing so, they allied themselves with radical groups. By allying itself with radical groups, the RPP completely alienated itself from the military as they saw these leftist groups as a threat to national security. As the left and right ideologies shifted away form the center, polarization between the political parties increased. 60 The formation of the Nationalist Front government in 1975 as coalition between the supposedly center right AP government and two other radical parties caused further tension between the political parties and the military. 61 The coalition government formed 56 Mehmet Ali Birand, The General s Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980 (London: Brassey s Defense Publishers, 1987), 15. 57 This phenomenon is not uncommon. Deep-rooted polarization between political parties is common factor leading to the breakdown of democratically elected governments and has occurred in Latin America on numerous occasions. Chile in 1973 and Venezuela in 1948 are two examples 58 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, p. 117. 59 Karpat, p. 147. 60 Heper, p. 118. 61 Ibid., p. 119. 19

afterwards by the RPP and minority parties was equally as disastrous. 62 The polarization characterized by the political sector spread to other sectors as well including, the teaching profession, security services, and the civil bureaucracy. 63 Waves of violence broke out against both extremists and moderates. The continuing violence polarized political divisions even further. 64 The violence and the fragmentation in Turkish politics and Turkish society for that matter, led to the military second overt coup in twenty years and its third intervention in democracy. The threat posed from both Islamic fundamentalism and radical violence was of paramount concern. The events leading up to the coup were complex. As stated with the previous transition case, the multi-dimensional aspects of Turkish politics are not specifically accounted for in Przeworski s model. However, the model does predict when a stable democracy will develop, and Turkey, again, did not meet the criteria. The traditional reformers (the RPP) had changed significantly and no longer had a real power base in the state elite. With the radicalization of the RPP, no political parties supported the reformist agenda or the state elite. Rather than the center right and the center left (the moderates and reformers) forming pacts to work out a reasonable political agenda, each aligned themselves with radical elements on the right and left respectively. Although, the transition dynamic does not account for this exact situation, cell # 3 suggests that instability would result from such a combination of occurrences. This intervention was different than the others in that the military was no longer aligned with the RPP, or any other social group for that matter. In fact, there was so much political fragmentation that the military was the only homogeneous group in 62 Karpat, p. 148. 63 Heper, p. 122. 20

society. 65 There was no state elite to align with as they had in the 1960 coup. Rather than creating a new body to run the government, the NSC took control and made governing decisions with little outside consultation. They abolished all of the old political parties in an attempt to limit partisan competition and also reaffirmed the powers of the NSC. The new constitution also restricted freedoms regarding the formation of groups that were allowed under the 1961 constitution. This high level of polarization between parties and within parties has remained. In several elections, five separate parties were able to pass the 10% voting threshold and made it into parliament. This provided for several unstable coalitions. No government had been able to establish a ruling majority in parliament until the most recent election. Furthermore, the military has maintained a high level of autonomy and has continued to influence political decisions behind the scenes, using the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism as their justification. And indeed, internal security was threatened by Kurdish separatism through the late 80s to the late 90s. Discussion When the above cases of democratic breakdown are compared it is observe that Przeworski s model has predictive value for the Turkish case. A couple of patterns emerge. Since the initial development of the multiparty system, the moderates have continually allied themselves with the radicals on the right, most notably religious fundamentalists. Initially, the RPP was consistent in that it allied with the state elite. However, later the RPP changed their party platform and broke off their alignment with 64 Ibid., 21

the state elite. From each breakdown it can also be observed that the lack of ideological consensus prevented the government from keeping order. Each breakdown resulted from a stalemate in parliament due to the inability or political parties to obtain a consensus on how to handle important political crisis, primarily relating to the economy and internal security (Islamic fundamentalism and separatist terrorism). In other words, the left and the right were unable to establish centrist parties in which they could negotiate to solve the emergent political problems. Further complicating the problem were the most radical groups on each side of the spectrum trying to take advantage of the chaos by promoting their own ideological agenda. 66 It appears that the right and the left strived to differentiate themselves in the hopes of gaining some electoral advantage. Perhaps they realized that this rigid differentiation would cause voters to choose sides. And indeed, these competing ideologies polarized Turkish society as well. The polarization and fragmentation is reflected in voting patterns throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 67 A continual intervening variable has been the high degree of military autonomy. Even when the military were not the figureheads of government, they had a high degree of influence in the political process. At times, they did not allow opposition parties to form governing coalitions. They were also able to control the selection of the president. In most cases, they ensured that the president was a former high-ranking military officer. On the other hand, overt military control was short lived and an elected government quickly returned to office. Albeit, not a government free of military constraints. 65 Ahemet Evin, Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980, in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 211. 66 Evin, p. 203. 67 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milletvekili Genel Seçimler. 22

By the 1980 intervention there existed no group that could work to create a consensus by which to govern the state. The situation in Turkey gives support to the elite consensus model of democracy in that it shows how the lack of consensus prohibits progressive change toward a consolidated democracy. As one can see from this case study, Turkey s history supports an elite actor-centered approach to the study of democracy. Furthermore, it shows that Przeworski s model is a useful heuristic by which to view the transition dynamic. In none of the above cases were the political parties able to establish a true center right and center left by which they could effectively govern and establish a consolidated democracy. However, the question still remains, why have the Turkish elite not been able to form governing coalitions that work toward consolidating democracy? The Turkish political elite and the state elite have not developed a political culture conducive to the necessities of democratic governance. The political culture necessary for democratic governance includes: moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation among political elites. 68 Dankwart Rustow lists four conditions that make democracy happen national unity, entrenched and serious conflict, conscious decision to adopt democratic rules and the habituation of these rules. 69 Although Rustow does not refer to these characteristics as political culture, they are indeed features of political culture because they are manifest in reoccurring patterns of behavior. Unfortunately the only one of these characteristics that the Turkish elite seems to have is entrenched and serious conflict. There has not been national unity. Although the 68 Larry Diamond, Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy, in ed. Larry Diamond, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 10. 69 Dankwart Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970), 361. 23

founders of the Republic tried to create unity through the indoctrination of Turkish nationalism and the denial of various ethnic identities, these strategies have failed to develop a national unity. Militant secularism has also been a problem because it is divisive. The conscious adoption of democratic rules has not occurred as can be demonstrated by the willingness of the military to intervene in politics. Needless to say, habituation to the rules of the democratic process has not occurred either. There must be agreement on these rules before they can be adopted. Several South American cases illustrated how the development of a democratic political culture is important to the development of democratic institutions. An example is the Venezuela case, which established democracy in 1958. Although it is not a perfect democracy it has endured for almost 50 years and illustrates how the institutionalization of the political culture is necessary for democracy. In Venezuela, it was widely recognized that political factionalism led to the military take over of 1948. 70 To prevent this form happening again, political elites made a conscious decision to reduce inter-party tensions by signing a pact. The pact recognized the legitimacy of competing parties, depersonalized conflict, and called for the elimination of violence. The pact was solidified by the relevant parties with an agreement to form a coalition government regardless of the outcome of the election. 71 Venezuela maintained a stable level of democracy until recently. As discussed early in the paper, Chile was also able to overcome political polarization through establishing consensus. 70 Daniel Levine, Venezuela since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics, in Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes in Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 93. 71 Ibid. 24

The answer to the previous question begs yet another question. Why hasn t Turkey developed a political culture more conducive to democracy? This question is more difficult to answer than the previous question. This is perhaps due to the types of regimes transitions that have occurred in each case. From the beginning, reform came from above. This was the case with all transition to democracy. However, when those from above did not like the outcome they took control and tried again after altering the rules by amending the constitution or creating a new one. There was never a rupture in the traditional power structure. The state elites always remained the ultimate arbitrator of power. On the other hand, in cases where there is reform through rupture, transitions seem to happen more smoothly. 72 This was the case for Argentina in 1982. The agenda of the transition was set by the anti-incumbent elites. Without competition from the incumbent military regime, the two main opposition parties were able to face-off in an election the following year. The transition was brief and relatively uncomplicated. 73 This type of transition is smoother and shorter because the pre-existing power base is eliminated. The lack of a bottom up or a transition from outside the traditional elite structure may explain why Turkey has not developed a political culture more suitable for democracy. The elite version of democracy was always imposed from above and this is inherently an undemocratic method of achieving democracy. The state elite maintained too much power in each case for a true democracy to develop. In order to maintain this power, they often legitimized their power by emphasizing internal security threats, specifically Kurdish Separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. 72 Gerardo Munck & Carol Leff, Modes of Transition and Democratization: South American and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Comparative Politics 29 (April, 1997), 353-354. 25

Postscript The recent election of November 2003 gives hope for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. A party that openly affiliates itself with Islam (the Justice and development Party or JPD) was elected as the majority party in parliament. The critical issues were no longer Islamic fundamentalism or Kurdish terrorism. Rather the most pressing issue was the faltering Turkish economy. 74 From the election results we can assume that Turkish voters are fatigued by the impotent governments of the past and are willing to take a chance to the JDP. The voters have elected a party that gives every indication that it is a progressive center right party. 75 The JDP won public confidence with a synthesis of conservative and liberal elements. First, they promote a democratic, transparent and accountable state. Second, they have a free market approach that is regulated enough to keep it honest and prevent destructive side effects. And third, they promote social justice. 76 Furthermore, rather than a radical Islamic party they use their religious principle as a guide rather than inflexible dogma and have been compare to conservatives in the United States. 77 Another important characteristic of the party is that they appear to exhibit democratic processes in their party deliberations. This is highly uncharacteristic of Turkish political parties. The party was only organized in 2001, yet was able to garner such a large percentage of the 73 Ibid., p, 354. 74 Ziya Onis & E. Fuat Keyman, A New Path Emerges, Journal of Democracy 14 (April 2003), 96. 75 Metin Heper, Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayip Erdogan, Muslim World 93 (April 2003), 158. 76 Onis & Keyman, pp. 100-101. 77 Ahmet Insel, The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, South Atlantic Quarterly 102. (Spring/Summer 2003), 302. 26

vote may indicate that they represent a bottom up movement. 78 As suggested earlier the lack of a bottom up element to Turkish democracy has likely hindered its progress. The AKP party may provide an impetus for change in this area. Other recent developments also offer Turkey greater prospects for democratic consolidation. Most importantly, Turkey s bid to join the EU has been a catalyst for a number of changes related to democratic freedoms. In 2001, thirty-four amendments were made to the Turkish constitution allowing unprecedented freedom for minority groups. In addition, the military may be showing signs that it is more reluctant to intervene in politics. A few years ago the military would have been much more reluctant to let the JDP establish a majority in parliament because of its religious underpinnings. Turkey s relationship with the EU will also require it end its dual government (ie. the military and the elected government paradox). 78 M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258. 27