INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE LOCAL HARD DRUG MARKET. TOWARDS A REGULATED HARD DRUG TRADE? THE CASE OF THE CITY OF ROTTERDAM

2004 BY THE JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE LOCAL HARD DRUG MARKET. TOWARDS A REGULATED HARD DRUG TRADE? THE CASE OF THE CITY OF ROTTERDAM DIKE VAN DE MHEEN, PAUL GRUTER The aim of interventions on the supply side of the hard drug market is to diminish or regulate the unwanted effects of the hard drug trade, with respect to both public health and safety. However, initiatives for the regulation of the hard drug trade cannot be pursued at the international governmental level because the sale of hard drugs is forbidden by law. Therefore, what remains are initiatives at the local level. In a case study of the City of Rotterdam, an inventory is made of interventions on the supply side. It describes interventions initiated by both governmental and private organizations, including the closure of certain dealing addresses, public transport and other general regulations, reporting centers for drug-related nuisance (i.e., local government), and self-regulation of dealing addresses and drug consumption/selling rooms (i.e., private interventions). The argument here is for a different approach of (dosed) suppression and regulation (by public and private interventions). In this approach, the use of quality criteria for dealing addresses and the spread of dealing addresses are important instruments. INTRODUCTION Hard drug related nuisance seems to be a continuing phenomenon. Therefore, the question arises whether we should accept the use and trade of hard drugs as an inevitable reality and seek solutions for hard drug related problems by interventions Dike van de Mheen, Ph.D., worked from 1987 to 1988 as researcher with the Rotterdam Area Health Authority, followed by an appointment as researcher and assistant professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (Department of Public Health) until 1999. During 1998/1999 she was senior adviser at the Rotterdam Area Health Authority. Since 1999, she has been Director of Research and Education at the Addiction Research Institute Rotterdam. Paul Gruter worked as a policy researcher for the City of the Hague from 1993 to 2000, specializing in juvenile delinquency and drug-related crime. Currently he is a part-time fellow at the Addiction Research Institute Rotterdam. Since fall 2001, his Ph.D. research has focused on subgroups and subcultures of cocaine dealers and the structure of cocaine markets in Rotterdam. JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES 0022-0426/04/01 145-162

VAN DE MHEEN, GRUTER on the supply side. The aim of interventions on the supply side is to diminish or to regulate the unwanted effects of the hard drug trade, with respect to both public health and safety. In this paper we explore possibilities for interventions on the supply side of the local hard drug market, using the City of Rotterdam as a case study. A SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE POLICIES The fundamental principle underlying drug policy is the assumption that controlled substances cause harm or have the potential to cause harm to society (Schmidt & Paul, 1993). In the Netherlands, as well as in Britain and the United States, for example, some authors conclude that drug control policies are should be based on the perceived need to disrupt the connection between drugs and crime (MacCoun, Kahan, Gillispie & Rhee, 1993; Dorn & South, 1990). It is hypothesized that a reduction of criminalization causes a reduction in drug-related nuisance. It is argued that drug control policies would be more effective if more attention were paid to the ways in which an irrepressible market may be shaped into more or less harmful forms by legislation and other policy strategies. The discussion on drug policy is polarized between the drug warriors (who advocate prohibition, stricter controls, and punishment) and the legalizers. MacCoun et al. distinguish three positions: (1) prohibition advocates maintaining the status quo of strict legal sanctions against currently illicit drugs; (2) decriminalization largely advocates maintaining the legal ban on the sale of drugs, but also advocates a reduction in criminal sanctions for possession of small amounts; (3) legalization advocates to legalise the sale and use of some currently illicit drugs, coupled with some form of governmental regulations. However, a wide variety of alternative policies and modifications to these positions has not, yet been addressed in the international debate (Kleiman, 1998; MacCoun, Reuter, & Schelling, 1996). This paper does not intend to give a complete overview of all possible alternative policies presented in the literature; MacCoun et al. (1996) have provided examples of alternative policies between the extreme positions of prohibition on the one hand and legalization on the other. DUTCH DRUG POLICY Dutch drug policy (for an extensive description see de Kort, 1995; Korf, Riper, & Bullington, 1999; de Kort & Cramer, 1999) is based on the Opium Act (Openbaar Ministerie, 1976). This law distinguishes between different kinds of drugs in order to ensure a separation of the markets: i.e., substances are classified as hemp (cannabis products) or drugs of unacceptable risk (other drugs). Because the primary goal is public health, there is much emphasis on care. The enforcement of 146 JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES

INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE LOCAL HARD DRUG MARKET criminal law is reserved for hard drug users and addicted persons. Dutch drug policy has two important focal points: monitoring of public health and combating international trade. Characteristics of this policy are tolerance and harm reduction; these concepts are defined below. Dutch criminal law includes the expediency principle. This principle allows the public prosecutor to refrain from the prosecution of criminal acts when such expedience serves the public interest, without first asking permission of the courts (Korf, 2002). In the Netherlands drug use is not seen as a high priority for suppression. The expedience principle implies that the risks of drug use for public health have to be balanced against the risk for public health arising from drug trade and subsequent criminalization. As mentioned above, in the Netherlands cannabis and hard drug (heroin/cocaine) markets are separated. Cannabis is mainly distributed via the socalled coffee shops, where access and availability is relatively high. Cocaine and heroin are distributed via house dealers, street dealers, and disco dealers (mainly cocaine), and recently there has been an increase in dealing via mobile phone (Barendregt, Lempens, & van de Mheen, 2000). Because there is little discussion on suppression or regulation of the cannabis market, this paper will focus on the hard drug market only. POLICY OF TOLERANCE The basic principle of the Dutch policy of tolerance is certainly not the idea that drug use is normal ; on the contrary, many see drug use as an evil within society. The idea of tolerance acknowledges that it is impossible to totally abandon this evil ; an attempt to do so may even be countereffective. Therefore, it is better to leave some room for flexibility, which can still be controlled (van Ree, 2002). Priority is given to combatting international trade of both soft and hard drugs. Use of drugs is not necessarily a crime. However, under Dutch law possession of drugs remains prohibited and is punishable. The policy of tolerance of the hard drug trade, however, has not been very successful with respect to reducing nuisance and criminality. Since 1994 26 Dutch municipalities have received over $51 million to support 120 projects aimed at reducing nuisance and criminality, but with disappointing results. One conclusion could be that regulation of the supply side is a necessary addition to tolerance of drug use: i.e., if use is tolerated, then trade must also be allowed (Boumans, 1999). Sometimes this does happen, for example, in Rotterdam. But we will show that, in the case of Rotterdam, regulation of the supply side is a complex issue, because the sale of hard drugs is forbidden by law. This means that initiatives for experiments in the regulation of the hard drug trade cannot officially be taken by governmental WINTER 2004 147

VAN DE MHEEN, GRUTER organizations. Thus, in this situation, we are left with initiatives taken by private organizations. HARM REDUCTION Harm reduction can be described as types of care aimed primarily at limiting damage to health and improving the living conditions of addicts. Care is not aimed solely at kicking the habit. Activities are primarily focused on reception, care, and societal integration of drug users. Activities in this context are the distribution of methadone, clean needles, food, and shelter (Trimbos Institute, 1996). The concept of harm reduction is, however, interpreted in different ways (Maris, 1999). It has never been defined by an (international) official body, and an explicit description is lacking (Fischer, Kendall, Rehm, & Room, 1997). Contrasting harm reduction with the more conventional approach of use reduction may help to explain the concept (Wodak, 1999; Caulkins & Reuter, 1997). Use reduction is aimed at prevalence, quantity, or expenditures, whereas harm reduction can be aimed at the harm entailed by both users and nonusers or solely at the harm entailed by nonusers, that is, nuisance reduction (Caulkins & Reuter, 1997). NATIONAL POLICIES Interventions on the supply side are more a question of local policy than of national policy. A state policy of prohibition on the consumption of a substance allows very few possibilities for different forms of regulation, especially when state policy is part of an international system of treaties. The local level is the policy arena in which changes in practice are made. Even so, policy at the local level remains imbedded in national policies, and, thus, international policy sets the limits for local policy. A CASE STUDY: THE CITY OF ROTTERDAM The city of Rotterdam is a trendsetter in the Netherlands with respect to innovative drug policy. The municipal strategy Safe and Clean (GGD Rotterdam e.o., 1998) presents a policy that acknowledges the complexity of the drugs problem. The Municipal Health Authority initiated this strategy in close collaboration with the addiction and social care organizations, police, judicature, citizens organizations, housing corporations, and pressure groups. The central aims are monitoring public health and reduction of drug-related nuisance. Priority is given to those neighborhoods confronted with the most criminality and drug-related nuisance. The Safe and Clean strategy concerning the hard drug problem comprises three main goals: 148 JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES

INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE LOCAL HARD DRUG MARKET the establishment of housing projects for hard drug users the establishment of hard drug consumption rooms interventions on the supply side. One of the basic principles of Safe and Clean is the concept of diffusion (Spijkerman, van de Mheen & van den Eijnden, 2000). In this strategy one solution for drug-related nuisance is to focus on drug-related problems throughout the city instead of concentrating it in specific neighbourhoods. In a quantitative study in the United States Saxe, Kadushin, Beveridge et al (2001) found that the most disadvantaged neighborhoods do have the most visible drug problems, but the drug use of their inhabitants is about equal to that in other communities. In Rotterdam, for example, about 65% of the users who buy their drugs in the neighborhoods where most dealing addresses are located do not actually live there (Source: Reporting centre, Drug-Related Nuisance Neighbourhood Delfshaven ). Visibility itself may promote a cognitive bias in the public opinion: visible drug use is falsely equated with actual drug use. The distinction between drug use among residents in urban disadvantaged neighborhoods and the perception of nuisance from substance use justifies a community-based drug policy that takes into account the broader drug market (drug sales and related crime) served by those neighborhoods. The market establishes itself in disadvantaged communities partly because of the low social capital in these neighborhoods; the drug economy further erodes that social capital (Saxe et al., 2001). This could be an argument in favor of a local policy of diffusion. This means that in the Safe and Clean strategy, users who are regularly in specific neighborhoods will be housed there and have possibilities to use drugs in those neighborhoods. Approaching the illegal drug trade from a societal perspective is a pioneering strategy. Public support is the first, and probably the most important, condition for further development of a drug policy in which drug dealers can play a constructive role. This pragmatic approach may positively influence public health, both for drug users and for citizens of those neighborhoods experiencing drug-related nuisance (Vermeulen & Barendregt, 2000). In the following case study, an inventory was made of the interventions on the supply side of the hard drug market in Rotterdam. First we must define the concept intervention. An overview of interventions on the supply side during the last 10 years shows that the public prosecutor, local government, and police are the most important participants. In addition, private interventions were also found. All initiatives of these parties to influence the supply side of the local drug market can be distinguished as either direct interventions or interventions that are not explicitly aimed at the supply side, but by their nature indirectly influence the supply side. WINTER 2004 149

VAN DE MHEEN, GRUTER Direct interventions aim to reduce the unwanted effects (nuisance, criminality) of drug supply for persons other than the drug users themselves. Interventions such as closing dealing addresses and combating hard drug trade in public spaces directly influence the supply side of the local drug market, as does the prosecution of hard drug dealers. This is in contrast to measures that are primarily aimed at reducing harm to users, for example, the prescription of methadone or the controlled medical prescription of heroin. These latter measures can influence the supply side, although that is not their main intention. This paper will not address these indirect interventions. Because the role of addiction and social care is seen as indirect intervention, this is also not discussed here. In summary, interventions on the supply side of the local drug market can be defined as follows: measures taken by local governmental or private organizations or individuals that are explicitly aimed (so called direct interventions) at influencing the supply side of the local hard drug market. The aim of these interventions is to diminish or to regulate the unwanted effects of the hard drug trade, with respect to both public health and safety. Methods used in this study include a review of the literature and policy documents and semi-structured telephone interviews with local key informants. Key informants were representatives of the reporting centers for drugs-related nuisance, police officers, the manager of the Rotterdam Public Transport, and officials of the Rotterdam Area Health Authority. Informants were selected from our contacts within the Drug Monitoring System (van de Mheen, 2000). The Drug Monitoring System (DMS) is a localized research system continuously collecting both quantitative and qualitative data about drugs, drug users, and related issues. The continuous character of the monitor and the integration of different research methods strengthen the study above the level of just an ad hoc measurement. Data for the DMS is mainly collected by means of a biannual drug user survey, interviews with key informants, and reports from community fieldworkers. Fifteen key informants were interviewed. The response rate was 100%. Interviews were semistructured, using a checklist concerning the kind of interventions on the supply side, their effectiveness, and the relevant participants. The average time of the interviews was 45 minutes. Data were tape recorded or summarized by written description and then analyzed. The paper concludes with ideas for future policy concerning interventions on the supply side of the hard drug market. THE ROTTERDAM CASE STUDY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE HARD DRUG MARKET IN ROTTERDAM In the 1980s, Platform Zero was opened next to the Rotterdam Central railway station. This open-air location functioned as a meeting place for hard drug users 150 JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES

INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE LOCAL HARD DRUG MARKET and dealers and was tolerated by the police. At that time the sale of base coke became important and led to an enormous increase in the number of visitors, both users and dealers. In 1994 Platform Zero was closed, ironically because of its own success. The closure of Platform Zero meant that former visitors spread to other parts of the city. Some users went back to the neighborhoods where they lived, but other users followed the dealers (Blanken & Barendregt, 1998). In reaction to the increase of users and dealers throughout the city and the related nuisance, the police started Operation Victor. Drug users were arrested, and dealing addresses were closed. Because dealers felt more vulnerable, they tended to conceal their trade from the outside world, making it more difficult for professional field workers to gain access to dealing addresses. The number of dealers that supported the projects for needle exchange also decreased (Barendregt, 2000). During this same period, however, policy makers began to realize that hustling the dealers and hard drug users would not decrease nuisance, but merely displace it. In 1995 (before the strategy of Safe and Clean ), the Municipal Health Authority organized a collaborative meeting for the police, drug users, dealers, addiction and social care organizations, and citizens organizations. All parties agreed that a small, regulated drug trade would support the wellbeing of drug users and minimize nuisance to the local inhabitants (Blanken & Hendriks, 1996). In subsequent years, several dealers opened dealing addresses that fulfilled the criteria formulated at the meeting with respect to a small-scale, quiet facility with a consumption room inside and the possibility for needle exchange. Following a change in municipal law in 1997, the local government was granted a new juridical instrument to close down dealing addresses that created nuisances. In accordance with this law, some dozens of dealing addresses were closed. As a result, however, street dealing got a new impulse (Barendregt, Blanken, & Zuidmulder, 2000), showing that marketing in the hard drug trade seems to survive these kinds of repressive measures. A recent development in the supply and trade of hard drugs is the increase in the use of mobile telephones (Barendregt et al.). Since 1998 Rotterdam drug policy has been incorporated in the Safe and Clean program. In order to achieve a spread of small drug scenes over the city, consumption rooms were planned in different neighborhoods. Rotterdam currently has seven hard drug consumption rooms, where users are allowed to consume hard drugs, but not to deal drugs. In addition some informal consumption rooms were founded, initiated not by the local government, but by the dealers themselves. Access to both types of consumption rooms is for pass holders only; about 475 persons visit these rooms each day (Barendregt, van der Poel, van de Mheen, 2002). Passes are distributed among homeless drug users. Two consumption rooms are for females only, in one consumption room drug users must participate in some activity, for WINTER 2004 151

VAN DE MHEEN, GRUTER example, selling the Street newspaper, bible study, or work for Topscore (a temporary employment agency for and organized by drug users). In addition, hard drugs may be consumed at some dealing addresses; however, no reliable data are available as to how many of these addresses exist. In 2002, the drug policy became more suppressive as the political climate became more conservative (Rotterdams Dagblad, 2002). Until now, the Rotterdam drugs policy maintained a reasonable balance between public health and public order. At the moment, however, the increasing focus on drug-related nuisance increases the risk of disturbing that balance. INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE HARD DRUG MARKET IN ROTTERDAM An inventory of both governmental and private interventions on the supply side of the Rotterdam hard drug market is presented in Figure 1. Analysis of the steps taken on the supply side shows that in Rotterdam, there are two kinds of interventions. On the one hand, interventions of semigovernmental organizations approach the hard drug trade in a suppressive way (discouragement or prohibition), for example, reporting centers for drug-related nuisance, public transport bylaws, closure of dealing addresses, and measures based on the General Local Ordinance. On the other hand, there are interventions with a regulating or tolerating character. This category includes nonintervention based on the expediency principle, as well as various private interventions. Below, we briefly describe all interventions (or noninterventions) as developed in the City of Rotterdam in the last decade. GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTIONS Governmental interventions include measurements taken by the public prosecutor, local government, and police. Based on the expediency principle, the public prosecutor can decide that nonintervention is preferable to the enforcement of law. For example, when a dealing address could be closed but dealing may then continue in a nearby public place, for example, where a school is located, the public prosecutor may decide not to intervene. Local governmental interventions are divided into three categories: local law and general local ordinance, municipal public transport bylaws, and reporting centers for drug-related nuisance. Since the change in municipal law in 1997, the Major of a city is allowed to close dealing addresses for a period of one year if public order has been disturbed such that it affects the health and safety of local residents. Other legal administrative instruments that can be used to combat drug-related nuisance in public places is described in local law government legislation. In addition, measures in the General 152 JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES

INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE LOCAL HARD DRUG MARKET FIGURE 1 INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE DRUG MARKET IN THE CITY OF ROTTERDAM Local Ordinance can be applied: bylaws can be issued to ban or restrict certain gatherings or access to certain locations. The Rotterdam Public Transport Association has taken specific measures against hard drugs during the last years. Drug trade, drug use, and begging on public transport are prohibited. To enforce these measures, the association collaborates with the police, uses video monitoring, and mobilizes flying squads of transport workers. Further, in collaboration with the addiction care organization, a care provider is placed with the public transport company. Reporting centers for drugs-related nuisance have been established in four neighborhoods, where local residents can report addresses that allegedly cause nuisance. When this nuisance proves to be a fact, contact is made with the owner/ occupant; if the situation does not improve, the location can be closed. The police are the most visible party in these interventions. In 2000 the local police started a so-called Flying Squad to cope with drug related nuisance, with extra surveillance in the most notorious areas. This extra surveillance included video control in certain neighborhoods. Police action is based on local ordinance. WINTER 2004 153

VAN DE MHEEN, GRUTER Similar to the public transport association, a care provider is placed with the police. This official tries to organize a treatment plan for detainees (in case they are problematic drug users) in the addiction care. PRIVATE INTERVENTIONS Private interventions include informal consumption rooms and self-regulated dealing addresses. In 1996, after the closure of Platform Zero, the so-called basements were established to meet the need for small-scale facilities for base coke users. Dealers initiated the use of basements without any involvement from other persons or organizations. Basements had the following objectives: to reduce nuisance and health damage of users to offer not only consumption, but also social activities (e.g., playing games, day trips, etc.) to supply free food and nonalcoholic drinks to sell drugs at normal market prices to have a maximum number of clients, using a system of passes and house rules. However, in 2000, after criticisms from the national government, drug trade was officially prohibited in basements. Since then, dealers have changed the name to Informal consumption room. The establishment of illegal dealing addresses can also be seen as private interventions. These dealing addresses, however, are not explicitly aimed at reducing nuisance. This means that some addresses will cause nuisance, while others will not. In the context of this paper, drug dealers are not seen as criminals, but as entrepreneurs with whom one can negotiate, and who are willing to take some social responsibilities. Negotiation can take place under the conditions of some (more or less explicit) quality criteria compiled specifically for dealing addresses. These criteria were made collectively by users, dealers, citizens, and care providers and imply small-scale facilities, room to consume inside, and possibilities for needle exchange (Barendregt, Schenk, & Vollemans, 2001). Adhering to these criteria implies that the dealing addresses will stay below the tolerated nuisance level. CONCLUSIONS: FUTURE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE HARD DRUG MARKET The case study of Rotterdam demonstrates that possibilities exist for local government and private persons/organizations to intervene on the supply side of the local hard drug market, even though, officially, state law does not allow much flexibility. 154 JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES

INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE LOCAL HARD DRUG MARKET This section discusses future policy with respect to interventions on the supply side of the local hard drug market. These interventions support the aim of local drugs policy, that is, to diminish or regulate the unwanted effects of the hard drug trade, with respect to both public health and safety. A DIFFERENTIAL APPROACH Based on the Rotterdam case we can distinguish four basic approaches to the drug problem: legalisation, strong suppression, dosed suppression, and regulation. We support a differential approach to these interventions based on the criteria discussed below. LEGALIZATION Legalization entails removing the criminal status from the possession and trade in drugs. Although this may serve to diminish some drug-related criminality, other forms of criminality may increase (e.g., aggression due to use of cocaine). In addition, it is hard to foresee the effects of such a measure on public health. The number of users may decrease or even increase (Korf, 2002). For example, MacCoun and Reuter (1997) have shown that commercial access (e.g., the coffee shops in the Netherlands) is associated with an increase (although very slight) in cannabis use. However, this paper will not discuss legalization as an optional approach on the local level because the international debate on this subject lies beyond the local responsibilities. STRONG SUPPRESSION Suppression means the punctual enforcement of the Opium Law. Theoretically, strong suppression of the possession and trade of drugs by means of this legal instrument could eliminate the drug problem: no drugs, no use. However, it is reported that this may have serious negative consequences for public health, wellbeing and safety. Generally speaking, strong suppression may lead to an ongoing process of marginalization. The study of Rotterdam shows that the closure of dealing addresses resulted in a movement of the hard drug trade to the street, which implies drugrelated nuisance (Barendregt et al., 2000). The importance of maintaining law and order on the one hand and that of public order on the other, seem to be in conflict. Therefore, public health, wellbeing, and safety draw little benefit from strong repressive measures. DOSED SUPPRESSION The expediency principle allows to refrain from prosecuting those facts that are punishable by law, in case the effects of prosecution are more harmful (with respect WINTER 2004 155

VAN DE MHEEN, GRUTER to nuisance), than the effects of refraining from such prosecution. In practice, in Rotterdam this strategy is applied on the local level to combat drug trade. In prosecution, priority is given to wholesale trade, international trade, and nuisancerelated trade. Trade on the retail level, aimed at local drug users who do not cause too much nuisance gets low priority in prosecution. In this way suppressive measures are used in a dosed way. The idea that dealers will comply with such a strategy is only partly true. There are always some dealers who want to make a lot of money quickly and do not care about the local environment (Barendregt, Blanken, & Zuidmulder, 1998). However, research has shown that some dealers will comply (Ponsioen, Blanken, & Barendregt, 1999a; Ponsioen, Blanken, Barendregt, & van de Mheen, 1999b). Dealers who try to avoid nuisance tend to be more selective in their client population: they discourage users who are potential troublemakers. Consequently in a strategy of dosed suppression, this latter group is even more marginalized on the street. We conclude that public health, wellbeing, and safety draw more benefit from dosed suppression than from strong suppression. It is, however, not the ultimate solution, as evidenced by ongoing drug-related nuisance in Rotterdam. REGULATION Regulation is based on the principal of dosed suppression but includes an active involvement of dealers. From the perspective of public health and nuisance reduction quality criteria are formulated at the local level (in the case of Rotterdam, see Barendregt et al., 2001), which have to be fulfilled by dealing addresses to get low priority in prosecution. Health and wellbeing play a greater role than in a strategy of dosed suppression. The choice for legalization, strong suppression, dosed suppression, or regulation in case of hard drug use is not a simple one. First, the choice depends on the place where drugs are used. In those neighborhoods where drug-related nuisance is very high, a choice for strong suppression seems logical. In locations where drugs are a more accepted phenomenon, for example, the prostitution zone, it is more advisable to choose between dosed suppression and regulation. Second, the choice depends on the target population. In the case of chronic users, who have a very weak position in relation to their dealer, regulation may be preferable to dosed suppression. The realisation of a differential approach starts with a thorough analysis of the problem. Within a consultative structure aimed at monitoring developments in the drug scene, care providers (including field workers), researchers, police, public servants, users, and dealers are involved. This consultative structure can be seen as periodic round table meetings, which will result in recommendations to local policy makers. The analysis should lead to a collectively supported local plan. Eventually, local policy makers take the final decision. 156 JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES

INTERVENTIONS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE LOCAL HARD DRUG MARKET A BALANCED SPREAD OF DEALING ADDRESSES The case study of Rotterdam indicated that part of a successful differential approach on the supply side of the hard drug market is a balanced spread of controlled trade locations, following the strategy formulated in Safe and Clean (Spijkerman et al., 2000). Given the current policy of tolerance of possession and use of small amounts of hard drugs, the strategy of diffusion implies that nuisance control is improved when dealing addresses are spread throughout the city. Dealing addresses should preferably be located in those neighborhoods were local drug users live or used to live. The strategy of diffusion is inspired by the fact that some dealers not only sell drugs but also allow clients to consume drugs at the same location. This led in Rotterdam to the establishment of the so-called basements, where hard drug users and dealers use the same address. A study on the economics of the local small-scale hard drug trade (Ponsioen et al., 1999a) showed that dealers restricted to one location are more sensitive to interventions from the local government and are more inclined to consider the local environment and health situation of their clients. It is not realistic, however, to offer dealers who are superfluous in one neighborhood a new place of business in another. This means that control should be indirect. When suppressive measures are taken, the local circumstances will eventually determine the new place of business. Factors such as infrastructure, availability of suitable premises, or competition with other dealers play a role (van der Torre & Hulshof, 2000). An indirect measure to achieve a diffusion of dealing addresses (when they fulfill the local quality criteria) is to give low priority to the closure of dealing addresses where they are wanted and high priority to closure where these addresses are unwanted. Knowledge on the local factors that play an important role in the movement of the drug market and a plan of action based on collective analysis should enable a diffusion of dealing addresses. An important condition for the effectiveness of such a model on control of the supply side of the local drug market is that the number of well-meaning dealers is sufficient. This emphasizes the necessity of more dealer research. In addition, local public support in different parts of the city is essential. Thirdly, the realization of a regulated drug trade throughout the city is only possible under stringent conditions, such as the local quality criteria formulated for the city of Rotterdam (Barendregt et al., 2001). Suppressive measures should be taken against hard drug dealers that do not comply with these criteria. In addition, street dealing and dealing by mobile telephone in the vicinity of regulated dealing addresses should be strongly suppressed. WINTER 2004 157

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