Ordinary DNS: www.google.com A? k.root-servers.net. com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30. Client's Resolver



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Transcription:

Ordinary DNS: www.google.com A? com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30 k.root-servers.net

Ordinary DNS: www.google.com A? com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30 k.root-servers.net www.google.com A? google.com. NS ns1.google.com ns1.google.com A 216.239.32.10 a.gtld-servers.net

Ordinary DNS: www.google.com A? com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net A 192.5.6.30 k.root-servers.net www.google.com A? google.com. NS ns1.google.com ns1.google.com A 216.239.32.10 a.gtld-servers.net www.google.com A? www.google.com. A 74.125.24.14 ns1.google.com

DNSSEC (with simplifications): www.google.com A? DO! com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30 com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net

DNSSEC (with simplifications): www.google.com A? DO com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30 com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net Delegation Signer identifies.com's public key (name and hash)

DNSSEC (with simplifications): www.google.com A? DO com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30 com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net Retrieving.com's public key is complicated (actually involves multiple keys)

DNSSEC (with simplifications): www.google.com A? DO com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30 com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net Specifies signature over another RR here, the above DS record

DNSSEC (with simplifications): www.google.com A? DO com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30 com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net Note: no signature over NS or A!

DNSSEC (with simplifications): www.google.com A? DO google.com. NS ns1.google.com ns1.google.com. A 216.239.32.10 google.com. DS description-ofgoogle.com's-key google.com. RRSIG DS signatureof-that-ds-record-using-com's-key a.gtld-servers.net

DNSSEC (with simplifications): www.google.com A? DO www.google.com. A 74.125.24.14 www.google.com. RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-records-usinggoogle.com's-key ns1.google.com

DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! www.google.com A? DO www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6 ns1.evil.com

DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! www.google.com A? DO www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6 ns1.evil.com observes that the reply didn't include a signature, rejects it as insecure

DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! www.google.com A? DO www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6 www.google.com RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usingevil.com's-key ns1.evil.com

DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! www.google.com A? DO www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6 www.google.com RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usingevil.com's-key ns1.evil.com (1) If resolver didn't receive a signature from.com for evil.com's key, then it can't validate this signature & ignores reply since it's not properly signed

DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! www.google.com A? DO www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6 www.google.com RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usingevil.com's-key ns1.evil.com (2) If resolver did receive a signature from.com for evil.com's key, then it knows the key is for evil.com and not google.com and ignores it

DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! www.google.com A? DO www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6 www.google.com RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usinggoogle.com's-key ns1.evil.com

DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! www.google.com A? DO www.google.com. A 6.6.6.6 www.google.com RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usinggoogle.com's-key ns1.evil.com If signature actually comes from google.com's key, resolver will believe it but no such signature should exist unless either: (1) google.com intended to sign the RR, or (2) google.com's private key was compromised

Credit: www.tcpipguide.com

Credit: Steve Friedl

Credit: Steve Friedl