Syllabus International Corporate Governance Wintersemester 2008-2009 Articles labeled are available as a pdf-file.
1 st Segment - Theory of the Firm, Governance and Finance Class 01-14.10. General Introduction, Agency Relationships (o.v.), In whose interest does the corporation work? Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976): Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 78-133. Tirole, J. (2001): Corporate Governance, in: Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 1-35. Class 02-16.10. Theories of the Firm and Management Alchian, A.A. and H. Demsetz (1972): Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 777-795. Williamson, O.E. (1979): Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 233-261. Harm, C. (2002): Bank management between shareholders and regulators, SUERF Study No. 21, Amsterdam, Ch. 1.1. Class 03-16.10. Governance and Finance Harm, C. (2002): Bank management between shareholders and regulators, SUERF Study No. 21, Amsterdam, Ch. 1.2 & 1.3. Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 2
2 nd Segment - Equity Governance ( I ) Class 04-21.10. Shareholder Voting and Disclosure Pound, J. (1991): Proxy voting and the SEC, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 241-285. Pound, J. (1992): Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes to Corporate Control, in: Harvard Business Review, March-April, pp. 83-93. Harm (2000): Shareholder Activism and Ownership Structure, mimeo, University of Münster. Class 05-23.10. Boards of Directors John, K. and L.W. Senbet (1998): Corporate governance and board effectiveness, in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, pp. 371-403. Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E. and J.L. Johnson (1996): Boards of Directors: A Review and Research Agenda, in: Journal of Management, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 409-438. Harm (2000): The Board of Directors, mimeo, University of Münster. Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 3
Class 06-04.11. 2 nd Segment - Equity Governance ( II ) Management Compensation Schemes Yermack, David (1995): Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 39. pp. 237-269. Pavlik, E.L., Scott, T.W. and P. Tiessen (1993): Executive Compensation: Issues and Research, in: Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 12, pp. 131-189. Sunder, Shyam (2002): Political Economy of US Accounting Collapse, mimeo, Yale University. Harm (undated): Incentives: The Role of Carrots and Sticks, mimeo, University of Münster. Class 07-06.11. Takeover Markets Jensen, Michael C., and Richard S. Ruback (1983): The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 5-50. Caves, R.E. (1989): Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency, in: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 151-174. Harm (2000): Takeovers and Leveraged Buy-Outs, mimeo, University of Münster. Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 4
Class 08-11.11. 3 rd Segment - Debt Governance Bankruptcy: Theory and International Evidence Franks, Julian, Kjell Nyborg, and Walter Torous (1995): A Comparison of US, UK, and German Insolvency Codes, IFA Working Paper 206-1995, London Business School, Institute of Finance and Accounting, London. Easterbrook, Frank H. (1990): Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 411-417. Aghion, Philippe, Oliver Hart, and John Moore (1992): The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. Class 09-13.11. Work-Outs: International Evidence Gilson, Stewart C., Kose John, and Larry Lang (1990): Troubled Debt Restructuring: An empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 315-353. Sheard, Paul (1994): The Main Banks and the governance of financial distress, in: Aoki, Masahiko and Hugh Patrick (eds.) (1994), pp.188-230. Harm, Christian (1997): The role of German banks to reduce the costs of financial distress, mimeo, Copenhagen Business School. Class 10-18.11. Bank Regulation Harm, C. (2002): Bank management between shareholders and regulators, SUERF Study No. 21, Amsterdam, Ch. 1.3 & 3. Woodward, Susan (1988): A Transaction Cost Analysis of Banking Activity and Deposit Insurance, in: Cato Journal, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 683-699 Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 5
Class 11-20.11. Debt Economies 4 th Segment - The Systemic View Harm, C. (1996): Debt Economies, mimeo, Stern School of Business. Class 12-25.11. USA: A Managerialist system Roe, M.J. (1991): A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, in: Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 10, pp. 10-67. Class 13-27.11. Law, Finance, and Growth La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1998): Law and Finance, in : Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp. 1113-1154. Class 14-27.11. Political Determinants of Governance Structures Harm C. (2004): Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Corruption and Other Forms of Rent-Seeking, Presentation at the 8 th ISNIE conference, Sept. 30 th Oct. 2 nd 2004, Tucson, AZ. Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 6