FINANCE 912 Financial Institutions
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1 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA The Wharton School FINANCE 912 Financial Institutions Course Objective: Itay Goldstein Spring 2010 The objective of the course is to provide an introduction to the theory of corporate finance, financial intermediation, and financial markets. The goal is to expose students to existing work and provide basic tools to do research in the area. Course Organization: The course will consist of lectures, in which I will review papers from the literature. Some papers will be discussed in class in great depth, while others will be mentioned briefly and left for the students for further research. A tentative list of topics and papers appears below. Topics and papers may be dropped or added, depending on progress. The final grade will be based on an exam and on a project. Details will be discussed in class. Course Materials: Below, there is a list of articles for each topic. They are the core of the material for the course. In addition, I refer students to relevant chapters in the following books: Hart (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. Tirole (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press. Course Overview: Here is a tentative list of topics and relevant articles and book chapters: 1. Separation of Ownership and Control: Moral Hazard
2 Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, Chapter 14. Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, Holmstrom, B., 1979, Moral hazard and observability, Bell Journal of Economics 10, Holmstrom, B., 1982, Moral hazard in teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13, Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom, 1991, Multi-task principal agent analyses: linear contracts, asset ownership, job design, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7, Contracting and the Theory of the Firm Hart, Chapters 1-4. Grossman S., and O. Hart, 1986, The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration, Journal of Political Economy 94, Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1990, Property rights and the nature of the firm, Journal of Political Economy 98, Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1996, The capital budgeting process: incentives and information, Journal of Finance 51, Stein, J., 1997, Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources, Journal of Finance 52, Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, 1998, Power in a theory of the firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113,
3 Scharfstein, D., and J. Stein, 2000, The dark side of internal capital markets: divisional rent-seeking and inefficient investment, Journal of Finance 55, Theories of Capital Structure Tirole, Chapters 3 and 6. Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48, Leland, H., and D. Pyle, 1977, Information asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation, Journal of Finance 32, Miller, M., 1977, Debt and taxes, Journal of Finance 32, Ross, S., 1977, The determination of financial structure, Bell Journal of Economics 8, Bhattacharya, S., 1979, Imperfect information, dividend policy, and the bird in the hand fallacy, Bell Journal of Economics 10, Myers, S., and N. Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 13, Brander, J., and T. Lewis, 1986, Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect, American Economic Review 76, December, Jensen M., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, American Economic Review 76, Stulz, R., 1990, Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies, Journal of Financial Economics 26, 3-27.
4 Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1991, The theory of capital structure, Journal of Finance 46, Zwiebel, J., 1996, Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment, American Economic Review 86, Financial Contracting and Security Design Hart, Chapters 5-6. Tirole, Chapter 10. Townsend R., 1979, Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification, Journal of Economic Theory 21, Gale D., and M. Hellwig, 1985, Incentive compatible debt contracts: the one period problem, Review of Economic Studies 52, Bolton, P., and D. Scharfstein, 1990, A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting, American Economic Review 80, Aghion, P., and P. Bolton, 1992, An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting, Review of Economic Studies 59, Berglof, E., and E. L. von Thadden, 1994, Short-term versus long-term interests: capital structure with multiple investors, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, Dewatripont, M., and J. Tirole, 1994, A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1994, A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109,
5 Bolton, P., and D. Scharfstein, 1996, Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors, Journal of Political Economy 104, Financial Intermediation, Credit Markets, and Financial Crises Tirole, Chapters Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss, 1981, Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, American Economic Review 71, Diamond, D., and P. Dybvig, 1983, Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, Journal of Political Economy 91, Diamond, D., 1984, Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring, Review of Economic Studies 51, Diamond, D., 1989, Reputation acquisition in debt markets, Journal of Political Economy 97, Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole, 1997, Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, Allen, F., and D. Gale, 2000, Financial contagion, Journal of Political Economy 108, Morris, S., and H. S. Shin, 1998, Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks, American Economic Review 88, Morris, S., and H. S. Shin, 2004, Coordination risk and the price of debt, European Economic Review 48, Goldstein, I., and A. Pauzner, 2005, Demand deposit contracts and the probability of bank runs, Journal of Finance 60,
6 6. Takeovers and Corporate Control Tirole, Chapter 11. Grossman, S., and O. Hart, 1980, Takeover bids, the free rider problem and the theory of the corporation, Bell Journal of Economics 11, Shleifer, V., and R. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political Economy 94, Bagnoli, M., and B. Lipman, 1988, Successful takeovers without exclusion, Review of Financial Studies 1, Grossman, S., and O. Hart, 1988, One share-one vote and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics 20, Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1988, Corporate governance: voting rights and majority rules, Journal of Financial Economics 20, Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi, 1997, Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, Financial Markets and Price Formation Grossman, S., and J. Stiglitz, 1980, On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets, American Economic Review 70, Glosten, L., and P. Milgrom, 1985, Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders, Journal of Financial Economics 14, Kyle, A., 1985, Continuous auctions and insider trading, Econometrica 53,
7 Admati, A., and P. Pfleiderer, 1988, A theory of intraday patterns: volume and price variability, Review of Financial Studies 1, Financial Markets and Corporate Finance: Feedback Effects Tirole, Chapter 8. Fishman, M., and K. Hagerty, 1992, Insider trading and the efficiency of stock prices, RAND Journal of Economics 23, Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole, 1993, Market liquidity and performance monitoring, Journal of Political Economy 101, Dow, J., and G. Gorton, 1997, Stock market efficiency and economic efficiency: is there a connection?, Journal of Finance 52, Subrahmanyam, A., and S. Titman, 1999, The going-public decision and the development of financial markets, Journal of Finance 54, Fulghieri, P., and D. Lukin, 2001, Information production, dilution costs, and optimal security design, Journal of Financial Economics 61, Goldstein, I., and A. Guembel, 2008, Manipulation and the allocational role of prices, Review of Economic Studies 75, Bond, P., I. Goldstein, and E. S. Prescott, 2009, Market-Based Corrective Actions, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
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