Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe

About this report After a tender procedure this job was commissioned to HTC - Hanseatic Transport Consultancy who have entered into a partnership with data lab for this task. During the process there have been regular contacts between the consultant and the STRING secretariat as well as two reviews/sessions with infrastructure experts from the STRING partners. STRING Secretariat Alléen 15 DK-4180 Sorø Tel: + 45 (0)2082 3459 The content, wording and conclusions in this report are solely the responsibility of the consultants. ISBN number: 978-87-92026-31-6 The consultants Multidimensional experience in the field of consultancy and practical expertise form the basis of our independent and authoritative approach to consultancy, an approach geared to achieving all your objectives. The range of expert advice on offer from HTC - Hanseatic Transport Consultancy - includes not only classic strategy and management consultancy for businesses operating in the fields of transport and logistics but also guidance on policies and institutions, notably in questions relating to competition and industrial politics. The way of our approach considers the increasing requirements of our customers with regard to economic and ecologic topics. HTC's consultancy advice is distinguished not at least by its independence, high standards and flexibility, bringing together a tried and tested methodology with a profound understanding of the transport sector. Innovative solutions trigger forward-looking perspectives for companies, policy, economy and society. As the competent assessment of high-speed networks in Northern Europe requires a multilateral expertise regarding market and infrastructure development aspects in at least the three countries (Germany, Denmark, Sweden), HTC has joined forces with the Danish company TDL. Hanseatic Transport Consultancy Dr. Ninnemann & Dr. Rössler GbR Schopenstehl 15 (Miramar-Haus) D-20095 Hamburg Dr. Jan Ninnemann, Dr. Thomas Rössler Tel: +49 (0)40 1817 54-06/-08 info@htc-consultancy.de TDL Transport Data Lab Henrik Sylvan Strandhøjen 3 DK-4000 Roskilde Henrik Sylvan Tel: +45 (0)2092 8040 henrik@sylvans.dk Status: 22.03.12

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe III Executive Summary National transport policies in Germany, Denmark and Sweden just generally follow the same guideline with the aim of reducing congestion, accidents and environmental externalities. Specific high-speed strategies do not exist yet, but the overall objective to change modal split by taking over passengers from motorised private transport and air transport also covers the pursuit of high-speed activities. Dedicated high-speed lines (>230 km/h) can only be found in Germany. Five high-speed sections stand for a length of 1,100 km (3.3 % of the total German network) without forming a coherent network. The investment volumes for current high-speed projects in Germany indicate that (high-speed) infrastructure development in Germany seems to be (too) cost-intensive due to disproportionate technical standards and track alignments. In contrast to Germany the Danish time-model approach is mainly based on the idea of setting a target of maximum travel time by increasing the velocity of trains; not for a specific top-speed, but sufficient to fulfil a reasonable point-to-point travel time. The existing network development plans in the three countries indicate that there are different accentuations with regard to the high-speed network development strategies: a more microeconomic approach in Germany influenced by corporate interests of German DB AG and a more macroeconomic approach in Scandinavia. As the TEN-T policy of the EU leaves the technical responsibility for the corridor development to the member states, a high-speed target for the Fehmarnbelt corridor requires a corridor-oriented mindset that recognizes the need for international mobility of the peripheral region of Scandinavia. The current high-speed vision for the Hamburg-Øresund corridor is mainly driven by regional initiatives e.g. in various INTERREG programs, industry cooperation platforms, political committees etc along the line. The considerations of DB Netze for the German FBL hinterland section focus on a conventional electrified double-track line with a maximum speed of 160 km/h between Lübeck-Puttgarden. Current investigations of alignment alternatives do not cover technical parameters for train operations faster than 160 km/h. Alternatives for a more capable network design seizing the opportunities of a still ongoing planning procedure should be initiated before further alignment decisions will be fixed. Driven by the green transport policy approach Denmark has opted for a high-class technical solution by deciding to introduce a nation-wide ERTMS system of the standards of ETCS level II and the ambition of a velocity-performance increase. Maximum speeds of 200 km/h (between Ringsted and Rødby) and of 250 km/h (between Ringsted and Copenhagen) are projected. As the 200 km/h section has been criticized from many institutions further upgrade initiatives are in consideration. As the situation of the public infrastructure budgets is supposed to deteriorate over the next years and the growing maintenance requirements of the existing railway network will exhaust potential budgets for a potential high-speed corridor Hamburg-Øresund innovative ways of financing as well as infrastructure development have to be considered.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe IV A general conclusion of the assessment of travel time, passenger volumes and infrastructure investments for the Fehmarnbelt corridor is that competitive travel times of 2:00 h to 2:30 h can be achieved with reasonable additional investments. The favourable network design generally follows the Danish time-model approach and is based on the idea to establish an efficient semi high-speed network which contributes to an acceptable increase of average travel times without requiring an overdesigned infrastructure project, which is to a limited extent politically as well as economically sustainable. The intelligent combination of upgrade and new-built projects play an important role for the provision of a high-class technical solution for the corridor. A corridor development following one of the (hereinafter illustrated) preferable scenarios make an important contribution to provide additional passenger as well as freight transport capacities, to increase the railway market share and to establish an innovative alternative for political decision makers for a sustainable future cross-border infrastructure concept. To support a corridor-driven new concept for a semi-high-speed line seizing the opportunities of a still not fully detailed planning procedure for the FBL hinterland connections (especially on German side) the necessary postulations for additional considerations have to be addressed soon.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe Content V Page 1. Initial situation 1 2. General Requirements for High-Speed Networks 2 2.1 Technical constraints and standards 2 2.2 Socio-economic impacts and complementary measures to facilitate regional benefits 3 3. National Frameworks for High-Speed Network Development 5 3.1 EU high-speed rail policy 5 3.2 High-speed rail in Germany 7 3.2.1 Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholders 7 3.2.2 National high-speed network 10 3.2.3 Network development strategy 16 3.2.4 Network development on Hamburg-Fehmarnbelt corridor 25 3.2.5 Demand and demand forecasting 29 3.2.6 Funding, financing and economic appraisal 34 3.2.7 First conclusions on high-speed activities in Germany 37 3.3 High-speed rail in Denmark 38 3.3.1 Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholders 38 3.3.2 National high-speed network 45 3.3.3 Network development strategy 45 3.3.4 Network development on Fehmarnbelt-Øresund corridor 51 3.3.5 Demand and demand forecasting 59 3.3.6 Funding, financing and economic appraisal 64 3.3.7 Main conclusions on the shape of a high-speed rail network 65 3.4 High-speed rail in Sweden 66 3.4.1 Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholder 66 3.4.2 National high-speed network 69 3.4.3 Network development strategy 69 3.4.4 Demand and demand forecasting 76 3.4.5 Financing, funding and economic appraisal 78 3.4.6 Main conclusions on the shape of a high-speed rail network 79 3.5 Table of classification 81 3.6 Comments on national high-speed rail developments from corridor perspective 83 4. Principle framework for (high-speed) network development on the Hamburg-Øresund corridor 85 4.1 Assessment of HSR costs 85 4.2 Assessment of HSR benefits 86 4.3 Network discussion under consideration of cost-benefit aspects 90 4.4 Validation of the marginal investments and market potential 97

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 1 With the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link and a high-speed rail link, Hamburg and Copenhagen will be brought closer together. (Olaf Scholz, mayor of Hamburg, June 2011) 1. INITIAL SITUATION Triggered by the Fehmarnbelt project there is on some political level an intense discussion on the future perspectives of a high-speed link between Hamburg and Copenhagen. This vision is intended to make the mobility of people between the two metropolitan regions more secure, more efficient and more environmentally friendly, with priority given to social and territorial cohesion, as well as to economic dynamism. Several economic and cultural centres in Europe can already be reached by trains travelling at speeds of 300 km/h and sometimes more. This includes cities such as London, Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Madrid, Rome and Milan. Until now there is no existing high-speed link between the Central European network and Scandinavia. Today it takes almost five hours to travel by passenger train from Øresund region to Hamburg. With a fixed link over the Fehmarnbelt, the trip time will be reduced to three and a half hours. Regardless the efforts for the establishment of a trans-european network for high-speed trains, the current planning according to the bilateral treaty between Denmark and Germany on the Fehmarnbelt hinterland connection on the German side (only) considers an electrified, double-track railway for a speed of at least 160 km/h for passenger trains and at least 120 km/h for freight trains. An upgrading of the railway tracks for high-speed trains or the construction of the second railway track before 2025 is not part of the agreement. Some promising alternatives for a more capable network design at reasonable investment levels seem to be possible but have to be initiated before further alignment decisions have been fixed. As one of the main objectives of the STRING cooperation is to find sustainable improvements in mobility i.e. having more transport of goods and people from fuel consuming to energy saving transport modes, the future integration of Scandinavia in a trans-european network for high-speed trains play an important role in today s (political) discussion. To support a corridor-driven debate seizing the opportunities of a still not fully detailed planning procedure for the FBL hinterland connections (especially on German side) the following study gives an overview of the status for high-speed networks in Northern Europe. The following analysis of framework conditions for a high-speed link between Hamburg and Copenhagen/Malmö generally covers the following aspects: Objectives for high-speed rail and guiding principles for high-speed rail connections between Central Europe and Scandinavia, National strategies for high-speed networks in Germany, Denmark and Sweden including cost estimates and time tables for decisions as well as implementations, Principle framework for (high-speed) network development on the Hamburg- Copenhagen (-Stockholm/Oslo) corridor under consideration of cost and travel time aspects.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 2 2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH-SPEED NETWORKS UIC (International Union of Railways) and EC Directive 96/58 define high-speed rail as systems of infrastructure and rolling stock which regularly operate at or above 250 km/h on new tracks, or 200 km/h on existing tracks. To develop some general requirements for high-speed networks this chapter gives a brief review of the technical as well as (socio-) economic framework of high-speed rail in Europe. 2.1 Technical constraints and standards High-speed infrastructure: Conventional lines, even with major upgrades, are basically unable to operate at more than 200-220 km/h. The layout parameters, transverse sections, track quality, catenary and power supply, and special environmental conditions must be able to sustain high operational speeds. High-speed infrastructure is supposed to fulfil the following requirements: High-speed rail infrastructure must be designed, inspected and maintained in optimum conditions. Layout requires large radius curves and limited gradients and track centre distances. Track geometric parameters must meet exacting tolerances. Slab track is in principle much more expensive than ballasted track, but it can be permanently operated with reduced maintenance frequency. Though slab track can be recommended in certain cases for viaducts and tunnels, discussion of the ideal track system must proceed on a case-by-case basis. Special catenary system and power supply system are required. On-board signalling system is required. According to UIC specifications 1 the following parameters for new high-speed lines have to be considered. The maximum gradient depending on operating conditions allowed for 300 km/h train speeds is set by the latest STI to 35 mm per metre (passenger traffic only with suitable rolling stock). For mixed traffic the maximum gradient is up to 12/15 mm/m. Design characteristics will allow trains to run at their maximum speeds. Minimum radius, associated with cant and cant deficiency, defines the maximum commercial speed, providing a good level of comfort to passengers. According to TSI, the minimum radius of curvature needs to ensure that the curve cant set does not exceed the minimum values. The figures below provide UIC standards for the minimum radius at different speeds. Horizontal curve radius 200 km/h: 2,500 m (minimum), 3,500 m (ideal) 300 km/h: 5,500 m (minimum), 7,000 m (ideal) Track centre distance 200 km/h: 4 m 300 km/h: 4.5/5 m Maximum cant 150/170 mm 1 UIC report Design of new lines for speeds of 300-350 km/h, 2001.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 3 Rolling stock and operating conditions: High-speed operations require train sets instead of conventional trains (locomotive and cars), because of the power-to-weight ratio and various other technical reasons, such as aerodynamic conditions, reliability and safety. Common basic characteristics of high-speed trains can be described as following: Self propelled, fixed composition and bi-directional, High level of technology, Limited axle load (11 to 17 tons for 300 km/h) -> ICE 3 2, High traction power (approx. 11 to 24 kw per ton), Power electronic equipment: GTO, IGBT, Control circuits. Computer network. Automatic diagnostic system, Optimized aerodynamics shape, In-cab signalling system/s, Several braking systems, High level of RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety), Technical and safety requirements (compliance with standards), Compatibility with infrastructure (track gauge, loading gauge, platforms, catenary, etc.). One particular aspect of the operating conditions is the signalling system. Line side signals are no longer useable at more than 200 km/h because they may not always be observed in time. In-cab signalling is absolutely necessary for high-speed operation. (-> UIC) Three systems exist on the different networks: French TVM 430 that equips all the French high-speed lines (signalling boxes and automatic headways), South Korean line, Benelux lines, and Eurostar service. German LZB that equips the German high-speed lines and the Madrid-Sevilla Spanish line. ERTMS ( European Railway Traffic Management System ) is the only normalized system for European Interoperability that is recommended. ERTMS level 2 now equips the Milan Bologna Italian line, the Madrid Barcelona Spanish line, and the new Eastern European Line in France and Germany, but it currently duplicates another system. 2.2 Socio-economic impacts and complementary measures to facilitate regional benefits High-speed rail is claimed to have a major impact on the (local) economy. For the assessment of these socio-economic impacts it is necessary to understand that, unlike motorways, high-speed networks will have a very limited number of stations. Therefore it will not promote a growth corridor, but rather separate growth nodes based around the stations. The theory is that economic activities located at or near these nodes derive economic benefits as a result of improved business connectivity resulting from shorter journey times, together with what is called the agglomeration effect. These are efficiencies resulting from geographical proximity of firms to each other, labour market effects, network economies and environmental externalities. In general localisation effects of transport fall off quite rapidly with distance, with little or no effect beyond 50 km or 80 minutes, and the 2 ICE 1 and ICE 2 with >20 t axle load.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 4 most significant effects much closer than this. High-speed rail is most directly relevant to particular high level services and higher tech manufacturing with a need for good longerdistance inter-city or international linkages. The main benefits arise over distances where the higher speed delivers a significant time saving relative to conventional rail. In France this seemed to be from about 2 hours upwards by TGV. Although intermediate stops cost about ten minutes of journey time and also affect line capacity. As a significant reduction of travel time is a key success factor for high-speed rail a strong trade-off between number of stops and the objective of short travel times can be observed. Less stops is equivalent to a reduced number of potential growth notes along the high-speed corridor. Stations must be in city centres or other locations where economic activity can be generated. However, the economic benefit spillover effects from growth nodes into their wider hinterland is very significantly constrained by the quality of the local transport system. Significant economic benefit only occurs when high-speed rail (HSR) investment is accompanied by major investments in local infrastructure. Furthermore integration with the existing rail network is important to achieve a high connectivity without long transfer times. Through running to destinations off the core network (where a new high-speed line cannot be justified) benefits can be increased. Similar benefits arise from improved access to airports (long and short haul). However, transport improvements due to high-speed network access tend not to have lasting effects. Rather, the benefits are taken in the form of a wider choice by households and businesses of places to live, work and locate. From a long-term perspective it is therefore necessary to develop governance and appraisal mechanisms (e.g. planning policy, regeneration, training) to deliver the complementary measures that would help to ensure that the effects of high-speed rail investment include a beneficial impact on regional economies.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 5 3. NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HIGH-SPEED NETWORK DEVELOPMENT The market for international high-speed services has increased sharply and is expected to continue to grow with the further development of the trans-european high-speed network. Therefore many national railways have started to develop or partly implemented their own strategy for high-speed services. This chapter gives an overview of European transport policy aspects as well as developments in the relevant countries Germany, Denmark and Sweden. 3.1 EU high-speed rail policy With the White Paper 2011 the European Commission adopted a roadmap of 40 concrete initiatives for the next decade to build a competitive transport system that will increase mobility, remove major barriers in key areas and fuel growth and employment. 3 The conceptual framework for a competitive and resource-efficient transport system covers the following objectives for the extension of the existing high-speed network for rail transportation: By 2050, complete a European high-speed rail network. Triple the length of the existing high-speed rail network by 2030 and maintain a dense railway network in all Member States. By 2050 the majority of medium-distance passenger transport should go by rail. The Europe-wide framework for the infrastructure development is set by the programme for the trans-european transport network (TEN-T). The objective of the programme is to establish the key links needed to facilitate transport, optimise the capacity of existing infrastructure, produce specifications for network interoperability and integrate the environmental dimension. The current TEN-T Guidelines consist of a relatively dense comprehensive network and the mentioned list of 30 priority projects, which at a great extent were determined bottomup, according to investment needs in member states and/or following previously defined pan-european corridors. The priority projects do not reflect European needs in a systematic way; they do not form a coherent multimodal network. Equally, there is no sufficient integration of EU transport or other policy fields in the existing TEN-T. The financing of the projects is highly dependent on national investment plans and priorities. Therefore a continuous network development is finally not guaranteed. Due to a cut-back of EU funding for rail projects, Poland for example just recently (Dec. 2011) decided to freeze all work on the high-speed project for the Y-shaped line from Warszawa through Lódz to Poznan and Wroclaw until 2030. As the public households in many European countries can be considered as critical, future reductions of investment volumes in railway infrastructure or at least re-allocations of investment funds with a stronger focus on maintenance issues as well as freight transportation network design can be expected. On the contrary the British Transport Secretary just recently (Jan. 2012) decided to proceed with plans to build a highspeed rail line between London and the West Midlands and on to Manchester and Leeds. For a further support of the network development the European Commission in October 2011 presented 10 Core Network Corridors of the trans-european Transport Network (TEN-T). The north south Corridor Helsinki-Valetta, based in part on a series of Priority 3 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/doc/2011_white_paper/white-paper-illustrated-brochure_en.pdf.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 6 Projects (1, 11, 12 and 20), ERTMS corridor B and Rail freight corridor 3, is a crucial axis for the European economy, linking the major urban centres in Germany and Italy to Scandinavia and the Mediterranean. The longest of the 10 TEN-T Core Network Corridors, it has two centrepieces to be realised: the Fehmarn Belt crossing the Baltic Sea and the Brenner Tunnel under the Alps. Figure 1 Helsinki-Valetta Corridor Source: EU Commission, Illustration: TDL. For the pre-identified section Copenhagen-Hamburg via Fehmarn the corridor description comprises Danish access routes to be completed by 2020, access routes Germany to be completed in 2 steps (2020-2027). So far there are no indications for high-speed activities. Referring to a statement on the priority project no. 20 Railway axis Fehmarnbelt from 2008, the EU Commission foresees only a completed category II line for the Hamburg- Puttgarden as well as for the Copenhagen-Stockholm link in 2020.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 7 3.2 High-speed rail in Germany 3.2.1 Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholders National transport policy and implications for (high-speed) rail strategy The national transport policy is defined by the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS) in accordance with the guidelines of the EU. Key target of the German policy is to facilitate mobility and make it sustainable. The Federal Government has set itself objectives in its transport policy which cover the following aspects: 4 Make optimum use of the existing transport infrastructure and foster efficient transport, Reduce traffic level, Shift significantly more traffic to the railways and waterways, Take efforts to upgrade the transport infrastructure on a human scale and in an environmentally sound manner, Reduce CO2 emissions and the specific energy and fuel consumption of transport. The overall objective to shift significantly more traffic to railways in order to reduce CO2 emissions implicitly also covers the aspect of high-speed rail development in Germany. Regarding the general accentuation, an ongoing change in German transport policy can be observed over the last few years. As forecasts predict that traffic levels will continue to rise drastically, especially freight traffic, an increasing orientation towards aspects facing freight transport and logistics can be stated. Therefore efficient logistics systems and networks are more and more considered as key elements of German transport policy. (High-speed) Strategy of transport ministry The Federal Ministry does not pursue a real HSR strategy. Merely the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (FTIP) 2003 5 as a framework for investments and a planning instrument in infrastructure for the Federal Government helps to develop a rough idea of the ministries strategy with regard to high-speed rail. Around 66 billion euros (44 %) of a total of 149 billion euros are earmarked for the construction of new and the upgrading of existing federal railway infrastructure, federal trunk roads and federal waterways. The priorities for the inclusion of evaluated projects in the FTIP 2003 are basically a result of the benefit-cost ratio, network design considerations, the status of planning and the level of investment that is likely to be available over the lifetime of the plan. Amongst the 28 first priority rail projects (investment volume 15,993.3 million euros) 6 projects with a sum of 9,358.1 million euros (59 % of total) are wholly or partly designated for speed levels of 230 km/h or more. With this programme of upgrading and new construction work, the Federal Government pretends to make a major contribution to the development of the trans-european highspeed rail network. 6 In fact experts criticize that there is no evidence for a coherent highspeed network, but rather single, isolated high-speed sections within the German network. 7 4 5 6 7 Source: http://www.bmvbs.de/en/transportandmobility/transportpolicy/transport-policy_node.html. At its meeting on 2 July 2003, the Federal Cabinet adopted the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003 valid for the period until 2015. FTIP 2003, p. 60. Andersen, S. (2010), Ein Zielbedienungskonzept für den Hochgeschwindigkeitsverkehr in Deutschland.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 8 (High-speed) Strategy of DB Netze Since the end of 2007 DB Netze has been responsible for infrastructure and operations, taking over from DB Netz AG. Its business areas include DB Netze Fahrweg, DB Netze Energie, DB Netze Personenbahnhöfe, DB ProjektBau and DB Station&Service. DB Netze does not embark on an own strategy for the development of a high-speed network. As stated in the previous section the FTIP sets the mandatory framework for the infrastructure development in Germany. The annually revised requirement plans define the specific projects realized by DB Netze as national infrastructure provider. The preparation of the plan is carried out after consultation of policy, ministries and DB Netze. In fact the national network development is highly affected by the corporate strategy of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB). As stated on DB webpage 8, Deutsche Bahn sees itself as an integrated group whose business units cooperate sensibly and efficiently. Only the close integration of infrastructure, passenger services, transportation and logistics, as well as engineering and procurement, enables DB to develop the innovations that optimize the potential of rail transport and strengthen its competitiveness in comparison to road and air. The comparison of segment profits/loss (EBIT) identifies DB Bahn Long Distance as economically one of the most important transport divisions of DB Holding. Therefore the corporate strategy (and therewith the infrastructure development) of DB shows a strong orientation towards the (monopolistic) long distance segment. For further details on the strategy of DB long distance see next chapter. Figure 2 DB segment reporting by business segments (million euros) DB Bahn Long Distance DB Bahn Regional DB Bahn Urban DB Schenker Rail 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 profit/loss (EBIT) 160 80 656 678 23 71-71 -291 Source: DB annual report 2010. (High-speed) Strategy of DB Bahn DB Bahn is the group that manages passenger travel within Germany. The segment reporting of the DB AG (see extract in the table above) underlines the significant importance of passenger transportation. In the commercially independent (no public subsidies like in regional transportation) and economically attractive long distance segment DB sees itself in a quasi monopolistic position (market share >98 %). ICE long distance trains are - compared to freight transportation - of public interest for a wide part of the population and positioned as DB flagships. That s why (high-speed) long distance transportation can be considered as key element in DB s corporate strategy. Deutsche Bahn s first ICE made its debut in 1991 and today there are 5 ranges: ICE 1, 2, 3, T and TD. The ICE family, with its 252 trains, is the newest part of the DB fleet and has an average age of just nine years. 8 http://www.deutschebahn.com/site/nachhaltigkeitsbericht 2009/en/our company/strategy/corporate strategy/corporate strategy.html

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 9 Figure 3 Name Deutsche Bahn ICE fleet Number of Trainsets Operating Speed Design Speed Service ICE 1 59 280 km/h 280 km/h 1991 ICE 2 44 280 km/h 280 km/h 1996 ICE 3 63 320 km/h 330 km/h 2000 ICE T 67 230 km/h 230 km/h 2005 ICE TD (Diesel) 19 200 km/h 200 km/h 2001 Source: Deutsche Bahn AG. In April 2011 Deutsche Bahn has reached agreement with Siemens to order up to 300 ICx trainsets. The new ICx will from 2016 on form the backbone of DB long-distance transport services. Described by DB as the largest single investment in the company's history and by the manufacturer as the largest individual order yet in Siemens history, the multibillion euro framework agreement will allow replacement of DB's ageing fleet of locomotive-hauled InterCity and EuroCity coaches. Later ICx vehicles are intended to replace the ICE1 fleet as well as the ICE2 trainsets. The initial order will cover two main variants. The first is a seven-car formation with three powered vehicles, giving a seating capacity of 499 passengers and a maximum speed of

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 10 230 km/h. These will be used to operate the bulk of DB s IC network, replacing locomotivehauled trainsets. The second variant is a 10-car train with five power cars and 724 seats. These will have a top speed of 249 km/h. These will replace the existing ICE1 and ICE2 trainsets, which currently operate at up to 250 km/h. DB says it will continue to use its ICE3 trainsets on those few routes which have maximum speeds greater than 250 km/h. With this new vehicle concept DB reaches a significant increase of travelling comfort which might contribute to attract additional passengers. Further impacts on the cost side can be expected due to less energy consumption and more efficient operations. Another conclusion is that DB withdraws from a further extension of the high-speed fleet with maximum speeds of more than 230-250 km/h. Trainsets with a maximum speed of 300 km/h are considered as barely cost-efficient. Figure 4 ICx trainset operative from 2016 Source: Siemens. 3.2.2 National high-speed network The high-speed part of the network accounts for 3.3 % of the total length of 33,723 km of tracks operated by DB Netze. The high-speed lines (defined as those where the maximum permitted speed is in the range of 230-300 km/h) now total approximately 1,100 km. The other conventional lines served by high-speed trains have been upgraded to a greater or lesser extent, and the maximum train speeds there are in the range of 160-200 km/h. The first German high-speed rail lines were planned in the 1980s, when the Iron Curtain dividing the country was still in place. Today there are five high-speed lines respectively sections: Hanover-Würzburg (327 km): the first and longest newly built line in Germany. With the later Nuremberg-Munich upgrades, this creates a largely high-speed route for Hamburg-Munich services.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 11 Stuttgart-Mannheim (100 km): Mannheim s approaches and a terminus layout at Stuttgart restrict acceleration of end-to-end timings for through services. Hannover-Berlin: 185 km of new build, via Wolfsburg rather than the 'classic' route through Magdeburg. A symbolic piece of engineering following Berlin's restoration as national capital, this and the earlier Hanover-Würzburg newly built line enable accelerated services to the south, albeit at much greater route length. Cologne-Frankfurt (177 km): Severe gradients assume ICE3 capability or better. Shorter than the sinuous Rhine route via Koblenz that it partly replaces, this newly built line also links Köln/Bonn and Frankfurt Main's airports. Nuremberg-Ingolstadt (89 km): Almost entirely built with slab track, this is a shorter route than existing lines and offers reduced timings in conjunction with the 200 km/h upgrade of Ingolstadt-Munich. From December 2006 the line featured the first Regional Express services (operated by DB Regio) operating at up to 200 km/h. Using Class 101 former IC coaches, it cuts 48 minutes off the previous fastest Nürnberg-München RE timings. Cologne-Aachen (70 km): This high-speed line is the German part of the Trans- European transport networks project high-speed line Paris Brussels Cologne. It is not a newly built railway line, but a project to upgrade the existing railway line which was opened in 1841 by the Rhenish Railway Company. Karlsruhe-Basel (incomplete): In March 1993 the first section, between Bühl and Achern (9 km) was put into service. The continued development of the line as the Neu- und Ausbaustrecke Karlsruhe-Basel (i.e. a mixture of new high-speed line and upgraded line). This line forms the most important northern access route to the Swiss AlpTransit project and is therefore part of a bilateral convention for an increase in the efficiency in rail transport between Switzerland and Germany. Speeds on the newly built lines vary, some 250 km/h with 280 km/h allowed for later running. Later lines are passed for service speeds of 300 km/h. The following map shows the maximum speed as well as the number of (high-speed) trains per hour.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 12 Figure 5 Maximum speed and trains per hour on German high-speed lines Source: DB Netz AG 2009. Only the Cologne-Frankfurt line is exclusively dedicated to high-speed trains (due to severe gradients). All other lines are used for mixed traffic as the following map shows.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 13 Figure 6 Mixed traffic on high-speed lines in Germany Source: DB Netz AG. All lines are 1,435 mm gauge and electrified at 15 kv ac 16.7 Hz. The following table shows the further technical parameters of the mentioned high-speed lines in comparison to the UIC standards. Line UIC standard Hannover Würzburg Stuttgart Mannheim Hannover Berlin Cologne Frankfurt Nuremberg Ingolstadt Centre distance Track superstructure Gradient 4-5 m 35 mm/m ballasted track, UIC-60 track, B-70 concrete sleeper 4.7 m ballasted track, UIC-60 track, B-70 concrete sleeper 4.7 m predominantly slab track. UIC-60 track 4.5 m slab track, UIC-60 track slab track, UIC-60 track 12.5 mm/m 12.5 mm/m 40 mm/m 20 mm/m Curve radius Design (reg/min) speed 7,000/ 5,500 m (300 km/h) 7,000/5,100 m 300 km/h red. 250 km/h 7,000/5,100 m 300 km/h 3,348 (min) 300 km/h 4,085 (min) 300 km/h Train control on-board signalling system continuous automatic trainrunning control (LZB) LZB LZB LZB add. CIR- ELKE 2 LZB L72 CE II add. CIR-ELKE 2

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 14 Cologne Aachen Karlsruhe Basel ballasted track, UIC-60 track, B-70 concrete sleeper slab track, UIC-60 track 250 km/h 250 km/h LZB add. CIR-ELKE 2 future: ETCS L2 The following three maps show the future perspective of the German high-speed network, based on the current plan of DB Netze. Figure 7 Today s network with a minimum speed of 230 km/h 9 Source: DB Netz AG. Existing lines min. 230 km/h Based on the existing network there are future plans for the extension of the German highspeed network. The following map and project overview considers the period until 2020/2025 and is based on the publications of DB Netze. The assessment especially with regard to the feasibility and the realisation timeline will be discussed later in this study (see section 3.2.6). 9 From 2002-2004 the Hamburg-Berlin line was upgraded for a maximum speed of 200-230 km/h

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 15 Figure 8 Network 2020/2025 with a minimum speed of 230 km/h Existing lines min. 230 km/h New high-speed lines until 2020/2025 Source: DB Netz AG. Speed extension on existing high-speed lines: 1. Hannover Würzburg, extension to 280 km/h (planned) 2. Mannheim Stuttgart, extension to 280 km/h (planned) 3. Wolfsburg Berlin, extension to auf 280 km/h (under examination) New high-speed lines until 2020/2025 (planned beginning of operation, Vmax): 10. ABS Augsburg München (2011, 230 km/h) 11. Erfurt Halle/Leipzig (2016, 300 km/h) 12. NBS Ebensfeld Erfurt (2018, 300 km/h) 13. Stuttgart Ulm (2020, 250 km/h) 14. Karlsruhe Basel (complete line until 2020, 250 km/h) 15. Rhein/Main Rhein/Neckar (ca. 2020, 300 km/h) 16. Y-Trasse Langwedel/Lauenbrück-Isernhagen (ca. 2020, 300 km/h)

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 16 Figure 9 Network extension in neighbouring countries and perspective for Germany New high-speed lines in neighbouring countries Upgrades in Germany after 2020/2025 Source: DB Netz AG. New highs-peed lines/extensions and projects in neighbouring countries: 17. Fehmarnbelt link (2018) 18. Hammerbrücke Brussels (2009) 19. Straßburg Paris (eastern section 2014) 20. Mulhouse Lyon (first section 2011) 21. Basel Mailand (new tunnel after 2016) 22. Kufstein Verona (first HSR section 2011, Brennerbasistunnel after 2020) 23. Salzburg Vienna (first sections open, complete line until 2015) 24. Frankfurt/Oder Warszawa (160 km/h, planned) 25. Hanau Fulda 26. Niederaula Blankenheim 27. Seelze Haste 3.2.3 Network development strategy Overall criteria of route selection are the reduction of journey times between German metropolitan regions with additional impacts on the trans-european rail network: Hamburg Frankfurt (16), Berlin Munich (11, 12), Frankfurt Stuttgart (15), Stuttgart Munich (10, 13). Furthermore there are still obligations from Federal Government decision in 1991 for the achievement of coherent living conditions in eastern and western Germany by the establishment of a cross-national transport network (German unity transport projects, VDE 8).

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 17 As already indicated in section 3.2.1 the network development until 2020/2025 underlines the very slowly proceeding orientation from a network with isolated high-speed sections towards a nation-wide high-speed network linking the main metropolitan regions within Germany and Europe. The most relevant projects covering the new construction of high-speed lines as well as the upgrade of existing lines for high-speed purposes will be described in detail in the following. 11. Erfurt Halle/Leipzig, 12. Ebensfeld Erfurt VDE 8 was approved as a Germany Unity transport project by the Federal Government. The upgraded Nuremberg-Ebensfeld line is the southernmost section of the Germany Unity Transport Project No. 8. The German government added the project to the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan in 1992. It is regarded as one of the most vital rail projects not only for Germany, but also for the trans-european rail network. The line is part of the Line 1 of Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T). Designed for maximum speeds of up to 300 km/h, the new line will reduce journey times between Munich and Berlin from 6 to 4 hours. It consists of five sub-projects: VDE 8.1 Upgraded line: Nuremberg to Ebensfeld (83 km), including S-Bahn (rapid transit) tracks from Nuremberg to Forchheim, planned opening date: 2017, VDE 8.1 New line: Ebensfeld to Erfurt (107 km), planned opening date: 2017 Erfurt junction (5 km), VDE 8.2 New line: Erfurt to Leipzig/Halle (123 km), planned opening date: 2015, 23 km opened in June 2003, VDE 8.3 Upgraded line: Leipzig/Halle to Berlin (187 km), opened in May 2006.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 18 Figure 10 VDE8 Development of corridor Berlin - Munich Source: DB Netz AG, www.vde8.de. The legislative framework comprises the following steps: Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (1992) -> Verkehrsprojekte Deutsche Einheit, Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act (BSchwAG), Regional planning procedure (1994), Plan approval procedure (1995/ 1996/2009 ff), EU legislation. The project planning and realization is conducted by DB ProjektBau GmbH as a 100 % subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG. On the project web-page www.vde8.de interested persons can find a detailed documentation of the time table and progress of the construction work. According to the progress report German unity transport projects 10 from May 2011 the budgetary funds for the continuation of the project VDE Nr. 8 are guaranteed. The investments in the sub-projects 8.1 (Nuremberg Erfurt) and Nr. 8.2 (Erfurt Leipzig/Halle) have been strengthened to achieve a completion of the new Erfurt Leipzig link until the end of 2015 and the new line Ebensfeld Erfurt line until the end of 2017. Due to financial restrictions (until now no mandatory financing agreement) the Ebensfeld Nuremberg upgrade will not be completed before the end of 2018. Therefore the full achievement potential on the way from Berlin to Munich will prospectively not be reached before 2019. 10 The total cost of the project is currently estimated to be 9.6 billion Euro. The widely discussed section Nuremberg Erfurt stands for 5.2 billion Euros. In the 1990s it was estimated to be 3.75 billion Euros. Costs have increased due to inflation and because addi- http://www.bmvbs.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/68032/publicationfile/40375/sachstandsberichtverkehrsprojekte-deutsche-einheit-stand-mai-2011.pdf.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 19 tional infrastructure is now required. Total expenditure on this particular line until the end of 2010 was 1.7 billion Euros. Figure 11 Project VDE 8.1: Nuremberg Erfurt VDE 8.2: Erfurt - Halle/Leipzig VDE 8.3: Berlin - Halle/Leipzig Source: Progress report VDE, p. 16. Investment volume VDE8 Total Investment (Million Euro/km) 5.201 (27.4) 2.738 (22.3) 1.653 (8.8) Investment until end of 2010 Open Investment 1.654 3.547 1.652 1.086 1.648 5 The financing of the project is tied to specific laws/funding bodies: Central government (Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act, economic stimulus plan), European Union (TEN program, EFRD, EU economic stimulus plan) Federal states (Local Transport Financing Act GVFG) Local authorities (EkrG) Capital resources DB Netz AG, DB Station & Service AG, DB Energie GmbH The estimated journey time reduction from 6 to 4 hours from Berlin to Munich differs considerably from the total investment volume of approximately 10 billion Euro. The forecast for the number of ICE trains on the line has been reduced from 32 trains per day and direction in 1994 to 16 in 2010. The new line mainly serves the axis between Munich and Berlin. The vision of a shorter journey time of 3 hours between both cities was given in favour of a (political motivated) stop in Erfurt instead of creating a direct Leipzig Nuremberg link (90 km shorter distance). For the execution of the project a (cost-intensive) solution with 64 km tunnel constructions has been chosen in order to allow freight trains on the line to increase the cost-benefit-ratio up to 1.8. De facto there are 4 sections with gradients up to 20 mm/m in order to avoid higher building costs which make the line more or less useless for efficient freight transportation. (10. Augsburg München), 13. Stuttgart Ulm, 15. Rhein/Main Rhein/Neckar The DB concept Netz 21 (network 21) 11 envisages a reduction of the travel time between Frankfurt and Munich from over three and a half today to only two and a half hours in the future. Basis for this timing form the following upgrading and new construction projects: Upgraded line: Augsburg to Munich (62 km), opened on 10 December 2011 with a new speed limit of 230 km/h after 13 years of building, New line: Stuttgart to Ulm (59 km), planned opening date: end of 2019, New line: Frankfurt to Mannheim (85 km), planned opening date: 2017. The Deutsche Bahn AG Stuttgart Ulm rail project breaks down into two project segments: refurbishment of the Stuttgart 21 rail node and the Wendlingen Ulm new-build line. The two projects are first priority projects in the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (FTIP) 2003 and also part of the federal railway infrastructure requirement plan. Before 11 The network 21 concept was developed in 1995 and has not been realized.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 20 construction begins, the rail project has to receive the required planning permission by undergoing the project approval procedures pursuant to Section 18 of the German General Railway Act (AEG). The planning approval procedure started in October 2001; first resolutions have been achieved in 2005 and 2006 (building law). With the results of the Stuttgart 21 referendum in November 2011 the continuation of the construction of the new Stuttgart main station is politically legitimated which strongly affects the progress of the approval procedure for the remaining sections of the (Stuttgart -) Wendlingen Ulm high-speed line. The following illustration shows the two projects. Figure 12 Planning approval sections Stuttgart 21 Source: www.bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de. In Stuttgart the terminal is to be rebuilt to a through-station, and the high-speed line Mannheim-Stuttgart is to be extended to Ulm via the airport located at a higher altitude. Its longitudinal slope is 25 mm/m (2.5 %) and more, heavy trains would have to continue to travel on the existing lines. The reduction of journey time between Stuttgart and Ulm by the new high-speed line is estimated to 26 minutes (from 54 to 28 minutes), if a stop at Stuttgart Airport is omitted. The new-build line forms part of the Magistrale for Europe and therefore of priority Trans-European Project No. 17. The legislative framework comprises the following steps: Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (2003), Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act (BSchwAG), Regional planning procedure (1996), Plan approval procedure (open resolutions for PFA 1.3, 1.6b, 2.1a/b, 2.2), EU legislation.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 21 The project planning and realization is conducted by DB ProjektBau GmbH. The applicable time table schedules the trial operations for beginning of 2019 - the start of operations is planned for December 2019. Shortly after the Stuttgart 21 referendum there is another building freeze due to a court ruling (Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg) from 16. December 2012. Further delays of the building progress can be expected due to an ongoing financial discussion and resistance of BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany) and other initiatives. The financing framework for restructuring the Stuttgart rail node amounts to a total of EUR 4.526 billion. Other opinions consider this cost estimation as too low. Most of that sum will be provided by the Federal government, Deutsche Bahn and the Federal Land of Baden- Württemberg. Deutsche Bahn AG: 1,747 million Euros Federal government: 1,229.4 million Euros Federal Land of Baden-Württemberg: 930.6 million Euros Regional capital Stuttgart: 291.8 million Euros Airport Stuttgart: 227.2 million Euros Verband Region Stuttgart: 100 million Euros The new-build line between Wendlingen and Ulm is expected to cost EUR 2.89 billion, a sum which will be split between the Federal government (2/3) and the Land of Baden- Württemberg (1/3). The estimated benefits from the project are in contrast to a 7.4 billion Euro investment. Due to the ambitious alignment with numerous tunnels, expected operational instabilities and the (still) ongoing resistance of project opponents further cost increases and delays are likely. The gradient of 25 mm/m (2.5 %) and more on the Wendlingen Ulm line makes heavy trains to continue to travel on the existing lines. Considering this constraint the cost-benefit-ratio of the project drops to 1.2 (including 17 lightweight freight trains per day) which makes the project economically limited useful. The broadly based resistance underlines the enormous mistakes in the project communication. The planned new Rhine-Main/Rhine-Neckar (Frankfurt Mannheim) intercity express (ICE) line closes the gap on the high-speed corridor between Cologne and Stuttgart (via Frankfurt). Furthermore it is intended to consolidate the backbone of the key north-south connections in the European railway system network (corridor 24 of TEN-T). The new ICE line is one of the "urgently required" measures in the FTIP 2003 that are intended to be realised by 2015. Designed for a maximum speed of 300 km/h, the new line will help to reduce the journey time from Frankfurt to Stuttgart from 70 to 53 minutes. Deutsche Bahn AG is currently determining the exact route. The original plans proposed by Deutsche Bahn contained a bypass route which would have skirted Mannheim. This would have resulted in considerable conflicts of usage on the lines in the high-density core area of the Rhine-Neckar metropolitan region and a severe downgrading of the Mannheim ICE hub. Due to intense discussions the original time-line of a completion until 2007 had to be given up, currenty there is no mandatory time line; experts expect an opening not before 2021.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 22 Figure 13 NBS Rhine-Main/Rhine-Neckar Source: Deutsche Bahn AG (http://www.deutschebahn.com/site/bahn/de/konzern/db hintergruende/ bauen bahn/laufende projekte/rheinmain rheinneckar/rheinmain rheinneckar.html). The legislative framework comprises the following steps: Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (2003), Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act (BSchwAG), Regional planning procedure (1999-2004), Plan approval procedure (start for the first section Frankfurt (M) Stadion Kreisgrenze Landkreis Groß-Gerau/Darmstadt-Dieburg in 2008), EU legislation. A time table for the construction of the new line can currently not be given. Following the in December 2011 published framework for infrastructure investments 2011-2015 in Germany (Investitionsrahmenplan für die Verkehrsinfrastruktur des Bundes) the Frankfurt -

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 23 Mannheim project is amongst numerous project which will generally not be started before 2015. The cost estimates including the Mannheim junction amount to 1,771.4 Euro. A future increase due to the project delay is likely. The financing of the project is tied to the followingg funding bodies: Central government (Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act) Capital resources Deutsche Bahn AG, Third party resources. The new line contributes to eliminating one of Germany's greatest capacity bottleneck, which is to be found in this area. The gap closing of the high-speed line Cologne Frankfurt Stuttgart is another important issue. With regard to the predicted traffic volumes on the Rhine axis especially in freight transportation it has to be asked, if the amount of 1.8 billion Euro can be invested more efficiently in order to avoid bottlenecks. The controversial Darmstadt and Mannheim junction and financial situation of the public households might cause a further delay of the project beyond 2021. 16. Y-Trasse Langwedel/Lauenbrück-Isernhagen The Y-Trasse is from Fehmarnbelt perspective the most important high-speed project in Germany as it ensures the connection of Hamburg to the high-speed link Hannover Würzburg. The main objective of the project is not only to reduce journey times between Hamburg/Bremen and Hannover (reduction 13/8 minutes), it is also to create additional capacity for hinterland transportation of the seaport of Hamburg. The Y-Trasse is part of the high priority corridor 5 (TEN-T) from Helsinki to Valetta on Malta via the Fehmarnbelt. The building comprises two sub-projects: New line (1): Hannover to Lauenbrück (92 km), start of construction not before 2015, planned opening not before 2020, Upgrade line (2): Visselhövede to Langwedel (22 km), start of construction not before 2015, planned opening not before 2020. To achieve the full potential of the line additional upgrades (e.g. Lauenbrück Buchholz (3), access to Hannover-Lehrte) which are not part of the project Y-Trasse are necessary. After the review of the requirement plan in September 2011 new parameters for the project design have been fixed. Due to the strong growth perspectives of freight transportation on the Hamburg hinterland corridor the transport ministry has revoked plans for a 300 km/h designed high-speed link in favour of a 250 km/h line dedicated for passenger as well as freight transportation. Impacts on future journey times have not been calculated yet.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 24 Figure 14 NBS/ABS Hamburg/Bremen Hannover (Y-Trasse) ❸ ❷ ❶ Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, Ulrich Bischoping, 04.11.2011. The legislative framework comprises the following steps: Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (2003), Federal Railway Infrastructure Development Act (BSchwAG), Regional planning procedure (1990s), Plan approval procedure (not started), EU legislation. A memorandum of understanding between Deutsche Bahn AG and Federal government (19 million Euros) respectively Federal land of Lower-Saxony (10 million Euro) has been signed, Hamburg and Bremen have also indicated to participate in the memorandum. As the new investment master plan (draft from 14.12.2011) has put the project Y-Trasse on hold (classification in lowest category D), the existing time table for the project is currently highly doubtful. A realization until 2020 is not likely; experts expect a completion 2025 or

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 25 later. On 30 th January 2012 DB AG CEO Rüdiger Grube announced to freeze all work on the project and to assess alternatives first. Even if the transport ministry has announced that there is no stop for the planning procedure the final realization of the project is therefore more unlikely than ever. Other alternatives are supposed to give a major contribution to solve the infrastructure capacity problems between Hamburg and Hannover, mixed operations with maximum speed for passenger trains of <230 km/h are likely from today s perspective. According to FTIP 2003 the investment volume counts for 1.3 billion euros (only projected ABS/NBS). Experts estimate the total cost of the project to be 5 billion Euros including the necessary upgrades of the feeding lines. For beginning of 2012 new cost estimations have been announced by DB. Issues regarding the financing of the project are currently not predictable. The railway infrastructure in the hinterland of Hamburg sees itself confronted with various challenges derived from the dynamic growth especially of container volumes in the port of Hamburg. The contribution of the Y-Trasse to gain significantly more capacity for freight transportation must be doubted. The line as originally projected fails to significantly release the bottlenecks in the railway nodes of Hamburg, Bremen and Hannover, new capacities will be available too late (financing, protests), other chances for separation of freight and passenger trains e.g. by upgrading regional infrastructure have not been considered in detail. The journey time decreases of <13 minutes contrasts with a 5 billion Euro investment in a dedicated high-speed line. 3.2.4 Network development on Hamburg-Fehmarnbelt corridor The German part of the Hamburg-Øresund corridor has to be divided into two sections. With the introduction of the new timetable on December 13, 2008, the electrification (Type Re200) of the Hamburg-Lübeck (-Travemünde) railway line was successfully accomplished. The modernization of the 85-kilometre double-track line section (maximum speed 160 km/h) was carried out over a period of two and a half years while maintaining full traffic on the line.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 26 Figure 15 ABS Hamburg-Lübeck Source: BMVBS. According to the specifications of the state treaty between Danmark and Germany the planning of DB Netze for the section Lübeck-Puttgarden focuses on an electrified railway line and - with the exception of the Fehmarn Sound Bridge, where the train path remains a single-track line - feature a double-track line. The overall economic analysis of a Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link was based on a conventional electrified double-track line (maximum speed 160 km/h). 12 In May 2010, Schleswig-Holstein decided to carry out a regional planning procedure for the rail connection of the Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link. The following map shows the different alignment alternatives. The alternatives A, 1A and E were proposed by DB AG, the X alternative is based on regional initiatives. As all alternatives more or less follow the current alignment, a future high-speed upgrade is most unlikely due to technical parameters as well as noise exposure. 12 Source: Rail Connection for the Fehmarnbelt Link, DB AG, 2011 (www.deutschebahn.com/site/shared /de/dateianhaenge/infomaterial/bauprojekte/fehmarnbelt feste fahrbahn englisch.pdf).

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 27 Figure 16 Alignment alternatives for Lübeck-Puttgarden section Source: DB AG, Kreis Ostholstein, Illustration by Lärmkontor/HTC. As the regional planning procedure has not been finished yet there are only provisional estimations for the investment. Following the most recent cost estimate the total invest-

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 28 ment volume counts for 817 million Euros. 13 Aspects of node extension in Hamburg and Lübeck as well further lines upgrades e.g. between Hamburg and Ahrensburg (S 4) are not included in this estimation. Detached from the specifications of the state treaty and the current planning of DB there are visions for a high-speed link between (Berlin -) Hamburg and Copenhagen (- Oslo) (e. g. COINCO approach fur a future high-speed link Berlin - Oslo 14 ). In spring 2011 the mayors of Hamburg and Copenhagen met to discuss an extended partnership between the two cities. Both had also infrastructure and high-speed trains on the agenda. 15 For further comments on the high-speed vision see section 0 of this study. At this point one thing can already be stated: a high-speed link Hamburg Copenhagen will most likely not work without a wholly or at least partly dedicated high-speed line as indicated on the following map. 16 A maximum speed of 250 km/h between Lübeck and Fehmarn supposably requires a track alignment without touching the seaside resorts of Timmendorfer Strand, Scharbeutz etc. Currently the DB seems to prefer an upgrade of the existing line. 13 14 15 16 According to an assessment of the German Federal Court of Auditors from April 2009 a potential cost increase of up to 60 % has to be considered. A published figure of 1.7 billion Euro for the total investment also comprises an upgrade of the Bad Oldesloe-Hamburg-Wandsbek link. High-speed train Oslo-Berlin, P. H. Jespersen, 2007. Femern AS Newsletter, June 2011. A maximum speed of 250 km/h between Lübeck and Puttgarden will most likely require a track alignment without crossing the seaside resorts of Timmendorfer Strand, Scharbeutz etc.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 29 Figure 17 Visions for high-speed line Hamburg-Copenhagen Source: TDL. 3.2.5 Demand and demand forecasting The total German passenger transport market recorded a slight gain in volume sold in 2010 thereby connecting to the robust development noted in 2009. While the rise in demand noted in the rail passenger and in domestic air transport sectors was driven by favourable overall economic conditions in Germany coupled with gains in both employment figures and disposable real income levels, the public road passenger transport segment continued its downward trend. Rail was the only mode of transport to expand its intermodal share of market in 2010. In total, the rail passenger transport sector was able to regain the share of market it lost in 2010 and currently has a market share of just over 10 %.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 30 Figure 18 German passenger transport market Growth rates Market share 2010 2009 2010 2009 Rail passenger transport + 2.4-1.5 10.1 9.8 DB Group + 2.2-1.6 9.4 9.2 Non-Group railways + 5.0 + 0.3 0.7 0.7 Public road passenger transport - 0.5-1.0 9.5 9.6 DB Group - 0.5 + 0.7 1.1 1.1 Motorized individual transport 0.0 0.0 79.1 79.3 Air transport (domestic) + 2.2-3.6 1.3 1.3 Total Market + 0.2-0.3 100.0 100.0 Source: DB Annual Report 2010. The rail passenger transport segment in Germany was able to post substantial gains in volume sold over the previous year s figure. Driven by a favourable market environment, demand noted by DB Group companies rose by 2.2 % over the same year-ago period. DB estimates that the performance of non-group railways rose by about 5 % due to their taking over additional lines in the regional transport segment. Their share of the rail passenger transport market in Germany rose slightly. In the long-distance rail segment, competitors still account for only a low market share of less than one per cent in terms of traffic performance. Once again, DB s principal competitor was Interconnex, a member of the French Veolia Group. Evaluating the development of the overall transport volumes in the (long-distance) rail passenger segment between 2005 and 2010 only a moderate increase of passenger volumes (5.9 %) as well as passenger kilometres (2.7 %) can be observed. Figure 19 Development of long-distance transportation (rail) 2005-2010 million passengers million pkm 2005 119 33,600 2006 120 34,500 2007 119 34,100 2008 124 35,500 2009 123 33,100 2010 126 34,500 Source: Destatis, Deutsche Bahn AG. Considering the impacts of new high-speed lines an increase in number trains going together with an increase of travellers has to be stated.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 31 Figure 20 Impact of high-speed lines in Germany Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, 2011. With regard to the development of the total passenger volumes, the beginning of highspeed operations (new lines as well new train sets) seem to have a minor impact as the following illustration shows. Figure 21 Impact of high-speed development on passenger km Source: HTC Illustration.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 32 Examples from France show that there seem to be stronger impacts of new high-speed operations on passenger volumes in other countries compared to Germany. Figure 22 Passenger impacts of Paris-Lyon TGV-line Source: IBU. Over the last decade ICE trains can be considered as the backbone of long-distance transportation in Germany. In 2010 nearly 78 million long-distance passengers travelled by ICE (1992: 10 million passengers). This stands for 60 % of all passengers of DB Fernverkehr. In fact the number of ICE passengers does not mirror the impacts of high-speed lines as ICE trainsets are used on various long-distance relations within Germany. Travelling by ICE has gained popularity as IC trainsets are most of the time old-fashioned and in a bad shape. For the future there seem to be no significant growth expectations for long-distance passenger transportation by rail. The study Prognose der deutschlandweiten Verkehrsverflechtungen 2025 on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS) predicts an annual passenger increase of 0.3 % until 2025. Forecasts considering aspects of a significant extension of the high-speed activities do not exist in Germany. But: demographic changes as well as ongoing changes regarding the housing activities might lead to a stronger population concentration in metropolitan areas which might also lead to an increased demand of (high-speed) passenger transportation between these agglomerations. The following map taken from the acatech-study Mobilität 2020 17 17 http://www.acatech.de/fileadmin/user_upload/baumstruktur_nach_website/acatech/root/de/ Publikationen/Projektberichte/Mobilitaet_2020_web.pdf.pdf.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 33 shows the expected demand for long-distance/ice-transportation and underlines the ongoing concentration on core-regions and a core-network. Figure 23 Transportation demand 2020 (passengers per day and direction) and changes to 2002 per day and direction Source: Acatech-study Mobilität 2020. Current projections of Deutsche Bahn AG from 2011 show an expected increase of operating performance between 2010 and 2030 of 5.2 % for long distance transportation (+ 7 million train-km), the average net speed is supposed to increase by 9.2 % up to 118 km/h. The following map shows the projected service level (expected trains per day) until 2030 (green: expansion of services, red: reduction of services). The most significant shifts in supply occur on the following lines: Supply duplication on the axis Cologne-Frankfurt-Stuttgart-Munich due to new line, Significant supply extension Frankfurt-Karlsruhe-Basel, Significant journey time reductions Berlin-Munich, Supply thinning peripheral net.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 34 Figure 24 Projected service level (trains per day) DB long-distance 2010 vs. 2030 Source: Fahrplan 2026, Deutsche Bahn AG. 3.2.6 Funding, financing and economic appraisal Section 7 of the Federal Railway Infrastructure Upgrading Act states that BMVBS shall submit a report to the German Bundestag each year on the progress made in upgrading the railway infrastructure network (Verkehrsinvestitionsbericht). In 2009 (latest published report 2010 for the year 2009) investment totalling 3,839 million Euros was made for the funding of railway infrastructure (BSWAG/DBGrg). Total expenditure on the rail projects under the current demand plan (only upgrade and new-built) was 1,592 million Euros, around 1,142 million Euros of which was financed from federal funds. The investment focused on the following new high-speed lines/upgraded lines: Karlsruhe Basle, Nuremberg Erfurt Halle/Leipzig, Augsburg Munich, Berlin Frankfurt (Oder) and Hamburg Lübeck. The following illustration shows the principle of the financing agreement between German government and Deutsche Bahn AG.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 35 Figure 25 Financing agreements between German government and DB AG Source: Deutsche Bahn AG. In December 2012 the German ministry (BMVBS) presented the latest draft of the new investment master plan (Investitionsrahmenplan) for the period from 2011 to 2015 for all modes of transport. The traffic forecasts and the in part critical condition of the infrastructure underline the necessity of large investments in the maintenance and upgrade of the existing road and rail infrastructure as well as the inland waterways. Therefore the in November 2011 approved Federal government budget comprises an extended infrastructure investment budget of 10.5 billion Euros for 2012 (including a 1 billion infrastructure acceleration program). For the period from 2013 to 2015 an overall budget of 10.1 billion Euros per year has been approved. Regardless of these large investments not all economically relevant projects can be realized. Due to increasing budget restrictions the existing list of upgrade and new building projects (FTIP 2003 based on the economic appraisal by costbenefit ratio) has been substantiated. The priority has been set to maintenance and replacement projects to support the performance of the existing infrastructure. For the preservation and upgrade/new-built of German railway infrastructure the investment master plan sets the following framework for the period from 2011 to 2015. The budget for the preservation of the existing network is double the budget for upgrade and new lines. Figure 26 Investment master plan for 2011-2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 sum Total investment 3,883 4,063 4,206 4,242 4,237 20,631 Misc. investment 182 256 300 360 370 1,468 Infrastructure acceleration program - 40 60 - - 100 Investment in existing infrastructure 3,701 3,767 3,846 3,882 3,867 19,063 and new projects Maintenance 2,590 2,540 2,510 2,500 2,500 12,640 Upgrade and new lines 1,111 1,227 1,336 1,382 1,367 6,423 Source: Investitionsrahmenplan 2011-2015.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 36 Compared to the sum of the trusted investment budget for the upgrade and the construction of new network sections (6.4 billion Euros), the investment needs amount to 7.5 to 8 billion Euros until 2015 (12.7 billion Euros until final project realization). Figure 27 25,0 Framework for German infrastructure investments total demand 20-20.5 billion 20,0 add. demand 1-1.5 billion demand for preservation 12.6 billion demand for upgrades/new lines 7.5-8 billion billion euro 15,0 10,0 add. demand 1-1.5 billion 5,0 available 19.1 billion available 12.6 billion available 6.4 billion 0,0 Source: Investitionsrahmenplan 2011-2015. Therefore a ranking of all projects is necessary. For efficiency reasons projects which are already underway are of highest priority. Only remaining budgets can be used for the upgrade and extension of the existing network. According to annex 1 of the master plan, all projects are ranked in four categories: Category A: accumulative projects, Category B: current projects, Category C: priority projects, Category D: other important projects. In the priority list in annex 1 the following projects with relevance to high-speed rail can be found. For further details see Investitionsrahmenplan 2011-2015 18. Figure 28 Five-year plan for infrastructure upgrades Cat. Project Investment needs from Project status 2011 (million euros) B ABS/NBS Stuttgart-Ulm-Augsburg 2,418.3 under construction (NBS Stuttgart-Ulm incl. Stuttgart junction) B ABS/NBS Karlsruhe-Basel 506.4 under construction 18 http://www.bmvbs.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/76848/publicationfile/49522/investitionsrahmenplan-2011- bis-2015-irp.pdf.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 37 B B C C D D D D D (Schliengen-Basel) VDE 8.1 Nuremberg-Erfurt (NBS Ebensfeld-Erfurt) VDE 8.2 Erfurt-Halle (Erfurt- Gröbers) ABS/NBS Karlsruhe-Basel (tunnel Rastatt) VDE 8.1 Nuremberg-Erfurt (upgrade Eltersdorf-Erlangen) ABS/NBS Karlsruhe-Basel (further sections) Hinterlandaccess Fehmarnbelt VDE 8.1 ABS Nuremberg- Ebensfeld NBS/ABS Hamburg/Bremen- Hannover (Y-Trasse) NBS/ABS Rhein-Main/Rhein- Neckar Source: Investitionsrahmenplan 2011-2015. 1,921.6 under construction 1,134.4 under construction 957.2 in planning stage 156.9 in planning stage 3.2.7 Main conclusions on high-speed activities in Germany Key target of the German (transport) policy is to facilitate mobility and make it sustainable. This can be considered as a door-opener also for high-speed concepts. The national network development in Germany is highly affected by the corporate strategy of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB). Due to the economic success of passenger transportation the DB corporate strategy shows a strong orientation towards the (monopolistic) long distance/ice-segment. DB Bahn strategy of new vehicle concept (ICx from 2016) is supposed to increase travelling comfort and contribute to attract additional passengers. Further impacts on the cost side can be expected due to less energy consumption and more efficient operations. With maximum speeds of more than 230-250 km/h of the new ICx fleet DB withdraws from a further extension of the fleet with maximum speeds of >250 km/h. The planning of DB Netze for the section Lübeck-Puttgarden focuses on a conventional electrified double-track line with a maximum speed of 160 km/h. Currently different alignment alternatives are under investigation. All alternatives do not cover a highspeed scenario. Detached from the current planning the mayors of Hamburg and Copenhagen have exchanged ideas on the vision for a high-speed link between (Berlin -) Hamburg and Copenhagen (- Oslo). The development of a coherent high-speed network in Germany will not be finished before 2025/2030. As investments priorities are shifting towards the preservation of the existing network it is likely that new building projects as well as necessary infrastructure upgrades to fill gaps in the existing high-speed will further be postponed. The realization of the Y-Trasse as gateway to the German high-speed network seems to be uncertain as DB AG decided in January 2012 to freeze all work on the project and to assess alternatives first. Other alternatives are supposed to give a major contribution to

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 38 solve the infrastructure capacity problems between Hamburg and Hannover, mixed operations with maximum speed for passenger trains of <230 km/h are likely from today s perspective. The investment volumes for current high-speed projects indicate that (high-speed) infrastructure development in Germany are too costly due to disproportionate technical standards and track alignments. Over the last decade ICE trains can be considered as the backbone of long-distance transportation in Germany. Compared to other European countries the number of passengers does not mirror the impacts of high-speed lines as ICE trainsets are used on various long-distance relations within Germany. The situation of the public infrastructure budgets is supposed to deteriorate over the next years and the growing preservation needs and upgrade of the existing network will eat up potential budgets for new high-speed lines. 3.3 High-speed rail in Denmark 3.3.1 Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholders National transport policy and implications for high-speed rail strategy In January 2009, all parliamentary parties, except from one very small, decided on a wide consensus regarding the national transport policy: the Green Transport Policy. Since January 2009, the national transport program has been concluded in and backed up by 10 political agreements on new investments in railways, roads, bicycle paths, bus systems, stations, ports, terminals, ITS, etc. National investments are financed through a dedicated infrastructure fund and through special public owned DBO-companies e.g. building and operating the fixed links or metro expansions in Copenhagen. The financial constraints require a very strict priority in the coming years as the means in the Infrastructure Fund are almost fully activated until 2020. More than hundred projects have been launched on the platform of the national transport policy, all with the aim to improve mobility and enhance the opportunities for a more green transport policy. Execution of the projects will be a priority up to 2020, but a strategic preparation for the next investment period 2020-2030 is in progress. In principle the new Danish government continues the Green Transport Policy: Transport CO2 emissions to be reduced further, Implementation of a green conversion scheme of car taxation, Public transport needs to lift most of the future growth in traffic, The railway sector must be reliable, safe and modern, Road capacity must be expanded where it causes congestion problems, but also in corridors where the future traffic growth resulting from economic and social development will require an expansion of infrastructure, Cycling should be promoted as preferable where it is a realistic possibility, Denmark should be a laboratory for green transport technology, Bridges, roads and railways must not destroy irreplaceable nature, Noise and air pollution in towns and cities must be reduced.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 39 However, in terms of pricing policy for public transport, the new Government will see to a more social balance (lower fares), and will execute the former Governments decision on introduction of road pricing, in first place with a toll ring around Copenhagen. An extended road pricing as well as monetary impacts from a further CO2 reduction are expected to catalyze modal shifts from road to (high-speed) rail. (High-speed) Strategy of transport ministry On the basis of the Green Transport Policy a historic revitalisation program with special focus on the rail sector has been decided. This action took many years to agree. In 1997 the Ministry of Transport published a high-speed railway plan (Baneplan modernization of the main railway network in Denmark) and it was followed up by specific planning acts for the first sections of a new fast Danish railway network. But more than 10 years of political debate on whether to prioritize upgraded solutions (ABS) for 200 km/h instead of building new lines for 250 km/h postponed the start of construction until 2009. Finally it was agreed to work accordingly to a strategic concept called the time-model setting a target of maximum travel time by increasing the velocity of trains; not for a specific top-speed but sufficient to fulfil a point-to-point travel time of max one hour reaching central terminals in the network. The implication of this time-model concept means that the top-speed of the trains has to be increased from the present 180 km/h to 250 km/h on certain sections of the railway network, but on other parts 200 km/h could be sufficient on upgraded lines. The by far largest part of railway traffic is coming to and from Copenhagen, but the potential for an increase in traffic can be seen in the main corridor Copenhagen-Aalborg.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 40 Figure 29 Passenger transport flows on the Danish railway lines (BaneDK) Source: DK National Railway Authority, 2011. Objectives for the railway investment program according to the Green Transport Policy has been set and agreed: The railway must be able to take most of the future growth in the transport sector, The railway must provide a more attractive and customer focused product, The railway must be reliable, safe and modern, The railway must be more efficient, and competition in the market should be strengthened, The railway vision is based on a doubling the rail passenger transport before 2030, The railway vision is based on a tripling the rail freight transport before 2030. For Denmark the geo-spatial conditions are special due to the many islands of which the nation consists. Before making a long term viable high-speed strategy it has been more relevant to finance and construct the major fixed link in a priority order: first the Great Belt, secondly the Øresund and then the Fehmarnbelt fixed link all very large investments in the same league as major European high-speed projects. As a consequence of the necessary massive investments in the fixed links the Danish railway sector was given less financial means during many years compared with other countries. Today Danish trains are running at only semi-high-speed (max 180 km/h on the InterCity lines), and modern signaling systems and electrification is lacking. The strategic planning of the national transport policy points at a number of development corridors which should be decided upon in 2014-2015 in order to continue modernization

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 41 and upgrading of the Danish main infrastructure in the period after 2020. These corridors consist of both railway or/and highway prioritized investments and as well major fixed links (tunnels or bridges): Jutland: new north-south highways and partly new railway lines, East-West: New fixed links to merge the two parts of Denmark, and here is the highspeed railway perspective important in all the alternatives analyzed, Zealand: here is a new transport corridor ( Ring 5 ) north of Copenhagen on the list. It is a combined railway and highway corridor connected to a possible fixed link across Øresund between Helsingborg and Helsingör. Figure 30 Strategic perspective map for infrastructure development in Denmark in the period after 2020 Source: Green transport policy status of strategic investigations, Ministry of Transport, 2011. It will always be very difficult to choose between these projects which count for more than 30 billion Euros in the investment program for 2020-2030. The East-West alternatives crossing either Little Belt or the direct Zealand-Jutland fixed link across the Kattegat are themselves a challenge for decision making. If the Kattegat-project should be preferred it would take more than half the budget.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 42 Of more importance for a Scandinavian high-speed rail system would be the improvement of the corridors in East-Denmark. The two cities Copenhagen and Malmö are going to investigate another alternative for a new fixed link across Øresund as a sort of supplement to the HH-link. This is also for discussion in the coming years. However, the political constellations on national and regional and local level are already in the process of finding some common understanding for the development. As a matter of fact there is a very clear back-up for investments in the Fehmarnbelt-corridor. Regional stakeholder positions Copenhagen and Hamburg are now getting closer as the Fehmarn-project is going to be realized. A declaration from the two Lord Mayors emphasizes the need to cooperate in different areas where the metropolitan centers have mutual advantages of a stronger regional economic development. Among the statements from the present declaration concerns the field of more effective infrastructure. If a budget of 6 billion Euros is spent on the fixed link giving one hour of improvement in travelling time also a parallel and reasonable improvement of the hinterland infrastructure should be prioritized in order to raise standards and fulfill the aims of the Trans-European Transport Network. A further reduction in travelling time of one hour therefore is set as a minimum demand. Figure 31 The Copenhagen-Hamburg declaration announcing a max travelling time between the two cities Source: Declaration of cooperation, Infrastructure vision, Mayors of Copenhagen and Hamburg, 2011

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 43 It s a new position taken to favoring high-speed rail investments, and the new policy can be identified also at the regional level. Earlier there was a fear that new roads and railways only would damage environment, but an understanding that investments can be done in a way where socio economic benefits could be obtained at the same time as the new infrastructure is build according to best practice, i.e. with the lowest possible negative impact on the local environment. Figure 32 The local and regional political institutions agree to favouring a future high-speed link across Fehmarnbelt Source: Political positions and statements from all municipalities in East Denmark and the Region Zealand and the Capital Region, 2011. These two transport policy framework papers identify the direction of future investments as a respond to national policy programs where there always has been a fight between the Western part and the Eastern part of Denmark with regard to obtain the best possible share of the national investment budget. The positions fully back up of strengthening the South Zealand Corridor from Fehmarn and construct a new transport corridor in the North up to a future HH-link to be build between the two harbor cities. This corridor will give priority to German-Swedish freight transit, but should also accommodate direct high-speed trains bound for Copenhagen Airport and linking to the Øresund Bridge further into the Swedish network. (High-speed) Strategy of DSB The main train operating company DSB do not make transport policies and strategies for high-speed projects. In the Scandinavian countries there has been made a complete and genuine separation of the railway infrastructure and the operating companies, both in the passenger and the freight business. This policy is a consequence of EU-legislation and in order to prepare for more competition and development within the railway sector.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 44 DSB currently has a fleet of semi-fast comfortable InterCity trains. But train speed is restricted to 180 km/h on all main lines. Figure 33 DSB train fleet Name Number of Trainsets Operating Speed Design Speed Service IC3/ER4 140 180 km/h 180 km/h 1991-93 IC4 83 180 km/h 200 km/h 2007-12 ICE TD (Danish modified) 10 180 km/h 200 km/h 2007 Source: DSB In the Danish long distance traffic a fleet of 140 trainsets have been operating since 1991 at the main network. 60 % of the fleet is powered by diesel engines, due to the lack of electrification of the lines especially in Jutland. The electrical version runs in multiple units with the diesel version across the Great Belt bridge in the domestic InterCity traffic. The transport policy in Denmark has been very much focussing on highway investments, metro, lightrail projects, cycle initiatives, etc. This has lead to the absence of a dedicated high-speed railway strategy and an electrification investment process. As probably the last purchase of diesel trains the IC4-series were decided as a way to find a necessary way of relieving the IC3/ER4 series in the short term. However, the supplier Ansaldo-Breda failed to deliver in the agreed quality. Even though 50 % of the payment was refunded the present situation is not optimal: all trainsets are under a technical re-make for at least the next two years. The IC3 trains are licensed and capable of running in both Sweden and Germany. The need of more rolling stock on Danish lines have lead to that all IC3 s are deployed in domestic services. The border crossing Danish-German traffic is now dominated by a fleet of 10 ICE-TD s being leased from DB. Regarding rolling stock development in Denmark it could be expected to find an electric inter-regional train unit, but with an operating speed of max 200 km/h. DSB is still reluctant

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 45 to go into serious considerations about the fast travel market. A simple replacement of the ICE-TD with the upcoming new ICE version capable of running on multi-current systems is very likely when the Fehmarn Belt link opens. For the Danish main lines there are not currently a high-speed rolling stock strategy available: it has not been decided whether DSB should prefer leasing of European standard equipment or going into self-development of a special Danish fleet of a semi-high speed train for 200-250 km/h. However, experience with the IC4-delivery certainly does not encourage the latter. 3.3.2 National high-speed network A dedicated high-speed network is non-existing at the moment, but the era will come due to the political agreement in 2009 (see previous section). An important part of the decision and the technical standards chosen is influenced by the parallel decision to realize the Fehmarnbelt fixed link. The projected new semi high-speed railway corridor from Copenhagen to Rødby is one important part of the future Danish high-speed network which will be described in the following section. 3.3.3 Network development strategy National perspective As described in section 3.3.1 the revitalisation program for the national railway was launched in 2009. The phase one of the time-model forms the new platform for constructing a comprehensive network of high-speed rail services covering the major Danish conurbations in which 75 % of the GDP is produced. The ambitious high-speed strategy has been decided for the national network to ensure significant faster travel times by train between major cities. The time-model includes the following initiatives: Fixing the maximum travel time between Aalborg and Copenhagen to 3 hours, resulting in a reduction of approx. 1½ hours, As first step introduce a 200-250 km/h service between Odense and Copenhagen in 2020. It must not take any longer than one hour between the two cities, As second step upgrade the Aalborg-Aarhus section. This has been initiated, in order for this part to introduce the first improvements 2018-2020, During 2013-14 it should be decided in which way the last section between Odense and Aarhus could be upgraded, Finally the strategy should fulfil the target of doubling railway traffic giving a passenger benefit in saving 3.5 million travel hours annually, reduce CO 2 emissions in the transport sector and reduce congestion on major highways. The time-model is a cornerstone of the strategy to develop the railway network between the provinces and tying Denmark better together. The faster journey times on main routes between parts of the country will attract travellers to public transport and enhance rail role in provincial traffic further. It is expected this ultimately would lead to a significant share of the travel market to using the public transport. Simultaneously, investments in the timemodel release capacity to develop the local and regional train services.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 46 Figure 34 The national railway development scheme Source: Green transport policy status of strategic investigations, Ministry of Transport, 2011. The ongoing strategic planning activities for the period 2020-2030 point at three ambition levels of the railway investment: As shown in the above figure the basic alternative A gives a journey time of two hours for the Copenhagen-Aarhus connection (the two largest cities in Denmark) corresponding to a mean travel speed at 160 km/h. This is comparable to ICE-services like the Hamburg-Hanover. Investments will be 2-3 billion Euros, which among other major infrastructure upgrading include a bridge crossing the Vejle Fjord (also with a road section). However, the Danish politicians want to investigate other options. In the alternative B the Copenhagen-Aarhus travel time could climb down to approximatly 1½ hours which would really lead to new domestic high-speed railway services. The preliminary cost estimate for this alternative is 6-7 billion Euros and involves a new fixed link of 16 km in the northern Little Belt. Most visionary is alternative C. Reducing the Copenhagen-Aarhus journey time to 1 hour changes the time-space map completely, but it implies the construction of new mega-infrastructure. The study includes a bridge of 50 km across the Kattegat plus new hinterland investment, which result in the total cost of 15-18 billion Euros. The fixed link solutions of model B and C also enable cars to use these new connections. For all alternatives it is of general interest that high-speed trains not only serve end-to-end markets of the biggest conurbations. The system is composed in a way where faster interregional trains should benefit of the new tracks. More capacity in the network is a pivotal focus for a better operation of commuter traffic and the medium-distance passenger traffic as well. A prerequisite for the plans seems to be the freight transport. Goods can be moved off the road onto the track if more capacity is offered the railway operators. Late 2013 the investigations will draw conclusions and become subject of a probably longer political discussion and positioning. It can be registered that sustainable mobility and effective transport solutions for the future are topics placed high on the political agenda for the national transport development strategies. Of course the problems of the global economy and the actual constraints in the state fiscal budgets could add some more years to how fast the visions can be realized. On the other hand there is a growing recognition of the fact that public works in the infrastructure field in itself generates the frames for future socio economic growth. In this context several sug-

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 47 gestions of a more international investment profile have been brought into the debate by different stakeholders. International perspective This first of all deals with the Swedish-Danish-German main transport corridor, i.e. the Øresund-Fehmarn line. Today the border-crossing transport between Jutland and Schleswig plays a major role. The picture will change when the fixed Fehmarn link opens. Freight transit on railway will be re-directed from the Jutland route to the Fehmarn link reducing the distance of the rail route Sweden-Denmark-Germany by 160 km. Due to the time distance generated by the rather slow ferry lines crossing the Baltic Sea approximately half the passenger volume from Scandinavia to Germany and vice versa is not executed via land transport modes. It is transported by air. The fixed Fehmarnbelt link and a substantial improvement of the hinterland infrastructure is expected to produce a new flow chart for both passenger and freight transport. The strategic master plan issued by the Capital Region presents a number of actions e.g. introduction of a Scandinavian high-speed rail system linked to the Trans-European network via Fehmarnbelt. It also suggests a new fixed link across Øresund and a new rail (and road) transport corridor north-west of Copenhagen.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 48 Figure 35 The international north-south corridors incorporate a new fixed link between Denmark and Sweden Source: Investments in the Future, the Capital Region Denmark, 2011. The Danish and Swedish Government have agreed to consider further perspectives of a new fixed links across Øresund. The HH-link and the supporting transport corridor is part of the investigations of the Ministry of Transport although it is emphasized that the idea of the HH-link originates from a Swedish initiative.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe Figure 36 49 The next fixed link: proposal for a tunnel project Source: IBU Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2010. In 2008-2010 the IBU-project published a number of updated technical analyses of the HHlink pointing at the obvious advantages for further integration and development the Øresund region. In 2011 the Swedish National Transport Administration presents a report with clear recommendations. It is subsequently acknowledged that the challenges of the capacity of the transport system across Øresund will intensify, the Øresund traffic must be seen in a longer perspective of the Fehmarnbelt link, and the potential benefits of building a link in the northern Øresund is worth investigating further. The IBU-analysis is probably the most detailed at the moment regarding a new Øresund crossing. The HH-fixed link is composed as a package of three tunnel sections : In the north a separate system of twin-tunnels for passenger trains running from centre-to-centre linking the two cities of Helsingborg and Helsingør. The inter-regional passenger service gives direct connection between many cities at the one side to the other, and it creates a virtual circular line around Øresund. A twin-tunnel system for cars south of the two harbour cities connects direct to the highway system instead of the present situation with intense road traffic e.g. a lot of international lorries in and out the cities. Replacement of the ferry lines with a 15 km tunnel results in a non-stop direct connection between the E4/E6/E47 motorways. A rail freight tunnel which connects direct to the existing Scania-railway line on the Swedish side, but will have to be connected to a completely new railway line in the Western transport corridor (originally decided to be placed in Ring 5). In the beginning of the study process the HH-link was seen closely integrated with a future high-speed rail system. At a later stage this position was changed in favour of having interregional and freight trains concentrated at the HH-route in the north of Øresund and the high-speed trains calling at Copenhagen Airport station via the Øresund Bridge in the south.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 50 Figure 37 Investment in the new Zealand transport corridor (Ring 5) and the Helsingør-Helsingborg Link billion Euros Køge-Helsingør highway 1.2 Køge-Helsingør railway line 1.3 Helsingør-Helsingborg passenger trains 1.2 Helsingør-Helsingborg freight trains 1.1 Helsingør-Helsingborg road connection 2.0 Total corridor package 6.8 Railway part 3.6 Source: IBU Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2010. In order to utilize the capacity in the best possible way, a choice in the IBU-management group was made for the future route for the main freight transport flows as a very important step for giving priority for faster passenger trains. By moving the freight transport today operated via the Øresund Bridge up to a future northern link this will give better access for passenger traffic to/from the airport. Figure 38 Freight and interregional train services in the Helsingborg-Køge corridor Source: IBU Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2010 www.ibu-oresund.se As stated the ongoing national strategic considerations for infrastructure investments in the period 2020-2030 includes this corridor perspective (see Figure 37). However, at the moment the process of the analytical work is not running in a very fast tempo even though the general picture on the regional and local level seems to cover a major interest for the pro-

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 51 jects. The HH-link could turn out being a less complex topic of planning compared with the challenges that the construction of the highway/railway transport corridor in the Danish hinterland might induce. The parties suggest the Danish government that more in-depth studies (than the present strategy analysis) should be initiated in order to find a solution for placing the exact alignment (Investment in the future. Capital Region, 2011). Further aspects regarding the South-Zealand corridor will be dealt with in the next chapter. 3.3.4 Network development on Fehmarnbelt-Øresund corridor According to the state treaty between Denmark and Germany on the Fehmarnbelt fixed link, the Kingdom of Denmark should have the sole responsibility for upgrading and financing the hinterland connection to the fixed link across the Fehmarnbelt in the Kingdom of Denmark. The upgrading of the hinterland infrastructure in the Kingdom of Denmark should be completed no later than at the opening of the fixed link across the Fehmarnbelt. This includes the electrification of the existing railway line between Ringsted and Rødbyhavn as well as the upgrading of the railway lines from Vordingborg to the Storstrøm Bridge and from Orehoved to Rødbyhavn to a double-track, electrified railway line. The planning process has not been based on one single and integrated decision for the whole railway corridor between Øresund and Fehmarnbelt. Separate decisions and financial funds is part of the process. In the original EU-initiative for a Trans-European Transport Network headed by former EUcommissioner Henning Christophersen the Fehmarnbelt link was incorporated in a highspeed railway net. The parallel guidelines for determination of the technical specifications for the new rail infrastructure recommended a dedicated high-speed standard. The classification of the future railway line across Fehmarnbelt was later on downgraded by the National Railway Authorities in fear of the high cost which an inter-operable ERTMS traffic management system eventually could induce. Therefore the technical specifications were adopted from the standards of the conventional rail network for semi high-speed resulting in more flexibility in the planning process. However, the green transport policy showed surprisingly to favoring a high-class technical solution for the Danish railway modernization program by the fundamental decision to introduce a nation-wide ERTMS system of the standards of ETCS level II. And the ambition of velocity-performance was also increased to 200-250 km/h. Section Copenhagen-Ringsted Quickly after the decision to go on with the fixed Fehmarnbelt link it followed the decision for the first new railway section, the new alignment between Ringsted and Copenhagen.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 52 Figure 39 The emergence of a high-speed railway through East-Denmark with connection to Fehmarnbelt Source: TDL illustration. The new Copenhagen-Ringsted line is financed through the ordinary state budget. The main section of 55 km at a cost of 1.4 billion Euros does not include running in and out of Copenhagen and Ringsted station. These small sections of 5 km which cannot be avoided and finally will enable a platform to platform connection are under construction for the cost 0.1 billion Euros (the KØR programme) giving a total construction budget of 1.5 billion Euros. Figure 40 General technical standard for the new line Max speed (for conventional rolling stock) 250 km/h Electrification 25.000 kv 50 Hz Traffic management ETCS-level II Operation Mixed passenger and freight Profile and max axle load GC + 25 ton The line will open in 2018 equipped with existing traffic management systems in order to have the present train fleet running at the new line at an allowed max speed of 200 km/h, but after test trial of the new ETCS-II the line will be commissioned for 250 km/h operation expected in 2020.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe Figure 41 53 The new Copenhagen-Ringsted high-speed railway line parallel to the existing motorways E55-E47 Source: Banedanmark, Danish National Railway Authority, 2011. The Ringsted-Rødby section From Ringsted to the Fehmarnbelt tunnel (Rødby) the railway line will be upgraded, electrified and fully equipped with ETCS-II and rebuild to double track except for the passage of the Storstrømmen Bridge which is undergoing separate investigations. The railway line is according to the ongoing planning act intended to be decided in details in order for the section to be in full operation in 2020. The decision base for this project consists of 3 alternatives: a 160 km/h, a 200 km/h and a 250 km/h alternative. The Danish National Railway Administration has made a position and points at the 200 km/h solution as the best investment for society. Total cost is estimated at 1.2 billion Euros. The price increase for raising standard from 160 km/h to 200 km/h is 13 %. The 200 km/h alternative is criticized from many institutions e.g. the Industrial Chamber of Denmark, research and university institutions and public organisations like municipalities. They point at the need to have a long term perspective and to raise the level of ambition regarding the max speed at least at some parts of the hinterland infrastructure. However, the 200 km/h alternative is most likely to be included in the national decision making. Later on further railway upgrade initiatives might be prepared and executed.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe Figure 42 54 The upgraded Ringsted-Fehmarn railwayline Source: Banedanmark, Danish National Railway Authority, 2011. It has been expected that the Minister for Transport would take the decision in spring 2012 and ask the parliament to approve the Act of construction. However, late 2011 it has been agreed among the political stakeholders to make a decision for construction of a new Storstrømmen Bridge (or tunnel). A fast process of planning and analyses has been initiated. A decision base should be presented for the political parties before summer 2012. At this point the decision makers should draw up their final position which will include the proposal from the Danish National Railway Authority. It has been thoroughly analysed whether a 1 billion DKK (13 %) more expensive 200 km/h alignment should be build instead of the 160 km/h alignment which has a total cost of 8 billion DKK. A positive net present value of 260 million DKK can be the result if a 200 km/h is going to be the preferred solution. And this is without the benefit of a new Storstrømmen Bridge. It is assumed 120 km/h on the Storstrømmen stretch (but this could be change, see below). Figure 43 Ringsted-Rødby Socio economic analysis 200 km/h Extra construction costs Time savings and increased revenue Net operating and maintenance costs Tax consequence and distortion factor Total Internal rate Source: Banedanmark, Danish National Railway Authority, 2011. NPV 2010 mill DKK -999 1,278 160-124 +260 5.9 %

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 55 The value of the travel time reduction is worth enough for paying for the extra construction cost. The National Railway Authority Banedanmark finds an internal rate of return of 5.9 % in their socio economic calculations. The Storstømmen Bridge As a consequence of budget constraints and as a part of the treaty between Germany and Denmark regarding the Fehmarnbelt link it was decided in first place to avoid construction of a new Storstrømmen bridge. But like the speed-commitment only was settled at a minimum speed of 160 km/h according to the treaty, history has developed differently. Final decisions on the hinterland infrastructure from the German-Danish border to Copenhagen might indicate that the main line standard will be significantly improved, i.e. with a line speed of 200-250 km/h and with new ETCS-II traffic management system. One of the remaining weak points in the Danish rail corridor Øresund-Fehmarn is the single-tracked Storstrømmen Bridge. Transport scientists e.g. TU-Denmark and a number of research institutions have pointed at the need to enhance capacity by building a new link across Storstrømmen. Inspections of the bridge have now revealed severe wear, and the life time of the bridge will be dramatically affected and reduced when the operation of the Fehmarnbelt traffic begins. Therefore it has top-priority to find a solution as soon as possible. Due to a political agreement at national level investigations of 5 technical alternatives for a new crossing are underway. Estimated cost is 0.4 billion, but is very much depending on the specific alternative. Figure 44 Investigation program for a new Storstrømmen bridge Source: Banedanmark, Danish National Railway Authority, 2011.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 56 The studies include the following alternatives: 1. A major renewal of the existing bridge, i.e. the existing single-track and 2 lane road 2. A major renewal, but only railway modernized and the road section closed 3. New railway bridge, the existing bridge is kept for car traffic 4. New railway bridge, the existing bridge ends its days for traffic 5. New combined railway and road bridge, the existing bridge ends its days for traffic. The schedule is to finalize technical and environmental investigations, as well as the planning and decision process in order to re-build the Storstrømmen Bridge or to open a new link in 2019. The traffic across the Fehmarnbelt will from that time be able to flow unhindered. There is no specification at the moment which level the railway part will be designed for. But as is the case for other rail upgrade projects the extra investment for a 200 km/h standard is probably in the area of 5-15 % compared with an only 160 km/h stretch. The initial drawings suggest curve radii for a 200 km/h solution. Capacity Øresund As part of the law package for the Fehmarn Belt hinterland infrastructure it has been decided to start a plan approval process for expanding capacity on the Øresund line through the station at Copenhagen Airport. Background for this is the bottleneck situation caused by too little station capacity for passenger trains and difficulties due to an increase in operations of German-Swedish freight transit trains in the future. Figure 45 Investigation program for capacity improvement on the Øresund line as part of the Fehmarnbelt hinterland infrastructure investments Source: Danish Railway Authority, Banedanmark 2011 (Environmental Impact Assessment, technical part) There are different alternatives in discussion, but a total investment of 0.1 billion should be expected. A fly-over solution is representing the most costly solution, but does not give optimal capacity improvement. It would be wise to direct freight trains from Denmark to Sweden through the existing station. In the other direction it is not necessary. Looking at a longer perspective a new fixed HH-link across Øresund, or another long lasting solution, could relieve the Øresund Bridge for most of the freight trains enabling the station to accommodate for a possible introduction of high-speed trains Sweden-Denmark-Germany

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 57 Investment budget 2011-2020 for the Øresund-Fehmarn corridor All in all the infrastructure investment in the new semi high-speed railway corridor is totaling approximately 8½ billion with expected commercial start of services in 2020 on the Danish side. Figure 46 Investments in the Øresund-Fehmarn corridor 2010-2020 Source: TDL Illustration. Further high-speed considerations A new high-speed railway line through the southern part of Zealand has been dealt with in several phases. And the interest for this has been growing slowly, although it turned out to be rejected as part of the existing planning for the Fehmarnbelt link in the period 2010-2020. In the mid-90s the Ministry of Transport decided to conduct a study of a high-speed railway line from Copenhagen to Rødby (Rambøll-Systra, 1997). The results from this were reported in the national Baneplan. However, it appeared to show more relevance a decade later when the decision of the Fehmarnbelt link was taken, and when the IBU-program started more thorough analyses.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe Figure 47 58 Study of high-speed line between Rødby (Fehmarn tunnel) and Køge with different alignment alternatives Source: IBU traffic model, Prof. Otto Anker Nielsen 2009 (left). Ministry of Transport, Baneplan 1997 (right). A new railway line parallel to the motorway E47 combined with a new bridge or tunnel across the Storstrømmen and a tunnel under the strait of Guldborgsund can give substantial more capacity in the network and much faster passenger trains. The consulting firm COWI assisted IBU/Professor Otto Anker Nielsen in his studies, and they came to an alignment with a price tag of 2.3 billion Euros. The National Railway Authority has also done recent studies during the stages of the environmental impact assessment of the Fehmarnbelt hinterland infrastructure. The cost is estimated to 3.1 billion Euros for a complete new alignment of 120 km new track incl. the two passages of Storstrømmen and Guldborgsund.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 59 Figure 48 Alternative for a high-speed rail line for 250 km/h from Køge to Rødby Source: Banedanmark, Danish National Railway Authority, 2011. The alternative of a new high-speed alignment can be built in stages after the upgrading project for the existing railway line although this strategy in the long run will be more expensive. 3.3.5 Demand and demand forecasting Today railway traffic in Denmark is on its highest level ever seen. Measured in absolute volume the public transport by train shows a historic high level of attraction, in recent years the driver' being medium-long or long distance journeys. Although new metro lines in Copenhagen contributed to the growth it was especially opening of the fixed links which accelerated the competitiveness of the railway sector. Figure 49 Railway passenger transport development in Denmark Source: Danish Ministry of Transport, A railway in progress, 2009. It is expected that the Danish long term strategic plans will favour investments in further railway renewal and upgrading projects. The Time model and the plans for building new fixed links will strongly support the national goal of doubling the railway transport. Investments in the Fehmarn Belt corridor will of course also contribute to this forecast, even though the ambition level of the expenditure and thereby the precise market reaction

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 60 cannot be settled at this moment, primarily due to the fact that the German specifications of the corridor has not yet been determined. Figure 50 Forecast Danish land transport volume until 2030 Source: Danish Ministry of Transport, A railway in progress, 2009. A rather large proportion of the growth in the demand for railway transport can be seen in long distance journeys of >150 km. In Denmark these journeys occur especially in the East-West direction across the Great Belt. Figure 51 Danish market segments for rail transport Source: Tetraplan 2007, Railway traffic forecast 2030 (Infrastructure Commission). Even though regional lines in West- and East-Denmark count for 61 % including commuter traffic on the suburban network around Copenhagen, the InterCity and long distance lines have a strong position within the railway system by 39 %. More or less half the international activity is bound for primarily German destinations (including night trains) and the other half consists of longer journeys from Sweden to/from Copenhagen Central or Copenhagen Airport (excl regional Øresund traffic). In economic terms the long-distance rail market plays an even bigger role; earnings are approx 50 %

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 61 higher in the long distance division of the railways compared with regional/ local transport divisions which need substantial grants from public funds. Figure 52 Market share in long distance travel (across the Great Belt) Source: Sund & Bælt 2008. Demand effects of the Great Belt link. Long distance rail transport has been growing the most. Looking closer at the East-West (Great Belt) corridor it can be concluded that the induced traffic in the first time period was significant after opening of the fixed link in 1997 and after introduction of faster IC3- services. Here we see the largest ramp-up effect, but the growth continued and then slowed down following more normal growth patterns. In the period 1995-2005 the long distance travellers grew from 4.5 to 7.8 million equal to an increase of 66 %. This corresponds to a growth of 900 million pkm based on an average journey length of 220-235 km by long distance trains across the Great Belt. Thereby more than half of the growth of 1.7 billion pkm came from the long distance trains. New regional Øresund trips can explain the other part of this growth story. Figure 53 Danish long distance railway traffic 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995-2010 Long distance (across Great Belt) mill pass 4.5 6.7 7.8 8.4 +87 % Long distance (across Great Belt) billion pkm *) 1.0 1.6 1.9 2.0 +101 % Rail total in DK billion pkm 4.9 5.4 6.2 6.6 +35 % Source: DSB annual reports, DS Danmarks Statistik and estimation *) The average time reduction after launch of the new train services in 1997 was 30 %. Between the most important end-to-end destinations, Copenhagen and Aarhus, the travel time shrank 1 hour 5 minutes from 3:55 to 2:50 for the fastest train (Lyntog) giving a reduction of 32 %. A rough estimation of the time elasticity gives approximately -2.0 as a result of the market effect stemming from the speed increase on main lines and the fixed link across the Great Belt. While the average length of the long distance journeys increased by 9 % we could argue that the elasticity even proved to be higher.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 62 Figure 54 The long distance railway traffic across Great Belt As can be seen from the diagram it appeared a little back-drop in 1998-99. This is due to the opening of the parallel road connection across the Great Belt which created severe competition between the modes. Despite the car traffic obtained 1 hour travel time reduction continued public transport to grow. When we more specific are looking at analyses of infrastructure development in the Øresund-Fehmarn corridor we will find at least 3 different views on demand forecasting. The old Femern A/S model predicts 3.800 train passengers in the border-crossing trains depending on a travel time Copenhagen-Hamburg of between 3 and 3½ hours. A high-speed option was not a main focus in these forecasts. The National Railway Authority Banedanmark analysed the effects of various upgrading alternatives of the hinterland line Rødby-Ringsted. Using an internal model Banedanmark also evaluated the effects of building a 250 km/h section from Køge to Holeby (Rødby) including a new passage across Storstrømmen. This was however not based on an international transport demand forecasting model, and did not incorporate a system dynamic approach where the line was seen in a perspective of an integrated coherent system Copenhagen-Hamburg. The IBU strategic infrastructure program (Interreg project) produced in 2008-2010 a rather large study of a Scandinavian high-speed railway system, and effects of different highspeed corridors were examined. The Coinco-corridor from Oslo towards Gothenburg, the

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 63 Stockholm-Øresund corridor and the Øresund-Hamburg corridor were examined in different variations and alignments. The IBU investigations resulted in several analysis reports. One of these concerned traffic modelling based upon EU s Trans-Tools model which gave input to a qualified assessment of potentials for a high-speed system to be implemented in Northern Europe. The background for the modelling was DG-Moves evaluations of the Trans-European Network and the so-called TEN-Connect studies. Figure 55 Results from the Trans-Tools model regarding a North-European highspeed railway system Source: IBU Bahnstrategie technical report, Prof. Otto Anker Nielsen, 2009 The Trans-Tools model showed some initial problems of explanation when making forecasting scenarios, but as the first model describing an international transport market in the North-European corridor it produced interesting data. The TU-Denmark validated the methods and the technical calculation routines. Based on the intensive modelling work a number of effects can be found. The IBU railway strategy focused on five alternatives, and the passenger effects of these were reported as follows: Figure 56 Results from the IBU alternatives for a high speed rail corridor The railway connection Hamburg-Copenhagen Travel time ICE pax/day Alt 0 Present services 4:45 1.000 Alt 1 Including the effect of the Fehmarnbelt fixed link 3:30 3.500 Alt 2 Danish and German hinterland basic program 2:40 5.000 Alt 3 Further railway upgrade ABS + NBS in DK and DE 2:15 6.000 Alt 4 New lines NBS in DK and DE 1:50 7.000 Alt 5 Dedicated high-speed NBS investments 1:30 8.000 Source: IBU Bahnstrategie summary report, prof. Otto Anker Nielsen, 2009

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 64 The studies described an increase in long-distance passengers as a more or less linear function of the travel time reduction. High-speed trains are found very competitive and they are gaining a relatively large market share especially in the travel time interval less than 3 hours. As local and regional effects are not considered directly in the Trans-Tools model (in the Fehmarnbelt corridor) and as the effect of the time reduction seems a little pessimistic it could be explained, that the increase in passenger numbers eventually will show a tendency to be higher than the IBU results depending on how the high speed line could be used for improving both international and local/regional services. Figure 57 Passenger effect at reduced journey times for long distance railway journeys across Fehmarnbelt Source: IBU Bahnstrategie Technical Report, Otto Anker Nielsen, 2009. Even though the results are not showing an exponentially growing function it can be extracted from the analysis that a travel time saving of half an hour is equal to an increase in demand of approximately 1.000 long distance passengers. Later in this report we test these data stemming from the Trans-Tools in 4 infrastructure development scenarios. 3.3.6 Funding, financing and economic appraisal For the investment period 2010-2020 the Danish Government has found sufficient financial means to continue their ambitions to implement a semi-high speed railway corridor Øresund-Fehmarn connecting Scandinavia to Germany. As can be seen from the table below public transport and railway investments play a significant role:

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 65 Figure 58 Danish basis program for new infrastructure investments State infrastructure investments in billion Èuros, Period 2010-2020 Fehmarn Belt link and hinterland DK 6.7 Metro Copenhagen 2.7 New railway lines 2.0 Reinvestment revitalisering program railways 2.0 ITS rail ERTMS 3.0 New motorways and state highways 4.8 Public transport program, busses etc. 0.4 Bicycle investment program 0.1 Port investment program I and II 0.1 Total 21.5 The green transport policy has been supplemented by a kick-start package in 2012, and a decision to continue electrification of main lines in Jutland and to establish a Northern metro line as a supplement to the on-going construction of 17 new metro stations in Copenhagen. Planning for congestion charging as a toll ring around Copenhagen has been cancelled and road pricing will be considered. Revenues from a national lorry charging system will from next year be allocated for funding of public transport. 3.3.7 Main conclusions on the shape of a high-speed rail network Denmark has taken the decision to introduce a semi-high-speed rail system called 'Time model'. From 2020, trains run up to 250 km/h in order to meet the political objectives set for the mean speed of min. 165 km/h to be able to contribute to certain travel times. Between 2020 and 2030 the number of stations that meet the criterion will be gradually enlarged. To achieve the goal of doubling the rail transport by 2030 it will be necessary to establish additional capacity for freight and as part of this to expand the Øresund line. A long term improvement of the capacity for the freight on rails influences carefully the potentials and the outcome of a further high speed strategy. Denmark is on track to restore its rail network after many years of neglect in innovation and investment, resulting in a lacking behind other European countries. More capacity will be build to cope with the transport goal. Looking however at the decision-making and planning process for the corridor Øresund- Fehmarn it is striking that this is sliced into 6 partial final decisions at this stage. And the projects do not show a heading of high speed but capacity improvement or upgrading. The 6 partial decisions are typically followed by construction acts: Decision process re. the fixed Fehmarn Belt link Decision process re. upgrading Rødby-Ringsted Decision process re. new line Ringsted-Ny Ellebjerg Decision process re. Ny Ellebjerg-Copenhagen Central Decision process re. new capacity on the Øresund line (Cph Airport) Decision process re. new Storstrømmen Bridge. Assessment: If decisions on railway infrastructure investment are sliced into many pieces and the transport system in the end should be fully integrated there will be a high risk for

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 66 cost increase due to interoperability problems and loss of benefits due to disintegrated services and generally a lower level of quality (where optimal travel times cannot be meet). 3.4 High-speed rail in Sweden 3.4.1 Transport policy and high-speed strategies of key stakeholder National transport policy and implications for high-speed rail strategy The national policy has a strong focus on regional effects, but it also encompasses a global perspective. This becomes evident when looking at the large volumes of goods transported over long distances, and the importance of the global outlook, where Swedish exports have an eye for accessibility to international markets. Rail freight has traditionally been given high priority on the Swedish network with an impressive market share of 30 %. (High-speed) Strategy of transport ministry Sweden was among the first to implement the EU policy concerning the complete separation of the commercial operation from the physical infrastructure. The Swedish transport policy works through its sector institutions which have been re-organized recently e.g. by forming the new Trafikverket. The Ministry has merged the former Railway and Road authority into one administration, thereby making a stronger incentive for intermodal transport solutions. When looking back at the Swedish transport policy it seems to have kept railway's role as an important part of the transport system. With a very strong focus on sustainability and climate-friendly solutions the railway has managed to double traffic as the following overview indicates. Figure 59 Railway passenger transport development in Sweden Source: Railway statistics, SCB. Today, major parts of the rail lines suffer from capacity constraints as a direct consequence of the increasing demand and the high utilization of the existing network. This has therefore become the main topic in the national transport policy, which allocates substantial financial resources to ensure a better performance quality, by double-tracking existing lines, improving the technical installations, etc. Some new line projects have been given priority e.g. the new City-tunnel line in Malmö or the City-tunnel lines in Stockholm and Gothenburg, but also the opening of the 150 km long Botnia line for 250 km/h operation in

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 67 the Northern Sweden should be mentioned, and not at least the extension of this project further North in the coming years. The national Swedish policy favors A gradually adaptive expansion of the transport infrastructure in line with the increase in transport demand, A substantial increase in capacity mainly in existing transport corridors, An adjustment of the transport system in order to reach the goal for a climate friendly transport sector. (High-speed) Strategy of SJ SJ can be found as the main carrier on most lines. The Swedish company covers a little more than half of the railway transport in Sweden in terms of passenger km, and SJ offer a regular service at semi-high speed to many destinations. Though top-speed is only 200 km/h the key performance measured in average speed is very high. Including stop times the X2000 trains are running at 150-160 km/h, which places X2000 at a little lower level compared with the ICE services. The X2000 is capable of running through Denmark. Several regional transport authorities in Sweden are managing their own fleet of semi fast inter-regional trains. These trains derive from the X5 series. The newest batch is the X55 which is a long distance, high comfort version for SJ. This fleet can be upgraded for 250 km/h operations. The following table shows an overview of the Swedish fleet of fast interregional trains. Figure 60 Series Swedish fleet of fast inter-regional trains Number of Trainsets Operating Speed Design Speed Service X2000 43 200 km/h 275 km/h 1990-91 X3 Arlanda 7 200 km/h 210 km/h 1989 X40 DD 43 200 km/h 200 km/h 2007

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 68 X50-55 93 200 km/h 250 km/h 2001-12 Source: SJ etc. It is expected that the increase in speed will be supported by implementation of the ETCS- II which means that 250 km/h gradually will be introduced in Sweden during the next 10 years. If dedicated high-speed investments is not decided as the favored solution then could the ongoing modernization of the present railway network probably be a variant of the US0 development strategy. Renewal of the rolling stock might take advantage of the full-scale Green Train experiment where research and development institutions and the supplier Bombardier etc. have prepared a next generation of rolling stock, X5G, which is very suitable for the Swedish market. Figure 61 Next generation for 250 km/h: the Green Train Source: Royal Technical University, Stockholm, Research program Gröna Tåget, www.gronataget.se. Its configuration is based on rather small units of 2-3-4 cars per train in a wide-body design utilizing the broad Swedish profile which allows for an approx 50 cm broader cabin compared with the continental UIC-profile. As the economy-class is designed with 3+2 seating this gives approx 15 % lower running costs for the operator which enables lower fares to be introduced for the market giving the operator a competitive advantage. The energy consumption is as low as 50 Wh per passenger-km for 250-280 km/h operations (65 % load factor). Under Swedish conditions the X5G is capable of running with tilting mechanism and in rather low temperatures of -40 C. The train has been tested at a driving speed of 300 km/h on tracks built for 160-200 km/h operations.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 69 Even though the base line alternative for the railway infrastructure forms a default scenario and the very useful Green train concept seems as a just down the alley development strategy the Swedish Government will have to decide whether the railway investments should take a more European continental direction. 3.4.2 National high-speed network A dedicated high-speed network does not exist in Sweden even though various transport development strategies and national planning has dealt with this question for 20 years. The 1,370 km long lines of the triangle network Stockholm-Gothenburg-Malmö have been upgraded for 200 km/h, which is also the case for some other lines north of Stockholm and Gothenburg. Parts of the network are prepared for a technical upgrade for 250 km/h, but there are no train services yet running at this max speed. Figure 62 Main railway network in Sweden and the selected lines for speeds higher than 200 km/h Source: National Infrastructure Plan Perspective 2004-2015, Banverket. 3.4.3 Network development strategy Like many other countries Sweden conducted major innovations to upgrade the railway main lines in the 1990s. Due to the large physical distances was a modernization strategy with new-built lines not considered realistic before than the existing main lines had under-

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 70 gone an upgrade through the renewal program. Therefore the development strategy firstly comprises an upgrade process called the base line alternative US0. This US0 should: Improve capacity in order to meet a rather large growth in the demand, Improve reliability of the railway services, Increase top speed to 250 km/h. The US0 could very likely become a first choice upgrade program: The program has a fairly high cost level of 10 billion Euro, A dedicated high-speed investment would instead cost 15 billion Euro, There are no new stations outside the present network, The only partially new tracks will result in capacity constraints at certain points. Figure 63 The base alternative US0 for upgrading the main lines Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, presentation, Trafikverket 2012. The base line alternative US0 relates to an expansion and upgrading of existing main lines for 250 km/h on major parts of the stretches. The alternative includes a number of new double track stretches for 250 km/h parallel to the existing tracks. These are e.g. the Eastern Link Järna-Linghem, Mantorp-Gripenberg, and Höör-Lund. In addition to this will be some longer third track sections paralleling to the existing tracks and a number of new bypass track for freight. The stretches like the Nässjö-Höör section will undergo adjustment that implies that the existing track will be moved within the existing railway fences. If the trains are assumed to run with tilting bodies >200 km/h would the travel time for non-

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 71 stop trains between Stockholm and Malmo be 3 hours and 13 minutes equal to an average speed of 190 km/h. Without tilting the travel time will be extended by about 15-20 minutes. The Swedish national authority Trafikverket concludes, that the US0 alternative will substantially improve the current travel market, but it does not radically improve accessibility for conurbations that today are placed outside the present railway network. The US0 involves capacity improvement, but this will hardly be enough and satisfy the increase in demand in 2050. The ongoing national planning process for creation of a dedicated high-speed network in Sweden consists of 4 alternatives: US1: integrated lines and direct services (320 km/h), US2: a modified version of US1 composed of a more separate system (320 km/h), US3. priority of end-destination market, external stations (320 km/h), US4: integrated system with focus on regional markets (280 km/h). US1 has an emphasis on national transportation needs, with close attention to regional needs where the strategy is an integrated system. US1 is based on the national highspeed investigation report with an alignment through West Scania and a target speed of 320 km/h. Travel time for non-stop trains between Stockholm and Malmö are assumed to be 2 hours and 30 minutes. The system is reminiscent of today's German and Italian systems, but a major difference with Germany is that US1 results in both more comprehensive traffic and shorter travel times. Figure 64 High speed alternative 1 and 2 Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, presentation, Trafikverket 2012. US2 also has an emphasis on national transport needs and with great attention to regional needs. This alternative is composed of a more stand-alone solution, where it is assumed that a larger separation from the rest of the network can be executed, but then it has fewer trains. This means that the transfer points must be efficient. The new line is assumed to go a shorter way to Lund-Malmö, enabling travel times to be shorter than in the US1. The system is similar to the current Spanish system and to some extent the Japanese system, transfer points are highly prioritized.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 72 Figure 65 High speed alternative 3 and 4 Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, presentation, Trafikverket 2012. US3 has an emphasis on national transportation needs, with a less focus for regional needs. The strategy is a separated TGV-like 320 km/h system with priority to short travel times. US3 strongly promote end-point connections, which means that the high-speed network is more separate and largely drawn outside urban areas. This option is reminiscent of the French high-speed network although it also demonstrates inspiration from the Spanish and Japanese networks. US4 has an emphasis on regional transportation needs, taking into account national needs. It is assumed that this alternative can be connected to the existing West Coast line just north of Helsingborg. The system can be more generic and built in stages. The top speed is assumed to be 280 km/h and the travel times longer than in the US1-US3. To some extend this implies a continuation of fast train services on the existing main lines. The system is similar in some parts of the current German system, but with more emphasis on regional expansion. Modifications of these alternatives are possible. More iteration can be done during the next phase of planning in order to optimize the costs and benefits of the final proposal for a new Swedish high-speed network. Integration with the international network across Øresund and Fehmarn Belt in 2020 and in a longer horizon would be advisable to include in the further study program. Figure 66 Total investment cost, billion EUR Travel time Stkholm-Malmö Average speed Stockholm- Cph Airport Swedish high speed rail investments and outcome US1 US2 US3 US4 15,3 14,1 n.a. 12,5 2:30 236 km/h 2:25 240 km/h 2:25 240 km/h 3:00 197 km/h 2:45 2:40 2:40 3:15 Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, presentation, Trafikverket 2012.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 73 From an Øresund perspective there is remarkable little focus on the West coast corridor Oslo-Gothenburg-Øresund. The West coast main line Gothenburg-Lund is still in the upgrading program after a 20 year old decision to establish double track on the whole stretch. The tunnel through Hallandsås just North of Helsingborg has been delayed for many years due to difficult geological challenges, technical problems with the TBMs, etc. The project is now in the final stage and in 2015 opens a new railway section for 200 km/h. However, there are still unsolved problems and decisions not made yet regarding the single track section North of Helsingborg station, Knutpunkten, towards Maria-Ängelholm. This creates a major bottleneck in the corridor. Figure 67 West coast main line upgrading Gothenburg-Lund-Malmö Source: Swedish Railway Authority, 2010 Status for the corridor development is as follows: The upgrading program for the West coast main line was decided in many stages. There are still works to be finished in the coming years, but most of the line is now technically in much better shape than 20 years ago. The long process may have caused some budget lifts as investments have been growing to 7 billion even though the Hallandsås tunnel problems were not foreseeable. In the Southern part of the corridor there are still construction works to do on the remaining single track section Helsingborg-Ängelholm. An upgrade of larger parts of the Gothenburg-Helsingborg section for 230-250 km/h operation is possible (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm). Based on the technical specification of the X5G could the travel times be reduced to 1:55 on the 305 km long stretch Malmö-Gothenburg incl. 3 stops, and for a direct service 1:45 (KTH model).

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 74 Construction of 75 km double track for 250 km/h on the Gothenburg-Trollhättan line should be opened completely this year, and a further 10 km section from Trollhättan north to Öxnered is also underway. Figure 68 Gothenburg-Trollhättan upgrade prepared for 250 km/h Source: Coinco North II presentation 2012 The Coinco Interreg project which deals with infrastructure development and cooperation in the corridor Copenhagen-Oslo is now looking at proposals for a more ambitious upgrading of the north-south corridor. The project originates as a Norwegian initiative and has set up a goal of a travel time of 2½ hours between Oslo and Copenhagen. Compared with the existing 675 km long journey lasting 8 hours it would indeed represent a tremendous change. The line between Öxnered and Oslo is causing real challenges due to its low standard in terms of speed and capacity. The Norwegian Railway Authority has just published investigations of how to rebuild the cross-border stretch as a modern transport system giving new benefits for travelers. Oslo-Ski will be the first section on the Southern line. After discussions during many years is a decision now taken in favor of doubling the capacity from 2 to 4 tracks involving 19 km new tunnel on the stretch to be completed in 2019. Between Ski and Öxnered there are two main alternatives in focus involving tunnel works for a length of 40-50 km. The alignment of A1 follows the existing line and A2 shortens the stretch by 30 km with a new line from Ski to Sarpsborg and a bypass at Halden.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 75 Figure 69 The South Section Ski-Öxnered Alt 1 (250 km/h) The Norwegian-Swedish cross-border high-speed rail project Travel time Investment Total length New line Tunnel % Oslo- Gothenburg 8.8 bill. EUR 327 km 184 km 25 % 2:18 Alt 2 (250-330 km/) 9.2 bill. EUR 297 km 195 km 30 % 1:40 Source: Norwegian Railway Authority, High-Speed Rail Investigation, 2012. Detailed studies show a significant difference between A1 and A2 regarding the travel time between the two major cities. While the first alternative reaches a speed in the area of 200-250 km/h the second more ambitious alternative suggest a top speed of 330 km/h on certain parts of the stretch. Investments are estimated to 8,8 respectively 9,2 billion EUR. The extra cost for exceeding the 250 km/h limit seems relatively low. Figure 70 Upgrading the international railway line Oslo-Ski-Öxnered Source: Norwegian high-speed rail investigations, Norconsult presentation 2012.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 76 3.4.4 Demand and demand forecasting The updated forecasts for the transport development in Sweden indicates a fairly large increase in transport, freight transport even at a more escalating level. This forecast includes various socio-economic growth parameters, but not specific actions like extraordinary investments in a dedicated high-speed rail system, a new fixed link across Øresund etc. Figure 71 Long term development for land transport in Sweden Person km (billions) 2006 2050 2006-2050 Road 89.2 149.2 67 % Railway 14.5 26.0 80 % PT (bus) 10.4 11.9 15 % Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, Trafikverket 2012. With a passenger transport increase of 80 % the railways in Sweden seem to get into huge capacity problems. Despite this growth it is only predicted that rail will enhance its market share by 1 percentage. Compared with the tendency for the demand development regarding bus transport the future market for new train services seems much more promising. There are several examples of successes within rail (of course also some failures). The well-known introduction of X2000 in the Stockholm-Gothenburg corridor could be mentioned. These services cutting travel time from 4 to 3 hours raised the market share for rail significantly in good correlation with other international examples. Figure 72 Development in market share for rail by shorter travel time Source: Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, High Speed railway investigations 2010. Another example is the traffic across the fixed Øresund link when we look at the train connections. There are normally 4 trains per hour per direction across Øresund, and max 1 train is an X2000. However, interregional Øresund-trains also run over distances of 200-

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 77 300 km which attract passengers from both the shorter commuting trips but also longer trips because of the Copenhagen airport. This terminal plays not only an important role for the Øresund region, it is actually the most important Swedish air hub next after Stockholm Arlanda. The fixed Øresund link has created a large synergy effect for the international relations and co-operations in general and for air, road and rail traffic. As one of the most successful cross-border infrastructure projects in Europe it is wise to learn from what kind of market reaction that can be achieved through a new and fast railway service. Figure 73 Passengers on regional/long distance trains across Øresund after the opening in 2000 Source: Statistics Øresund Brokonsortiet. A rough estimate points at a time-elasticity of -6.0 if we are only measuring the effects of passenger increase and time reduction. During 10 years the passenger market (excl. car traffic which experienced the same effects of time reduction) has grown from 3.6 to 11 million passengers per year. But elasticity of frequency must also be taken into consideration as well as an elasticity of expansion of direct services between many towns on both sides. Before the bridge there was practically only one direct service with fast ferries between the city of Copenhagen and Malmö

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 78 Of course was the financial crisis not possible to avoid for the international traffic across Øresund. The market will have to be rebooted by new initiatives. In this context a survey of the viability of a new Express Metro tunnel line of 27 km across Øresund is under preparation. The demand effect for a high-speed rail system has been examined. The results show an increase ceteris paribus of 19-21 % of total long distance traffic, but there is not much difference between the alternatives to see. The fastest alternative seems to have the highest output. Effects of an improved West coast main line in the corridor Øresund-Gothenburg- Oslo have not been taken into consideration. Measured in passenger kilometers the effect for the railway as such is significant. Figure 74 Mio passengers, Long distance Passenger demand effect of a Swedish high-speed rail system 2030 base US1 (320 km/h) US2 (320 km/h) US4 (280 km/h) 34.5 41.7 42.1 40.9 Diff. 2030-US - 21 % 22 % 19 % Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, Trafikverket 2012 (US3 not available). 3.4.5 Financing, funding and economic appraisal The Swedish state budget for railway investment is rather tight for the ongoing period. A large proportion of the budget is earmarked for maintenance and re-investment purpose. Figure 75 National railway investment budget for the period until 2021 Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, Trafikverket 2012 (US3 not available). For investment in new infrastructure and for upgrading the existing railway assets is it within the frame budget possible to spend 0.75 to 1.25 billion EUR annually on the national initiatives.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 79 This indicates that a high-speed rail system representing a capital investment of approx 14 billion Euro has to supplement with external funding. If the whole system is built in 10 years time it equals to 2 billion Euro per year. A minor part of the necessary capital can be found in the regions, but probably between 10 and 20% could be found as EU financial support, if the high-speed system is defined as a cross-border project e.g. linked to the ongoing investments in the Fehmarn Belt hinterland infrastructure. As the project especially the more dedicated high-speed alternatives is suitable for accelerating competition between operators in the railway market, and as the marginal earnings are lucrative would operators be able to contribute to part of the investments. The direct revenues and costs stemming from the daily transport business show a substantial surplus. Figure 76 Total benefits and cost, net present value US1 (320km/h) US2 (320 km/h) US4 (280 km/h) US0 (250 km/h) US0 (+200 km/h) billion EUR Benefits (consumers surplus + 9.4 9.8 8.3 6.6 5.6 scrap value) Investment cost (+ tax -12.8-11.8-10.6-9.5-9.5 distort) B/C npv ratio -0.3-0.2-0.2-0.3-0.5 Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, Trafikverket 2012 (US3 not available). Looking at the socio-economic assessment for the whole project is it not a surprise that the results reveal a deficit at the bottomline. The traditional assessment methods for transport projects could certainly misjudge effects of that kind of dimensions which are here in question. Large scale investment can be extremely difficult to justify by utilising the present model competence. The most advantageous alternative giving a benefit/cost ratio of -0.2 is also the most capital intensive. The less ambitious alternatives with lower efficient travel time is revealing a more negative benefit/cost result. Especially if it should happen that is impossible to run long distance trains at 250 km/h in the base line alternative US0 (+200 km/h). If the train speed would have to be limited to 200-220 km/h then could the costs be too high and the benefits too low. 3.4.6 Main conclusions on the shape of a high-speed rail network The policy of mainly rebuilding the existing infrastructure represents a dilemma. Never has the train traffic been larger, but the expected increase in freight and passenger transport demand could be difficult to realize while reconstructing the existing track facilities. Heavily utilized lines and expectations of more attractive (shorter) travel time of passenger trains, more departures, and also transport of larger goods volumes favor a strategy of building new line sections.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 80 Of course there will be discussions at the local level of which kind of high-speed model is the most feasible as well as pros- and con s regarding the specific alignment proposal, but the greatest challenges in this context seem to be to choose between a separated system with higher reliability instead of a more integrated system which could turn to be more sensitive to train delays etc. in the existing system, to select the market orientation of the system, i.e. whether the train connections for the large cities should have a little more priority by utilizing their strength to drive fast on longer distances, or the system should give more priority to stop trains that serve conurbations of a small and medium size. Figure 77 Design characteristics for high-speed rail systems Source: Swedish transport capacity plan, workshop presentation, 2012. Another challenge seems to be the financial and organizational issues. A transport system of this size has been dealt with in other countries, and the experiences are both positive and less positive. A company structure with public ownership like the Fehmarn Belt consortium could be a model. Finally could market-dimensions as well as network dynamics be seen in a more appropriate international perspective than the present investigations suggest. It is of great interest to include the inter-modal connectivity e.g. the Copenhagen Airport hub function. But an emerging high-speed railway is underway in Denmark even though it is more like a semi high-speed system to start with. This and the fixed Fehmarnbelt link will add positive synergy effects into a potential new Swedish (and Norwegian) high speed network.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 81 3.5 Table of classification Based on the fact finding in the previous sections the following overview can be generated comparing the specific framework in Germany, Denmark and Sweden. National transport policy High-speed strategy of transport ministry High-speed strategy of national railway Rolling stock policy of national railway National high-speed network Network development strategy Germany Denmark Sweden Facilitate mobility and make it sustainable (-> shift significantly more traffic to rail) No real HSR strategy, development of 6 projects for speed levels of > 230 km/h DB with significant influence on highspeed network development Fleet of 166 trainset with operating speed of 280 km/h or more. New vehicle concept from 2016 to replace ICE1/2 and IC with maximum speed of 230-250 km/h Five high-speed sections > 230 km/h total for appr. 1,100 km (3.3 % of total network). Today no coherent high-speed network. The network development until 2020/2025 underlines the very slowly proceeding orientation from a network with isolated high-speed sections towards a nation-wide Consensus on a green transport policy (-> new investments in railways) Time-model : setting of max. travel time instead of specific topspeed (-> top-speed has to be increased from 180 km/h to 250 km/h on certain sections) DSB not engaged in transport policies and strategies for highspeed projects Fleet of semi-fast comfortable InterCity trains (speed restricted to 180 km/h). Future: not decided whether DSB should prefer leasing of European standard equipment or going into self-development of a special Danish fleet of a semi-high speed train for 200-250 km/h No existing dedicated high-speed network so far. The ongoing strategic planning activities for the period 2020-2030 follow the objective to ensure significant faster travel times by train between major cities (time-model). Strong focus on regional effects due to long physical distances Substantial upgrade process called the base line alternative US0 (-> Increase top speed to 250 km/h) No real HSR policy of SJ can be observed Fleet of 93 trainsets from X5 series as newest batch. Long distance, high comfort version for SJ, which can be upgraded for 250 km/h operations, Green Train experiment No dedicated highspeed network, triangle Stockholm- Gothenburg-Malmö upgraded for 200 km/h, parts of the network are prepared for 250 km/h upgrade Consideration of 4 alternatives: US1: integrated lines and direct services (320 km/h), US2: modified version of US1 composed of a more separate system

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 82 high-speed network linking the main metropolitan regions within Germany and Europe. Cost extensive alignments as well as other obstacles (financing, protests) might cause significant delays. The strategic master plan of the Region presents a number of actions e.g. introduction of a Scandinavian high-speed rail system linked to the Trans- European network via Fehmarnbelt. It also suggests a new transport corridor northwest of Copenhagen to link with a new Øresund tunnel to Sweden. Favoring of a highclass technical solution (ETCS level II) and increased ambition of velocity-performance (200-250 km/h) -> Copenhagen-Ringsted 250 km/h from 2020, Ringsted-Rødby 200 km/h (further upgrade in discussion). Mixed operations, but studies on a high-speed line for 250 km/h from Køge to Rødby. (320 km/h), US3. priority of end-destination market, external stations (320 km/h), US4: integrated system with focus on regional markets (280 km/h) Fehmarnbelt hinterland access Electrification of Hamburg-Lübeck doubletrack line section (maximum speed 160 km/h) accomplished in 2008. Planning for Lübeck-Puttgarden section focuses on conventional electrified double-track line (maximum speed 160 km/h). Alignment alternatives are currently under investigation, but do not cover a high-speed scenario. 2010 almost 78 million passengers (>60 % of long-distance pass.) travelled by ICE (not only high-speed). Compared to other countries the beginning of high-speed operations seems to have a minor impact on the total passenger volume. For the future there are no significant growth expectations for long-distance passenger transportation by rail (+ 0.3 % p.a. until 2025). Total expenditure on rail projects (upgrade Remarkable little focus on the West coast corridor Oslo- Gothenburg-Øresund, Coinco project is now looking at proposals for a more ambitious upgrading of the northsouth corridor. Demand and demand forecast 2010 8.4 million long distance passengers. General forecasts for the railway sector envisage a growth potential of 6,5 billion person km until 2030 corresponding to 3.4 % p.a.; of this increase are 36% new trips >150 km and 32 % is new medium-long trips of a length of 50-150 km. Updated forecasts for the transport development in Sweden indicate a fairly large increase in railway passenger transport (+80 % until 2050). Demand effect for a HSR system has been examined. The results show an additional increase ceteris paribus of 19-21 % of total long distance traffic Financing, funding and economic appraisal State infrastructure investments for the Swedish state budget for railway investment

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 83 and new-built) in 2009 was 1,592 million Euro. Investment master plan 2011-15: trusted investment budget for upgrade and new-built (6.4 billion Euros), investment needs (7.5 to 8 billion Euros). Budget for the preservation of the existing network is double the budget for upgrade and new lines. period 2010-2020 comprise 21.5 billion Euros, thereof 13.7 for rail (excl. Metro Copenhagen). Share for upgrade/new-build of >80 %. National investments are financed through a dedicated infrastructure fund and through special public owned DBO-companies. The means in the infrastructure fund are almost fully activated until 2020. is rather tight for the ongoing period. A large proportion of the budget is earmarked for maintenance and re-investment purpose. HSR investments of approx 14 billion EUR have to supplement with external funding. 3.6 Comments on national high-speed rail developments from corridor perspective The previous evaluation of the national high-speed rail developments forms the base for the following comments from the Hamburg-Øresund corridor perspective. Obviously the key objective of the national transport policies in the three investigated countries is to change modal split in passenger transport with the aim of reducing congestion, accidents and environmental externalities. With an expansion of high-speed lines travel times will become very short both on the high-speed network and on lines connecting with that network. Following this general policy an expansion of the high-speed network is supposed to have great effects on the passenger traffic market. Rail travel is expected to increase, and rail is estimated to take over passengers from internal flights. The different network structures indicate that there seem to be various impacts on the high-speed network development strategies in the three countries. As more microeconomic objectives based on corporate interests of German DB AG contrast with more macroeconomic objectives of the Scandinavian countries a common high-speed strategy for the Hamburg-Øresund corridor seems to be challenging. The TEN-T policy of the EU which leaves the technical responsibility for the corridor development to the member states can in the best sense build the guideline for a high-speed vision. The example of the joint approach of the mayors of Hamburg and Copenhagen to work on a joint vision for a high-speed link between (Berlin-) Hamburg and Copenhagen (-Stockholm/Oslo) seems to be a promising kick-off for the future sphere of activities. These activities should be based on a corridor-orientated lobbying in Berlin, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo and Brussels. As described the considerations of DB Netze for the section Lübeck-Puttgarden focus on a conventional electrified double-track line with a maximum speed of 160 km/h. Even if the current investigation of alignment alternatives does not cover a high-speed scenario the technical parameters (curve radius etc.) of a (potential) new alignment should at least consider future speeds of more than 160 km/h. The Danish flexibility in the planning process before and after the green transport policy approach has finally led to favoring a high-class

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 84 technical solution by the fundamental decision to introduce a nation-wide ERTMS system of the standards of ETCS level II and the ambition of a velocity-performance increase. The investment volumes for current high-speed projects in Germany indicate that (highspeed) infrastructure development in Germany seems to be (too) cost-intensive due to disproportionate technical standards and track alignments. Especially for the relatively flat Hamburg-Øresund link a slim infrastructure development should be the objective. As the situation of the public infrastructure budgets is supposed to deteriorate over the next years and the growing preservation needs and upgrade of the existing network will eat up potential budgets for new high-speed lines innovative ways of financing high-speed corridor Hamburg-Øresund have to be considered. Judging the rolling stock policy of DB AG and DSB there seem to be future opportunities for a joint corridor approach. The new DB vehicle concept (ICx from 2016) is supposed to increase travelling comfort and contribute to attract additional passengers. Further impacts on the cost side can be expected due to less energy consumption and more efficient operations. With maximum speeds of more than 230-250 km/h of the new ICx fleet DB withdraws from a further extension of the fleet with maximum speeds of >250 km/h but opens up the chance for an efficient semi high-speed solution. For real cross-border high-speed operations international co-operations and fleet strategies together with Swedish SJ have to be thought (see Thalys example).

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 85 4. PRINCIPLE FRAMEWORK FOR (HIGH-SPEED) NETWORK DEVELOPMENT ON THE HAMBURG-ØRESUND CORRIDOR Based on the previous comments from the corridor perspective and the overall objective of significant journey time achievements through high-speed activities the benefits arising from the development of a new high-speed infrastructure (sections) will be compared with cost aspects to come to an overall HSR-assessment for the Hamburg-Øresund corridor. 4.1 Assessment of HSR costs Total social costs of building and operating a high-speed line comprise the producer and the external costs. Producer costs involve two major types of costs: infrastructure and operating costs. External costs are associated to construction (e.g. barrier effect and visual intrusion) and operation (e.g. noise, pollution and contribution to global warming). In the following the focus will be on infrastructure costs. The construction costs for high-speed infrastructure have to deal with the challenge to overcome the technical problems which avoid reaching speeds above 300 km/h (e.g. roadway level crossings, sharp curves, new signalling mechanisms, more powerful electrification systems). According to UIC, building new HSR infrastructure involves three major types of costs: planning and land costs, infrastructure building costs and superstructure costs. Planning and land costs: Feasibility studies, technical design, land acquisition, legal and administrative fees, licenses, permits, etc. Planning and land costs can reach up to 10 % of total infrastructure costs in new railway lines requiring costly land expropriations. Infrastructure building costs: Terrain preparation and platform building. Depending on the characteristics of the terrain, the need of viaducts, bridges and tunnels, these costs can range from 15 to 50 % of total investment. Superstructure costs: Rail specific elements such as tracks, sidings along the line, signalling systems, catenary, communication and safety equipment, installations, etc. From the actual building costs (planning and land costs, and main stations excluded) of 45 HSR lines in service, or under construction, the average cost per km of a HSR line ranges from 9 to 40 million of Euros with an average of 18 million Euros. 19 The upper values arise from difficult terrain conditions and crossing of high density urban areas. According to UIC studies the average costs for the construction of 1 km of new high-speed line in Europe count for 12 to 30 million Euros. 20 The following table presents an overview of building costs for selected infrastructure projects in Germany as well as references from other countries. 19 20 Figures taken from OECD Discussion Paper No. 2008-16 The economic effects of HSR investment, October 2008. http://www.uic.org/img/pdf/20101124_uic_brochure_high_speed.pdf.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 86 Figure 78 Project Building costs for selected infrastructure projects in Europe Length Total costs (mill. Euros) Tunnels (%) Costs per km (mill. Euros) NBS Stuttgart - Ulm 60 km 2,890 50 % 48.2 NBS Nuremberg - Ingolstadt 77 km 4,011 35 % 53.4 NBS Frankfurt - Cologne 177 km 7,070 18 % 40.0 NBS Stuttgart - Mannheim 99 km 3,420 31 % 34.5 LGV Rhin-Rhone 140 km 2,312 2 % 16.5 Gotthard Basistunnel 57 km 8,900 100 % 157.0 Fehmarnbelt railway section* 19 km 2,750 100 % 145.0 Copenhagen-Ringsted* 60 km 1,490 3 % 24.9 Helsingborg-Kävlinge (200 km/h) 40 km 399 0 % 10.0 Source: HTC/TDL research (* = budget). 4.2 Assessment of HSR benefits Investing in high-speed infrastructure is associated with a noticeable reduction of journey times, higher comfort, reduction in the probability of accidents, and in some cases the release of extra capacity which helps to alleviate congestion in other modes of transport. Furthermore extended high-speed services help to downsize the net environmental impact of transport and boosts regional development. The observation of existing high-speed lines shows that user benefits deserve a closer examination. The main focus will be on journey time reductions. The user time invested in a round trip includes access and egress time, waiting time and in vehicle time. The total user time savings will depend on the transport mode where the passengers come from. Evidence from the assessment of high-speed rail development in selected European countries shows the following journey time reductions after the introduction of HSR services in comparison to a conventional rail connection: Operating speed of 100 km/h: potential time savings of one hour or more, 130 km/h: 45-50 minutes savings for distances in the range of 350-400 km, 160 km/h: time saving is around half an hour over a distance of 450 km. 21 Access, egress and waiting time are practically the same. For road transport and line lengths around 500 km, passengers benefit from travel time savings but they lose with respect to access, egress and waiting time. Benefits increase when travel distance is long enough as HSR runs on average twice as fast as the average car. Nevertheless, as the travel distance gets shorter the advantage of the HSR diminishes as in vehicle time lost weight with respect to access, egress and waiting time. Air transport is in some way the opposite case to road transport. Increasing the distance reduces the HSR market share. For a 2,000 km trip (and shorter distances) the competitive advantage of HSR vanishes. On the other hand HSR has extended market shares in the medium distance range. Considering a standard high-speed line of 500-600 km air transport has lower in vehicle time. The advantage of HSR rests on access, egress and waiting time, plus differences in comfort. The net user benefit of deviating a passenger from air 21 Steer Davies Gleave, 2004: High-speed rail: international comparisons.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 87 to HSR could even be positive in the case of a longer total travel after the shift. This would be the case if the values of time of access egress and waiting time are high enough to compensate the longer in vehicle time. The relative advantage of HSR with respect to air transport is significantly affected by the existing differences in the values of time, and these values are no unconnected with the actual experience of waiting, queuing and passing through security control points in airports. The generalized cost of air transport is seriously penalized by security controls at airports, and this translates in more attractiveness of the HSR option. Within this discussion it has also be considered that an efficient high-speed network access plays an important role for the growth potential and the catchment areas of Hamburg as well as Copenhagen Airport. If Copenhagen Airport is to retain its status as the traffic hub of Scandinavia, it is important that the number of potential passengers is increased substantially in the years to come. Therefore the attraction of additional passengers outside the current catchment area of four million people is of high importance. The vision for the next 10 to 15 years must therefore be to double the catchment area to 8 million people with less than two hours transport to the airport. Figure 79 Catchment Area of Copenhagen Airport Source: Copenhagen Airport. This will be possible through expansion of infrastructure as well as the elimination of bottlenecks. Various studies emphasize that there is a clear correlation between the size of the catchment area and the number of passengers and routes. Today almost 90 % of the traffic is international, while many of Nordic competitors have around 40-50 % domestic traffic. The decision by Finnish-based Blue1 to use Copenhagen Airport as a hub beginning in March of this year, the coming SAS and Air China routes to Shanghai and Beijing

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 88 as well as the existing inter-continental routes e.g. to Bangkok, Singapore, Chicago, Tokyo, New York and Colombo may help to attract further passengers. As the following map indicates Copenhagen is generally the airport which most citizens can reach in less than half an hour, 1 hour, 1.5 hours and 2 hours respectively. The catchment area covers most of Denmark and all of Southern Sweden which accommodates 40 % of the entire Swedish population. With an improved infrastructure connection via FBL further passengers from Germany could also be attracted. Further impacts on the air cargo volumes can also be expected. Amongst the largest unserved inter-continental destinations from Hamburg several CPH destinations can be found: Bangkok: Annual market size HAM-BKK: 65,500. Largest unserved market from HAM catchment area Singapore: Annual market size HAM-SIN: 36,200. Reason for travel: 72.1% business (Hamburg Airport Passenger Survey) Chicago: Annual market size HAM-CHI: 33,700. 39.5% of traffic to Chicago is business (Hamburg Airport Passenger Survey) Shanghai: Annual market size HAM-PVG: 29,100. Reason for travel: 55% business (Hamburg Airport Passenger Survey). On the other hand there are also new opportunities for Danish passengers due to an easier access to Hamburg airport. Currently 3.7 million people can reach Hamburg Airport within one hour, 4.9 million in 1.5 hours and 7.5 million in two hours. This catchment area is supposed to be further extended by a Fehmarnbelt fixed link. Hamburg Airport s timetable covers 115 domestic and international direct routes. On the following map showing the embarking passengers at HAM by region the importance of the Danish market Jutland for the airport can be observed, the Copenhagen region is currently untouched. Figure 80 Embarking Passengers at HAM by Region Source: Hamburg Airport. Due to the ongoing passenger loss the airport of Lübeck plays a minor role in this discussion. Being the only Ryanair base along the corridor Lübeck might be able to attract additional Danish passengers due to cheap rates, but the total volume is expected to be negligible compared to HAM or CPH.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 89 Benefits also come from generated traffic. The conventional approach for the measurement of the benefit of new traffic is to consider that the benefit of the infra-marginal user is equal to the difference in the generalized cost of travel without and with HSR. The last user with the project is indifferent between both alternatives, so the user benefit is zero. Assuming a linear demand function the total user benefit of generated demand is equal to one half of the difference in the generalized cost of travel. According to estimations from CER, UIC and UNIFE passenger growth on high-speed lines is mainly affected by modal shifts: modal shift from air transportation 27 %, modal shift from road (car) 37 %, modal shift from road (coach) 2 %. 34 % of the new passengers are induced. 22 Figure 81 Reasons for HSR passenger growth induced 34% modal shift 66% road (car) 37% road (coach) 2% air 27% Source: CER, UIC, UNIFE. Assessments of the impacts of price level and journey times on demand also emphasize the strong importance of ticket pricing. The fixed link will in conjunction with a semi high-speed rail service induce a market for regular commuting. The labour market effects and local business activities in the immediate hinterland of the link will of course be influenced of the 12 minutes ride for a car ride crossing the link, thereby creating new business opportunities for the region. However, long distance commuting by a fast and high-frequent train service will also arise from a level almost non-existing today. In this context, a short traveling time to be decisive, but affordable prizes and favorable travel conditions will also be essential to expand the market in the long run. 22 CER, UIC, UNIFE, 1994: Hochgeschwindigkeitszüge in Europa. Brüssel/Paris.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 90 Figure 82 Impact of pricing and journey times on traffic demand (example weekly passengers commuting between Copenhagen and Hamburg in 2020) 23 180 minutes, 60 Euros 180 minutes, 40 Euros 150 minutes, 60 Euros 150 minutes, 40 Euros 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 # of passengers (both directions) Source: C. W. Matthiessen et al., 2011: The Fehmarnbelt Fixed Link - Regional development perspectives. 4.3 Network discussion under consideration of cost-benefit aspects Based on the assessment of HSR costs and benefits in the previous sections a simplified cost-benefit comparison can be developed. With regard to HSR costs there are sound arguments to focus on the construction costs for high-speed infrastructure. Average costs in the range from 9 to 40 million Euros per km high-speed line overwhelm operating costs by far and can therefore be considered as key criteria. To simplify the very complex discussion of HSR benefits, the focus will be on the aspect of travel time reductions. According to the findings from previous sections the following impacts on journey times can be reached by increasing the operating speed. Figure 83 Impacts on journey times from speed changes from to journey time reduction 100 km/h high-speed level potential time savings of 60 minutes or more 130 km/h high-speed level 45-50 minutes savings for distances in the range of 350-400 km 160 km/h high-speed level time saving is around 30 minutes over a distance of 450 km Source: OECD, Steer Davies Gleave. As journey time reductions separately do not create a measurable pecuniary benefit, the impacts of reduced journey times on the demand side have to be considered. Therefore the further assessment will be further reduced to the analysis of the relation between journey times and the demand for high-speed passenger transportation. 23 see also: Madrid-Barcelona: market share rail/air 50:50, price ratio rail/air 1.9, Paris-Brussels: market share rail/air 95:5, price ratio rail/air 0.28 (Source: OECD).

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 91 To evaluate this relation, aspects of travel time elasticity have to be considered. Travel time elasticity can be described by the following formula: p e = p t with t p p t t change in demand for passenger transportation demand for passenger transportation changes in journey times journey time A study on travel time elasticity for the long distance segment conducted by TH-Aachen 24 in 1992 shows the following results for different travel motivations: business trip: -0.82 vacation trip: -0.44 private trip: -0.71 A verification of these 20 year old data with updated figures from the review of the requirement plan 2011 allows for the example NBS Hamburg-Hannover (Y-Trasse) the following derivation of travel time elasticity: Expected travel time reduction Hamburg-Hannover from 69 to 52 minutes (-25 %), Expected passenger increase Hamburg-Hannover from 8.8 to 10.5 million passenger trips (+19 %), Travel time elasticity of -0.76. HTC has also evaluated travel-time elasticities for other high-speed or upgraded lines: Cologne-Frankfurt -0.82, Berlin-Hamburg (upgrade): -1.11, Madrid-Barcelona -2.48, Paris-London -0.82, Brussels-Paris -0.52, Brussels-London -1.61. The inauguration of the Paris-Lyon TGV-line stands as a European paradigm of high speed when the old loco-hauled InterCity-trains (the Corail -fleet running 200 km/h) were supplemented by the new TGV-services. During the first 10 year period a tremendous development could be seen in the transport corridor. The InterCity trains carried 12.5 million passengers before the opening of the parallel TGV line in September 1981. After 10 years the old trains had only 4 million passengers left, while the TGV-trains were carrying 18.2 millions. Although it is not possible to establish a total overview of all demand and supply parameters influencing the South/South Eastern transport corridor a general time elasticity of -1.65 can be registered. The previous overview of travel time elasticities shows a wide range of results. Furthermore it has to be stated that the comparability of the single results is difficult due to different sample periods and the lack of transparency regarding the passenger increases in detail. Therefore the figures above can only used for a rough validation of results. The further discussion with focus on the Hamburg-Øresund corridor is based on the results from Figure 56. A travel time elasticity matrix based on the estimated passenger increases 24 Krämer, Th., 1992: Der Modal-Split im Personenfernverkehr, TH-Aachen.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 92 caused by reduced journey times between Hamburg and Copenhagen describes a wide range of values for the travel time elasticity e. Figure 84 Travel time elasticities for different journey time reductions between Hamburg and Copenhagen new travel time 03:30 02:40 02:15 01:50 01:30 04:45-9.50-9.12-9.50-9.77-10.23 03:30-1.80-2.00-2.10-2.25 former travel time 02:40-1.28-1.28-1.37 02:15-0.90-1.00 01:50-0.79 Source: HTC calculations. Compared to the findings from other (high-speed) projects the travel time elasticities for the Hamburg-Copenhagen axis seem to be unusually high. A closer look at the results underlines the strong impact of an improved connectivity due to the Fehmarnbelt fixed link (first row with travel time elasticities of < -9). A nonstop service without ferry transfer seems to be the strongest argument for a significant increase of passenger acceptance. Assessing the impacts of further travel time reductions e.g. from 3:30 h to 2:40 h the elasticities reach a range which is comparable to other successful projects (e.g. Madrid- Barcelona). Furthermore it has to be stated that the positive impact of travel time reductions loses importance the shorter the travel time is. The principle of marginal benefit uses leads to the question, which investments need to be made to reach certain travel time reductions. For the implementation of high-speed services on the Fehmarnbelt corridor different upgrade scenarios were evaluated. Figure 85 Impacts of different upgrade scenarios (excluding Fehmarnbelt tunnel) Investment (million Euro) Travel time Extra pax/ day ( p ) Scenario 0 0 4:45 1,000 No fixed link Scenario A (basis) 200 km/h standard to be constructed in DK 4,000 25 3:00 2,800 (+280 %) Scenario B DE: +100-170 2:30 1,000 Investment for raising (+26.3 %) speed from 160 to 200 km/h in DE Scenario C DE: +600-800 2:00 2,000 Investments for a 200- DK: +800 (+20.8 %) 250 km/h upgrade in DK and DE Scenario D DE: +2,000 1:35 3,000 Investments in dedicated DK: +400 (+17.2 %) high-speed section in DK and DE Source: Banedanmark, Femern A/S, DB AG. Pax t 3,800-1:45 (-36.8 %) 4,800-0:30 (-16.7 %) 5,800-0:30 (-20.0 %) 6,800-0:25 (-20.8 %) e -7.61-1.58-1.04-0.83 25 Including the following upgrades (see page 56): Bad Schwartau-Puttgarden (817 million EUR), Ringsted- Rødby (1.2 billion EUR), Storstrømmen (0.4 billion EUR), Ringsted-Copenhagen (1.5 billion EUR), capacity Øresund line (0.1 billion EUR).

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 93 In the following the four scenarios will be described in detail. To achieve (more or less) significant travel time reductions necessary investments related to the scenarios A to D have to be considered. The infrastructure pre-conditions for the scenario A regarding the Danish investment projects have already been described in section 3.3.4. Figure 86 The high-speed development scenario A Source: TDL. Scenario A serves as a form of basic scenario. It does not take the effects of the German hinterland investments into account, but it includes the most likely Danish decisions on the network development. The total travel time reduction on the Copenhagen-Puttgarden stretch will be 1 hour 40 minutes, the fixed link itself giving 1 hour of reduction. The 200-250 km/h standard of the hinterland railway line has been found the socio economically best solution, and this view plays an important role in the Danish decision making when the Danish parliament is supposed to pass the construction act. The decision on alignment alternative for the hinterland infrastructure between Puttgarden and Lübeck is pending. This minimum alternative represents a significant change in accessibility across the new link. Travel time improvement can be compared with the largest changes that have occurred in comparison to other mega projects in Europe. Travel time between Copenhagen and the German border is reduced to 1 hour 20 minutes, corresponding to an average speed of 150 km/h. Between the border and Hamburg are here provided a travel time equal to the current of 1 hour 40 minutes (from the ferry dock to the train arrives in Hamburg Hbf). Average ICE speed is as low as 95 km/h. The scenario can be realized if the Puttgarden-Lübeck line could not be completed before the opening of the fixed Fehmarn link. Regarding the rolling stock investments of the railway undertakings it has to be considered that the trainsets have to be adapted to the maximum speed level of 250 km/h (underutilisation of equipement on the lower speed sections).

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 94 Figure 87 The high-speed development scenario B Source: TDL. Scenario B suggests a +160 km/h alternative to be decided instead of a lower ambition level just focussing on the need to expand capacity for freight trains. If it is assumed that the present max speed of 160 km/h on shorter parts of the existing railway line can be raised to a more regular 160 to 200 km/h speed, then it should be possible to cut off half an hour of the journey time. Without much difficulty the fastest trains can run the Puttgarden-Hamburg line in 70 minutes equal to an average speed of 129 km/h for an ICEservice. The marginal investment for the semi high-speed scenario B seems relatively low compared with the travel time gain. An estimate for the additional costs to raise the line speed to approximately 200 km/h is between 100 and 170 million Euros (13 % surcharge on base investment 26 ). The fastest trains between Copenhagen and Hamburg will in this future scenario offer a journey time of 2½ hours. It must be recognized that in Scenario B are some less coherent elements of the upgrade of rail infrastructure in the Danish-German corridor. It is indeed doubtful whether this can be done if the conversion of a single track must be done after the opening of the fixed Fehmarnbelt link. A current example from South Jutland shows that if the train operators should be respected, construction works will only be done at nights and the extra track shall be placed with a longer distance to the existing one, which increases costs by 19 %. In this case where DB Schenker made complaints, the Danish parliament decided for an extra financial bill due to increase in construction costs by 8 %. The conversion can be made cheaper if the transport authority simply close some of the local train traffic. For example by only running freight trains on the single track and temporary rebuild the line. In this context a completely new double track would be much more preferable. 26 According to the Danish Railway Administration s department Fehmarn Belt hinterland infrastructure: Miljøredegørelsen Høringsudgave, hæfte 1 report 1 additional costs for the 200 km/h alternative (Grundløsning 1) compared with the 160 km/h alternative (Grundløsning 2) is 13 %.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 95 Figure 88 The high-speed development scenario C Source: TDL. Scenario C constitutes a high-speed connection in line with other major high-speed projects in Europe. It is assumed that the existing line across Zealand can be shortened by 20 km by building a 55 km long new line from Køge to Vordingborg (see section 3.3.4), and the upgrading standard will be raised to 230 km/h on the new double track on Lolland and in the tunnel. The marginal investment volume is 0.8 billion Euros. The 55 km double track Køge N-Vordingborg N can be estimated to a total of 1.3 billion Euros. This alternative will replace another possible upgrade of the 40 km long Lille Syd line Køge-Næstved estimated to 0.5 billion Euros which enable more capacity for transit freight. It is assumed that the need for capacity for the railway freight transport brings in an important background parameter for future railway investments. As such a new line between Køge and Vordingborg replaces a less ambitious upgrading project for the line Køge-Næstved ( Lille Syd ). This project concerns electrification and double tracking the line as well as enhancing the speed limit, but only for 160 km/h. In order to relieve the capacity constraints on the new high-speed line Copenhagen-Ringsted due to the inappropriate mix of slow and fast trains, the freight trains could effectively be deviated in Køge on to the Køge-Vordingborg line. This also improves runtimes for the national high-speed service Copenhagen-Odense. Furthermore the line between Puttgarden and Lübeck is assumed to be equipped for fully 200 km/h operation (the single-track Fehmarnsund Brücke to be reconstructed with a double track; the motorway then need a tunnel crossing and the line between Bad Oldesloe and Hamburg-Wandsbek is upgraded. 27 The further upgrade between Hamburg and Lübeck mainly comprises the construction of an additional line to shift regional transportation from RE-trains to an enhanced S-Bahn concept (S4). A significant reduction of regional trains helps to provide additional capacity for long-distance as well as freight transportation. According to German Federal Court of Auditors the estimated investment just for the construction of an additional line between Bad Oldesloe and Wandsbek count for 560 million Euro incl. a 60 % increase of construction costs. It has to be discussed if the highspeed scenario has to take the full cost here as the separation of the S4 has been on the 27 A further extension of the railway node Lübeck is not considered.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 96 agenda all the time. Including the further Puttgarden-Lübeck upgrade a net investment on the German side of 0.6-0.8 billion Euros can be estimated. The direct trains between Hamburg and Copenhagen will now target a 2 hour travelling time by achieving an average speed of 165 km/h on the German side 150 km/h and on the Danish side 194 km/h. Figure 89 The high-speed development scenario D Source: TDL. Scenario D represents the best-case for a high-speed link between Hamburg and Copenhagen by reaching the shortest possible travel time of 1 hour 35 minutes giving an average speed of 203 km/h. A service like this requires further investments of 0.4 28 billion Euros on the Danish side comprising a new 3 km shorter by-pass line for 250 km/h paralleling the motorway across Falster and Lolland as well as a new tunnel under Guldborgsund. On the German side a nearly 50 km new alignment from Bad Schwartau along the highway to a point northwest of Hamburg-Rahlstedt can fulfil the aim to reduce the travel time by achieving a higher speed on a line that is shortened by 7 km. The estimated costs for this ambitious project count for approximately 2.0 billion Euros. 29 For the Lübeck-Puttgarden section a further upgrade for a maximum speed of +200 km/h is assumed. 30 The scenario D is as investment profile composed like the Karlsruhe-Basel combined ABS/NBS project. A target of high average speeds could be met for a railway with a mix of traffic, but the technical standard of the line has to be raised significantly. When all the proposed infrastructure elements are implemented the fastest train service will be 1 hour 35 minutes. A less fast service with a couple of stops under way runs just under 2 hours. 28 29 30 According to the Danish Railway Administration s department Fehmarn Belt hinterland infrastructure: Miljøredegørelsen Høringsudgave, hæfte 1 report 1. The extra costs for a by-pass solution has been estimated to 0.2 to 0.6 billion DKK. There are 3 possible alignments investigated. It is assumed the middle alternative to cost 0.4 billion Euros. Source: IHK Lübeck, Entwicklung der Verkehrsinfrastruktur auf der Achse Hamburg - Puttgarden im Zuge einer festen Fehmarn-Beltquerung. A dedicated high-speed line would require a new alignment (NBS) as well as an upgrade of the existing line to ensure the connectivity of the seaside resorts causing tremendous additional costs.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 97 Although the Bruxelles-Paris high-speed line will have exactly the same length of 320 km after the rebuilt of the whole Hamburg-Copenhagen stretch it will not be possible to reach the 234 km/h TGV-speed as a performance of the normal time table which sets a run time of 1 hour 22 minutes between the two cities. However, it should be borne in mind that freight traffic in the Franco-Belgian corridor has a separate track. Freight trains and TGV s are not mixed together in daytime operation. In the Danish-German corridor freight train partially run on the same track 24-7. 4.4 Validation of the marginal investments and market potential The estimate for extra passengers due to the travel time reduction leads to a potential for making extra revenue in the interest of the train operating companies. A part of the additional user benefits has to remunerate the marginal investment cost for enhancing the quality of infrastructure (speed and capacity). If it is assumed that extra 1.000 passengers in 2020 would be carried in the 24 ICE departures (both directions per day) then trains on average would increase their load factor by 42 passengers. In general the marginal cost per passenger will fall, but transport of some of the additional passengers will always cause extra costs, and on some departures extra seats would have to be supplied. In this sense it will cost extra to gain extra passengers, but if yield management ticket pricing and some more differentiation of prices could be integrated into the commercial business compared with the present marketing performance, probably a lot more earning would be possible. Today the 2nd class ticket Hamburg-Copenhagen is 81.00 Euro (normal tariff) and 1st class is 130.00 Euro. Average price per ticket is 30-50 % lower. If a share of between 20.00 and 28.00 EUR per passenger could be allocated for an extra upgrading of the infrastructure, then there will be in the area of 140-190 million Euro for the extra investment. This estimate is based on 1.000 extra long distance passengers across Fehmarnbelt, but not revenues derived from extra regional passengers on both sides. If it is assumed that the railway investments (both speed improvement and more capacity) also would benefit freight transport and this corresponds to 50 % of the marginal passenger revenue, then will the investment potential increase. Further, if we include an EU-subsidy of 15-20 % for the infrastructure investment then could 240-330 million Euro in total be allocated for the project paid by the extra traffic generated and paid fully on normal market conditions.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 98 Figure 90 Investment potential due to marginal earnings Source: TDL. A train service Hamburg-Copenhagen lasting 2 to 2½ hours will be attractive to more time sensitive as well as comfort-quality focussed travellers. Today a high willingness to pay can be observed on the SAS flight route. The standard economy class is 440 Euro and a business is 560 Euro both of them one way. Probably this price reveals the lack of competition on this 350 km long route, but it also shows that the market will pay a relatively high price for short travelling time. Therefore it could be reasonable to assume that the business travel segment could pay a marginal higher price for fast and frequent train journeys. After all the Hamburg and the Øresund regions belongs to the richest regions in Northern Europe. GDP per employed in the Zealand region and in the Hamburg region is 85,000 respectively 78,000 EUR (2007). Against this background, it might as hypothesis noted that there is an unexplored market for fast and frequent train connections Hamburg-Copenhagen, and that a modern concept will actually attract long distance travelers. If looking at competitive strength of trains, it clearly appears that it is precisely the long and medium-long journeys which the train shows its largest market share relative to other modes. Figure 91 The market strength of the long distance train operation Source: Data from Model Center, TU-Denmark, and Incentive Partners, Rail potential analysis, DK 2010.

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 99 In Denmark, 16% of all transport regarding trips over 150 km is done by train. This number may of course vary a little from country to country, but what seems important in this respect is that the train has just its strength on the long distance travel and here is far above its average market performance. When therefore making a potential growth chart of new market initiatives it is estimated that for every new 100 person km on the railway will 32 person km be generated by trips of more than 150 km because of the train's competitive advantage in long distance travel. Many metropolitan areas invest in new metro lines, which relieve congestion in the city road network, but the dominating short trips to be made here affect only marginally positive rail traffic market share in total. Compared to city traffic, the growth of railway traffic across the Fehmarnbelt might not be very dense calculated in number of trips, but here we will look more closely at the potential to generate new traffic. As previously stated, the standard time elasticity explains a large part of growth. The probability of a forecast turns out in reality depends on more factors than time gains, including whether an integration process actually takes place. In this context it may be useful to derive a travel frequency for trips between two points. That does not take into account whether it is business or leisure trips. We will look into this general citizen s travel activity level by assuming that a process of integration and bringing two major cities together similar to that found between Bruxelles and Paris may also occur elsewhere e.g. between Hamburg and Copenhagen, which covers roughly the same distance as between Paris and Bruxelles. With the introduction of Thalys trains have been created a stronger integration. Before the French railways suggested a high-speed connection between the two cities had air traffic a more dominating role, but high-speed trains now offer an intense and affordable service. The travel frequency by Thalys is 0.9 trip per inhabitant per year in this corridor. It means that citizens of the two conurbations take almost one trip (one-way) every year. Figure 92 Travel frequency as a function of travel time reduction Source: IBU-Bahnstrategie data and demographic data from the cities. Encouragement to travel depends on the right quality and the right amount of services offered. Between Hamburg and Copenhagen's train frequency per capita day 0.11. With a fast train service on the 2 ½ hour (Scenario B) can be calculated that trip frequency increases to 0.52. For our very fast Scenario D, which comes closest to our Paris-Brussels

Report Status for High-Speed Networks in Northern Europe 100 reference, trip frequency will be increased to 0.73. And thus still well below the reference case. Two observations must be done. First, it would be reasonable to include Malmö catchment area for Copenhagen. In consequence, it makes a fall of 0.05 in trip frequency, making it more robust in comparison with the reference case. Secondly, from a Scandinavian point of view seem most other cases, however, difficult to use as a reference, since most cities are built up with several international corridors. This is not the case here, since the corridor is surrounded by the waters, and the most efficient southbound connection will be via the Fehmarn tunnel in the future. This underscores the likelihood of a significant effect on trip frequency. At the same time it must be emphasized that a substantial reduction in travel time of 2 to 2½ hours will change the current travel patterns quite extensively. Drawing a conclusion the previous scenario consideration has shown that competitive travel times of 2:00 h to 2:30 h can be achieved with reasonable additional investments. The network design generally follows the Danish time-model approach and is based on the idea to establish an efficient semi high-speed network which contributes to an acceptable increase of average travel times without requiring overdesigned infrastructure projects like Stuttgart 21 which are to a limited extent politically as well as economically sustainable. The intelligent combination of upgrade and new-built projects provides a high-class technical solution for the Hamburg-Øresund corridor comprising the following advantages: Provision of additional passenger as well as freight transport capacities, Considerable travel time reductions as incentive for a future increase of railway market share, Lower investment volumes supporting faster decisions and shorter realization periods, Flexible infrastructure design as base for future upgrades or technical advancements, Match with Danish transport policy and (necessary) innovative alternative for political decision makers on German side, Concept as pilot for a sustainable future cross-border infrastructure development. Besides the numerous advantages there are also risks of this concept. If decisions on infrastructure investment are sliced into many pieces and the transport system in the end should be fully integrated there will be a high risk for cost increase due to interoperability problems and loss of benefits due to disintegrated services and generally a lower level of quality (where optimal travel times cannot be meet). Despite the hesitant actions of DB AG regarding the infrastructure development on the German side the current planning process opens up the chance to postulate additional upgrades. Collective agreements on further actions after the completion of the current upgrade project seem to cause significantly more efforts. With the decision to favoring a highclass technical solution by implementing a nation-wide ERTMS system of the standards of ETCS level II, the ambition of velocity-performance increases as well as the actions for infrastructure projects the Danish transport policy has set some promising guidelines for the corridor development on the Hamburg-Øresund axis.