team Western Europe Cédric Besnard* HSBC Bank plc, Paris branch +33 1 56 52 43 66 cedric.besnard@hsbc.com Florence Dohan* HSBC Bank plc +44 20 7992 4647 florence.dohan@hsbc.com CEEMEA Michele Olivier* HSBC South Africa (Pty) Ltd +27 011 6764 208 michele.olivier@za.hsbc.com Raj Sinha* HSBC Middle East +971 4423 6932 raj.sinha@hsbc.com Sector sales David Harrington Sector Sales HSBC Bank plc +44 20 7991 5389 david.harrington@hsbcib.com Lynn Raphael Sector Sales HSBC Bank plc +44 20 7991 1331 lynn.raphael@hsbcib.com *Employed by a non-us affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is not registered/qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations 1
2 Sector structure Food retail Beverages Consumer & Retail - Europe Food and HPC General retail Luxury EMEA Equity Research See sector section for further details See sector section for further details See sector section for further details See sector section for further details Food Producers Home Personal Care Nestlé Lindt Danone Reckitt Benckiser Henkel L Oréal Beiersdorf Unilever Source: HSBC
Sector price history to May 2012 800 Dec. 07 - Dec. 08 Input costs inflation concern Dec. 08 - Dec. 09 Collapse in mature economies, but emerging markets save the day. Input costs deflation help margins + 8.0% EMEA Equity Research 700 Sector organic sales growth Dec. 04 - Dec. 07 Premiumisation era + 7.0% 600 + 6.0% 500 + 5.0% 400 + 4.0% 300 + 3.0% 200 + 2.0% Sector share price index 100 + 1.0% 3 0 Jan-90 Dec-90 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, HSBC + 0.0%
4 EBIT margin* versus asset turnover chart (2011) 1.1 Beiersdorf Lindt 1.0 U nilev er EMEA Equity Research 0.9 Asset Turnover(x) 0.8 0.7 Hen kel Nestlé L'O réal Reckitt Dan one 0.6 0.5 5.0% 10.0% 15. 0% 20.0% 2 5.0% 30.0 Adju sted EB IT M arg in(%) * EBIT margin adjusted for restructuring and other exceptional costs; asset turnover as a ratio of sales to total assets Source: Company reports, HSBC calculations
Sector description Segments The sector consists of two segments: food manufacturing and home and personal care (HPC). It is dominated by several large, international multi-brand groups. Some of them focus on food, such as Nestlé, others on HPC, such as L Oréal, and some combine both, such as Unilever. Brands and categories Food and HPC companies rely on brand awareness. Managing the distribution channel, from hard discounters to department stores, through negotiations with retailers on price and in such areas as on-shelf availability, is key. Sector categories like dairy products and skin care are not fixed entities. They are shaped by the leading brands and by innovation. Each category goes through a life cycle from growth, driven by an increase in the penetration rate, to maturation, when concentration is high, volume growth decelerates only offset by emerging markets and price elasticity is greater. Sector characteristics Food and HPC is historically a defensive sector. Cyclicality is limited by the relatively small share of discretionary purchases in its sales in most categories. Pricing power is low, so operating leverage mostly depends on volume growth to cover cost inflation. Key themes Cédric Besnard* HSBC Bank Plc, Paris Branch +33 1 56 52 43 26 cedric.besnard@hsbc.com Florence Dohan* HSBC Bank Plc +44 20 7992 4647 florence.dohan@hsbc.com Michele Olivier* HSBC South Africa (Pty) Ltd +27 011 6764 208 michele.olivier@za.hsbc.com Raj Sinha* HSBC Bank Middle East +971 4423 6932 raj.sinha@hsbc.com *Employed by a non-us affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is not registered/ qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations Emerging markets We estimate the industry has increased its exposure to emerging markets by at least 50% in 20 years. In 2011 the European stocks we cover derived around 44% of sales from emerging economies, where category growth is driven by rising income per capita, which implies migration to branded products, demographics and urbanisation. These markets account for more than two-thirds of the sector s sales growth (sometimes 100%), and represent the biggest growth driver in coming years, especially as saturated US and European categories tend to become zero-sum games that are costly to expand. However, competition is also growing, and not all categories benefit as much from emerging markets. The European companies already have a good level of penetration in the soap and laundry mass markets in some emerging economies, for example, since they have been targeting the low end of the income ladder for years. Skin care and baby food are still taking off. Raw materials Raw materials, from milk to petrochemicals or vegetable oils, are a key manufacturing cost. Raw material and packaging costs represent about 15% to 25% of sales for cosmetics players but around 30% to 35% of sales for food and home care. That means input-cost price volatility is a key issue, as the cost base can quickly rise and require risky price increases to offset it. The main commodities are milk (Danone being the most exposed because of its yoghurt business), oil-related/pet/plastics (which affects all players, but mostly Henkel, Reckitt, Unilever), tea (Unilever), cocoa (Nestlé), coffee (Nestlé), vegetable oils/palm oil (Unilever), sugar, fruit and vegetables. These companies usually hedge by three to six months for most of these commodities, implying that price variations tend to come through to the gross margin with a time lag. Some of these commodities are either regulated (EU sugar) or quoted (cocoa). A commodity like milk is less visible, since it is not quoted and needs to be purchased locally. When input costs start to bite, the debate is on whether the company can offset this with price increases (or emergency cost savings), while commodity deflation usually raises questions as to whether companies will pass on the full benefit to consumers. 5
Pricing capacity more relevant than the myth of pricing power The industry pricing has hardly ever beaten inflation in the last decade. Groups pricing capacities are thus mainly a result of their exposure to inflation-driven emerging countries. Advantages of all sorts (for example, softening commodity costs and favourable FX) are usually reinvested in pricing or advertising in order to foster volumes growth. This can cause price wars. The threat of price wars: food specialists less at risk than the HPC oligopoly We view food as an industry of specialists, and an aggregate of local monopolies/rational duopolies (including Danone in yoghurts, Unilever in European spreads, Nestlé and Mars in pet food, and Kraft in cream cheese). HPC is much closer to being a global oligopoly, with the top 6 FMCG almost always operating in the same categories and/or regions. This implies different pricing behaviours, in our view. Therefore, while food players have more differentiated pricing policies, HPC players are more likely to follow peers pricing in order to maintain market shares. This puts the HPC sub-sector more at risk of margin-dilutive price wars, as in 2009-10 with the price war in Indian laundry between Procter and Unilever, which spread to European home care. In such a competitive oligopoly, it is particularly important to identify any early signs that a key player is not playing by the rules and is trying to gain market shares by increasing price/promotional investments, as this can start a chain of events impacting all companies. Sector drivers The cubic matrix Most of the companies are exposed to the same consumption trends, but organic sales growth, excluding FX and M&A, can range between high and low single digits. Each company can be seen as a cubic matrix, with its organic growth potential the sum of three drivers: category mix, geographical mix and execution the capacity to gain market share and roll out innovation. A combination of growing categories those that aren t too mature or competitive and provide pricing power, for example and a good execution track record seem most important. A category can always be rolled out in new countries, although being in growing countries but with mature or competitive segments, or with execution issues, may offer less visibility. The end game for all companies is to find the right balance inside the cubic matrix to generate sustainable organic sales growth, the clear earnings growth driver over the long term, in an industry not over-reliant on cost cutting. The components of organic growth watch for volume growth Organic growth in food and HPC is driven by three metrics: (1) Price increases: These are a less important driver than some may think. We estimate that pure pricing (ex mix) over 20 years averaged c2% a year in the sector, implying low pricing net of inflation. Furthermore, in some categories, price elasticity can cap the companies ability to raise prices for more than a year (in the case of external shocks like input-cost inflation). (2) Mix: Improving the mix means introducing a new product that is sold for more than the company s average price point for products, or a replacement product at a higher price than the old version, usually justified by the argument that it offers more benefits. The company invests in R&D to improve the product and advertising and marketing to promote it. We believe the return on a successful change in mix is quite high as a significant part of the fixed cost is the same as for the old version, but the new product 6
sells at a higher price. That said, mix is a tool with little visibility (consumers trading down is a common pattern in the industry) and requires strong innovation to be a sustainable driver. (3) Volume growth: Volume growth is the driver offering the most visibility and thus is the most looked at by the market. There are various ways to generate volume growth, some cheaper than others. We identify three main drivers, appropriate to different stages of the product cycle. (a) Volume can be increased by increasing the number of consumers of the products, primarily by expanding the penetration of particular categories in a country. This requires little investment once the cost of creating the category has been passed on. Most of the growth comes from consumers taking up a newly available product. Companies can increase volumes by entering emerging markets, for example, since rising income per capita in those countries makes consumers migrate to branded goods. (b) Increasing the frequency of consumption within a category is usually more important when increasing the number of consumers becomes harder. Hair care would be a good example: selling a conditioner to accompany a regular shampoo doubles consumption each time customers wash their hair. Another category is biscuits, where companies have promoted the idea of eating biscuits at a variety of times 10am, then noon, then mid-afternoon. (c) A greater focus on market share is the last step in a category life cycle. It occurs when a category is fully penetrated, private labels have appeared in mature regions as credible alternatives, and roll-out in new regions has been completed or has become a necessity. Excluding innovations, market-share gains are the only driver of volume growth. They need to be generated by advertising and promotions, execution or price cuts. At this point the cost of growth is very high and needs to be accompanied by costcutting or M&A. A&P: a critical tool to drive volume growth Advertising and promotions (A&P) is a key to driving volume growth. It represents about 12% to 15% of sales in the food industry and as much as 30% for the cosmetics industry. We do not consider A&P to be a variable cost in a marketing-driven environment; it is more an inflationary fixed cost. But in practice it is also partly a variable cost. Marketing expenses are not only linked to growth, product activity and launches, but they also can be adjusted in the short term to smooth margins. However, the boundary between phasing and short-term cuts sometimes becomes blurred. There are numerous examples of A&P phasing when margins are under pressure, although this is generally not considered as a positive. Consumer staples evolve in a multi-brand-driven environment, where growth investment is key to winning market share and delivering operating leverage in the long term. It s true that what counts is the share of voice the proportion of a company s advertising as a percentage of the industry s total advertising spending. A&P spend in absolute terms can thus go down if the industry overall is cutting marketing spending, as the share of voice can remain constant and the brand franchise untarnished. But no company wants to be the first to cut marketing, at the risk of being the only one, especially as tough times demand more A&P, not less, to justify price levels. We see here a classic dilemma, where all players have an interest in pushing the A&P level down, but none has an interest in moving first (especially when savings can give some leeway in margin phasing). Beyond the normal productivity gains slightly deflating the marketing expenses ratio, and the increasing use of cheaper digital media, we do not believe there will be a structural decrease in A&P ratios in the coming years. 7
M&A: buying growth, building scale When categories start to become too saturated or competitive, buying market share or new categories through M&A (balance sheets are usually healthy due to good cash conversion) can look more attractive than overinvesting to expand categories with limited potential. Accordingly, Nestlé increased its exposure to the growing but very competitive infant nutrition segment by buying Pfizer s baby food unit in April 2012, acquiring an EM-led, high growth business and reducing exposure to more mature segments such as confectionery. This also helped Nestlé build scale in baby food, which we think could have maximised its margins. In a sector where profitable growth is the key valuation driver, deals often rely on growth synergies, rather than on cost efficiencies. We agree that growth synergies are the more important of the two, but they also take longer to achieve and are harder for the market to quantify. This results in analysts frequently being proved to have been mistaken in their view of a deal, followed by stock market corrections. We believe the best example of this is Danone-Numico: the deal made a lot of strategic sense, relying on growth synergies, but Danone paid a rich 22x EBITDA, explaining the 2007 share price correction. Valuation A structural PE premium to the market The food and HPC sector (the weighted average of the European stocks under our coverage) has traded at a premium to the broader market fairly consistently since the start of our relative PE historical analysis in January 1998. Its relative premium has averaged 40% to date, a function of strong visibility on top-line growth and FCF generation. The previous peak industry premium was 100% (November 2008, during the market meltdown): the premium had decreased to 7% by August 2009. The HPC sector typically trades at a higher premium than food: in the past investors put more emphasis on HPC s profit growth potential DCF is the traditional tool to value the companies given their stability, rather high visibility on sales growth and resulting operating leverage. In terms of disclosure, most companies split out organic growth between price/mix and volume (the key metric investors look at), at least every half year, and usually disclose their A&P investments. European Food and HPC: growth and profitability * 2008 2009 2010** 2011 2012e Growth Sales 4.8% -1.0% 7.0% -4.9% 6.3% EBITDA 32.5% -16.0% 66.3% -20.9% 7.3% EBIT 37.0% -18.8% 83.2% -22.1% 8.5% Net profit 34.9% -30.3% 118.8% -25.4% 10.7% Margins EBITDA 20.9% 17.1% 26.9% 17.6% 17.9% EBIT 17.9% 13.9% 24.0% 14.8% 14.9% Net profit 14.3% 10.2% 20.4% 11.0% 11.2% Productivity Capex/Sales 8.7x 4.9x 8.5x 9.2x 4.9x Asset turnover 1.0x 0.9x 0.9x 0.8x 0.8x Net debt/equity 0.6x 0.4x 0.3x 0.4x 0.3x ROE 23.5% 23.7% 22.7% 20.9% 21.7% Note: based on all HSBC coverage of European Food and HPC - all data are weighted by sales, in constant currency * all data are reported figures, thus implying very high volatility due to contribution from one offs ** 2010 figures inflated by Nestlé capital gain on Alcon Source: Company reports, HSBC estimates 8
Sector snapshot Key sector stats MSCI Europe Food Products Dollar Index 5.12% of MSCI Europe US Dollar Trading data 5-yr ADTV (EURm) 930 Aggregated market cap (EURbn) 300.3 Performance since 1 Jan 2000 Absolute 145% Relative to MSCI Europe US 167% Dollar 3 largest stocks Nestlé, Unilever, Danone Correlation (5-year) with MSCI Europe 0.55 US Dollar Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream, HSBC Top 10 stocks: MSCI Europe Food Products Dollar Index Stock rank Stocks Index weight 1 Nestlé 51.2% 2 Unilever 24.3% 3 Danone 11.2% 4 Associated Brit.Foods 3.9% 5 Lindt & Spruengli 2.1% 6 Kerry Group 'A' 2.0% 7 Suedzucker 1.6% 8 Barry Callebaut 1.3% 9 Tate & Lyle 1.2% 10 Aryzta 1.1% Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream, HSBC Country breakdown: MSCI Europe Food Products Dollar Index Country Weights (%) Switzerland 55.7% UK 16.2% Netherlands 13.2% France 11.2% Ireland 2.0% Germany 1.6% Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream, HSBC Core industry driver: the components of organic growth 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Volume growth Mix contribution Price increases Source: Company data, HSBC PE band chart: HSBC European Food and HPC coverage 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Jan-95 Jul-96 Jan-98 Jul-99 Jan-01 Jul-02 Jan-04 Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, HSBC Jul-05 Jan-07 Jul-08 Jan-10 PB vs. ROE: HSBC European Food and HPC coverage 4.5 4.0 Jul-11 21x 19x 18x 16x 14x 30 26 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 22 18 14 10 Fw d PB (x ) - (LHS) F w d ROE (%) - (R HS) Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, HSBC 9