Regime Change and Democratization in Cuba: Comparative Perspectives Eusebio Mujal Leon, Department of Government, Georgetown University Eric Langenbacher, Department of Government, Georgetown University This paper has been prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (September 3 5, 2009) in Toronto, Canada.
INTRODUCTION The study of Cuban politics has been dominated by the notion that its subject is exceptional and immobile. To some degree this reflected the long shadow cast over Cuba by the permanent presence of Fidel Castro and his highly personal imprint on the Revolution. He and his regime outlived the Soviet gerontocracy, outlasted no fewer than ten US presidents, and survived the cataclysm provoked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Finally, in July 2006, biology accomplished what neither political nor economic crises had managed to do, and he finally ceded power to his brother. It is now Raúl Castro s task to manage the transition from a highly (though not exclusively) personalized system of rule to a more institutionalized one, while preparing the ground for the inevitable transfer of power from the sierra generation to a younger set of leaders. With the foreseeable departure of the founder, more than a succession is occurring in Cuba. There are ample signs that the transition to a new regime, not necessarily a democratic one, is already under way. Moreover, in addition to the political transition and timetable, a second, economic transition is also in process. The old state centric economic system does not work. Cuba does not produce much of anything, and it relies (much as it did in the good old days of the Soviet Union) on petroleum subsidies from Venezuela to keep its economy alive. Agriculture is a shambles. More than half the arable land lies fallow, and more than 80 percent of the food consumed on the island must be imported. The quality and availability of consumer goods is poor, and there are
shortages of everything from electricity, to energy, to basic services. In light of the partial liberalization of the economy (creeping capitalization, joint ventures, Western tourism, and a dual currency economy characteristics of an enclave economy which are reinforced by an extended network of clientelism), social stratification and income inequality across the island have intensified. The simultaneous political and economic crises Cuba faces are more acute than at any point since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Aggravating the situation at this point is the incomplete succession (a revitalized Fidel Castro still casts a shadow over his brother) as well as the prospect of greater changes to come. At the same time, civil society is weak, and there is little visible opposition to the regime. Moreover, this is not the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Weltanschauung is not propitious for democracy. Neither is the Latin American regional context which has seen the rise of democratic authoritarians. All of this makes for a complex situation and leads us to ask: What are the prospects for regime change in Cuba? What are the major institutional actors? What are the likely contours of a transition process? What might be the parameters of the new system? In this paper, we address these issues from a number of perspectives. First, we review the various phases of the regime since 1959, analyzing the role of political actors within and outside the regime (including civil society and the diaspora) and identifying the major pressure points for change in the economy. The second part of the paper considers other transitional experiences, and what relevance they might have relevance for Cuba. Drawing from East European, Asian
(especially Vietnam and China) and other Latin American cases, we look at several issues related to elite divisions, economic reform, civil society, migration and identity, and nationalism. The paper concludes with a brief examination of future transition scenarios and likely regime outcomes for Cuba. Among the possibilities we consider are the continuation of a post totalitarian system (muddling through); some kind of party or military controlled authoritarian system (the evolutionary path), and, a more dramatic rupture and establishment of some kind of (liberal) democracy (the revolutionary option). THE CHARACTERISTICS AND EVOLUTION OF THE CUBAN REGIME Any effort to understand where the Cuban Revolution is headed must begin with an analysis of its trajectory and the substantial changes that the incumbent regime has experienced over the past five decades. In this effort, the longstanding presence of Fidel Castro is apt to mislead us. His commanding persona suggested immutability and permanence, but such was not the case. Over five decades the Revolution went from the exuberance of the guerrilla victory and the mass mobilization campaigns of the 1960s, to its institutionalization in the 1970s with the adoption of Soviet style economic and administrative reforms, to the tsunami provoked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and finally to the special period of the 1990s when the survival of the regime itself was at stake. Remarkably, the regime survived the crisis, but at a significant price. The special period transformed the foundations of the socialist order, provoking important
changes in the economy and society (not least involving the reintroduction of foreign investment), while also substantially debilitating the State and its capabilities. When Fidel Castro fell ill in 2006, his brother, Raul Castro, assumed power in an almost seamless succession process. Not far below the surface stability, however, lies the prospect of greater challenges soon to come. Raul Castro is an interim leader who presides over first stages of the transition to the post Castro era. If all goes well for the regime, that process will involve managing the change from a highly (though not exclusively) personalized system of rule to a more institutionalized one, while preparing the ground for the inevitable transfer of power to a younger set of leaders. If things do not go well, that process could lead to some fairly dramatic changes. Whichever is the case, the process of transition to the post Castro era will usher in a new type of regime to Cuba. The twin pillars of the Revolution have been the Communist Party (PCC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). They are the core and occasionally interchangeable parts of the ruling elite, and they form part of what we denominate the partido fidelista. Though this party lacks a formal structure or program, it clearly has the vocation to govern and rule. The party has an inner core represented by the veterans from the guerrilla struggle against Batista, and its members are recognizable by their loyalty, respect for, and deference toward the figure of Fidel Castro and the Revolution he led. The máximo líder is an exemplar of charismatic authority, but his rule has also had a strong institutional base within which the PCC and the FAR have been the most important, albeit not the only instruments. Neither the FAR nor the PCC, individually or in terms of their
relationship, can be easily compared with their homologues, either in the former (or present) Communist countries or elsewhere in Latin America. The PCC is the ostensible vanguard of the revolutionary process, but for an organization with such a title, it has had a curious history. The PCC did not exist during the struggle against Batista and was only created after the victorious guerrillas took power in 1959. Founded in 1965, it did not celebrate its first congress until 1975. Since then, party congresses have been irregular with the last one occurring in 1997 and the upcoming one (scheduled for the end of 2009) having been postponed until next year. This is not the typical trajectory of a hegemonic Leninist party. Nonetheless, it is true that over the past forty years the PCC has steadily expanded its political and administrative roles. Its members run the state apparatus, replacing what remained of the former pro Soviet Popular Socialist Party (PSP) cadres. The PCC has also undergone substantial renovation, and a new generation of leaders (many of whom have served as provincial party secretaries) sits in the highest leadership ranks. Their influence is most visible in the provincial and municipal party organizations outside of the capital city of Havana The FAR is the other component of the bicephalous Cuban power elite. They are the direct heirs of the Rebel Army that conquered power and made the Revolution. They have a special relationship with the PCC, characterized more by collaboration and distribution of tasks than by subordination. The FAR have never been defeated in the field of battle, are enormously respected by ordinary citizens, and have assumed important responsibilities in diverse government ministries and agencies. Since the cataclysm of the 1990s, the FAR have played a key role in the
implementation of the regime s survival strategy. Not only is the FAR responsible for external defense and internal security (the Ministry of the Interior is under the supervision of the Ministry of the Armed Forces), its officers (present and former) also run most of the joint ventures with foreign investors. More recently, after a ministerial reshuffle in March 2009, military technocrats who have applied Western business and managerial techniques in FAR enterprises and selected civilian ones as well (what is known in Cuba as the sistema de perfeccionamiento empresarial) have been placed in charge of the economic ministries. The FAR holds a position within the Cuban system that is quite unique compared with the status of other militaries, either in Communist countries or in Latin America. With their former chief, Raúl Castro now president of Cuba and with strong representation in the highest government and party bodies, it will play a critical role during the transition to a new regime in Cuba. Both the guerrilla experience and fifty years on a war footing have contributed to the enhanced role of the military in Cuban society. The same experience has had a profound effect on state structures, national ideology, and the organization of society. The case of Cuba confirms the considerable academic literature on how war and its threat allows regimes and government to neutralize and eliminate opponents, extract resources from the population, and distribute them to those who support the regime. 1 Among the most important particularities of the Cuban case have been (1) the absence of a traditional hegemonic Communist Party (the embryo of the partido fidelista was the victorious Rebel Army), (2) the departure and exile of many
opponents who chose exit over voice (nearly 15 percent of Cubans live outside their country) (3) the utilization of mobilization, education, and intimidation rather than mass violence as instruments for control and consolidation, (4) the destruction and/or subordination of nearly all independent societal organizations (the one exception was the Catholic Church which was, nonetheless, effectively brought to heel), (5) the salience of nationalism (and anti Americanism) in a country whose half century of formal independence belied a sovereignty much truncated by the weight and intervention of the United States, (6) the persistence of a low intensity civil war between Cuba South and Cuba North (as we might refer to the zones whose respective capitals are Havana and Miami), and (7) the reality of an enduring cold war with the United States which reinforced the militarization of Cuban society and justified extended controls and repression. The Cuban regime has been characterized by an intrusive state whose elites have atomized society, controlled and reorganized it, and channeled participation vertically through a host of mass organizations. This process has eliminated political competition, destroyed economic society, rendered civil society weak and ineffective, and shattered notions of personal rights and responsibilities. Over the past decade, Cuban society has not quite resurrected (in the evocative phrase of Enrique Baloyra), but neither has it remained immobile. 2 Multiple civic networks and associations have developed, though it is by no means easy to disentangle which are oppositional, dissident, and non oppositional sectors and activities. 3 Few groups are independent. Most stand in some relation to the state, even while seeking margins of autonomy from it. Moreover, even where they are critical of
economic and social conditions, they are not necessarily calling for regime change or transformation. Even the Catholic Church, probably the best organized civic organization on the island, affirms its political neutrality and has opted for negotiation, if not accommodation, with the regime. 4 There has been a modest but noticeable increase in civil disobedience over the past decade. 5 Nonetheless, human rights groups and opposition organizations remain isolated, weak, and subject to constant harassment. They confront daunting obstacles in making their views known and in connecting with ordinary citizens. As the noted civic activist Dagoberto Valdés has aptly noted: In Cuba there are political opponents, there are dissidents, there are other groups of an incipient civil society, but there is also much civic and political illiteracy that does not permit social and political actors to define themselves and to focus on their own role. 6 There have been four phases of the Cuban Revolution, each of which corresponds to a variant of the totalitarian type of regime. The first phase (1961 1970) involved the creation of the Cuban version of a totalitarian regime. It involved the creation of a new, highly centralized and invasive state whose objective was nothing less than to mold a New Man, the establishment of a highly effective security apparatus (complemented by the organization of a ubiquitous network of neighborhood committees known as the Comités de Defensa de la Revolución), 7 and the implementation of an aggressive strategy of mobilization that was accompanied by the development of a radical, anti capitalist and anti imperialist ideology. Early in the process Fidel Castro affirmed he was a Marxist Leninist, but he can no less accurately be described as a man of action, the founder of his own political religion
whose radicalism had a more intuitive and moral foundation than an intellectual or philosophical one. The second phase (1970 1986) involved the effort to reproduce Soviet structures and institutional arrangements on the island, thus laying the foundations for Cuban integration into the Soviet bloc and ensuring the longer term economic and political stability of the regime. The priorities of state building and mobilization, which had been accompanied in the external sphere by the guerrilla internationalism of the 1960s, now gave way to the requirements of institutionalization, specialization, and a foreign policy where traditional instruments (including the use of regular armed forces to project power) played a much more prominent role. Strategic convergence led to much closer alignment with Soviet foreign policy and general (if wary and unenthusiastic) acceptance of its policy of détente and peaceful coexistence. The institutionalization of economic reforms, the accompanying reorganization of the state, and the re direction of military energies toward foreign missions had important effects on the twin pillars of the partido fidelista, the PCC and FAR. The result was that each organization became more professional and specialized within its own sphere of action. PCC members increasingly monopolized the domestic political arena, while the FAR, now externally directed, saw its (relative) autonomy and role as the vanguard of proletarian internationalism reinforced. The division of labor that developed between the FAR and PCC lasted until the mid 1980s. 8 The institutionalization of the 1970s also marked the beginning of the (first) transition from a totalitarian to a post totalitarian regime in Cuba which
involved a significant decline in mobilization, the simultaneous implementation of planning mechanisms and decentralization of economic decision making, and the growing reliance on material incentives. Accompanying these developments was the rise of corruption and the emergence of a new class of careerists within the state apparatus. Fidel Castro blamed these developments on the Soviet style reforms and launched a campaign of rectification of errors and negative tendencies. The latter led to a purge of pro Soviet technocrats in the PCC, new restrictions on self employment, a renewed effort to recentralize economic controls, a return to the moral incentives of an earlier era. These measures signaled the closure of the incipient transition to a post totalitarian regime. Rectification proved only the first of several challenges confronting the regime during the 1980s. More turbulent times loomed ahead. One major challenge came from within it focused on the arrest and execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa and four other officers in July 1989. This is not the place an extended discussion of these events. Suffice it to note that, while Ochoa was accused of involvement in the drug trade, he also probably represented a bonapartist sensibility among professional officers who had served in Africa (where Cuba had maintained more than 50,000 soldiers since 1975) and had become accustomed to significant autonomy from the political leadership. The conclusion of the Ochoa affair shook the foundations of the ruling elite, leading to extensive purges within the military and security commands. Fourteen ministers, vice ministers and heads of state enterprises lost their jobs, 5 per cent of the Central Committee was ousted, the Minister of the Interior was jailed, several thousand army and security officers were
relieved of their jobs, retired or offered positions in the national police, and the Ministry of the Interior was placed under the control of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR). The other crisis was external in nature and related to the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev with his application of perestroika, glas nost, and a new thinking in foreign policy. This and the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union and its allies meant more than the end of alliance and an ideological point of reference. It also sent the Cuban economy into a profound tailspin. The end of the special relationship led to the suspension of oil deliveries, the collapse of trade (85 percent of which had been the bloc countries), and the end of Soviet subsidies that represented 40 45 percent of the GDP. The third phase (1991 2006) of the Cuban Revolution marked the end of the Cuban experiment in autarky and introduced what Fidel Castro called the special period in a time of peace. It also led to deep structural changes that included dollarization of the economy and introduction of a dual currency (July 1993), the granting of permits to engage in limited self employment, the re opening of farmer s markets, the search for foreign capital and the creation of numerous joint venture companies (many of them run by the armed forces), the encouragement of tourism and remittances from immigrants, and the re direction of investment away from social programs (with their corresponding decline in quality and access) and toward those sectors that would attract foreign investors. The net price for the survival of the regime was the re introduction of foreign investment, the creation of (protected and segregated) capitalist enclaves, and the
(temporary) relaxation of many restrictions on self employment. These transformations, in turn, led to greater social stratification and inequality (manifested most clearly in who had access to dollars) on the island. The reforms of the special period affected state and society in different ways. On the one hand, as Javier Corrales perceptively noted, the emergence of joint ventures increased the discretionary power of the State. Foreign enterprises paid the Cuban state in dollars for the workers they hired, while the workers received their compensation in undervalued pesos. Not only did the State extract significant profits from the joint ventures (and also surplus value from workers); it was also the gatekeeper which provided jobs and benefits to worthy citizens vetted and approved by the PCC and mass organizations. 9 At the same time, the special period also shone a bright light on the growing incapacities of the Cuban state. Most notable has been its inability to provide effective services for the population, particularly in the areas of health and education, but also in transportation and housing. The fitful and uneven, second Cuban transition from totalitarianism to posttotalitarianism began in the 1990s. The demands of survival compelled the relaxation of controls and the toleration of reforms, but once the worst was over (1996), Fidel Castro suspended or otherwise restricted the most unpalatable of the measures (dollarization and self employment, for example). By this point, however, even as he reaffirmed his totalitarian vision, railed against corruption and creeping capitalist values, and launched new mobilization campaigns (the battle of ideas was one such), the power of the state could accomplish had declined. The economy had become more open; and, as a result, citizens abandoned their
socialist jobs and flocked to the capitalist enclaves (largely the segregated tourist facilities or the joint ventures where foreign investors had installed themselves). Despite the persistence of controls, economic problems and realities trumped ideology and mobilization. And yet, paradoxically, if the State had far fewer resources than before and economic problems abounded, the immediate survival of the regime was assured. There was no other game in town. Even if there were those within the leadership who entertained reformist or liberalizing ideas, they were sure to keep such notions to themselves. Not only were the risks high, there was also neither a viable opposition nor a strong civil society to whom they could defect or with whom they could negotiate. The ascent of Raúl Castro opened a new phase for the regime. It marked the beginning of the end of the Castro era, while also marking the possible opening toward a new regime. The precise shape of this future regime is still very much up in the air the possible (though not equally probable) options include a posttotalitarian, an authoritarian, and even a democratic regime. Much more of a certainty is the fact that Raúl Castro in an interim leader who cannot rule with the same legitimacy and authority as his brother who, though on the sidelines, continues to offer his opinion through periodic reflexiones. Fidel Castro was, after all, the founder of the regime; he ruled based on the notion that politics was war by other means (as in the slogan socialism or death that he launched in the late 1980s); and, he measured success in political and moral (not on economic) terms amid exhortations to greater struggle and sacrifice. Raúl Castro may be the anointed successor, but he certainly cannot rule in
the same fashion as his brother. Soon after assuming the reins of power, Raúl Castro spoke of the need to introduce structural and conceptual changes. 10 His speeches sound like a tropical combination of Henry Ford, V.I. Lenin and Max Weber replete with references to systematic rigor, order, and discipline and to rationality and efficiency. He has criticized the excessive prohibitions in Cuban society, and even talked about this imperfect socialism of ours. Though his words are amenable to interpretation, Raúl Castro is by no stretch of the imagination a liberal or interested in the establishment of a liberal democracy in Cuba. As he told the Cuban National Assembly in August 2009: I was elected neither to restore capitalism in Cuba nor to surrender the Revolution. I was elected to defend, maintain and to further perfect socialism; (I was not elected) to destroy it. 11 Raúl Castro has endeavored to shift the Cuban regime toward a performance based legitimacy with priorities that include (1) the reinvigoration of a moribund economy, (2) rationalization and de centralization of state administration (so it no longer asphyxiates the economy and production), and (3) the eventual transmission of power to the next generation of leaders. He confronts significant obstacles in his efforts. Cuba has not escaped the consequences of the current international economic crisis, and it has also been buffeted by a series of devastating hurricanes. There is also evidence of resistance within the bureaucracy and the party to programs to lease land to private farmers as well as other measures designed to provide incentives and increase productivity in other sectors of the economy. It may not be coincidental that the Sixth PCC Congress scheduled for later this year has been postponed until 2010.
Since assuming the presidency in February 2008, Raúl Castro has consolidated his power within the partido fidelista. His first move was to place close allies in the highest government and party policy making bodies. In the Council of State, he named fellow septuagenarian and pillar of orthodoxy, José Ramon Machado Ventura, as First Vice President, thus visibly passing over Carlos Lage whom many had assumed would get the job. He also named General Julio Casas as Minister of Defense and also named him a vice president of the Council of State. Just a few months later, at the April 2008 Central Committee plenum, the younger Castro proposed sierra veteran (and occasional rival) Ramiro Valdés as well as his protégé, General Alvaro López Miera, join the PCC Politburo. Representatives of the armed forces hold two of the six vice presidencies of the Council of State and six (seven, if we count Raúl Castro) of the 23 seats on the Politburo. A second set of initiatives dismantled the parallel government known as the Grupo de Coordinación y Apoyo al Comandante en Jefe. Fidel Castro had created this group in the mid 1970s as his personal instrument for intervention in the bureaucracy. It operated directly out of presidential office and independently of ministries and other institutions. Its members were an elite of jóvenes lobos recruited from among the most active and visible student and Communist Youth leaders. Many young leaders had launched their political careers through this vehicle, most notably Carlos Lage and Felipe Pérez Roque, both of whom had served as chiefs of staff. Soon upon taking office, Raúl Castro took aim at the Grupo de Apoyo and others who operated outside the formal institutional structures. He quickly replaced Hassan Pérez (head of the Communist Youth), demoted Otto Rivero
(he was responsible for Fidel Castro s battle of ideas project), and in October 2008 dismissed Carlos Valenciaga on charges of corruption. Many wondered what would be the next shoe to drop and if would involve Foreign Minister Pérez Roque whose high public profile went hand in hand with the status of heir apparent. In effect, Pérez Roque had staked a claim to future leadership in a December 2005 speech at the National Assembly. With Fidel Castro present, he had identified the premises for the continuity of the regime, affirming the need for moral authority based on austere conduct, dedication to work and the absence of privileges. 12 Undoubtedly, there were some in the audience who were not amused. Pérez Roque s downfall eventually came in March 2009 when, along with Carlos Lage, he was ousted from all government posts after Cuban state security had taped the two of them making jokes about Fidel Castro s infirmities and the incompetence of Raúl Castro and Jose Machado Ventura. The third step in the consolidation of raulismo came with the March 2009 Cabinet re shuffle where more than a dozen ministers lost their jobs. This was the largest shake up the Cuban government had ever experienced. What most probably animated the changes was the sorry state of the economy reduced foreign exchange reserves, a growing trade deficit, weak productivity of all sectors, not least in agriculture. Out went the economic team that had managed the economy since the 1990s. In came a new version of the PCC FAR coalition committed to the rationalization of the state administration and the implementation of perfeccionamiento in the general economy. The new Minister of the Economy, Marino Murillo, was a former FAR officer who had been Minister of Domestic Trade
and had headed an anti corruption drive. Colonel Armando Pérez Betancourt, the architect of perfeccionamiento, joined the government as Vice Minister of the Economy. General Salvador Pardo, former head of the Union of Military Industries (UIM), became Minister of Heavy Industry. General Ulises Rosales del Toro kept his portfolio as Minister of Agriculture. Those who saw in the new Cabinet a reinforced FAR were only half right. Holding up the other side of the equation was a cohort of younger PCC leaders, virtually all of whom had served as provincial party secretaries and sat on the Politburo. 13 The jury is still out on whether perfeccionamiento can revitalize the Cuban economy, but there is little doubt that the PCC FAR tandem remains the pillar of the Cuban political order under Raúl Castro. Elements of flux and continuity characterize the incumbent regime in Cuba. A succession (undoubtedly more prolonged than was anticipated) is under way, and the contours of a new style of rule are emerging. The personal and charismatic style associated with Fidel Castro has been replaced with a more pragmatic and rationalistic logic. Even as Raúl Castro derives his legitimacy from the past (and, most particularly, from his brother), there are clear signs that he seeks to govern differently. Later, in the conclusion to this paper, we shall consider the various options and their probability. Here we simply note that twenty years of special period have transformed Cuban society. Some of the most important changes have come with the reintroduction of capitalism (the opening to the world economy and the welcome given to foreign investors are one example; tourism and the cultivation of links with the diaspora are another) and the emergence of a proto capitalist
managerial elite associated with sectors of the armed forces. A gerontocracy of sierra veterans still dominates the commanding heights of the regime, but time is not on their side. Already alongside them in the Council of State or the Politburo sit a new generation of leaders with strong technocratic credentials. Over the past fifty years, Cuba has exhibited several exceptional traits, the most important of which relate to the scope of military influence and the nature of the relationship between the FAR and the Communist Party. 14 Not only is the scope of military influence in Cuba extraordinary (the FAR is responsible for external defense, controls the security services, has an important voice in public policy, and participates in the selection of regime leaders), 15 but its relationship to the Communist Party (especially at the highest levels) is also characterized by parity, not subordination. The most important innovation of raulismo has been to renovate the fidelista coalition by placing a new generation of technocrats (drawn from both the PCC and the armed forces) into the highest ranks of government and administration. COMPARATIVE THEMATIC DIMENSIONS Although every regime transition has its own unique characteristics, there is no doubt that consideration of other cases provides important lessons, parallels and insights. For the Cuban case, comparative perspectives are even more important, given the ideographic tendency to view the Revolution as exceptional as well as the relative dearth of information regarding key socio economic variables. Moreover, the academic and public Zeitgeist has shifted discernibly over the last few years. No
longer is the spread of democracy taken for granted. Instead, there is a much more realistic set of expectations and conceptual lenses about the prospects for democracy. These suggest that autocracies are more resilient than once thought, that the establishment of democracy should be viewed as a long term process (fraught with dangers and often unsuccessful), and that where there is a trade off to be made between stability and (uncertain prospects for) democracy, citizens and societal actors may value the former much more than the latter. For many years, comparative scholars have focused on transitions to democracy or transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. An entire subfield of transitology (and later consolidology ) developed after the onset of the third wave which emphasized elite level negotiations and pacts. 16 Recent years have witnessed a substantial shift in perspective with the rise or resilience of autocracies, the emergence of hybrid regimes, and failed democratization projects. There was additional scholarly criticism that most of the empirical and theoretical work of an earlier period was based on a biased sample of third wave cases concentrated in the Southern Cone or East Europe and that this ignored an entire subset of regimes that had not democratized. Others pointed out that the experiences of earlier democratizers were unduly neglected, inhibiting efforts to construct a more unified theory of democratic change. 17 Some political scientists have shifted to analyzing the new authoritarianism, petro states or hybrid regimes as a third reverse wave of democracy or some sort of fourth wave of regime (not democratic) transition. 18 Of course, as Juan Linz reminds us, there have always been hybrid regimes, but at the
height of interest in democratization in recent years, such alternatives were not the center of research interest the assumption was that many of these systems were unstable halfway houses, which would reach the telos of democracy (perhaps a defective form) soon enough. 19 Francis Fukuyama advanced this widespread but now discarded assumption in his neo Hegelian proposal that the end of history (liberal democracy) had been achieved and, thus, it was only a matter of time before all countries entered the post historical democratic Eden. 20 The scholarly shift has also entailed a return to earlier class based frameworks that the class based frameworks that the transitology school (many of whose members viewed the middle classes as invariably democratic) largely ignored. There was renewed focus on class based analysis and sociological variables as well as heightened interest in economic factors, including a focus on the relationship between economic development, wealth, and democracy and on the ways that economic development could sustain authoritarian regimes which involved the recovery of works by earlier generations of scholars who studied regime maintenance and change. Finally, there has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of institutions (the state and political parties, for example) and governance. During the ascendance of the democratization paradigm, another key field of comparative inquiry was the concept of civil society. Relying on several prominent third wave cases (Poland and the Philippines) and landmark studies such as Robert Putnam s Making Democracy Work, a consensus developed that civil society was the key variable that explained the transition, consolidation and quality of
democracy. Authors identified several central roles that civil society played as a structural space separate from the state and the private realm which empowered opposition or civil discourse; as a realm where values conducive to democracy (such as social capital or trust) were generated. 21 The impact of these perspectives on scholarship and public policy is difficult to exaggerate. Civil society promotion became a pillar of most international development efforts, and even the World Bank endorsed policies in support of civil society as the solution to manifold political, social and economic ills. Recent academic work on civil society has also challenged this consensus. 22 In addition to studies that question which type of non state voluntary organizations belong under the civil society rubric (non profit groups only?), there have been others suggesting that some democratic transition and consolidation processes have occurred in the absence of a vigorous civil society. Alternatively, Sheri Berman and others has argued that civil society can flourish and support a variety of regime outcomes. 23 Civil society mirrors and replaces the old uses of the middle classes, but as with its explanatory predecessor, it does not invariably support or encourage democratization, not to mention that the existence and actions of certain civil society organizations may, in effect, weaken an ancien régime without correspondingly contributing to its replacement by a democracy. Like the middle classes or ceti medi of the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, civil society can support or be utilized and, even, captured by a variety of regime types. In this respect, much depends on the role of the state and the strategies of state elites. Moreover, not all civil society groups foster democratic spaces or values and much more effort is
necessary to differentiate between those types that will foster democracy and those that will not (along the lines of Putnam s horizontally versus vertically structured groups). Critics have pointed out that (implicitly) many authors normatively advocated civil society as a viable substitute for traditional political institutions and structures. Again, recent studies conclude that this is not so there is no alternative to political parties, the institutions of the state, and enhanced governance capacity. Our point is not that civil society is unimportant. Indeed, a vigorous civil society can be an essential support for the transition and sustenance of democracy, but we do insist that other actors (not least the state) can influence and mold it. Civil society cannot be understood in isolation and is neither a sufficient nor necessary cause for a democratic outcome. Indicative of the new emphasis on regime type, transition and maintenance processes (and the return to more classical variables) are the studies by Jason Brownlee and Michael McFaul. 24 Brownlee s Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (2007) compares unstable regimes (the Philippines and Iran) to stable ones (Egypt and Malaysia), concluding that the existence of broader national institutions capable of regulating elite conflict (such as political parties) play a crucial role. The authoritarian regimes Brownlee studied liberalized and engaged in plebiscitarian policies (and hence are not examples of the closed hegemonies of the past), but even so, there was no democratization. The key to stability lay in the existence of a ruling party that could effectively control the state, manage elite competition, and co opt as well as suppress societal opposition and civil society. McFaul s analysis of post Communist cases (2004) reinforces a wonderfully
simple point that regime outcomes are based on the balance of forces present at the moment of transition; or, in other words, that might makes right. In Poland and Hungary, where democrats were stronger, democracies resulted; where autocratic elites had the edge, authoritarianism resulted (Kazakhstan and Belarus). Where there was parity between regime and opposition, and contrary to the expectations of the earlier pacted transition school, partial, unstable and defective democracies resulted (Russia, Ukraine). Another study (this one by Michael Bernhard) 25 makes a cognate point when analyzing the 20 th century transitions in Poland and Germany by stressing that the key explanatory variable was whether pro democratic forces remained united and continued to press forward with their objective. If this occurred, there was more likely to be a successful democratic transition and consolidation. We turn now to different experiences (from various regions) to see what insights they might generate for the Cuban case. A first set of references includes the Portuguese and Spanish transitions that kicked off the third wave of democratization in the 1970s. The Spanish model of negotiated settlement resulted from the decomposition of an authoritarian regime and its transition to a parliamentary democracy in the context of an emerging European space. 26 Neither the nature of the Castro regime nor the characteristics of Cuba (with its weak civil society and heroic but atomized opposition) suggest that the Spanish case is relevant at this point. In addition, there was a substantial period (at least twenty years) of socio economic modernization in which active civil and economic societies played an important role. The democratization of Spain also took place in favorable
international environment, both in geopolitical and economic terms. If Spain offers relevant parameters for comparison, these might involve not the 1970s, but rather the late 1940s. At that time, the authoritarian regime of Francisco Franco was internationally isolated, reeling from the defeat of its Axis allies, and suffering under a UN sanctioned embargo from 1946 onward. How the Spanish regime survived this crisis might be usefully compared with the Cuban experience in the 1990s and even into the 21 st century. By the late 1940s, it might also be noted, the Cold War had transformed the international environment, creating more propitious conditions for the survival of Franco s anti Communist regime. The survival of the Cuban regime may be influenced by a similar transformation, this time in our time period. The Cuban regime survived the debacle of the early 1990s, and over the past decade the number of influential countries whose regimes are autocratic have increased. Utilizing the very primary but irrefutable logic of the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the incumbent Cuban regime has pursued closer links with China, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. The result is that, if we compare its situation today with twenty years ago, the regime is much less isolated and susceptible to international pressure. For its part, the Portuguese experience of the 1970s, where the dynamic of soured colonial adventure fueled the rise of praetorianism, allows us to understand better the relationship between Cuba s military (dis)engagement from the Angolan Civil War and the rise of discontent among sectors of the Cuban military during the 1980s. Nevertheless, parallels to the current situation are weak in light of the military purges of the late 1980s (the Ochoa affair) and the absence of further Cuban
military interventions around the globe. If there is still an open question in this regard, it revolves around the (systemic) tendency of the present Cuban regime to deploy the armed forces in multiple arenas throughout Cuban society. As we noted earlier in this paper, this has increased the influence of the military in the Cuban polity, but over the longer run, it may also encourage factionalism or, at least, erode the cohesion of the armed forces. Under conditions of regime change, this could have important. East European cases provide another point of reference for the Cuban case. Perhaps the most obvious similarity is Communist hegemony and the evolution in all cases at various points in time into a post totalitarian regime subtype. 27 The comparable factors include a prior phase of coercive repression and statesponsored socio economic engineering and mobilization, followed by a partial withdrawal from sustained repression, while maintaining the mechanisms of mobilization in place. The regime becomes ideologically hollowed out or a living lie, compelling individuals to go through the motions that very few continue to believe. The younger generations, in particular, opt out of the system, and what was once a project infused with unbridled optimism becomes infused with a despondent grayness, reflecting little confidence in the future. Further exacerbating this psychological cleavage, a gerontocratic elite consolidates power and permits little renovation. Fidel Castro s charismatic post totalitarianism diverges from most East European experiences (perhaps with the exception of Ceaucescu s Romania) and also includes a mélange of home grown nationalism, anti Americanism and personal charisma. The latter afforded him greater flexibility and more options,
which partially accounts for why he was able to survive the special period. Where the Cuban case diverges from the East European experience relates to nationalism not to its importance but in how it played out. Though the intensity of such sentiment varied among the cases, nationalism in Eastern Europe generally (at least in the northern flank) stood on the side of those who favored regime change. This was certainly the case in Poland, where the Catholic Church and the (autonomous) labor movement associated with Solidarity formed the wedge all animated by strong anti Communist, anti Soviet (and anti Russian) nationalistic traditions that eventually brought the regime down. Put another way, where Communism was associated with foreign imposition, it was more easily depicted and fought against as illegitimate. In any case, the Polish process took ten years, involved the hollowing out of Communist rule, and eventually led to the imposition of martial law and the military coup led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski which dethroned the Communist party these events were manifestation of a regime shift from post totalitarian to a military authoritarian one after 1981. By contrast, the Cuban Revolution was homegrown, and Fidel Castro and his regime took pains (even more so after the disintegration of the Soviet Union) to emphasize their nationalist credentials and to present themselves as the heirs of national heroes such as José Martí and Antonio Maceo. Moreover, in the Cuban case, the United States is the imperialist power; and Castro, the David who successfully challenged its hegemony and restored national dignity to the country. That Cuban exiles found refuge in the United States, a country that also allowed them to participate in the elaboration of its policies toward their country of origin, further
allowed the Cuban regime to identify both the diaspora (qua displaced opposition) and any manifestations of internal opposition as anti national agents of a foreign power. Thus nationalism and anti imperialism trump democracy, much as the state (the instrument of nationalist affirmation and the patron of clientelism) does to markets and capitalism. If we place the Polish case to one side, the Central and East European experiences look more relevant. Except in Poland, the first half of the 1980s was a time of stability, with some scattered dissidence rather than organized or effective opposition. Very few analysts appreciated the significance of the Helsinki Accords or the Charter 77 movement. Even fewer knew of the obscure playwright Václav Havel. Most favored or viewed as highly desirable the emergence of reformist Communist elites who would slowly and deliberately put their countries on the path to liberalization and, eventually, democracy. Certainly, only an illuminated few foresaw the debacle of real existing socialism as it collapsed after 1989. Within a few years, however, the entire region had undergone an extraordinary democratic transformation and rejoined Europe. One especially useful East European point of comparison may be the highly institutionalized, relatively prosperous and exceptionally well policed German Democratic Republic (GDR), where late blooming civic organizations combined with images and information from West German television and an unexpected and uncontrollable emigration crisis in the summer and fall of 1989 to bring Communist rule to a sudden end. 28 The apparent strength and capacity of the Cuban state notwithstanding, one of its most significant weaknesses lies in the realm of
emigration. Its moments of greatest vulnerability occurred with the 1980 Mariel exodus (when more than 250,000 people left the island) and again during the riots in Regla and Cojimar in 1993 and on the Havana waterfront in 1994. The US Interests Section in Havana has a list of 750,000 Cubans who want to emigrate, and there is an ongoing flow of illegal migrants that pass through other Caribbean countries. Certainly, were a radical rupture to occur, it might well coincide with an emigration crisis, much as occurred in the GDR. One strategy employed by the East German authorities to maintain their power was to rid themselves of oppositional dissidents by allowing the West to buy their freedom. A similar circumstance obtains in the case of Cuba where dissidents are released on condition that they leave the country. Over time, many dissidents have availed themselves of such opportunities, but more recently, many refuse to do. Another pertinent parallel derived from the East German case was the dependence on external (Soviet) support. It is certainly not coincidental that the regime fell shortly after the Soviet security guarantee was rescinded (in what some have called Gorbachev s Sinatra Doctrine ). Fidel Castro and his regime survived (barely) the withdrawal of Soviet support in the early 1990s and the grave economic crisis that it engendered. Today, the regime is similarly dependent on support from Venezuela, and it is probably the regime would collapse if such external support were withdrawn once again. Moreover, media and new communications technology from the United States and Cuba North (including the Internet) may play an analogous role to West German television in the years before the fall of the Wall in terms of
demonstration effects and, with the Internet, a technology that can be difficult to censor and control. The weeks of protest in Iran in the summer of 2009 largely Twitter driven reveal this potential, although the Chinese authorities (with whom the Cubans have consulted extensively) have shown skill in this regard. Certainly, some of the most prominent critics of the Cuban regime in recent years have been individuals like the blogger Yoani Sanchez. 29 East Germany (along with Czechoslovakia) also contains another hopeful message insofar as civil society and societal opposition was viewed during the 1970s and 1980s as weak in comparison to other East bloc countries. Yet, in the weeks and months before the regime collapsed, opposition came to flourish. The same could occur in Cuba. These third wave Eastern European cases as well as the subsequent color revolutions in the region also suggest that there may be a tipping point at which the level of economic development, civic organization, and the emergence of an alternative coincide. That said, much depends on the balance of forces within the elite at a moment of instability or transition as well as the unity of the ruling coalition. All successful East European democratizations developed some sort of pro democratic opposition (in the case of East Germany, the analogue was the Federal Republic) and a preponderance of pro democratic forces at the moment of transition. The unsuccessful cases, as McFaul makes clear, reveal a different balance of power, one that tilts toward regime elites. Applying these insights to the Cuba case with its weak civil society and amorphous opposition (and the corresponding success of the ruling elite to manage its unity and to convince its citizens that there is no viable alternative to its national project) leads us toward a more pessimistic
prognosis. Unfortunately, it is also very difficult to assess properly both the degree of discontent and the potential for an opposition movement in Cuba today. Before moving away from the European cases, it is also pertinent to discuss what lessons and parallels we might glean from what Ruth Berins Collier calls the historical cases of regime change and democratization. 30 These date mainly from the 19 th century and pre WWI era and represent what Huntington called the first long wave of democratization. Both the older and newer studies on these cases emphasize several factors and dynamics that are relevant to an analysis of Cuba. First, to return to Barrington Moore s famous finding no bourgeoisie, no democracy which in a sense was the culmination of Anglocentric, whiggish conventional wisdom recent scholarship has suggested that this was not the case across the board. 31 Various scholars have found, the attitude of the bourgeoisie towards the regime varies. In some cases, the middle sectors would ally with labor (Lib Lab pacts) to press for fuller democratization. Britain is the classic example in this regard. But, in many, actually most cases on the continent, the bourgeoisie (more along the lines of clases medias or ceti medi whose characteristic is their close relationship to and dependence on state elites) perceived the surging power of the industrial proletariat to be a threat and consequently joined forces with traditional (monarchical) power holders to thwart change. Prussia Germany, but also early 20 th century Italy and Spain are examples of this pattern. These historical European cases remind us of how central is the power of the state and its capacity to perpetuate existing power relations. Strong (absolutist) European states were quite capable of co opting enough oppositional leaders and
policy ideas to retain their legitimacy and to sustain non democratic regimes. Again, classic examples come from post 1871 imperial Germany, first with Bismarck s paternalistic and authoritarian welfare state, and later with Wilhelm II s belligerent nationalism, militaristic arms/naval build up, and colonialism. (This search for a place in the sun, Fritz Fischer argued decades ago, was a way to deflect attention away from problems, tensions and demands for democratization at home.) 32 A more modern, nationalistic opiate of the masses has resonated elsewhere, not least in Cuba where Fidel Castro proved especially adept at its cultivation. Cuba has been independent for little more than a hundred years, but its truncated national sovereignty prior to 1959 and the numantine nationalism associated with fidelismo suggests it could continue to provide fertile soil for nationalist forms of authoritarianism into the future. A different set of vantage points from which to analyze the Cuban experience can be derived from the experiences of China and Vietnam. These two Asian countries share with Cuba the experience of intertwined nationalist and communist revolutions that gained power after victory in a civil war. Totalitarian regimes under charismatic leaders have given way to what some have called (in the case of China) responsive authoritarianism 33 and loosened controls at the local level accompanied by efforts to improve governance and governability. In both China and Vietnam, such (political) reform efforts occur in the context of high levels of economic growth produced by the embrace of capitalism, so characteristic of post Mao China and contemporary Vietnam. Yet both countries have embraced this new economic system, while effectively retaining single party dominant regimes. This
prompts us to several observations with relevance for the Cuba case First, both regimes may be classified as developmental authoritarian regimes 34 a not so distant relative of the paternalistic welfare authoritarianism of Bismarckian Germany. The regimes have delivered economic growth and rising standards of living for years which means they benefit from hard won performance legitimacy. Ongoing efforts at reform also suggest that regime elites understand the fragility of performance based legitimacy and recognize that their increasingly complex societies require improved governance and institutions. Efforts to rationalize the state and especially the state economy nexus by combating corruption and local tyrannies (China) and fostering a nascent rational legal order shows that the elites seek to create more resilient forms of procedural legitimacy. 35 Such efforts imply a recognition that the preferences of a growing middle class and the stratum of successful entrepreneurs and managers (as well as the needs of a more advanced economy) have to be addressed. Both regimes have also understood that development implies the end of the dream of Communist autarky, and they have, therefore, joined the requisite international organizations, most notably the World Trade Organization (China in 2001 and Vietnam in 2007). Many of the reforms (particularly with respect to property rights and taxation schemes) have been consequences of such membership and many others derive from the extensive investment by foreign (Western) multinational corporations (or their sponsor governments e.g., intellectual property rights). 36 What kind of regimes will emerge from these extraordinary changes is an open question. Certainly, Asia is full of (semi) authoritarian or only partially
liberalized and/or single party regimes (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand). Moreover, both China and Vietnam appear to correspond to Brownlee s conclusions about the requisites of a stable authoritarianism especially the need to co opt potential opposition elements, to accommodate salient elite sectors (the Chinese consciously under represent booming regions like Shanghai and the Vietnamese are meticulous in the proportionate representation of north and south in both government and party leadership ranks), and to reach out to new, thus avoiding the pitfalls of gerontocracy. 37 There is also the issue of path dependency and momentum. Only in retrospect will we know when both regimes have passed the point of no return. Would either communist party risk plummeting performance legitimacy and economic crisis if they pulled back from the reforms and the international economic openness of recent years? Of course, selective repression (Falun Gong, Uighurs) and censorship (the Internet), as well as nationalism (Taiwan, Tibet) also help the parties to maintain power. Indeed, most analysts emphasize the increased salience of Han Chinese nationalism as the remnants of Maoist ideology wither and die. 38 On the other hand, one of the strongest and continually reiterated findings from comparative studies is the close connection between economic development, resulting wealth and democratization. Certainly, wealth does not pre ordain a transition to democracy (although it greatly facilitates it not the least of which is because of changing class composition, a surging civil society, and value change), but if an opening occurs, the likelihood of sustaining democracy is great. 39 This was exactly the pattern in South Korea, Taiwan and (earlier) Japan. We think an outcome like this is probable enough in Vietnam (but so, too, a Malaysian parallel).
China is more difficult to predict also because of several unique dynamics its sheer size, the nationalistic confidence in its civilization, and a broadly held belief that only a strong hand can curb fissiparous tendencies and maintain the unity of the country. These cases offer a marked contrast with the current Cuban situation, while simultaneously generating valuable insights. Cuba s economic reforms pale in comparison and a sustainable economic take off has not transpired. While Raúl Castro is no Deng Xiao Ping, there is evidence, including a two week study trip he made to China in 1997, that he is interested in the implementation of some Chinesestyle economic reforms. How far the younger Castro is prepared to go in the direction of capitalist economic reforms is unclear. He is undoubtedly aware of the asymmetries between the Cuban and Chinese/Vietnamese situations and of the vulnerabilities that close proximity to the United States brings. If the Cuban regime successfully navigates between the Scylla of immobility and the Charybdis of upheaval, comparisons with these Asian experiences may shed light on how hegemonic party states engage in economic reform, de centralize administration and enhances governance, introduce limited political liberalization (especially at the local level), and even transform the way their heretofore vertical and highly centralized ruling parties operate. Certainly, Brownlee s insights into strong party control, cohesion and co optation of oppositional forces are still considerations. Yet, the Asian cases may also serve as an admonition to the members of the Cuban ruling coalition once a take off occurs and the regime can bask in performance legitimacy, there may be no turning back especially given the
proximity to the rich and potentially hegemonic United States and with the sizable Cuban diaspora ready to invest or return. International openness and reforms resulting from membership in organizations like the WTO compel change. Another insight, this one from Vietnam, suggests that the impetus for economic and political reform may come from unexpected sources. In the case of Vietnam, much of this impetus has come from the old South, and it was only 11 years after the collapse of the government of South Vietnam that the Communist elites introduced the Doi Moi reforms. 40 Obviously, Castroism has had more time to transform the economic and social landscape in Cuba, but the continued vibrancy of the underground economy, the new classes that foreign capitalism has engendered, and the presence of a strong diaspora may contribute to a similar outcome. How does the Cuban experience compare with other cases closer to home, in Latin America? Although the Cold War framed the Cuban Revolution, fidelismo always had an idiosyncratic and highly personal quality, which it expressed in a flamboyantly nationalistic style. In some ways, fidelismo differed only in degree from the sorts of caudillismo (or even extreme presidentialism) found elsewhere in Latin America. The role of the military in Cuba has parallels in the region, as does Fidel Castro s use of nationalism to affirm identity and to divert attention away from economic failures and mismanagement. Relative to other Latin American autocracies in the past and present, the strongest singularity of the Cuban case lies in the absence of political pluralism within the ruling coalition and the focused drive to destroy anything resembling an independent economy or civil society. The past twenty years have seen significant changes in the capacity of the Cuban state and in
the nature of the polity. These transformations may deepen under Raul Castro. And once the sierra generation passes from the scene. With the Cold War over and a less hostile international and regional environment, not to mention under the pressure adjusting to the pressures of globalization, the Cuban regime may evolve. Only time will tell if Cuba will follow either the path forged by the PRI during its lengthy hegemony or the less institutionalized, semi military model of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. What should not discounted is that a future Cuban elite might eventually try to flesh out a more Latin American style of leadership, complete with limited pluralism, extended networks of clients, and semi contested elections. CONCLUSION We are on the cusp of the post Castro era, but the contours of the new regime are difficult to predict with any degree of precision. What we do know is that the regime confronts three coincident challenges. First, there is an ongoing succession process, moments during which autocratic regimes are especially vulnerable. Second, there is also an analytically distinct regime transition under way. Third, the economy is in dire straits and must be fixed. Moreover, there is also the epochal turnover of political generations with the sierra generation certain to depart the historical stage within the next few years. And all this occurs in the context of a particular Zeitgeist there is a democratic recession globally 41 and a resurgence of hybrid, semi authoritarian regimes regionally. No longer is democracy perceived as
the inevitable product of a regime transition, and there is an active debate over whether democracy promotion efforts should be scaled back. Yet, looking to the future, there are numerous parallels and insights from analyses of other cases successful examples both of transitions to democracy and maintenance of authoritarian regimes. Based on the East European experience, we highlight the importance of nationalism, even though we note that the lesson for Cuba may be negative insofar as Cuban nationalism traditionally has been directed against the United States. From the Polish case, we extrapolate the important role of civil society. But the most fruitful parallels may be gleaned from East Germany whose rapid and dramatic destabilization shows what an emigration crisis can produce and how quickly opposition can flourish with even a small opening. From the East Asian cases, we emphasize the importance of economic development as a vehicle for the consolidation of performance legitimacy and the maintenance of a single party regime. Yet China and especially Vietnam also point to the dangers economic development and integration into the world economy can pose to Communist Party hegemony. The deepening transformation of social classes and the pressures for governance reform may lead to profound changes in how these parties rule. In sum, there are several possible transition scenarios. 42 A first scenario envisions an effort to return to the mobilization strategies and more orthodox policies of the past. Whether any successor to the brothers Castro would have the authority, charisma, and capacity to compel such a change is doubtful. Moreover, the necessary external military and economic support (originally from the Soviet
Union and more recently from Venezuela) is by no means assured and decades of mobilization (with little apparent result) may simply have worn out both the populace and regime incumbents. Scenario number two involves a post totalitarian consolidation or perhaps an evolution toward a non totalitarian form of authoritarianism. This would include some relaxation of controls (but with continued harassment of dissidents and opponents), expanded but gradual economic reforms, and broader debate within the ruling elite. In the longer term, this option could lead to the emergence of a middle class (and civil society) closely enmeshed with and dependent upon a developmental state. Though China and Vietnam might serve as examples in this regard, it should also be noted that both countries are larger, more self sufficient, and less easily penetrated than Cuba. Even if it has been isolated for the past fifty years, Cuban society has maintained many links (familial, social, and psychological) with its neighbors, including the sizeable émigré community in the United States. Key elements of this third scenario would be the elite s ability to remain united and their success in addressing Cuba s myriad economic problems. The existence of sizeable petroleum reserves in the Gulf of Mexico might help solve these problems and also lessen the regime s dependence on Hugo Chávez. This scenario also assumes that Cuban society remains largely inert, acquiescing to the restrictions imposed by the ruling elite. A fourth and final scenario represents the democratic option with its two possible paths. The first would involve a collapse of the regime. Such an outcome is probable only if a major emigration crisis or natural disaster overwhelms the
capacity of the state or results in a massive breakdown of public order. The East German experience in the summer and fall of 1989 provides a parallel here. Of course, the comparison is not perfect because a geographically contiguous and larger sister state with a historical legacy of unity does not exist. Southern Florida may be analogous, but again, a 90 mile maritime border is both different and perhaps more effective than a wall. The Cuban diaspora certainly has the attributes and the resources necessary to become an important player in any transition scenario. It represents approximately 15 percent of the Cuban nation (a proportion that is quite large compared to many other exile communities) and has extensive resources among them, the capacity to influence US policy. And yet, the diaspora that is both a magnet and lifeline for many who live in Cuba (remittances total more than $1 billion USD annually) also provokes resentment and even fear among its relatives on the island. Ultimately, its role and prospects will depend on how Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits define their identity and sense of community. The second evolutionary path assumes the development (if not necessarily the ascendance) of a sizeable reformist sector within the regime that would be willing to negotiate with the political opposition and the representatives of mass social movements and independent civil society. Though difficult to imagine under present circumstances, the probability of this last scenario will increase once the post Castro era truly arrives. In the absence of the Castro brothers, internecine conflicts within the ruling coalition are more likely. Fissiparous tendencies within the military may also emerge, with more professional officers distancing themselves
from their more political or entrepreneurial counterparts. A more organized and emboldened civil society, in advancing from narrower economic and social demands toward more explicitly political claims, could provide a social base for mobilization and protest. Notes 1 See Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), 21 28 and 67 91 as well as Cameron Thies, War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49 No.3 (July 2005): 451 465. 2 Enrique Baloyra, Socialist Transitions and Prospects for Change in Cuba, in Enrique Baloyra and James Morris (eds.) Conflict and Change in Cuba (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 38. 3 Margaret Crahan and Ariel Harmony, Does Civil Society Exist in Cuba? The article is available at http://cubainfo.fiu.edu/documents/crahandoescivilsocietyexistincuba.pdf. 4 See the interview with Jaime Cardinal Ortega in Temas, January March 2008, 125. The retirements of Archbishop Pedro Meurice and Bishop Jose Siro from the dioceses of Santiago de Cuba and Pinar del Rio, respectively, inclined the balance toward the more accommodationist wing of the Catholic hierarchy. 5 For an excellent account, see Xavier Utset, The Cuban Democracy Movement: An Analytical Overview, June 16, 2008. Available at h ttp://cubainfo.fiu.edu/documents/utset%20cuban%20democracy%20movement%2 0June%202008.pdf. 6 See http://cubacatolica.blogcindario.com/2007/05/00170 la cuba que suenoentrevista a dagoberto valdes fundador y exdirector de vitral.html. Though the obvious caveats are in order, several independent polls taken over the past few years provide a partial glimpse of Cuban public opinion. Gallup interviewed a thousand Cubans in Havana and Santiago de Cuba in September 2006, just after Fidel Castro fell ill. Only 26 percent of the respondents said that they were satisfied with their freedom to choose what to do with their lives (the average for Latin America as a whole was 79 percent). Cuba s healthcare and educational systems, by contrast, drew satisfaction scores of 75 and 78 percent, respectively. Asked about the country s leadership, 49 percent approved, 39 percent voiced disapproval, and 13 percent did not answer 7 Josep Colomer, Watching Neighbors The Cuban Model of Social Control, Cuban Studies, No. 31 (1999): 118 138 and Benigno Aguirre, Social Control in Cuba, Latin American Politics and Society Vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 2002): 81 8 Domingo Amuchastegui argues that party and military form a unicellular organism, each with a separate function. Domingo Amuchastegui, Cuba s Armed
Forces: Power and Reforms Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies (Miami: University of Miami, 1999):110. 9 Javier Corrales, The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reforms and Regime Survival in Cuba, 1989 2002, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 39 No. 2 (June 2004): 50 10 Speech by Raúl Castro, July 26, 2006. 11 http://www.cubaminrex.cu/discursosintervenciones/articulos/raul/2009/2009 08 01.html 12 Speech by Felipe Pérez Roque to National Assembly on December 23, 2005. See www.cubaminrex.cu/archivo/canciller/2005/fpr_231205.html 13 Among these were Jorge Luis Sierra (Minister of Transport), Lina Pedraza (who, having established the Ministry of Audit and Control and served as its first head, was now appointed Minister of Finance and Prices), Miguel Diez Canel (named Minister of Higher Education in April 2009), and Maria del Carmen González (Minister of Food Industry). 14 For a discussion, see Eusebio Mujal León and Lorena Buzón, Exceptionalism and Beyond Civil Military Relations in Cuba (Manuscript, 2009). A Spanish version of this paper will be published next year in a book edited by Felipe Aguero and Claudio Fuentes. 15 Harold Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela, en Civil Military Relations in Latin America New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001): 165 16 See Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go? Slavic Review 53.1 (1994): pp. 173 185; Valerie Bunce, Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" Slavic Review 54.1 (1995): pp. 111 127; 17 See the debate between Adam Przeworski, et al. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well being in the World, 1950 1990. (New York: Ca mbridge University Press, 2000) and Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, Endogenous Democratization, World Politics 55 4 (2003) pp. 517 549 18 Larry Diamond, Thinking about hybrid regimes, Journal of Democracy (2002), 13 2, 21 35; Thomas Carothers, The Sequencing Fallacy, Journal of Democracy, 18, 1 (2007), 13 27; Bruce Gilley, Is Democracy Possible, Journal of Democracy, 20, 1 (2009); 113 127; Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi Authoritarianism (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 19 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization i n the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 20 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 21 Wolfgang Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies, Democratization, 11, 5, December 2004, pp. 33 58 22 See Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley and Mario Diani, eds., Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective (Hanover:
University Press of New England, 2001); Omar G. Encarnación, Civil Society Reconsidered, World Politics (2006), 357 376. 23 Sheri Berman, Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, World Po litics, 49, 3 (1997) 401 429; Sheri Berman, Islamism, Revoluti on, and Civil Society, Perspectives on Politics, 1, 2 (2003), pp. 257 272 24 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Michael McFaul, The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, World Politics 54, 2 (2002); 212 244. 25 Michael Bernhard, Institutions and the Fate of Democracy: Germany and Poland in the Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005). 26 Juan Linz, An Authoritarian Regime: Spain in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds., Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), 291 341. 27 Juan J. Linz and Al fred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 28 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution : the crisis of Communis m and the end of East Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 29 Tom Gjelten, Cuban Days: The Inscrutable Nation, World Affairs, Summer 2009, pp. 11 23. 30 Ruth Berins Collier, Paths toward democracy: the working class and elites in Western Europe and South Americ a (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999) 31 Barrington Moore, Social origins of dictatorship and democracy : lord and peasant in the making of the modern world (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993). See also Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist development and democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) and Daron A cemoglu, James A. Robinson, Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006). 32 Fritz Fischer, Germany's aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967); See also Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and democracy in Germany (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967) 33 Robert Weller, Responsive Authoritarianism, in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond, eds., Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 117 33. 34 Georg Sorensen, Democracy and democratization : processes and prospects in a changing world (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008). 35 See Cheng Li, ed., China s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Vo X. Han, Vietnam in 2007: A Profile in Economic and Socio political Dynamism, Asian Survey (2008) 48, 1, 29 37. 36 See Gerd Will, Vietnam heute: Begrenzte Reformen, ausufernde Probleme, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 27 (2008). 37 See Phuong An Nguyen, State society Relations in Contemporary Vietnam: An Examination of the Arena of Youth, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 47, 3 (2006), 327 341.
38 e Modern Chinese State (New York: Cambridge See David Shambaugh, ed. Th University Press, 2000), 233. 39 See Przeworski et al. (2000). 40, Doi Moi: Erneuerung auf Vietnamesisch, Aus Politik und See Doris K. Gamino Zeitgeschichte, 27 (2008). 41 See Larry Diamond. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World (New York: Times Books, 2008.). 42 The discussion draws on Eusebio Mujal León, Can Cuba Change? Tensions in the Regime, Journal of Democracy, 20, 1 (January 2009), 32 34.