Knightian Uncertainty and Interbank Lending



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Knightian Uncertainty and Interbank Lending Matt Pritsker Federal Reserve Board 46th Annual Bank Structure Conference May 5, 2010

Housing Market: Case-Shiller Index 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

Bank Spreads: LIBOR-OIS

Main Ideas Markets breakdown because of asymmetric information, risk, and

Main Ideas Markets breakdown because of asymmetric information, risk, and Confusion, Knightian Uncertainty (KU)

Main Ideas Markets breakdown because of asymmetric information, risk, and Confusion, Knightian Uncertainty (KU) 1 KU creates problems if agents don t understand the environment when it matters. 2 Agents behave more cautiously with KU causing market function to deteriorate.

Main Ideas Markets breakdown because of asymmetric information, risk, and Confusion, Knightian Uncertainty (KU) 1 KU creates problems if agents don t understand the environment when it matters. 2 Agents behave more cautiously with KU causing market function to deteriorate. Application: Interbank market. 1 Structural uncertainty about banks risk exposures built-up pre-crisis. 2 During the crisis knowledge about risk exposures mattered. 3 Private institutions can help reduce the effects of KU, but govt intervention may be needed. 4 Policy proposals to reduce uncertainty through enhanced transparency: Stress-test like policy to reduce uncertainty during a crisis. Enhanced info on key banks total exposures to reduce uncertainty ex-ante.

Interbank Market: 2 Banks Directly Trading 2 Banks i and j. Timeline: 3-Dates. Date 0 K-structure chosen. Banks invest in LT loans w/ret R.

Interbank Market: 2 Banks Directly Trading 2 Banks i and j. Timeline: 3-Dates. Date 0 K-structure chosen. Banks invest in LT loans w/ret R. Date 0: R N[µ(0),Σ(0)]. Date 1: R N[µ(1),Σ(1)]

Interbank Market: 2 Banks Directly Trading 2 Banks i and j. Timeline: 3-Dates. Date 0 K-structure chosen. Banks invest in LT loans w/ret R. Date 0: R N[µ(0),Σ(0)]. Date 1: R N[µ(1),Σ(1)] Date 1 News arrives about asset performance; µ() and Σ() are updated. Bank i receives a ST borrower w/ reservation value R L Bank j receives a positive funding shock. Trade in interbank loan market.

Interbank Market: 2 Banks Directly Trading 2 Banks i and j. Timeline: 3-Dates. Date 0 K-structure chosen. Banks invest in LT loans w/ret R. Date 0: R N[µ(0),Σ(0)]. Date 1: R N[µ(1),Σ(1)] Date 1 News arrives about asset performance; µ() and Σ() are updated. Bank i receives a ST borrower w/ reservation value R L Bank j receives a positive funding shock. Trade in interbank loan market. Date 2 All loans mature. Banks default if not solvent. Remark: Tension at date 1.

The Effect of Knightian Uncertainty Assumption: i s default probability only depends on the performance of its long-run loan portfolio PD i (ω i,t) = Φ ( Li 1+L i R D ω i µ(t) ) ω i Σ(t)ω i Where portfolio weights are ω i, Assets A i, Deposits D i, Equity E i, Leverage L i = D i /E i, R D is the insured rate on deposits.

The Effect of Knightian Uncertainty Assumption: i s default probability only depends on the performance of its long-run loan portfolio PD i (ω i,t) = Φ ( Li 1+L i R D ω i µ(t) ) ω i Σ(t)ω i Where portfolio weights are ω i, Assets A i, Deposits D i, Equity E i, Leverage L i = D i /E i, R D is the insured rate on deposits. Uncertainty: Bank j is uncertain about bank i s LT portfolio weights: ω i C[ω,ω]

The Effect of Knightian Uncertainty Assumption: i s default probability only depends on the performance of its long-run loan portfolio PD i (ω i,t) = Φ ( Li 1+L i R D ω i µ(t) ) ω i Σ(t)ω i Where portfolio weights are ω i, Assets A i, Deposits D i, Equity E i, Leverage L i = D i /E i, R D is the insured rate on deposits. Uncertainty: Bank j is uncertain about bank i s LT portfolio weights: ω i C[ω,ω] PD i [PD i,pd i ]

The Effect of Knightian Uncertainty Assumption: i s default probability only depends on the performance of its long-run loan portfolio PD i (ω i,t) = Φ ( Li 1+L i R D ω i µ(t) ) ω i Σ(t)ω i Where portfolio weights are ω i, Assets A i, Deposits D i, Equity E i, Leverage L i = D i /E i, R D is the insured rate on deposits. Uncertainty: Bank j is uncertain about bank i s LT portfolio weights: ω i C[ω,ω] PD i [PD i,pd i ] PD i = PD i w/ extreme uncertainty aversion

Bank i s Borrowing Spread at Date 1 PD i LGD i = PD i LGD i + (PD i PD i )LGD i = Default Prem + Uncert Prem

Bank i s Borrowing Spread at Date 1 PD i LGD i = PD i LGD i + (PD i PD i )LGD i = Default Prem + Uncert Prem If R L < R f + PD i LGD i, then i s spread is too high to finance its ST loan opportunity.

Bank i s Borrowing Spread at Date 1 PD i LGD i = PD i LGD i + (PD i PD i )LGD i = Default Prem + Uncert Prem If R L < R f + PD i LGD i, then i s spread is too high to finance its ST loan opportunity. Uncertainty over i s portfolio exposures can cause its borrowers to get cut off.

(a) Uncertainty Premium and Expected Loan Return

(b) Uncertainty Premium and Loan Volatility

Results So Far Uncertainty premia depend on Leverage, Volatility, and Expected Asset Returns. Uncertainty premia can be low with high leverage if volatility is low, and/or expected returns are high [Pre-Crisis Situation]. Uncertainty premia can become very elevated if leverage is high, and expected returns for some assets are lowered, or volatility for some assets becomes elevated [Crisis Situation].

Interbank Market: Anonymous Brokered Market Large (Core) banks extend loans to each other in an anonymous brokered market. Bank j forms worst case beliefs over the risk of the banks it could be dealing with. Bank j is uncertain about other large banks total exposure to bad assets and how all assets Y M are distributed among the banks.

Interbank Market: Anonymous Brokered Market Large (Core) banks extend loans to each other in an anonymous brokered market. Bank j forms worst case beliefs over the risk of the banks it could be dealing with. Bank j is uncertain about other large banks total exposure to bad assets and how all assets Y M are distributed among the banks. PD = max ω k,k=1,...2n 2N 1 1 2N 1 k=1 PD k (ω k ) Notation: A assets, Y M LT loans of 2N banks.

Interbank Market: Anonymous Brokered Market Large (Core) banks extend loans to each other in an anonymous brokered market. Bank j forms worst case beliefs over the risk of the banks it could be dealing with. Bank j is uncertain about other large banks total exposure to bad assets and how all assets Y M are distributed among the banks. PD = max ω k,k=1,...2n 2N 1 1 2N 1 k=1 Notation: A assets, Y M LT loans of 2N banks. 1 Adding up constraint: 2N k=1 ω ka k = Y M 2 Individual bank maximization constraint: ω k C(ω,ω),k = 1,...2N PD k (ω k )

Main Results 1 The anonymous brokered market structure with only large banks is resilient to problems in small sectors of the economy,

Main Results 1 The anonymous brokered market structure with only large banks is resilient to problems in small sectors of the economy, but less so for large sectors.

Main Results 1 The anonymous brokered market structure with only large banks is resilient to problems in small sectors of the economy, but less so for large sectors. 2 The market may break-down and because of positive externalities government audits that reveal information on exposures may be needed to restore market function.

Main Results 1 The anonymous brokered market structure with only large banks is resilient to problems in small sectors of the economy, but less so for large sectors. 2 The market may break-down and because of positive externalities government audits that reveal information on exposures may be needed to restore market function. 3 Audits should leverage off of examiner knowledge.

Main Results 1 The anonymous brokered market structure with only large banks is resilient to problems in small sectors of the economy, but less so for large sectors. 2 The market may break-down and because of positive externalities government audits that reveal information on exposures may be needed to restore market function. 3 Audits should leverage off of examiner knowledge. 4 Reducing uncertainty about core banks total exposures Y M ex ante reduces the likelihood of market breakdown, and reduces the costs of breakdowns if they occur.

Effect of Uncertainty About Y M in Bad Conditions

Closing Thoughts 1 I have shown that transparency initiatives may improve market function by reducing uncertainty and confusion ahead of and during a crisis. 2 The transparency is needed so that financial intermediation can take place. 3 The transparency initiatives I propose do not make individual banks fully transparent. 4 Many proposals to address future crisis are based on market information. For these to work, we need to improve the quality of information that the market uses to price risk.