Requirements for Clearing & Settlement Systems Jan Woltjer De Nederlandsche Bank
Why is the infrastructure for Clearing, settlement and custody so important? Europe ==> Key to integration of the financial markets Emerging markets ==> Key to developing and growth of the market In all markets ==> Possible threat of the stability of the financial system
Recent initiatives with respect to Securities Settlement Systems (SSS) CPSS / IOSCO recommendations for SSS Financial Stability Assesment Program of the IMF and World Bank
CPSS / IOSCO Recommendations Core Issues 1) Sound legal basis 2) Avoiding / elimination of risks 3) Improving efficiency and practicality 4) Fair access and governance 5) Implementation of oversight / supervision
Aspects of a sound legal basis Enforceability of transactions Protection of customer assets Immobilisation and dematerialisation Netting arrangements and novation Securities lending Finality of settlement Delivery versus payment Default rules Collateral rules and regulations
Risks in Securities Settlement Systems Principal risk Market risk Liquidity risk Legal risk Custody risk and deposito risk Operational risk Systemic risk
PRINCIPAL RISK in Securities Settlement Systems ==> How to avoid principal risk? ==> How to arrange delivery versus payment - Model 1 Trade for Trade systems (gross-gross) - Model 2 Gross / Net systems - Model 3 Net / Net systems
Market risk in Securities Settlement Systems What is market risk? How to avoid it?
Liquidity risk in Securities Settlement Systems What is liquidity risk? How to avoid it? - Liquidity arrangements on the securities sides - Liquidity arrangements on the cash side
Custody risk and settlement bank risk in securities settlement systems Custody risk Legal protection of the investor against a bankruptcy of a CSD and/or a custodian Segregation of own securities and client securities of a custodian sound accounting practises and procedures Settlement bank risk Settlement in central bank money in case of settlement in commercial bank money use: - a special purpose vehicle (SPV) - full collateralisation of cash and securities lending schemes
Operational risk In order to be operational reliable, the SSS should have 1) An adequate organisation 2) An adequate automation and security policy. In this context the SSS should have: - a sound description of the system - an adequate data management (including backup and audit trails) - an adequate emergency plan and crisis management - an acceptable disaster recovery facility - sufficient processing capacity - adequate procedures in place concerning procurement, development and modification of the system - adequate measures taken to prevent unauthorised access to the system - adequate measures taken to safeguard authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and verifiability of datacommunication messages
Improving efficiency and practicality dematerialisation / immobilisation (transfers by bookentry only) trade confirmation and straight through processing vast and secure communication and information channels use of economies of scale
Fair access and governance direct versus indirect access competition versus centralisation horizontal integration versus vertical integration (silos) governance structure in case of a monopoly
Implementation of effective oversight independent overseer clear and transparant regulatory framework effective instruments for the overseer / supervisor clear and transparant framework for co-operation between Central Bank and Securities Supervisory Authority
Conclusions A secure and effective SSS is crucial for the development of the market The scope of the system should be as broad as possible to make use of economies of scale The infrastructure and practices for clearing, settlement and custody should as a minimum comply to the CPSS / IOSCO recommendations for SSS In case of netting unwinding should be avoided and the system should have an adequate risk management in order to settle even in the event that the participant with the largest payment obligation is unable to settle