FPGA Implementation of Network Security System Using Counting Bloom Filter



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International Journal of Research in Information Technology (IJRIT) www.ijrit.com ISSN 2001-5569 FPGA Implementation of Network Security System Using Counting Bloom Filter Shruti, Harshada J. Patil 1PG Scholar, 2 Assistant Professor Department of VLSI Design and embedded system Vemana IT, Visvesvaraya Technological University, Belgavi, Karnataka, India. 1Shrutivmath@gmail.com, jharshadap@gmail.com Abstract As we know hackers, viruses and other kind of malware is main problem for the ever increasing threats in computer system which will affect speed and performance of the system. Increment of threats and network speed causes the conventional software based network intrusion detection system must choose between the high data rates and security as well as protection. In order to overcome this, we have designed hardware based network intrusion detection system on chip using counting bloom filter. Here the design consist of extremely high throughput and can detect threats successfully as well as mitigate know threats and here in this project the only known counting bloom filter based network intrusion detection system to be implemented on a FPGA. 1. Introduction Virus, worms, and programmer assaults on systems cost billions of dollars and influence a huge number of clients. Furthermore late prominent assaults on our national security foundation. for example, the penetration of Chinese programmers uncover that protection against system interruption is presently a matter of money related and is very critical for the national security. It is inaccurate to accept that every client or individual machine on a system is secure. This is because of the extensive number of machines that need to be secured, each of which obliges time, experts in technical field and consistent cautiousness to guarantee assurance against the most recent threats. Without using the IC s fabrication here moving for the FPGA that is field programmable gate array because they are reconfigurable chips which will have the programmable logic and perform multiple operations and complex operation in parallel and it has become most flexible platform for the hardware based network intrusion detection. Thus hardware network intrusion providing many features such as real time protection against the wide various array of threats with maximum throughput. Here we are using most efficient data structure bloom filter which provide highest maximum possible throughput and efficient data structure for the hardware based pattern matching. In this randomized representation of threat database are used for storage purpose and as well as allowing for a various advantage over the hash table which provide the large quantity of overhead and there will consist of enough memory to store the entire threat database. Counting bloom filter is Shruti, IJRIT-442

improved version of the bloom filter which will provide more flexibility than the basic bloom filter. In this undertaking, we display the initially advanced, counting bloom-filter-based Network Intrusion Detection actualized on a FPGA: our outline is immeasurable through further parallel operation and, as far as anyone is concerned, is one of the most elevated throughput hardware based network intrusion detection system in presence. Initially we will consider the probabilistic arithmetic which are the premise of Bloom Filters, and the advancement of Bloom Filters is nothing but Counting Bloom Filters. Scope: This project provides maximum throughput and high speed network intrusion detection. The software based network was initially used but it has many drawbacks such as it will consume more memory space and it will required many lookup tables and provide less throughput in this we have to choose between the speed of data rates and security of the network. Thus the hardware based network intrusion detection came into existence which will use the hash tables it is kind of counter which will count each bit with stored data randomly then it will allow the network to computer. It provides high speed data rates and maximum throughput and it will consume less memory thus less lookup tables. In order to provide efficient operation we are selecting bloom filter for hardware based network intrusion detection system. 1.1 Object : It introduces the bloom filter and counting bloom filter which basically provides the efficient performance and maximum high throughput. The boom filter is nothing but the advanced method of hash tables which will provide high throughput. In order make the bloom filter much better with more flexibility the counting bloom filter came into existence. It will help us to maintain the information with more security and it will avoid the viruses, hacking and other malware. There will be no necessary of choosing option between the speed and security. The important object of this project is that using hardware based network intrusion detection we will detect the virus or hacking before it enters the system which will provide more efficient performance and higher throughput as well as flexibility. Thus it will consider many features such as performance with high speed data rates and high throughput. There will be overcome of the many drawbacks like large usage of memory and as well as the time consuming operations. Here the network intrusion detection will test it with the real world threats and as well as the present performance benchmarks. Finally the main object of using bloom filter is that it will provide the low hardware complexity and high accuracy operation with high throughput. 1.2 Motivation : As we know, now days virus, hacking and malware attacks on network creates lots of loss to the every field in one or other way. Thus the network intrusion detection is the matter of financial as well as security of each and every network. Initially software based network intrusion detection was invented by the Cisco which will provide less throughput with more memory for lookup table which creates many complication in performance so, thus there will be motivation of the hardware based network intrusion detection is introduced in order to get well secured information and as well as the high throughput performance. 1.3 Outcome of The Project: provide maximum high throughput Shruti, IJRIT-443

less hardware complexity more efficient high speed fully secured network intrusion detection 1.5 Development Specification: Platform : Language: windows VERILOG and VHDL Simulator: Xilinx ISE 13.4 FPGA devices: vertex 5 FPGA 1. BACKGROUND 2.1 Hash function: A lightweight intrusion detection system will eas-ily be deployed on most any node of a network, with nominal disruption to operations. light-weight ID' ought to be cross-platform, have atiny low system foot-print, and be simply organized by system administrators United Nations agency ought to implement a particular security solution during a short quantity of your time. they\'ll be any set of package tools which may be assembled and place into action in response to evolving security things. light-weight IDS\' area unit little, powerful, and versatile enough to be used as permanent parts of the net-work security infrastructure. A hash table is one in every of the foremost engaging decisions for fast operations which needs O(1) average memory accesses per lookup. Indeed, as a result of its versatile relevance in network packet pro-cessing, a number of the fashionable network processors give a inbuilt hashing unit. A survey of some recent analysis literature on network packet process reveals that hash tables are rife in several applications together with per-flow state management, science operation and packet classification. These modules are generally parts within the data-path of a high-speed router. Hence, they need to be ready to method packets at line speed that makes it imperative for the underlying hash tables to deliver a decent operation performance. Following could be a short discussion on however varied algorithms and applications use hash tables and why their search performance is vital. Maintaining Per-flow Context: one among the foremost vital ap-plications of hash tables in network process is within the context of maintaining association records or per-flow states. Per-flow state is beneficial in providing QoS to flows, measurements, watching and payload analysis in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).For instance, a hash table of association records for communications protocol connections. A record is made and accessed by computing a recap the 5-tuple of the TCP/IP header. This record could contain the mandatory con-nection state that is updated upon the arrival of every Shruti, IJRIT-444

packet thereon association. Efforts ar beneath thanks to implement such IDS in hardware for line speed packet process. In these im-plementations, association records ar maintained in DRAM.. 2.2 Related work: A hash table operation involves hash computation followed by storage memory accesses. Whereas memory accesses because of collisions is moderately reduced by exploitation refined cryptanalytic hash functions like MD5 or SHA-1, these ar troublesome to calculate quickly. within the context of high-speed packet process devices, even with specialised hardware, such hash functions will take many clock cycles to supply the output. for example, a number of the present hardware implementations of the hash cores consume quite sixty four clock cycles,, that exceeds the budget of minimum packet time. Moreover, the performance of such hash functions is not any higher than the theoretical performance with the belief of uniform random hashing. Another avenue to enhance the hash table performance would be to t plot an ideal hash perform supported the things to be hashed. 2.3 Fast hashing: For the aim of clarity, we tend to develop our algorithmic rule and hash table design incrementally ranging from a naive hash table (NHT). we tend to think about the hash table algorithmic rule during which the collisions area unit resolved by chaining since it\'s higher performance than open addressing schemes and is one in all the foremost common strategies. An NHT consists of the array of buckets with every bucket inform to the list of things hashed into it. we tend to denote by the set of things to be inserted within the table. Further, let be the list of things hashed to bucket and the item during this list. Thus, X i = {X i 1, X i 2, X i 3...X i ai} X = U L i=1 X i where a i is the total number of items in the bucket i and L is the total number of lists present in the table. In the Figure 1, x 3 =z, x 8 =w, a 3 = 2 and L=3. Fig 2.1: Naive Hash table Shruti, IJRIT-445

2.4 Basic Fast Hash Table: We currently consider our fast Hash Table algorithmic rule. 1st we have a tendency to consider the fundamental type of our algorithmic rule that we have a tendency to decision Basic quick Hash Table (BFHT) so we have a tendency to improve upon it. We begin with the outline of Bloom filter that is at the core of our algorithms. A Bloom filter could be a hash-based arrangement to store a collection of things succinctly. It computes k hash functions on every item, every of that returns associate degree address of slightly in an exceedingly the bit map of length m. All the k bits chosen by the hash values within the bit map area unit set to 1. By doing this, the filter primarily programs the ikon with a signature of the item. By repetition a similar procedure for all input things, Bloom filter are often programmed to contain the outline of all the things. This filter are often queried to visualize if a given item is programmed in it. 3. DESIGN METHODOLOGY 3.1Counting Bloom filter: The main drawback of bloom filter is that once the element has been programmed into the array, it cannot be deleted without erasing and reprogramming the filter from scratch. This is because there is no way to reset the bits corresponding to one element to ZERO and ensure that none of those bits were needed by another element still in the Bloom Filter. To address this deficiency, Bloom Filters have been adapted into Counting Bloom Filters (CBFs). Fig 4.1. A Counting Bloom filter with 4-bit up/down counter A CBF is identical to a standard Bloom Filter in concept, but differs in implementation: the Bloom array for a CBF consists of counters and not individual bits (Fig. 4.1). By using counters for a CBF, you can add and remove items from the CBF. Instead of setting a bit when programming it, you increment (+1) the corresponding counters; when deleting an item you decrement ( 1) the corresponding counters. To query the CBF for the existence of some piece of data, you check if all the corresponding counters in the Bloom array are non-zero (like checking if all corresponding bits are set to ONEs in a standard Bloom Filter). 1.2 Designing Counting Bloom Filters Since each counter in the CBF array has a limited size, some new challenges are introduced, such as what to do if a counter overflows because too many elements are added. Empirically, a reasonable counter size that minimizes overflows for most applications is four bits. Regardless of the counter size, there is always the Shruti, IJRIT-446

possibility that you reach the maximum value of a counter and an overflow occurs: in this situation it is best to leave the counter at its maximum value. While this could potentially cause a false negative (which is impossible with standard Bloom Filters), if the deletions from the CBF are more-or-less random (as is the case with real-world data), and the counter is of a reasonable size (i.e. 4 bits), the average time until a false negative occurs is extremely large. We used CBFs for our network intrusion detection as they allow for dynamic re-programming (add/delete) of the filter. This flexibility is highly desirable to ensure that the filter is up to date, e.g. if a new worm outbreak occurs (add), or if an attack is no longer a threat because the affected software was patched (delete), etc. The CBFs drawbacks are outweighed by their advantages, the abundant resources on the FPGA (mitigating the memory requirement), and the very low probability of a false negative.the Field Programmable Gate Array is made up of 4-bit or 6-bit Look-Up Tables (LUTs) which can be programmed to compute any Boolean function of 4 or 6 inputs, respectively. 3.3 Hardware implementation: Before moving on to Network Intrusion Detection, we first designed, optimized and implemented the necessary Bloom Filters on the FPGA. We have implemented three Bloom Filters in both standard and Counting variants on the Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA hosted on the ML403 development board. The FPGA consists of 5,472 slices (a slice contains two LUTs), 36 block RAMs (of 18-kbits each), and an embedded PowerPC 405 processor. The embedded processor eliminates the need for a separate computer to perform control functions such as TCP/IP network communication, making intelligent decisions in the NID threat detection process, etc; this enabled us to make this a system-on-a-chip. 3.4 Standard Bloom Filter Implementation: The Bloom array (m = 16384-bits) is keep in Block RAM on the FPGA. to maximise output and minimize the management and routing logic, we have a tendency to provide every hash perform exclusive access to the block RAM via a dedicated I/O port. we have a tendency to succeed this as follows: since every this block RAM has 2 I/O ports (i.e., you\'ll perform 2 freelance reads/writes to completely different addresses per clock cycle), and that we have k = eight hashes, we have a tendency to split the bit array across k/2 = four block RAMs that contain m/4 = 16384/4 =4096 bits every. However every hash perform must be changed thus its output falls inside the vary of its exclusive block RAM, this doesn\'t effects the false positive rate or the effectiveness of the Bloom Filter. An gate is employed to perform the ultimate membership check. 3.5 Counting Bloom Filter Implementation: As delineate in section III, going from a customary Bloom Filter to a investigating Bloom Filter design simply involves modifying the Bloom array in order that every bit may be a 4-bit counter instead. we have the tendency to enforced our Counting bloom filter by storing the counter values in block RAM; every block RAM includes a capability of 18-kbits. The RAM was used at the 4-bit depth, and 4-bit adders were enclosed to increment or decrement the RAM counters whereas comparators were wont to check if the counters were set (i.e., its worth was larger than zero). Mistreatment the LUTs because the counters was thought-about (as a counter may be a 4-bit Boolean function) however rejected due to an insufficient range of LUTs on the FPGA and therefore the large routing overhead which might have well reduced performance.the input data Ethernet packets (frames) is fed to the preprocessor that extracts the information processing packet, baring the headers Shruti, IJRIT-447

and forwarding the host info to the PowerPC and also the TCP/UDP payload to the investigating Bloom Filters. The filters take 2-, 4- and 8-byte knowledge inputs respectively; this {can be} as a result of the threat patterns (such as ILOVEYOU for the Love Bug worm) can be of variable size; the preprocessor should be used to stay track of patterns longer than 8-bytes we haven\'t enforced this capability nevertheless. Fig. 3. 2 A simplified block diagram of our NID design. A flow chart showing however our Network intrusion detection device operates is shown in Fig. 5. whenever the Counting bloom filter, perform operation with the super fast processor is need to investigate about the output of the Counting bloom filters and select if a threat is detected. without considering this to a separate chip(for example as is finished in some industrial Network intrusion detection systems) we have a tendency to set to style the Network intrusion detection device as a whole system-on-chip by exploitation to the embedded system processor. when the network intrusion system detects a threat from the Counting bloom filter outputs, it will eliminates the functions which are similar of a false positive by confirmative, that is present within the hash table (stored in DDR RAM). Note that this addition of bloom filter and small secondary hash table approach is much quicker and as well as uses less memory than a full hash-table approach. Fig 5. Flowchart of Network Intrusion Detection using CBFs on an FPGA Shruti, IJRIT-448

If the threat is confirmed, the Network intrusion detection device drops the info packet and sends a web management Message Protocol (ICMP) datagram of sort DESTINATION unreached with rationalization code Host administratively prohibited to the supply of the malicious packet. where the UDP packet in the system is shipped to facility wherever the computer system user will more analyze the alerts. The NID device may also take a lot of forceful steps like information processing obstruction of known/persistent hosts to avoid denial of service attacks on the network intrusion detection device. Advantages: High throughput Less memory consuming High speed High network intrusion detection system Applications: Collaborating in overlay and peer-to-peer networks: Bloom filters can be used for summarizing content to aid collaborations in overlay and peer-to-peer networks Resource routing: Bloom filters allow probabilistic algorithms for locating resources. Packet routing Bloom filters provide a means to speed up or simplify packet routing protocols Measurements: Bloom filter provide a useful tool for measurement infrastructures used to create data summaries in routers or other network devices. 2. Performance Analysis And Results 4.1 Output of counting bloom filter: Shruti, IJRIT-449

4.2 Output of hash function: 4.3 Output of bloom filter: Shruti, IJRIT-450

4.5 Output of the project: CONCLUSION We presented a single-chip, FPGA-based hardware Network Intrusion Detection (NID) system using Counting Bloom Filters. Our design identifies and can neutralize threats such as hackers and viruses at the network boundary before they can attack end-user computers. As network data rates increase, such real-time preemptive action may prove impractical for software NID solutions. Counting Bloom Filters are efficient, randomized data structures that are much faster and use less memory than the hash tables usually used in software applications. Consequently, our NID device has a throughput of 3.5 Gbps over an order of magnitude higher than commercial software-based NID systems. Future work includes increasing the number and variety of threat-signatures that the system can detect as well as full scale testing on a live network. We hope that by increasing the flexibility and speed of effective Network Intrusion Detection we can help secure computers against malicious attacks, reduce associated financial losses and prevent the compromise of national security. Shruti, IJRIT-451

References [1] R. Lemos, Counting the cost of slammer, CNet, Feb. 2003. [2] J. W. Lockwood, J. Moscola, M. Kulig, D. Reddick, and T. Brooks, Internet worm and virus protection in dynamically reconfigurable hardware, in Proc. of Mil. and Aero. Programmable Logic Device (MAPLD), Sep. 2003. [3] J. Swartz, Chinese hackers seek U.S. access, USA Today, Mar. 2007. [4] B. Achoido and M. Kessler, Worm, virus threat grows, USA Today, Apr. 2003. [5] Installing Cisco intrusion prevention system appliances and modules 5.1, Cisco. Shruti, IJRIT-452