Wireless Vulnerability Management Wireless Vulnerability Assessment Airport Scanning Report Part - II A study conducted by: AirTight Networks, Inc. www.airtightnetworks.com 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc.
About This Study Background Airtight Networks released the results of its airport wireless vulnerability scan study on March 3, 2008 This follow-up expands the scope by adding vulnerability reports of more airports across the world The Goal To assess adoption of security best practices at Airport s Wi-Fi networks To assess information security risk exposure of laptop users while they are transiting through airports Page 2 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Study Methodology Visited 13 new airports world-wide (9 in US, 2 in Europe, 2 in Asia-Pacific) USA: New York (JFK), Washington (IAD), San Antonio (SAT), Fort Lauderdale (FLL), Dallas (DAL), Seattle (SEA), Omaha (OMA), Chicago (MDW), San Diego (SAN) Europe: Southampton (SOU), Dublin (DUB) Asia/Pacific: Bangkok (BKK), Pune (PNQ) Scanned Wi-Fi signal for 5 minutes at a randomly selected location (typically a departure gate or lounge area) Total number of APs found = 318 and Clients = 311 Page 3 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Previous Study Key Findings & Implications Evidence Study Findings Critical Airport systems found vulnerable to Wi-Fi threats ~ 80% of the private Wi- Fi networks at Airports are OPEN / WEP! 1 2 3 Data leakage by both hotspot and non-hotspot users Only 3% of hotspot users are using VPNs to encrypt their data! Non-hotspot users found leaking network information Viral Wi-Fi outbreak continues Over 10% laptops found to be infected! Page 4 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
New Study Findings The same pattern of wireless vulnerabilities were found at all airports again Vulnerabilities in the core systems at airports more wide-spread than previously assessed Several airports seem to be using WEP-based baggage tracking systems Insecure configuration practices observed APs with out-of-the-box default configuration Open/WEP APs with hidden SSIDs Page 5 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Wireless Vulnerabilities Revisited AP Encryption Majority of APs are OPEN ~ 64% A significant number of WEP installations are visible ~15% Only 21% APs are using WPA/WPA2 The ideal break-up: Hotspot APs OPEN Non-hotspot APs WPA/WPA2 Page 6 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Wireless Vulnerabilities Revisited Viral SSIDs The spread of viral SSIDs is seen at European airports too Both SOU and DUB airports had viral SSIDs present Free Public WiFi is the most common viral SSID Seen at 8 out of 13 newly scanned airports An active ad-hoc network of 4 users was found at the DAL airport The users were security-conscious they were using WEP! Page 7 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Viral SSIDs Spread to Europe Viral SSIDs spread to Europe! Free Public WiFi found at all major airports! Page 8 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Airport s Critical Systems are Vulnerable Previous study reported one instance of baggage system using WEP (at SFO) New evidence confirms that this occurrence is quite prevalent Similar vulnerabilities spotted at JFK and IAD airports Wireless APs possibly used for baggage handling are using WEP. E.g. bagscanjfkt1 (JFK), bagscanlhiad (IAD) Page 9 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
JFK Baggage Scan Possible baggage handling system Page 10 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
IAD Baggage Scan Possible baggage handling system Page 11 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Bangkok Customs and Baggage Scan Possible baggage handling system Customs network! Page 12 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Clients Found Connected to Open Customs Network at Bangkok 2 Clients found connected to Customs network Page 13 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Insecure Practices Observed APs with default configuration in use! Over 30% airports have one or more APs with default configuration (which are always insecure) This not only suggests that security practices were overlooked but these APs can inadvertently also act as Honeypots SSID Encryption Location Linksys (1 Client connected) OPEN Continued reliance on Hidden SSIDs for security! Over 40% security conscious users still continue to use Hidden SSIDs instead of using WPA/WPA2 JFK Linksys WEP SAT Default (2) WEP BKK Linksys OPEN DAL Linksys OPEN BKK Page 14 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Call for Action Airport Authorities Airport Authorities and Airlines need to secure their private Wi-Fi networks Secure legacy Wi-Fi enabled handheld devices being used for baggage handling Use at least WPA for Wi-Fi enabled ticketing kiosks Protect the Airport IT networks against active Wi-Fi attacks Page 15 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.
Call for Action Wi-Fi Hotspot Users Do not connect to Unknown Wi-Fi networks (e.g. Free Public WiFi ) while at the airport or any other public places Be aware of your Windows Wi-Fi network configuration Periodically inspect your Windows Wi-Fi network configuration Remove unneeded Wi-Fi networks from your Preferred list Do not use computer-to-computer (ad-hoc connectivity) while at public places such as airports Business Travelers - Use VPN connectivity while using hotspot Wi-Fi networks Turn OFF your Wi-Fi interface if you are not using it! Page 16 Wireless Vulnerability Management 2008 AirTight Networks, Inc. Proprietary & Confidential.