Drought Micro-insurance in Ethiopia: An Innovative Model to Increase the Resilience of the Poorest Households

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Drought Micro-insurance in Ethiopia: An Innovative Model to Increase the Resilience of the Poorest Households Index Insurance Innovation Initiative January, 2010 Rome, Italy Dir biyabir anbessa yassir. When spiders webs unite, they can tie up a lion.

Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation HARITA (11/07-12/09): A Case Study in Community-driven CC adaptation; Holistic drought risk management; Weather index insurance, designed for/by farmers; Replicable/scalable approach Trust, Education, Demand-Side Focus

Selected Partners & Advisors Adi Ha Multipurpose Farmers Cooperative Relief Society of Tigray (REST) Nyala Insurance Co. DECSI microfinance institution National Meteorological Agency Tigray Food Security Office Mekele University Institute for Sustainable Dev t Oxfam America Swiss Re Columbia University/IRI The Rockefeller Foundation Index Insurance Innovation Initiative (I4)

1996 Foundation of Trust in Adi Ha & Today

21 Farmers Collecting Rain Data Playing Experimental Games Enrollment Day Testimonial Design Team Learning to Measure Rainfall

Complement Informal Insurance & Ethiopia s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) PSNP: Predictable Transfer for Predictable Needs Insurance: Predictable Transfer for Unpredictable Needs

Standalone Insurance Package Package Characteristics Percentage premium price: 24% Expected payout just over 1 in 5 No direct price subsidy Results (May 2009) 200 hh purchased (approx. 20% of all households) Avg. premiums: 138 ETB*, 1.8X minimum option *adjusted for landholding

PSNP vs. Non-PSNP Farmers The majority (65%) of buyers were PSNP participants. On average, PSNP purchased more cover than non-psnp.

Female vs. Male Headed Households 38% of all enrollees: female head of hh Vast majority purchased with labor

Table 51: Differences in characteristics of buyers vs. non-buyers Post-Rollout Survey (Peterson 2009) Buyer? N Mean Std Dev Std Error Non-buyer 68 0.1471 0.3568 0.04327 Gender (% women) (F=14.019, p<0.000) Buyer 114 0.4035 0.49277 0.04615 Total 182 0.3077 0.46281 0.03431 Non-buyer 68 48.1029 15.10277 1.83148 Age of household (F=31.726, p<0.000) Buyer 114 37.0439 11.23867 1.0526 Total 182 41.1758 13.85887 1.02729 Non-buyer 66 0.3182 0.46934 0.05777 PSNP participation (% who participate) (F=19.967, p<0.000) Buyer 111 0.6486 0.47956 0.04552 Total 177 0.5254 0.50077 0.03764

Table 51: Differences in characteristics of buyers vs. non-buyers Post-Rollout Survey Peterson (2009) Buyer? N Mean Std Dev Std Error Non-buyer 68 3.3088 1.61795 0.19621 Timad of rainfed land you own (F=6.61, p<0.011) Buyer 113 2.6217 1.81115 0.17038 Total 181 2.8798 1.76828 0.13143 Non-buyer 68 0.5228 0.41325 0.05011 Timad of irrigated land you own (F=5.842, p<0.017) Buyer 112 0.3772 0.37817 0.03573 Total 180 0.4322 0.39701 0.02959 Non-buyer 68 2.7426 1.41287 0.17134 Timad of teff grown last season (F=7.389, p<0.007) Buyer 114 2.1009 1.61187 0.15097 Total 182 2.3407 1.56777 0.11621

TOP REASONS FOR PURCHASE Generally worried about drought: 55.3% Looking for additional coping mechanism: 20.2% Trust organizations involved: 7% Want to try something new: 6.1%

TOP REASONS FOR NON- PURCHASE Unaware of the opportunity to buy: 40.7% Did not understand insurance: 12.8% No reason: 30% SATISFACTION RATES Price: 93% Coverage period: 95.6% Crop used: 82.5% Satellite data ok: 89.5% Complaint process: 92.1%

Future Research Does this approach really benefit the poorest farmers? IFW vs cash may make a difference. How much insurance is optimal? How to measure benefits of risk reduction/labor? Affects value proposition and CBA. How replicable? How scalable? Farmers manage basis risk via savings or gamgam??

Thank you! For more information, please contact: David Satterthwaite Sr. Global Microinsurance Officer, Private Sector Department Oxfam America dsatterthwaite@oxfamamerica.org

The Distribution Model

HARITA Distribution Yr. 1 Predictable Transfers for Predictable Needs (PSNP 8 million beneficiaries) Predictable Transfers for Unpredictable Needs (Drought Insurance Proposal) Drought index triggered Donors, GoE New Donors (Oxfam Yr. 1) (Later: CC Adaptation Funds, CDM, Carbon Credits?) Donations Donations Cash-for-Work Program (PSNP in Tigray) Premiums Cash / Grain Ins. Voucher Poorest Households (PSNP Participants) Farmer Co-op Labor Labor Local Insurer (Nyala) & Global Reinsurer (Swiss Re) Premiums Payouts Microfinance Institution (DECSI) Premiums Payouts Credit Poor Households (Non-PSNP Participants) Repmnts