What is network security?

Network security Network Security Srinidhi Varadarajan Foundations: what is security? cryptography authentication message integrity key distribution and certification Security in practice: application layer: secure e-mail transport layer: Internet commerce, SSL, SET 2 Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy Figure 7.1 goes here well-known in network security world Bob, Alice want to communicate securely Trudy, the intruder may intercept, delete, add messages What is network security? Secrecy: only sender, intended receiver should understand msg contents sender encrypts msg receiver decrypts msg Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other Message Integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection 3 4 Internet security threats Packet sniffing: broadcast media promiscuous NIC reads all packets passing by can read all unencrypted data (e.g. passwords) e.g.: C sniffs B s packets Internet security threats IP Spoofing: can generate raw IP packets directly from application, putting any value into IP source address field receiver can t tell if source is spoofed e.g.: C pretends to be B A C A C src:b dest:a payload B src:b dest:a payload B 5 6 Application Layer 1

Internet security threats The language of cryptography Denial of service (DOS): flood of maliciously generated packets swamp receiver Distributed DOS (DDOS): multiple coordinated sources swamp receiver e.g., C and remote host -attack A plaintext K A ciphertext Figure 7.3 goes here K B plaintext A C B 7 symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identical public-key crypto: encrypt key public, decrypt key secret 8 Symmetric key cryptography substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another plaintext: ciphertext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc Q: How hard to break this simple cipher?: brute force (how hard?) other? 9 Symmetric key crypto: DES DES: Data Encryption Standard US encryption standard [NIST 1993] 56-bit symmetric key, 64 bit plaintext input How secure is DES? DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase ( Strong cryptography makes the world a safer place ) decrypted (brute force) in 4 months no known backdoor decryption approach making DES more secure use three keys sequentially (3-DES) on each datum use cipher-block chaining 10 Symmetric key crypto: DES DES operation initial permutation 16 identical rounds of function application, each using different 48 bits of key final permutation 11 Public Key Cryptography symmetric key crypto requires sender, receiver know shared secret key Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never met )? public key cryptography radically different approach [Diffie- Hellman76, RSA78] sender, receiver do not share secret key encryption key public (known to all) decryption key private (known only to receiver) 12 Application Layer 2

Public key cryptography Public key encryption algorithms Figure 7.7 goes here Two inter-related requirements: need d ( ) and e ( ) such that 1.. B B d (e (m)) = m B B 2 need public and private keys for d (.) and e (.) B B RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm 13 14 Authentication Goal: Bob wants Alice to prove her identity to him Authentication: another try Protocol ap2.0: Alice says I am Alice and sends her IP address along to prove it. Protocol ap1.0: Alice says I am Alice Failure scenario?? Failure scenario?? 15 16 Authentication: another try Protocol ap3.0: Alice says I am Alice and sends her secret password to prove it. Authentication: yet another try Protocol ap3.1: Alice says I am Alice and sends her encrypted secret password to prove it. I am Alice encrypt(password) Failure scenario? Failure scenario? 17 18 Application Layer 3

Authentication: yet another try Goal: avoid playback attack Nonce: number (R) used onlyonce in a lifetime ap4.0: to prove Alice live, Bob sends Alice nonce, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key Authentication: ap5.0 ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key problem: how do Bob, Alice agree on key can we authenticate using public key techniques? ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography Figure 7.11 goes here Figure 7.12 goes here Failures, drawbacks? 19 20 ap5.0: security hole Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice) Figure 7.14 goes here Digital Signatures Cryptographic technique analogous to handwritten signatures. Sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator. Verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can verify that Bob, and no one else, signed document. Simple digital signature for message m: Bob encrypts m with his private key d B, creating signed message, d B (m). Bob sends m and d B (m) to Alice. Need certified public keys (more later ) 21 22 Digital Signatures (more) Suppose Alice receives msg m, and digital signature d B (m) Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob s public key e B to d B (m) then checks e B (d B (m) ) = m. If e B (d B (m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used Bob s private Alice thus verifies that: Bob signed m. No one else signed m. Bob signed m and not m. Non-repudiation: Alice can take m, and signature d B (m) to court and prove that Bob signed m. Message Digests Computationally expensive to public-key-encrypt long messages Goal: fixed-length,easy to compute digital signature, fingerprint apply hash function H to m, get fixed size message digest, H(m). Hash function properties: Many-to-1 Produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint) Given message digest x, computationally infeasible to find m such that x = H(m) computationally infeasible to find any two messages m and m such that H(m) = H(m ). 23 24 Application Layer 4

Digital signature = Signed message digest Hash Function Algorithms Bob sends digitally signed message: Alice verifies signature and integrity of digitally signed message: Internet checksum would make a poor message digest. Too easy to find two messages with same checksum. MD5 hash function widely used. Computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process. arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to construct msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x. SHA-1 is also used. US standard 160-bit message digest 25 26 Trusted Intermediaries Key Distribution Center (KDC) Problem: How do two entities establish shared secret key over network? Solution: trusted key distribution center (KDC) acting as intermediary between entities Problem: When Alice obtains Bob s public key (from web site, e- mail, diskette), how does she know it is Bob s public key, not Trudy s? Solution: trusted certification authority (CA) 27 Alice,Bob need shared symmetric KDC: server shares different secret key with each registered user. Alice, Bob know own symmetric keys, K A- KDC K B-KDC, for communicating with KDC. Alice communicates with KDC, gets session key R1, and K B-KDC (A,R1) Alice sends Bob K B-KDC (A,R1), Bob extracts R1 Alice, Bob now share the symmetric key R1. 28 Certification Authorities Secure e-maile Certification authority (CA) binds public key to particular entity. Entity (person, router, etc.) can register its public key with CA. Entity provides proof of identity to CA. CA creates certificate binding entity to public Certificate digitally signed by CA. When Alice wants Bob s public key: gets Bob s certificate (Bob or elsewhere). Apply CA s public key to Bob s certificate, get Bob s public key 29 Alice wants to send secret e-mail message, m, to Bob. generates random symmetric private key, K S. encrypts message with K S also encrypts K S with Bob s public sends both K S (m) and e B (K S ) to Bob. 30 Application Layer 5

Secure e-mail e (continued) Alice wants to provide sender authentication message integrity. Secure e-mail e (continued) Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication, message integrity. Alice digitally signs message. sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature. 31 Note: Alice uses both her private key, Bob s public 32 Pretty good privacy (PGP) Secure sockets layer (SSL) Internet e-mail encryption scheme, a de-facto standard. Uses symmetric key cryptography, public key cryptography, hash function, and digital signature as described. Provides secrecy, sender authentication, integrity. Inventor, Phil Zimmerman, was target of 3-year federal investigation. A PGP signed message: ---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE--- Hash: SHA1 Bob:My husband is out of town tonight.passionately yours, Alice ---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE--- Version: PGP 5.0 Charset: noconv yhhjrhhgjghgg/12epj+lo8ge4vb3mqj hfevzp9t6n7g6m5gw2 ---END PGP SIGNATURE--- 33 PGP provides security for a specific network app. SSL works at transport layer. Provides security to any TCP-based app using SSL services. SSL: used between WWW browsers, servers for I- commerce (shttp). SSL security services: server authentication data encryption client authentication (optional) Server authentication: SSL-enabled browser includes public keys for trusted CAs. Browser requests server certificate, issued by trusted CA. Browser uses CA s public key to extract server s public key from certificate. Visit your browser s security menu to see its trusted CAs. 34 SSL (continued) Secure electronic transactions (SET) Encrypted SSL session: Browser generates symmetric session key, encrypts it with server s public key, sends encrypted key to server. Using its private key, server decrypts session Browser, server agree that future msgs will be encrypted. All data sent into TCP socket (by client or server) i encrypted with session SSL: basis of IETF Transport Layer Security (TLS). SSL can be used for non- Web applications, e.g., IMAP. Client authentication can be done with client certificates. designed for payment-card transactions over Internet. provides security services among 3 players: customer merchant merchant s bank All must have certificates. SET specifies legal meanings of certificates. apportionment of liabilities for transactions Customer s card number passed to merchant s bank without merchant ever seeing number in plain text. Prevents merchants from stealing, leaking payment card numbers. Three software components: Browser wallet Merchant server Acquirer gateway See text for description of SET transaction. 35 36 Application Layer 6