Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge. Daniel Kaufmann World Bank Institute. www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/



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Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge Daniel Kaufmann World Bank Institute www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ Presentation at Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement Conference, Ethical Globalisation Initiative and The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University Law School New York, March 1 st, 2004 1

Human Rights and Governance: Initial Empirical Exploration Power of Data & towards empirical analysis 1. Unbundle and initial exploration of trends 2. Assess links across different types of Human Rights (1 st GHRs & 2 nd GHRs) 3. Study links between Human Rights and Governance/Rule of Law/Anti-Corruption 4. Disentangling Causality Direction of linkages 5. Initial Implications for discussion 2

Data Sources used in initial exploration Macro : i) SUNY data coding extension (from Amnesty and US State Dept.; ii) KK Aggregate Governance Indicators; Micro, 1-- project: 1500 WBank-funded projects Micro 2 -- firms: worldwide enterprise surveys Micro 3 country-based public officials surveys 3

Human Rights; 1 st GHR (1): Absence of Killings 1 Good 1996 2003 Bad 0 Oecd Eastern Europe Former Soviet Union (NIC) dev. Latin America / Caribbean Subsaharan Africa South Asia Source: Webster background compilation for Governance Indicators (GM IV, forthcoming). A high value reflects respect for human rights. 4

Human Rights; 1 st GHR (3): Absence of Torture 1 Good 1996 2003 Bad 0 Oecd Eastern Europe Former Soviet Union (NIC) dev. Latin America / Caribbean Subsaharan Africa South Asia Source: Webster background compilation for Governance Indicators (GM IV, forthcoming). A high value reflects respect for human rights. 5

Human Rights; 1 st GHR: Life Protection (Composite of Absence of Killings, Absence of Disappearances, Absence of Torture, & Absence of Imprisonments) 1 Good 1996 2003 Bad 0 Oecd Eastern Europe Former Soviet Union (NIC) dev. Latin America / Caribbean Subsaharan Africa South Asia Source: Webster background compilation for Governance Indicators (GM IV, forthcoming). A high value reflects respect for human rights. 6

Human Rights; 1 st GHR: Women s Rights (Composite of Economic, Social, and Political Rights) 1 Good 1996 2003 Bad 0 Oecd Eastern Europe Former Soviet Union (NIC) dev. Latin America / Caribbean Subsaharan Africa South Asia Source: Webster background compilation for Governance Indicators (GM IV, forthcoming). A high value reflects respect for human rights. 7

Human Rights; 1 st Generation (9): Government Censorship 1 Good 1996 2003 Bad 0 Oecd Eastern Europe Former Soviet Union (NIC) dev. Latin America / Caribbean Subsaharan Africa South Asia Source: Webster background compilation for Governance Indicators (GM IV, forthcoming). A high value reflects respect for human rights. 8

Voice and Accountability 1 Good 1996 2002 Bad 0 OECD Eastern Europe Former Soviet Union (NIC) dev. Latin America / Caribbean Subsaharan Africa South Asia Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III (2003), http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html. 9 Please note the values are rescaled from the original to 0-1. However they are not strictly comparable with the other 5 indicators in panels A-E because they are from a different source.

200 Child Mortality vs. Voice & Accountability Child Mortality per 1,000 births (log) 10 0 PRK IRQ ZAR MMR SDN TKM LBY SLE AFG AGO SOMRWA LBR CIV ZMB BDI ETH GIN TCD CAF PAK COG UGAMRT NGA CMR YEM ZWE HTI BGD EGY GTM DZA CHN IRN TUN VEN RUS NER GHA DOM PER PHLBRA ATG ZAF JAM KOR HRV URY CRI EST CHL USA GBR ITA CAN SVN NLD FRA DNK NOR FIN ISL r = -0.66-2.5 0.0 2.5 Voice and Accountability Low Source: KK 2002, WDI 2002 High 10

$50,000 Income per Capita vs. Voice & Accountability ITA USA NOR CAN DNK FRA GBR ISLNLD FIN Income per capita (PPP, log) $3,000 PRK LBY TKM IRQ MMR SDN ZAR RUSVEN TUN IRN DZA EGY GTM ZWECHN GIN CIV CMR PAK HTI COG BGD AGO MRT LBR RWA AFG BDI ETH SOM TCD CAFNGASLE YEM UGA ZMB NER ATG BRA PER DOM PHL GHA KOR HRV ZAF JAM SVN URY CHL EST CRI r = 0.63 $150-2.5 0.0 2.5 Voice and Accountability Low Source: KK 2002, Heston-Summers & CIA World Factbook High 11

Corporate Ethics vs. Voice & Accountability High 7 ISL GBR FINDNK NLD NOR Corporate Ethics Low 4 2 Low ZWE CHN AGO HTI PAK ETH CMR DZA TCD TUN EGY MWI UGANGA RUS BGD KEN GTM ZMB VEN Corporate ethics drawn from EOS 2003. Question: The corporate ethics (ethical behavior in interactions with public officials, politicians and other enterprises) of your country s firms in your industry are among the world s worst / best. 12 Voice and Accountability drawn from KK 2002. MOZ -2.0 0.0 2.0 Voice and Accountability GHA DOM PER PHL NAM BRA JAM HRV KOR BWA ZAF URY EST SVN CHL ITA CRI FRA USA CAN r = 0.75 High

Corporate Ethics vs. Human Good 7 Rights ( Women ) r = 0.70 Corporate Ethics 5 Poor 3 Low Medium-Low Medium Medium-High High 'WOMEN' Composite Index WOMEN is a composite indicator combining average country ratings for three categories: women s political rights, women s economic rights and social equality of women. Source: State Department and Amnesty International. Corporate ethics drawn from EOS 2003. Question: The corporate ethics (ethical behavior in interactions with public officials, 13 politicians and other enterprises) of your country s firms in your industry are among the world s worst / best.

$50,000 Income per Capita vs. Rule of Law ITA FRA USA NOR CAN DNK GBR NLD ISL FIN Income per capita (PPP, log) $3,000 SOM TKM ZWE IRQ CMR CIV HTI COG AGO MMR SDN VEN RUS LBY GTM BRA IRN DZA PER DOM JAM GIN PHL CHN PAK BGD MRT GHA LBR NGASLE TCD CAF YEM RWA PRK UGA NER ZMB AFGBDI ETH ZAR HRV ZAF TUN EGY KOR ATG SVN URY EST CRI CHL r = 0.82 $150-2.5 0.0 2.5 Rule of Law Low Source: KK 2002, Heston-Summers & CIA World Factbook High 14

Child Mortality vs. Control of Corruption Child Mortality per 1,000 births (log) 200 10 0 Low SLE AFG SOM AGO RWA NERLBR ZMBCIV IRQ TCD BDI ETH CAF GIN ZAR COG UGA PAK NGA MRT MMR CMR YEM HTI ZWE SDN BGD ZAF PRK GHA EGY GTM DOM PER TKM DZA PHL BRA CHN IRN TUN LBY VEN JAM RUS ATG URY CRI EST KOR HRV ITA SVN CHL USA GBR CANNLD FRA DNK NOR FIN ISL -2.5 0.0 2.5 Control of Corruption 15 Source: KK 2002, WDI 2002 r = -0.77 High

Child Mortality vs. Grand (Corporate-Public) Corruption (X axis measures extent of Capture of laws/regs/policies by corporates) 200 Child Mortality per 1,000 births (log) 10 TCD HTI AGO BGD GTM PHL PAN MLI UGA NGA DOM ZWE VEN RUS PER ZMB ETH PAK CMR SEN IDN JAM CRI BRA HRV DZA MUS ZAF GHA EGY LVA CHN URY CHL EST KOR USA GBR ITA CAN NLD SVN FRA DNK FIN NOR TUN r = -0.67 0 Low 2.0 4.5 7.0 Source: WDI, EOS 2003 Absence of state Capture by corporates ISL High 16

Health Access vs. Control of Grand (corporate-public) Corruption (X axis measures extent of Capture of laws/regs/policies by corporates) High Equality of Health Access 7 4 Low 1 NOR CAN NLD FRA SVN EST KOR TUN ITA LVA GBR CRI HRV IDN CHN USA MUS DZA EGY URY GHA PAN ETH UGA RUS JAM CHL DOM PER ZAF PHL NGA MLI PAK SEN ZMB TCD HTI GTM BGD CMR BRA AGO ZWE VEN ISL DNK FIN 2.0 4.5 7.0 Low Absence of state capture by corporates r = 0.81 High Health gap drawn from EOS 2003. Question: The difference in quality of the healthcare available to rich and poor people 17in your country is large / small. Active Capture drawn from EOS 2003. Question: How commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments of bribe to influence laws, policies, regulations or decrees?

Empirical Unbundling: Some Weak Links are important the Illustration of the effect of 1 st GHR and AIDS 50% ZWE SWZ LSO BWA AIDS Prevalence (log) 7% ERI ZAR SDN RWA AGO CIV CMR BDI COG ETH HTI TCD CAF UGA MWI KEN NGA SLE ZMB MOZ BFA GHA DOM NAM GUY ZAF BHS r = -0.34 LBY SOM CHN PAK IRN YEM EGY GTM RUS BRA PER JAM EST USA CRI URY ITA FRA CAN CHL GBR ISL NLD DNK SVN NOR FIN 0% BGD PHL HRV KOR -2.5 0.0 2.5 Voice and Accountability Low High 18

Unbundling Empirical Links Matter for Policy: Distinguishing between strong and weak links Strong Empirical Links - Soft 1 st GHR & (most) 2 nd GHR - Soft 1 st GHR & World Bank-funded Projects - 1 st GHR & corp. ethics (corporate/elite capture) - 1 st GHR & rule of law/anti-corruption - Rule of Law/Anti-Corruption & 2 nd GHRs - Corporate/Elite Capture & 2 nd GHRs 19

Weak Empirical Links: Some Important Exceptions - Between Hard (life protection) & Soft 1 st GHRs - 1 st GHRs and AIDS - 1 st GHR and labor - 2 nd GHR and labor 20

Implications, general If further validated, results have implications in terms of focus on interventions: 1. When directly 2. When indirectly 3. When neither (tradeoffs due to limited resources-c/b) 4. Building mediating role of rule of law/anti-c 21

Some Implications, specific 1. Empirics Matter for: informed advise, review popular notions; monitoring checks/balances 2. Progress in 1 st GHR not dramatic: focus 3. Soft 1 st GHR are key for 2 nd GHR: focus 4. 1 st GHR not a luxury good (no reverse link from 2 nd -to-1 st ) 5. Differences within various 1 st GHRs: challenge 6. Some 2 nd GHR need specific interventions (weak link 1) 7. Other 2 nd GHR may not be first priority (weak link 2) 8. Rule of Law/Anti-Corruption key mediator between 1 st and 2 nd GHR issues: convergence (mediator) 9. Addressing Elite Capture/Corporate Ethics: mediator www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 22