The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel s National Security

THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 95 The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel s National Security Efraim Inbar The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900 Israel http://www.besacenter.org ISSN 0793-1042 February 2012

The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies The BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University was founded by Dr. Thomas O. Hecht, a Canadian Jewish community leader. The Center is dedicated to the memory of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who concluded the first Arab-Israel peace agreement. The Center, a non-partisan and independent institute, seeks to contribute to the advancement of Middle East peace and security by conducting policy-relevant research on strategic subjects, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel. Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author's views or conclusions. BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy summarizes the papers delivered at conferences and seminars held by the Center, for the academic, military, official and general publics. In sponsoring these discussions, the BESA Center aims to stimulate public debate on, and consideration of, contending approaches to problems of peace and war in the Middle East. The BESA Memorandum series consist of policy-oriented papers. The content of the publications reflects the views of the authors only. A list of recent BESA Center publications can be found at the end of this booklet. International Advisory Board Founder of the Center and Chairman of the Advisory Board: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht Vice Chairman: Mr. Saul Koschitzky Members: Prof. Moshe Arens, Ms. Judy Ann Hecht, Ms. Marion Hecht, Mr. Robert Hecht, Prof. Riva Heft-Hecht, Hon. Shlomo Hillel, Mr. Isi Leibler, Amb. Yitzhak Levanon, Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Mr. Robert K. Lifton, Maj. Gen. (res.) Daniel Matt, Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, Maj. Gen. (res.) Ori Orr, Mr. Seymour D. Reich, Amb. Meir Rosenne, Mr. Greg Rosshandler, Amb. Zalman Shoval, Amb. Norman Spector, Mr. Muzi Wertheim International Academic Advisory Board Desmond Ball Australian National University, Ian Beckett University of Kent, Eliot A. Cohen Johns Hopkins University, Irwin Cotler McGill University, Steven R. David Johns Hopkins University, Yehezkel Dror Hebrew University, Lawrence Freedman King's College, Patrick James University of Southern California, Efraim Karsh King's College, Robert J. Lieber Georgetown University, Barry Posen Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Jasjit Singh Centre for Strategic and International Studies Research Staff BESA Center Director: Prof. Efraim Inbar Research Associates: Dr. Efrat Aviv, Dr. Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Prof. Stuart A. Cohen, Dr. Gil Feiler, Prof. Jonathan Fox, Prof. Hillel Frisch, Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Col. (res.) Aby Har-Even, Dr. Tsilla Hershco, Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Prof. Avi Kober, Dr. Yaakov Lifshitz, Prof. Ze'ev Maghen, Mr. Amir Rapaport, Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, Maj. Gen. (res.) Emanuel Sakal, Prof. Shmuel Sandler, Dr. Eitan Shamir, Dr. Dany Shoham, Dr. Shlomo Shpiro, Dr. Max Singer, Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum Director of Public Affairs: David M. Weinberg Program Coordinator: Hava Waxman Koen Publication Editor (English): Ilana Hart Publication Editor (Hebrew): Alona Briner Rozenman

The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel s National Security Table of Contents INTRODUCTION... 1 THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT... 2 The Weakening of Arab States and Increased Uncertainty... 2 The Regional Balance of Power... 4 THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN CLOUT... 5 THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL... 7 Strategic Surprises... 7 Regional Isolation... 8 Erosion in Israel s Deterrence... 10 Growing Security Risks... 11 Threats to the Sea Lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean... 14 The Iranian Nuclear Challenge... 17 ISRAELI RESPONSES... 18 A Larger Defense Budget... 19 The Imperative for Defensible Borders... 22 Forging Strategic Alliances... 22 Responding to Iran... 24 CONCLUSION... 24

The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel s National Security Efraim Inbar * INTRODUCTION Dramatic events have unfolded in the Middle East since the beginning of 2011. Large numbers of demonstrators have gathered in central squares to voice outrage against their rulers while demanding sweeping governmental reforms. Four long-time dictators have already been removed from power. The Arab world is in turmoil and authoritarian regimes are under great duress. The trajectory of these events is not entirely clear, creating much political uncertainty. While the nature of these domestic upheavals is novel internationally, the ongoing Middle East turmoil only underscores current regional trends. While the Arab states become weaker, non-arab states like Turkey and Iran are becoming relatively stronger; and the US is slowly losing influence in the region. This unstable environment indicates trouble for Israel. What follows is an assessment of the implications of the changing regional environment for Israel s national security. The article first presents the main elements of the changing strategic landscape around Israel: the weakening of Arab states, changes in the regional balance of power as radical anti-american forces appear to be gaining greater influence, and America's apparent retreat from the Middle East. Part two focuses on how these elements affect Israel s national security. Of foremost concern are the heightened risks of rapid change and strategic surprises, greater uncertainty regarding the behavior of leaders in neighboring states, increased terrorist activity, reduced deterrence, growing regional isolation, emerging threats in the eastern Mediterranean, and the continuing Iranian nuclear challenge. Part three of the article discusses ways in which Israel must prepare itself to meet the challenges of the deteriorating security environment. * The author is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES Notably, Israel must increase defense outlays to expand its standing army, particularly the ground and naval forces, and make additional investments in missile defense and research and development. Israel must also insist on defensible borders, seek out new regional allies, and maintain its special relationship with the US. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT The Weakening of Arab States and Increased Uncertainty Despite over a century of Western cultural influence, the Arab world has failed to modernize in many respects. As of yet, no Arab state has evolved into a stable democracy. 1 Several UN reports point out that the Arab world lags behind the rest of the international community in civil liberties, political rights, education, gender equality, and economic productivity. 2 This deplorable state of affairs is the root cause of discontent and frustration, which fuels mass protest. Absent a liberal-democratic political culture, however, mass mobilization in pursuit of political change is unpredictable and is not necessarily conducive to democracy. 3 Heralding the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia or the Lotus Revolution in Egypt as model cases of popular discontent in the promotion of democracy, freedom, dignity and justice reflects a misunderstanding of complex political processes. One should recall that the much welcomed 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, which was steered by pro-western political elements and led to free elections, ended just four years later with Hizballah s takeover of the state. Similarly, free elections in the Palestinian territories, pushed by a misguided American foreign policy, led to the hardly-legitimate Palestinian presidency of Mahmoud Abbas and a Hamas dictatorship in Gaza. It is therefore highly likely that the newfound Arab hope for a more open and just political system will be hijacked in free elections by Islamist parties whose commitment to democracy is nil. Islam, the heart and soul of the identity of most Middle Easterners, has always had great appeal in the region. 4 This reality makes Islamic political forces the strongest alternative to the current dictators of the Arab states. The Islamists are likely to gain power, whether by elections or by revolutionary means, as they are usually the best organized political force outside the ruling 2

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY government. Recent election results in Tunisia and Egypt amply demonstrate this point. The increasing Islamist influence in Arab states may generate regimes with a variety of revolutionary zeal. Unfortunately for their neighbors, revolutionary regimes generally tend to display warlike behavior in the immediate years after taking power. 5 Even if the weak democratic elements in the Arab world, despite all odds, succeed in generating a democratization process, this would still pose dangers for its neighbors. While a democratization process is laudable, historical records suggest that states in transition to a stable democracy are more war-prone than autocratic regimes. 6 Neither Islamic revolutionary regimes nor fledgling democracies fare well for regional stability. So far, much of the old dictatorial order has survived, but its stability has been undermined and the nature of any successor regimes is uncertain. The audacious demonstrations of the Arab masses against tyranny in a quest for more responsive governments challenge the current political order. The potential for further deterioration in the region and the risk of additional states being torn by turmoil and civil war and sliding into failed state status has increased significantly. Such political entities are characterized by the absence of a monopoly over the use of force; delivery of very limited justice; inability to sustain a legal and regulatory climate conducive to private enterprise, open trade, and foreign investment; and difficulty in meeting the basic needs of the population in terms of health, education, and other social services. 7 The harbingers of such a scenario are Libya and Yemen. The possible disintegration of Iraq and Syria, two very different cases, is also not a far-fetched scenario. Inevitably, the ruling governments in the Arab world will be busy parrying increased domestic challenges in the near future. The unrest in the Arab world, its growing Islamization, and the greater potential for its fragmentation testify to the socio-political crisis and decline in the region a growing trend. At the same time, the foreign policy of these states has introduced much uncertainty, complicating the strategic calculus of policy makers. 3

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES The Regional Balance of Power The upheavals in the Arab world accentuate another regional trend the rise of non-arab Middle East powers Iran, Israel and Turkey at the expense of the Arab states. 8 The further weakening of the Arab states will have a meaningful impact on the regional balance of power. The most important Arab states, Egypt, Iraq and Syria, face serious domestic challenges. While Saudi Arabia and Jordan seem to have weathered the crisis, they definitely have to pay greater attention to their domestic arenas. With the exception of Bahrain, whose destabilization required Saudi military intervention, the rest of the Arab Gulf monarchic regimes appear to display greater political resilience than their republican sisters. 9 Nonetheless, the need to focus on domestic problems will reduce the ability of all Arab states to build national power, project power beyond their borders, and combat the Iranian and/or Turkish regional influence. The Islamic Republic of Iran regarded what occurred in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya as pure and virtuous revolutions inspired by Imam Khomeini. 10 Tehran and Ankara, both of whom are aligned with radical Islamist forces, have welcomed the Arab Spring, particularly the anti-mubarak demonstrations designed to topple the military-based regime. 11 Historically, Egypt was perceived as a regional rival to the Turks and Persians. An Egypt beleaguered with domestic problems has little energy to focus on countering Iran s and Turkey s aspirations and influence. Both vie for regional primacy and are interested in gaining popularity in the Arab world, in which Egypt occupies a prominent role. Moreover, growing influence by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt suits the ideological inclinations of Iran s and Turkey s rulers. Indeed, the new Egypt has taken steps toward rapprochement with Iran. At the same time, the United States exit from Iraq opens the door for Iran, as well as for Turkey, to meddle in the affairs of another important Arab state, albeit a weakened one, in order to gain greater regional power. Turkey also actively supports the Sunni Islamist opposition to the Alawite regime in Syria, 12 whose fall would be quite a blow to Iran. The instability in Syria has focused attention on the historic Turkish- Persian rivalry in the region, signaling once more the dilution of Arab 4

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY power and decreased Western influence. Even if Syria remains a source of conflict between Iran and Turkey, these two countries still cooperate on many levels, including energy transactions, opposing Kurdish nationalism, dividing spheres of influence in Iraq, and aiding Muslim Brotherhood elements in the Arab world. They also share a preference for an inactive US. The decline in the relative power of Egypt enhances the leadership role of Saudi Arabia as the only Arab state with the ability to somewhat contain Iranian and Turkish influence. Not surprisingly, the balancing game is complex. A Saudi-Turkish alliance has formed to try to end Assad s rule in Syria, an Iranian ally. The successful Saudi intervention to protect the Sunni regime in Bahrain is another example of curtailing Iranian influence. In this role, Saudi Arabia has become a tacit ally of Israel. Indeed, democratic and politically stable Israel is also a rising non- Arab power and a player in the regional balance of power. The power differential between Israel's national might and its neighbors has further increased as it manages to prosper economically and to develop a high-tech military. 13 Israel is a de facto American ally whose fortunes are linked to perceived US status in global and regional affairs. As Cairo and Ankara dilute their pro-american orientation and cool their relations with Jerusalem, the once favorable regional balance of power, from Israel s perspective, is deteriorating. Finally, the key factor in the regional balance of power is the prospect of Iran becoming a nuclear power. This would be a game changer, affecting the destiny of the region. THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN CLOUT In 2011, developments in the Middle East underscored the further erosion of the US position in the region. This is partly due to the Obama administration's deliberate, multilateral retrenchment designed to curtail the United States overseas commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift burdens onto global partners. 14 It is also partly due to its confused, contradictory, and inconsistent responses to the unfolding events in the Middle East. First, there was 5

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES a quick demand to oust then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, an action unequivocally viewed in the region as betrayal of a loyal friend and ally. 15 Then, the American criticism of Saudi Arabia s military intervention in support of the Sunni ruling Al-Khalifa family in Bahrain (March 2011) raised eyebrows in Arab capitals. 16 Similarly, many in the Middle East were puzzled by Washington s slow response to Gaddafi s domestic troubles, leaving the initiative for his removal to its West European allies. The desertion of the eccentric Gaddafi, who in final analysis had cooperated with the West by giving up his arsenal of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in 2003, was a surprise. Washington failed to grasp that the lesson learned by Middle East leaders from the American attitude toward Libya is that it is better to stick with the WMD programs, as exemplified by North Korea and Iran, in order to prevent a Western military intervention. In contrast, the brutal suppression of the local opposition by the anti-american regimes in Iran and Damascus elicited only mild and very late expressions of criticism from the Obama administration. The American decision in July 2011 to facilitate a dialogue with the anti-western Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt further eroded the credibility of the US as an astute political player and credible ally. While there are voices in the West denying any enmity between the Muslim Brotherhood and the US, there is no doubt that the leadership of such Islamist movements throughout the Middle East sees America as a bitter enemy. In the Middle East, leaders have witnessed America's retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan, its engagement (or appeasement, in Middle Eastern eyes) of US enemies Iran and Syria, and the desertion of friendly rulers. This strengthens the general perception of a weak and confused American foreign policy. 17 Moreover, American military power is extremely stretched and increasingly constrained in terms of budget. Finally, the empowerment of the mobs in the Middle East inevitably strengthens anti-american elements. America and its ally, Israel, are the favored scapegoats in the Middle East, reflecting deep-rooted anti-western attitudes by frustrated multitudes that yearn for the long-gone Muslim Golden Age. 18 Israelis wonder whether America is capable of exercising sound strategic judgment and standing by its allies. The animosity displayed by the Obama administration toward the 6

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY Netanyahu government only reinforces the bewilderment about American Middle East policy. Thus, the growing consensus in the region among America s friends and foes is Obama does not get it. The immediate impact of the US in the region has declined due to its confused and hesitant responses to the turmoil in various countries and to the apparent irrelevance of the US to the complex domestic processes underway. But this may be transitory. The Arab countries that are angry with America, such as Saudi Arabia, will continue to depend on the US in more ways than one, while countries that are trying to introduce change, such as Egypt, will require outside assistance and support; and few powers apart from the US are wellsuited to offer it. Finally, potential change in the White House following the November 2012 American elections leaves open the possibility of reinstalled confidence in the US. THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL From an Israeli perspective, the current Middle East trends are hardly positive. 19 Indeed, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has frequently expressed his apprehensions about the direction of the Arab Spring. 20 Despite its economic and military strength, Israel remains a small state with limited resources and diplomatic leverage to shape its environment. It cannot attain what Arnold Wolfers once called milieu objectives. 21 Moreover, as a status quo power, it has displayed little desire to play any leading role in regional affairs. While ending the conflict with the Arab world has been a permanent feature of Israel s foreign policy, integration within the Middle East was never an appealing objective. Israel carries some weight in the international politics of the region; however, mainly it must adjust to rather than try to shape regional and global developments. Israel, then, must focus on emerging threats and prepare adequate responses. Strategic Surprises Over the years Israel has built a large and sophisticated intelligence apparatus. Nonetheless, the unrest in the Middle East came as a surprise. Israeli officials had speculated in recent years that the forthcoming succession of an aging Mubarak could turn Egypt into an 7

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES Iran next door. But this conjecture was quashed by the predictions of Israeli intelligence analysts and academic experts for a smooth transfer of power. Similarly, Israel failed to gauge the strength of the opposition in Syria. This is a stark reminder of the potential for rapid change and political uncertainty in the Middle East. Strategic surprises, as improbable as they are, still can happen. Consequently, it is always necessary to prepare for a variety of scenarios, particularly the worst-case ones. Furthermore, Israel must take greater care when considering improbable but gravely threatening situations. 22 Regional Isolation As the Arab world looks less receptive to peace overtures, Israel must prepare for greater regional isolation. The growing power of Islamist circles and the deteriorating status of the US in the Middle East negatively affect the historic peace process between Israel and its neighboring states. 23 This process, characterized by a reluctant acceptance of Israel as a fait accompli in the region, was primarily the result of the gradual realization that Israel could not be eradicated by force due to its strength and that of its American ally. 24 Another factor which helped bring Arab actors to the negotiating table was the vital diplomatic role played by the US in narrowing party differences and endeavoring to reduce Israeli anxieties over taking risks for peace. The Obama administration is less able than its predecessors to induce Arab states to sign peace treaties with Israel and is less credible in attempts to compensate Jerusalem for concessions that entail security risks. Its financial incentives for the Jewish state are also more limited. Nowadays, the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan are under great strain as anti-israel domestic forces, particularly the Islamists, become more influential and vocal. 25 The Egyptian military, still in control of the country, has announced its support for keeping Egypt s international commitments. But even if the vector of Egyptian politics does not change dramatically in the near future, the current regime is weaker than the previous one and, in all likelihood, does not wish to be burdened with the Israeli relationship. The cold peace might, therefore, become even chillier. Similarly, Jordan might prefer to 8

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY keep Israel at arm s length so as not to expose itself to criticism by radical opponents. The current impasse in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians complicates the situation. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been in disarray since Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007, deeply splitting the Palestinian national movement. In response to increasing regional Islamist influence, the PA leadership in the West Bank signed a reconciliation pact with Hamas in May 2011 designed to mend ties between the two factions. While its implementation has been delayed due to fundamental differences, a stronger Hamas role in Palestinian politics makes the slim chances for bridging the Israeli-Palestinian divide even more remote. 26 The PA has actually defied American calls to return to the negotiating table, opting instead for unilateral action. Similarly, the political volatility in Syria disqualifies it from being a peace partner whose commitments can be taken seriously. Non-radical states in the Arab world are likely to relegate the pragmatic cooperation with Israel to back channels or to minimize their interactions with the Jewish state. The weaker Arab states are becoming more vulnerable to radical penetration from Iran and to domestic Islamist forces that are opposed to rapprochement with Israel. For example, the new Tunisian government, in which the Islamists play a major role, is gearing up to ratify a new constitution that includes a section condemning Zionism and ruling out any friendly ties with Israel. The Islamists' recent success in the region, coupled with US' perceived departure, further encourage the radical forces and validate their anti-american policies. In pro-western states, as US support is seen to be unreliable, rulers will begin distancing themselves from the US and its ally, Israel. Since the new Middle East is not conducive to peacemaking, the peace process has seemingly frozen. The international community, nonetheless, expects progress in the peace negotiations and many blame the current impasse on Israel's reluctance to pursue peace vigorously. This is detrimental to Israel, undermining its position as a strategic Western asset in a turbulent region. 9

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES Furthermore, the rising non-arab powers in the Middle East, Iran and Turkey, are unfriendly toward Israel. Domestic changes, beyond Israel s control, have led to the foreign policy reorientation of these regional powers that were once Israel s allies. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran heralded the rise of an anti-israeli militant theocracy. In Turkey, the entrenchment of the Islamist AKP, after successive electoral victories (2002, 2007 and 2011), moved this pivotal state into the anti-israel camp. Both instances indicate further regional isolation for Israel. Erosion in Israel s Deterrence America's decline in world affairs, particularly in Middle East politics, may be temporary; yet, it has an immediate impact on the region. 27 US weakness negatively affects Israel s deterrence capability, which is not simply limited to its military power and capacity to win conventional wars and low-intensity conflicts. The perceived closeness of Israel to America, and the expectation that the US will come to Israel's aid if needed, is an equally important component of deterrence. The Obama administration, however, has disappointed some of its Middle East allies, and its friendship with Israel is no longer self-evident. As a result, Israel cannot necessarily rely on Washington s diplomatic, economic, or military support in the event that it is attacked. Furthermore, Israeli use of force as a preventive or preemptive move could exacerbate the strained Jerusalem-Washington relationship a pillar of Israel s national security. Such considerations are not new, but they are nowadays more relevant than in the past as Israel considers military action against Hamas, Hizballah and Iran. Israel could find some consolation in the fact that the Middle East crisis proves once again that it is America's most reliable strategic ally in the region. In the future, it is likely that US planes will be able to land safely in the Middle East only in Israel. Similarly, only Israeli ports will be dependable for American contingency planning in the eastern Mediterranean. This does not mean that US declarations of commitment to Israel s security are fully credible. However, Israel has no alternative to its 01

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY alliance with the US, as its hegemonic status in world affairs is unlikely to change in the next 20 years, at least. Therefore, in the coming few years particularly if Obama is re-elected in November 2012 Israel must exercise caution vis-à-vis Washington. Growing Security Risks The Arab world is comprised of many weak states that are too busy handling domestic affairs to invest in assembling a military coalition against Israel or in building a modern conventional military force capable of rivaling the Jewish state. In fact, the military, economic, and technological gap between Israel and its neighbors has widened over the years, making a large-scale conventional attack increasingly unlikely even if Jordan and/or Egypt were to abandon their peace treaties with Israel. Nonetheless, there remains a threat of other forms of military aggression against Israel at the unconventional level, particularly due to Israel's weakening deterrence capability. Unstable or failed states, characterized by their complex and decentralized decision making processes, are less deterrable than states with strong, centralized political control. 28 Consequently, the regional crisis augments Israel's potential military challenges. This can happen particularly if the new leaders are strongly motivated by hatred toward Israel, are inexperienced, or miscalculate their steps. Moreover, neighboring Arab leaders may decide to divert the attention of their populace from domestic problems by starting a war of attrition with Israel or by initiating terror attacks. For example, in the past, Syria s Assad has, under duress, organized civilian marches on Israel s borders. In addition, the domestic problems plaguing weakened Arab states make them more terror prone. As leaders lose their grip over state territory and borders become more porous, armed groups and terrorists gain greater freedom of action. Such problems plague post- Mubarak Egypt, where law and order have become more lax. For example, in the Sinai Peninsula on Israel s border, a pipeline supplying Israel (and Jordan) with Egyptian natural gas has been repeatedly sabotaged. Sinai has also turned into an unimpeded route for Iranian weapons supply to Hamas and a base for terrorist attacks 00

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES against Israel. Hamas has even set up rocket production lines in Sinai in an effort to protect its assets, as the group believes that Israel won't strike targets inside Egypt due to the affect it would have on bilateral relations. 29 Furthermore, as weakened states lose control over their security apparatus, national arsenals of conventional (and non-conventional) arms become more vulnerable, which may result in the emergence of increasingly well-armed politically dissatisfied groups who seek to harm Israel. For example, following the fall of Gaddafi, Libyan SA-7 anti-air missiles and anti-tank RPGs seem to have reached Hamas in Gaza. 30 Similarly, in the event that the Syrian regime collapses, Syria s advanced arsenal, including chemical weapons, shore-to-ship missiles, air defense systems, and ballistic missiles of all types could end up in the hands of Hizballah or other radical elements. 31 The domestic dynamics of certain unstable countries are of course more consequential due to their strategic significance or politicocultural resonance in the region. For example, Egypt, the strongest and most populous Arab state, plays a pivotal role in Middle East politics. The praetorian, pro-western Egyptian regime sacrificed Hosni Mubarak, promised elections and reform, and formed an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, the only well-organized political force outside the ruling government. It remains to be seen how well the Egyptian generals can control the Brotherhood's ascendance. The prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its seemingly great international acceptance will bolster the cause of the radical Islamists all over. An Islamist takeover of Egypt would create a strategic earthquake, strengthening the radical axis in the Middle East and possibly reviving an Arab military coalition against Israel. Israel s fears center around the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty a main pillar of Israel's national security. Egypt's defection from the Arab military coalition removed the strongest military component from Israel s list of enemies, thereby dramatically improving Israel's strategic situation. Moreover, the peace with Egypt has prevented the Arabs from launching a two-front war against Israel, thus allowing 02

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY significant cuts in Israel s defense expenditures. The demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula further stabilized the strategic Egyptian-Israeli relation by denying the two sides the option of surprise attacks. The demilitarization arrangements, often seen in Egypt as an infringement on its sovereignty, might now be violated, signaling a significant change in Egyptian foreign policy. Such violations would elicit a heightened threat perception in Israel and might be considered a casus belli. The erosion of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai, which borders Israel and the Gaza Strip, has enabled Hamas to enhance its military capabilities and freedom of action. Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that regards Israel as a religious aberration and is committed to its eradication, encouraged by the developments in Egypt, might adopt a more aggressive posture toward the Jewish state. The Islamists in Egypt are not averse to this. In fact, the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo already led Egypt to lift restrictions on traffic in and out of Gaza, easing the Israeli blockade. This strengthens Hamas grip on Gaza and on radical Islamic elements within the Palestinian national movement. The political vacuum in Sinai creates several new security challenges for Israel along the southwestern border. The area could become a haven for terrorists, as has occurred in parts of Lebanon, or a base for pirates, as in Somalia. It has already turned into a highway for weapons smuggling to Hamas. Managing the situation requires a larger military presence in the area facing Sinai. Under duress, Israel might even be forced to recapture parts of Sinai. As relations with Egypt have become somewhat uncertain, Jerusalem is closely monitoring developments with Jordan, which signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. 32 While Israel regards Jordan as its "strategic depth," or buffer zone between it and potential enemy lines to the east, the Jordanian elite see Israel as an insurance policy against invasions from its neighbors. So far, King Abdullah has successfully ridden the Middle East storm with minimal damage to his rule or to relations with Israel. However, even here the opposition is rising, and if Iraq or Syria fell to Muslim radicals, the pressure on the Hashemite dynasty would grow. Jordan s fall would plant hostile forces along 03

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES Israel s longest border and the one closest to its heartland the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem-Haifa triangle, which holds most of Israel s population and economic infrastructure. Syria, on Israel s northern border, is also in turmoil (at the time of writing) and it remains unclear whether the Alawite regime will survive or be replaced by a new Sunni leadership. In summer 2011, Assad tried to ignite a diversionary war against Israel. This was a warning signal for Israel to prepare for the future possibility of hostilities along the now quiet Golan border, whether initiated by Assad or his successor. Regional events have detracted attention from the Palestinian issue, particularly since the uprisings have largely ignored the Palestinians. The PA's ability to harm Israel in order to reignite international interest is very limited, and the renewal of a terror campaign against the Jewish state could be very costly to the Palestinians. Yet, the weak and illegitimate PA has come under increasing pressure from the powerful and popular Hamas. A Palestinian strategic miscalculation, leading to the eruption of another round of violence, is a possibility that Israel cannot ignore. Jerusalem must continue closely monitoring the threats posed by its adjacent and more distant neighbors. The recent political turmoil has generally weakened the Arab states, giving Iran greater opportunity to extend its reach. Moreover, America's strategic fatigue and its ideological inclination to shed overseas responsibilities have left an opening for its Middle East rivals, China and Russia not a welcome scenario by Israel. Thus, the regional unrest is a warning bell for Israel to better prepare its defenses in case the situation worsens. Threats to the Sea Lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean The turmoil in the Arab world is changing the strategic landscape around Israel, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean basin, where elements of radical Islam could gain control. In this region, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey display Islamist tendencies, threatening the current unrestricted access to this area by Israel and the West. About 90 percent of Israel s foreign trade is carried out via 04

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY the Mediterranean, making freedom of navigation critical for Israel s economic well-being. Moreover, its chances of becoming energy independent and a significant exporter of gas are linked to Israel s ability to secure free passage for its maritime trade and to defend its newly discovered hydrocarbon fields, Leviathan and Tamar. In Tunisia, the Islamists won the November 2011 elections. In Libya, evolving political events after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi indicate that radical Islamic elements will play a greater role in the future of the country. If the transition to a new regime descends into civil war, the ensuing chaos may allow greater freedom of action for Muslim extremists from the shores of this Mediterranean country. Libya s eastern neighbor, Egypt, is still ruled by the military, but the November 2011 elections catapulted the Islamist parties into a dominant position in the emerging Egyptian political system. Apart from having important ports on the Mediterranean, Egypt also controls the Suez Canal, a critical passageway linking Europe to the Persian Gulf and the Far East that could fall into the hands of the Islamists. Significantly, Egypt has already opened the Suez Canal to Iranian military vessels (February 2011). Access to the waterway enhances the ability of radical Iran to supply its Mediterranean allies, Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza. Moreover, it enhances Iran's access to Muslim Balkan states, namely Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo, increasing its influence in that part of the Mediterranean as well. Even if the Egyptian military is able to curtail the Islamist forces at home, its grip over the Sinai Peninsula is a different issue. As noted, the tenuous control of Egypt over Sinai has further weakened since the fall of the Mubarak regime. This could lead to the Somalization of Sinai, negatively affecting the safety of naval trade along the Mediterranean, the approaches to the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea. At the same time, nearby Gaza is currently controlled by Hamas, a radical Islamist organization allied with Iran. Israel's enforced naval blockade on Gaza has increasingly been criticized by the international community. Considering the recent political changes in Egypt and their detrimental impact on Egyptian-Israeli relations, containment of 05

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES the Islamist threat from Gaza will become even more challenging in the near future. North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits Lebanon, a state dominated by radical Shiite Hizballah, whose ports are inhospitable from a Western perspective. Hizballah has already laid claim to some of the huge Israeli-found gas fields in the sea, which could diminish Europe s energy dependence on Russia and Turkey. Moreover, Syria, an enemy of Israel and current ally of Iran, exerts considerable influence in Lebanon. Its Mediterranean shores, north of Lebanon, are also hostile to the West and its ports even supply services to the Russian navy. While the Assad regime in Syria faces great domestic opposition and may fall, any Syrian successor regime could be Islamist and anti-western as well. The next state on the eastern Mediterranean coastline is AKP-ruled Turkey. The country has, over the past few years, shifted away from a pro-western foreign policy, adopting instead a radical foreign policy stance. The Turkish government supports Hamas and Hizballah, opposes sanctions on Iran, and holds a strident anti-israel position, which reflects the AKP's Islamic coloration. Moreover, Turkey has displayed huge ambitions for leadership in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the eastern Mediterranean. A combination of Turkish nationalism, neo-ottoman nostalgia and Islamic-jihadist impulses has pushed Turkey into an aggressive posture on several regional issues. It has, for instance, flexed its naval muscles by threatening Israel that it will escort flotillas trying to break the blockade on Gaza. Turkey has also threatened Cyprus regarding its desire to acquire a share of the potential energy riches south of the island. Turkey is interested in gaining control or partial ownership over the maritime gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean as this would help fulfill its ambitions to serve as an energy bridge to the West, thereby creating dependence on it. This puts Ankara at loggerheads with Nicosia and Jerusalem who share an interest in developing the hydrocarbon fields in their exclusive economic zones and exporting gas to energy-thirsty Europe. The conflict of interests might lead Turkish troops, stationed in the northern part of divided Cyprus, to complete the conquest of 06

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY the island started in 1974. Such a Turkish takeover would not only hurt Western geo-economic interests, but would constitute a significant Western loss of the strategically situated island. The Cypriot island served as a bone of contention in the past between Persia and the ancient Greeks and between the Ottomans and Venetians. In short, it represents the struggle between East and West. West of Turkey is Greece, a democratic Western state with a stake in the protection of the Cypriots from Muslim domination. Its current economic crisis, however, might erode its limited military ability to parry the Turkish challenge alone. With the exception of Israel, all other eastern Mediterranean states would likely favor the return of Cyprus to Muslim rule and the ascendancy of Islam in the eastern Mediterranean. Western influence in the eastern Mediterranean is being challenged by the growing radical Islamic influence in the region. The access of Iran to Mediterranean waters, the disruptive potential of failed states, and the competition between countries for energy resources is destabilizing the region. But it is not clear that Western powers, particularly the US, are aware of the possibility of losing the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea to radical Islam or are preparing in any way to forestall such a scenario. Foolishly, they seem to believe that the so-called Arab Spring heralds an improved political environment and that Turkey represents moderate Islam. Such American naiveté and European gullibility could become extremely costly in strategic terms. The Iranian Nuclear Challenge The upheaval in the Arab world has deflected attention from the realization of Israel s most feared scenario a nuclear Iran. Moreover, the Middle East turmoil has played into the Iranian strategy to simply buy time in order to present the world a nuclear fait accompli. In the meantime, Iran assiduously continues to work on its nuclear project, hardly impressed by economic sanctions and diplomatic displeasure. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency published a report (November 2011) voicing its concern over Iranian activities that do not easily fit with those of a civilian program. 33 07

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES Israel is very concerned about the ineffective international response to Iran's nuclear progress. This global passivity seems either to indicate an inadequate understanding of the far-reaching implications 34 or a lack of political will to tackle a difficult strategic problem. A nuclear Iran would generate further efforts of nuclear proliferation in the region as states such as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would hardly resist the rationale for adopting similar nuclear postures, thereby turning a multi-polar nuclear Middle East into a strategic nightmare. Iranian nuclear attainment would strengthen its hegemony in the strategic energy sector by its mere location along the oil-rich Arabian Gulf and the Caspian Basin the "energy ellipse." 35 A nuclear Iran would also result in the West's loss of the Central Asian states, which will either gravitate toward Iran or try to secure a nuclear umbrella with Russia or China, countries much closer to the region. An emboldened Tehran, after nuclearization, will also become more active in supporting radical Shiite elements in Iraq and agitating those communities in the Arabian Gulf states. Moreover, since Tehran is a central backer of terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it may be reckless enough to transfer several nuclear bombs to such proxy organizations, which will have no moral constraints on detonating a nuclear device in a European or American harbor. Iran's nuclear program coupled with further improvements in Iranian missiles would initially put most European capitals, and eventually North American, within range of a potential Iranian attack. The Obama administration seems reluctant to orchestrate crippling sanctions on Iran or to use force in order to stop it. Jerusalem realizes that the time to decide whether to preempt against key Iranian nuclear installations or live with a nuclear Iran is getting closer. Israel s inclination to remove the threat of a potential nuclear enemy is going to be tested. Indeed, during the summer and fall of 2011, there was an unprecedented flurry of statements by Israeli officials and former officials on whether an attack on Iranian nuclear installations would be necessary or wise. 36 ISRAELI RESPONSES Jerusalem realizes that the demonstrating crowds in the Arab streets are not likely to be effective agents of democratization and that the 08

ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY popular sentiment in the Arab world is largely anti-western and of course anti-israel. While Israel would welcome peace-loving, democratic neighbors, its strategic assessments must be based on a worst-case scenario. After all, conflict and bloodshed have been a historical constant in the region. Understanding that its survival is largely dependent upon its national power, Israel has cultivated over the years a remarkable military machine. As a result, the last largescale war fought by Israel was in 1973. Since then, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has been preoccupied with small wars and non-state actors. Yet, the changing strategic environment dictates more caution and the need to meet a variety of threats. Maj. Gen. Eyal Eisenberg, head of the Home Front Command, has warned that developments in the Arab world increase the probability of an all-out regional war. 37 While a multi-front ground war is still of low probability, it cannot be ignored. As Israel s strategic environment becomes more hostile, the expansion of the IDF and the updating of its war-fighting scenarios is a necessity. A Larger Defense Budget Israel has little choice but to increase its defense outlays in order to meet future challenges, as outlined above. Israel must invest in building a stronger force that is able to deal with a variety of contingencies, including large-scale war. Israel needs a larger standing army, particularly ground and naval forces. Since force building is a lengthy process, appropriate decisions on force size and structure, as well as budget allocations, must be made as soon as possible. Several additional areas requiring special attention include missile defense and research and development (R&D). The southern border, which was quiet for a very long period of time, once required only limited Israeli military presence. However, the potential changes in Egypt, as well as in Syria, require the stationing of larger forces on these borders. Moreover, the uncertainty over the future of Egypt, Syria and Jordan arouses a worst-case scenario assessment, which involves simultaneous military challenges of different kinds on all of Israel s borders. 09

MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES The IDF has already deployed better quality troops to the Egyptian and Syrian border areas. The tensions along the Egypt-Israel demarcation line have also necessitated organizational changes, such as establishing a new regional brigade next to Eilat. 38 Israel has to beef up its military presence along this border. A new division must be deployed in Israel s south in order to deal with Egyptian contingencies as well as face the growing challenges stemming from Gaza. Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Ganz has stated the need for large-scale intervention in Gaza. 39 A larger Israeli navy, responsible for hosting strategic systems, has become increasingly important as Israeli territory, with its air force bases and deployment areas, becomes more vulnerable to missile attacks. This need, however, has not become a budgetary priority. The modernization and expansion of the surface fleet (excluding submarines) was neglected for some time and navy procurement plans were not accommodated this must be quickly rectified. The political dynamics in the states on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean, reviewed in the previous section, demonstrate the growing threats to the sea lanes traversing this region as well as to the new gas discoveries. The need to protect these waterways further necessitates the upgrade and expansion of Israel s surface navy. Furthermore, dealing with missiles of a variety of ranges has been on the national security agenda for at least two decades. Budgetary constraints, anti-defense prejudices and strategic shortsightedness have slowed the development and adequate deployment of a multilayered missile defense system. This situation needs to be remedied as the motivation of radical forces to attack Israel grows the entire Israeli Home Front might come under intense rocket and missile assault in any future conflict with Iran's proxies, Hamas and Hizballah. To this end, the IDF has requested roughly $4 billion from the treasury over the next five years to complete its missile defense program. 40 Meeting the missile challenge also requires improving passive protection and active defense. Passive protection includes the construction of shelters and fortified rooms in homes, and the 21