THE ID SHIELD SOLUTION FOR THE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS CONTROL Version 4.1

2015 THE ID SHIELD SOLUTION FOR THE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS CONTROL Version 4.1 ID SHIELD Hôtel d entreprises Albi-Innoprod 8 avenue Pierre-Gilles de Gennes 81000 ALBI Contact : Raphaël ROCHER raphael.rocher@idshield.fr +33(0)6 83 34 16 66

Part 1 : Hardware The proposed equipment includes : - 1 PC laptop semi-rugged Panasonic model CF 54 MK2 based on an I 5 processor, 8 Gb of RAM and 400 Gb of space on the hard disk. - 1 ARH documents scanner 960 dpi (Made in Hungary). This resolution allows to observe perfectly the IPI security (Invisible Personal Information). Peripheral devices : - 1 microscope-camera (2 Millions pixels, magnifier : x 200). - 1 camera and his support for the facial recognition. - 1 fingerprint reader for the FP recognition. - 1 mouse - 1 4G key for the telecommunications through Internet (SIM Card not supplied). WIFI Access is also possible. The Cognitec software licence can be provided although no camera is used. Just to better observe the visage on the photos. Cognitec is the world leader of the facial recognition. Solidity The first required feature is the solidity. The computer can fall down from 76 cm without being damaged. ID SHIELD has based its software development on the ARH Scanner. This equipment is extremely solid. We do not have noticed any scanner breakdown since 3 years in the suitcases installed in Western Africa and South America. Autonomy The equipment can work connected on electricity but also with Lithium Batteries. In this configuration, it has a real autonomy of 8 hours. 2 batteries are usually provided. The laptop has an autonomy of 8 hours. The new model of Panasonic laptop (CF 54) can have in option a second 1

battery so that more than 10 hours of autonomy are possible. Consequently, we can control the passengers at places without electricity and also on the gateway for passengers in transit. Service continuity For Service continuity reasons and considering the experience we have since many years, we add to the basic equipment : - 1 additional loader for the lithium batteries (total : 2 loaders), - 1 additional battery (total 3 batteries). The complete equipment is integrated in a suitcase with foam. This foam is specifically cut on measure. 2 wheels help the transfer of the equipment. The weight of the suitcase is roughly 12 kg. The micro-computer and the lithium batteries must be loaded at the end of the control during the night. The data must be downloaded on the external hard disk 2 Tb which is also supplied. Part 2 : The ID SHIELD Control Program ID SHIELD has developed a program to control the following documents : - Passports ( except the documents without MRZ track), - European Residence permits, - European ID cards, - Schengen Visas : France and other Schengen States. - French driving licences. The logic of the ID SHIELD controls is based on the programmation of all what is realizable. The crossing of all controls allows a kind of net in which a false document is rapidly trapped. Furthermore, the security features of the documents must be controllable. If they exist, they will be indicated and verified. If the controller does not find them, the document will be seriously questioned. 2

SUMMARY OF THE RELEASE 4.1 I. The MRZ control 1. Number of characters per line, 2. ICAO Check digits, 3. Personal Number check digit, 4. OCRB Characters chart and measures allowances, 5. Fillers, 6. Passport Number Format, 7. Dates format, 8. Expiry dates of a document, 9. Check of the States Code, 10. Verification through Internet of a document number or of the Identity of the document holder, (online), 11. Blank Stolen documents (ID SHIELD private database), 12. Difference between the information of the same doc read under visible light and IR light. 13. VIZMRZ : Data in VIZ and Data in MRZ comparison. 14. Non opening of the chip II. The control of the personal data page A. Controls which are common to all travel documents 1. The paper : the UV reaction. 2. The IR reaction. 3. The watermark. 4. The «Inkjet» background. 5. The rounded corner of the document. B. The controls of the presence of certain security features C. Known mistakes D. Securisation of the photo with the IPI process 1. Optically Variable Ink, 2. Micro-prints, 3. Tactile securities, 4. Physical securities, 5. The chromotrope ink (Fluorescent ink), 6. The laser perforations (Destriperf). 7. Delachrome effect. 3

III. The control of the RFID chip A. The chip has been destroyed. B. Chip authentication : Is the chip the first original chip? C. The verification of the signature of the data by the issuing State : have the data been modified? D. Are the data listed in the EF.COM file all present? (Index of all Data Groups). EF.SOD : hashes of all DG signed by the Issuing State. E. The Certificate used by the Issuing state : is it valid and non revoked? IV. The data contained in the chip A. The different methods to open the chip B. Information contained in the chip C. Use of this information. V. The identification of the traveler A. The comparison of the visages comparison. B. The Faces comparison (ARH). C. The facial recognition (Cognitec). D. The fingerprints recognition (Greenbit). E. The detection of emotion (2016). VI. The controls of the traveler regarding his destination and his nationality A. Requirement for a VISA/ATV (Airport Transit Visa) B. The calculation of the time spent in the Schengen Space (EU Regulation 610/2013) and the rule of the 90 days / 180 days. C. The travel within airports belonging to the Schengen Space (VISA C requirement). D. Period of time remaining after the return of the traveller to his State. VII. The assistance to the documentary controllers A. The Mail function. B. Skype : free phone on Internet C. Teamviewer : free remote control software D. Consequences on the controls organisation. VIII. Storage server IX. Software Maintenance 4

INTRODUCTION : The legal context and the obligations of the airlines A. The legal texts Item 3.33 of the annex 9 of the Chicago Convention (7 December 1944) Schengen agreement. 19 june 1990. Item 26. Transports French Code. Item L 6421-2 French CESEDA Item L 625-1 French Law project 23 July 2014. Item 28 The passengers must have all the required documents for the transit and destination points of his travel. Idem Idem Idem. Indicates that an obvious error in the documents leads to a fine. This error is something that can be detected by an agent of the airline through a normal careful examination. Increase in the fine amount. B. The fraud observed by the airlines - The document (Passport, ID Card, Residence Permit, Schengen Visa) has been entirely manufactured or made from other true documents or with a blank stolen document. - The personal data page has been entirely replaced. - The personal data page has been modified. - The document is produced by a holder who should not be the holder (ID theft, look alikes) - The periods of time are not respected : expired document, time remaining after the passenger return, arrival before the period of validity of the visa - Inland transport within the Schengen space : a C visa is required. The airlines are responsible for all of these reasons. But they are not responsible for : - The duration of the stay inside the Schengen space : 90 days out of 180 days, - The living means of the traveler. - The residence at destination. 5

C. Controls performed by the airlines 14 MRZ Logical Controls 8 Physical controls Nbr of characters/line ICAO Check digit National check digit OCRB character chart Dimensional allowances Fillers Passport Number format Expiration date Country code Internet assistance Blank Stolen figure Between 2 lights comparison Non opening of the chip Comparison between VIZ and MRZ 2 Biometric controls (chip and data) S O F T W A R E Fiduciary paper B 900 Ink Watermark Inkjet background Document Round corners Presence of securities : OVI Micro-prints Perforations Tactile securities Chromotrope Ink Delachrome effect Mistakes IPI Traveller s Identification Situation of the traveller Assistance to the doc control : VGP, Mail Skype and Teamviewer Visual controls D. Controls for which the airline is not responsible - Duration of the stay within the Schengen Space, - Means of living. - Residence at destination. I. The MRZ track control The MRZ is the first element that permits to identify the document to control. A. Scope of the controls 1 / Number of characters per line The non-respect of the number of characters per line is a major error. It is also very tedious to be obliged to count each line in order to check if there are 30, 36 or 44 characters per line of an ID1, ID2 or ID3 document. 6

2 / ICAO check digit (according to the 9303 standard) The calculation of this check sum is applied to the document number, to the birth date, to the expiry date and to the whole track (composite check digit). In green : the check digit is validated by the program. In red: the check digit not validated by the program. 3 / The national check digit in the personal number The States can integrate in the free area of the MRZ (end of the second line) a personal number (Most often, it is the number of the ID Card). A check digit can also exist. If it is the case, ID SHIELD controls this number and its check digit (Around 45 checksums have been decoded). The calculation is not at all the same as the ICAO check digit control. On the contrary, these check digits are based on the Luhn Algoritm, the Modulus 11 or another method. These methods are most of time not published. The control is done by the program without the intervention of the user. Some check digits are remained unknown (Pakistan for example). Example : ISRAEL Personal Number : Israeli Passport. MRZ track «8» is the national checksum. We recalculate this digit in using the algorithm used by this State (Here : Luhn). ID SHIELD checks also the internal structure of these personal numbers. If an O is displayed, the program will transform the letter O into a zero. 4 / The OCRB character chart and the dimensional allowances The OCRB character chart is compulsory. The ID Shield Program checks that this chart is respected. 7

So ID SHIELD checks the dimensions defined by the standard (height of the characters, space between the characters, space between the lines, disposition of the lines with regard to the 2 edges of the document). The non-respect of this makes the difference between an industrial document and an home made document. 90% of the photocopies create this error. However, this control is not applied to the Schengen VISA : it has appeared that these documents were printed with the means of the consulate when it creates the VISA. 8

Example : True MRZ track of a Schengen Visa delivered by Italy and unfortunately nothing is conform Other example : 5 / The fillers (<) Portuguese Visa delivered at Dakar. Not conform but true Called Fillers, their position in the MRZ track respects specific rules (9303 Standard). We will regret that some documents do not respect them at all. This could also indicate that it is an homemade document. Especially if other documents respect this standard. Example of Fantasy : the Vietnam Example of non respect : India The Vietnamise Filler is printed in the wrong direction «>» The 2 fillers between the Issuing state and the Holder s name are of excess 9

Example of non respect : the Poland Complete Fantasy letting a doubt on the document 6 / Passport Number format The Passport Number never overtake 9 characters because the 10 th digit is the ICAO Check digit. In this number, we find letters and digits. The States are free to organize theses figures and letters. ID SHIELD performs this particular control and checks each format number. Besides, some States do not position this number where it should be. We must in that case create an exception in the Program. 7 / Dates Format Most of the time, the dates are presented according to the English tradition : YYMMDD. ID Shield checks the internal structure of the date (month not higher than 12, Day not higher than 31). ID SHIELD also draws attention to local practices : only the year is indicated as the birth date, not the month or the day. It should be abnormal to have a complete date in the Inspection Visible Area and nothing in the MRZ. Only the year 1952 is shown in the second line. Moreover, a special attention is displayed if the controlled person is a minor due to the different financial consequences that this particularity creates : the fine reaches 10000 euros in France and must be paid immediately if this minor is discovered with false or incomplete travel documents. 8 / Expired Document The program reads the expiry date and compares it with the date of the control. Normally, the expired document are not accepted (refer to the general conditions of transport of the airline). Concerning the Expired Residence Permits, it will be appropriate to ask for the document stating that a renewal has been requested. This document can be scanned and controlled under UV. 10

Background with guilloche Chromotrope Ink and coloured fibres appearing under 9 / Verification of the Country Code Verification of the Country Code. It exists nationality of fantasy. Example : CAB for Capo Verde that does not exist. CPV is correct. There are sometimes traditions that are difficult to modify. This is the case of the Zimbabwe who should use ZWE as its country code and who uses ZIM. 11

10 / On line Verification through Internet of a document number Sometimes, it is possible to check a passport number (or ID card, Residence Permit). These websites are not numerous but, when they exist or when they are indicated, ID SHIELD program their access, the rekeying of the number being suppressed using the memory of the mouse (right click and paste). Example : Latvia Site Sometimes, it is possible to valid the name of the holder of the document (Venezuela, Chile). URL : http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/registro_electoral/registro_electoral.php. Indicate the ID Card Number (Cedula de Identidad). Result : We obtain the name of the holder indicated in this database (most often a voters list or a taxpayers list).sine qua non condition : be connected to Internet. Response time is very short. 12

16 The user must simply see that the Internet Icon is active (orange color) indicating that an access to a remote Web site is programmed. 11 / Blank Stolen Document It concerns the blank documents stolen during their transport before their personalization with the date of the future holder. Example : O3KD : French blank stolen series 13

ID SHIELD obtains lists of blank stolen lists from airlines or Embassies. The free access to these data through Interpol is reserved to only one Airline : QATAR airways (January 2015). If a document number is into a list, a Blank Stolen Pop up appears on the screen. This database is embedded in the laptop. 12 / Difference of reading between 2 lights If there is a difference between the MRZ read under the white light and the same MRZ read under Infra Red, an error will be indicated and the characters which are different will blink. This can reveal a MRZ scratching, the text which has been hidden reappearing under IR. 13 / Non opening of the chip The passport s chip is opened with a protocol called BAC or SAC. There are 2 reasons explaining that the chip is not readable : - The chip has been burnt : simply left in the microwave during 5 seconds, - The MRZ track has been modified and this modification prevents the chip to be open. In the second case, it is important to control with the microscope the area of the MRZ to search for scratchings, glue, modified background. EXAMPLE : On this image, the upper edge is based on blue points. If we go down the document to the MRZ, we can see inkjet background. This MRZ has a checksum error in the birthdate field (8). This has a consequence for the final check digit (6). The white and shining spots can result from glue. Note that the airline in France cannot be prosecuted for this error because it requires a microscope. So, the airline cannot be fined. 14 / Comparison between the data in VIZ and in MRZ This control is in progress. It permits, document after document, to compare data in VIZ (name, first name, birth date, expiry date) and in MRZ. 14

II. The control of the personal data page A. The controls common to all travel documents 1 / The Paper : UV reaction This page can be different from the other pages of the document. It is always interesting to compare the personal data page and its adjacent page. We first begin with the UV reaction (365 nm). The fiduciary paper used for banknotes or the security documents as the travel documents is manufactured from fibers coming from cotton, rags or wood without additions of optical whiteners. These whiteners react under UV light. The correct reaction is a document that remains dark. It exists genuine documents that fluoresce. Example : Passports from Israel and Chile ISRAEL CHILE On the contrary, this passport from Angola is false. UV : Angola. The PPT is fluorescent UV : Conform Reaction If the rule is not to have optical whiteners in the fiduciary paper, we can however have similar reaction with the recycled paper that does not fluoresce. We will in that case look at the other security features (watermark, colored fibers, planchettes). But all international calls for tenders indicate that the document must be manufactured without optical whiteners. 15

2 / The reaction under Infra Red Image under visible light Image under Infra-Red No data are readable under IR. This is not compliant with the 9303 standard. 3 / The watermark It is realized during the paper manufacturing. It is present on all pages of the passport. It is visible using transmitted light. Watermark of the French driving license (1999 Edition). 4 / Inkjet background The background must be realized in offset (offset). If Inkjet or other process (laser) is used for the background, the document must seriously be questioned. Inkjet back ground Differences between the personal data page and its adjacent page 16

The documents controller must use his magnifier and place it on a non printed spot. The program will indicate the rate concentration of the red, yellow and blue points. This information vary with the moves of the magnifier. Above a certain level, there is no doubt about the inkjet printing. 5 / The round corners of the document The round shape of the corners of the pages of the passport is done by a machine (not a nail cutter). We continue with our works to render this control automatic. B. The controls of presence of certain security features Each State defines its own visible or tactile securities that will be applied to its own credentials. In this scope, ID SHIELD defines into a database called «Visual Controls» the securities that can be checked. It also indicate frauds that has been discovered. Among them : - 1. L OVI : Optically Variable Ink : ink changing of color according the angle of view. (See the RF of the French ID Card), OVI Portugal Passport 17

- 2. The micro-prints : micro-letters or micro-texts invisible with naked eyes. Canadian Passport: The word «passport» is a micro-print - 3. The tactile securities : The MRZ of the Portuguese passport is printed in relief. So, we can feel it when we touch it («taille douce» printing or Intaglio Printing). - 4. The physical securities : Triangular (or rectangular or square Perforation on a part of the passport number (Opposite image : English Passport). Another example : The 3 micro-perforations of the French ID Card or of the French Residence Permit. Other example : the DESTRI-PERF process to create a ghost photo. - 5. The securities realized with fluorescent ink (chromotrope) : Passport of Mauritius : ghost photo, signature, + information attached to the passport. The correct UV Image is systematically displayed with the 1st scan. Thus to avoid to accept an UV image different from the appropriate one. 18

6. The laser perforations Correct Destriperf process Cutter made security 7 / The Demachrome effect On the right : the visible image. On the left : If we place a red filter on the image of the right, we obtain another image which is a cock with an ax. Are concerned in particular : Kenya (above) and the Japan (here under). 19

C. Known Mistakes A POP UP message is displayed if known mistakes can be verified for the scanned document. Example : Japon. It is written FOREION instead of FOREIGN. It is written «SUNAME» instead of «SURNAME». + Inkjet back ground «Give Name» instead of «Given Name» «Code of Estate» instead of «Code of State» 20

A. Protection of the Photo with the IPI process It is a protection which is invisible. A decoder filter (or the ARH scanner) must be used. This security consists in hiding a text in the Photo. Example : Portugal. The Passport Number appears on the Photo. The Photo is correctly coupled with this Passport Number. 17 States use this protection against the photo substitution. The program automatically indicates that this security is implemented. States having adopted this security : Pays adoptant cette technologie pour leur passeport (Octobre 2015) : Hong Kong Bulgaria Croatia Portugal Thailand Sri Lanka Pakistan Korea Malaysia (not the latest) Philippines Macao South Africa Cyprus Sweden Estonia Belgium Cap verde III. The RFID Chip control Scope: biometric documents : Passports, Residence Permits, ID card. The objective is not to read the chip but to control that the chip has not been modified before we read it. Once this formal control is performed, then the controller can examine the data contained in the chip. These controls are based on a dialog between the RFID reader installed in the scanner and the Chip. These possible modifications (except when the chip has been knocked with a hammer or left in a micro-wave during 5 seconds) are invisible. 21

ID SHIELD has focused on this specific and technical control to avoid to validate an apparently correct document whose data have been completely modified. It is more a Security control than a documentary control. Airlines will not be fined for that but they could board a person whose identity is hidden. The question is : For which purposes a traveler has hidden his real identity? A decision must be taken within the airline to accept or to refuse these documents in the following situations : 1. Distroyed or burnt chip : no answer from the chip. 2. Chip authentication : Is the chip original? not replaced since the issuing date? 3. The chip contains a summary of the files which are present in the chip : This file is called : EF.COM. Are all Data Groups present? 4. Have the private data of the passport s holder been modified since the passport has been issued? Passive authentication is performed to check the hashes of all files (also called templates) from the chip. 5. Verification of the certificate of the Issuing State to avoid the use of a revoked certificate. The opening of the chip is done through what is called the Basic Access Control. ID SHIELD, as a private company, is not allowed to obtain a Certificate which, associated to Chip Authentication process, will allow the access to the DG 3 (Fingerprints). This is reserved to the Enforcement Agencies only. IV. The control of the content of the chip A. The methods to open the chip Are implemented : 1. Basic Access Control 2. Furthermore, since January 1st, 2015, SAC (standing for Supplemental Access control) is also implemented. This protocol is more secure. 3. Extended access control. The 2 first methods are accessible to everybody. The 3rd one requires a Certificate to authenticate the Terminal as a Police Terminal to allow it to access to the Fingerprints which stored in the Datagroup 3. B. Information contained in the chip The pertinent information are stored in different Data Droups (DG). 22

Obligatoire in French : means Compulsory in English. E. Use of the information ID SHIELD uses the information of the chip as follows : - Creation of a screen gathering all the morphologic information of the holder of the ID Document : photos, Photos comparison, color of the eyes, height), - Comparison between the visible photo and the photo in the chip : they must identical and the eyes are normally aligned according to the ground, - Comparison of the biometric photo with the real face using the face recognition system (Algorithm of COGNITEC- Germany). - Comparison of the 2 MRZ : the visible and the one in the chip. V. The traveller Identification The documentary controller needs also to be sure of the identity of the person in front of him (fight against the «lookalikes» who detain genuine documents but not belonging to them and for which the photos are looking like their own faces. Figures from the French Bureau de la Fraude Documentaire (DCPAF) : Years Number of«lookalikes» 2012 2 996 2013 4 924 2014 3000 (source : PAF - BFD) In the airlines world, these ID thefts represent today 30% of the minutes addressed by the Police at Frontiers to airlines such as Royal Air Maroc or Tunis Air. This use of the resemblance can be explained by the higher and higher difficulty to ex nihilo manufacture a travel document, the used securities becoming more and more sophisticated. 23

A. Morphological results table ID Shield proposes a board with all the results of the comparison between the visible photos and the photos in the chips. It adds also physical elements such as height, race. B. The visages comparison 1. Manual : It is possible to align the photos of the passport + Visa + Photo in the chip. The software magnifier allows to increase the size of the same part of the face among the 2 or 3 photos. The manual comparison is then possible between the 3 images. 7 points must draw the attention of the controller : a) The forehead, b) Th eyes, c) The ears, d) The nose, e) The space between the nose and the lips, f) The lips, g) The chin. 2. Automatic : In less than 5 seconds, the comparison is done between 2 photos and a score is displayed using green and red rectangles. The green circled figure is a validated check digit. 3. COGNITEC, the supplier of the algorithm is the world leader of the facial recognition. We compare the photo in the chip (without noices due to the protection film) with the real face when the passenger board the plane. 24

C. The Fingerprints recognition ID SHIELD is able to perform this control when a certificate is given to him to authenticate the suitcase as a Police Terminal. We use the Greenbit technology. D. The stress detection ID SHIELD is on the point to test the stress detection. As we see on these images, this emotion is detected on the visage on the right.(blood under the skin.). It becomes possible to push this emotion. Examples to test : - Presentation of a anti-drugs dog to a traveller carrying drugs, - Indication of a fine amount and/or Jail for a false document holder. The aim is to provoke an emotion. The facial recognition can be performed at the same time. In France, the facial recognition is submitted to the autorisation of the privacy organisation (CNIL). The emotions detection belongs to the behaviour analysis and is not subject to authorization. VI. The control of the traveller s situation considering his destination A. Obligation to have a Visa/Transit Airport Visa The immigration rules concerning the Schengen Space is integrated into the Program and is corrected when necessary. Regarding his nationality, the traveler will have to produce a Visa or an Airport Transit Visa. TIMATIC WEB is integrated on a demo base. It is not a free product : a license must be paid to IATA. B. Time spent in the Schengen Space (EU Regulation n 610/2013) ID SHIELD has reprogrammed the calculator from the EU Commission (DG Home Affairs and Justice) It permits to calculate the time in days spent on the Schengen space during the 180 past days (Rule of the 90 days/180days). The airlines are not obliged to perform this control. 25

C. Travel within the Schengen Space If a traveler, after his landing at CDG, needs to go to a third country in crossing another Schengen State (even to go to ORY), a Visa Type C is required. ID SHIELD has created a specific interface to reveal the inner travel.this is based on the declarations of the traveler. This can also be modified if the airline agrees to give us the access to the Passenger Name Record (PNR) where these data exist. D. Validity of the passport (EU Regulation n 610) The passport must be valid 90 days after the passenger has returned into his usual country. A Pop up is displayed when we are in this situation. VII. The aids to the controller A. VGP (as Vigipirate) It is possible to pilot the controls in creating an alert when some information, extracted from the MRZ, can permit to create a specific profile of persons who can in particular destroy their documents on board. B. The Mail function During the control, the controller can send a mail to his Supervisor. This person receives all the photos of the documents of the traveler. The Supervisor can take the control of the remote suitcase through TEMVIEWER. A phone conversation can also be established using the free product SKYPE. C. Teamviewer : the way to remotely control the suitcase The Supervisor can take the control of the suitcase in installing the free Teamviewer on his computer. It is the same software that ID SHIELD uses to check a remote suitcase. D. Modification of the Organization due to the use of the suitcase The suitcase realizes some controls (not all) but realizes them quickly. The major errors must lead to a NO GO. The controller should be able to access to the upper level when necessary. 26

We recommend the local purchase of the SIM card necessary to perform a wireless connection. This will help the controller to: - Access to remote databases, - Access to his Upper Level. VIII. Data storage Today, storage is done with USB keys and an external hard disk. Data must be stored during 12 months. If the volume of data is important, we can propose a solution more adapted with a specific program to operate researches. IX. Software maintenance ID SHIELD no longer proposes the hardware maintenance. Just the software maintenance. Consequently, spares (scanner + Laptop + craddle) must be put in stock. For the software maintenance, the connection to our server «IDSHIELD.fr» is the best way to update the software and the embedded databases. If problems, do not hesitate to call us on phone. 27