Australia's quasi-market delivery of case management

Transcription

1 International Social Security Association International Experts Workshop of the ISSA Technical Commission on Unemployment Insurance and Employment Maintenance Case management to sustainable employment? Brussels, Belgium, April 2006 Australia's quasi-market delivery of case management Principal Economist Employment Analysis and Policies Division Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ISSA/WS/AC/BRUSSELS/2006

2 Australia's quasi-market delivery of case management 1 Principal Economist Employment Analysis and Policies Division Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1. Introduction Quasi-markets for employment services essentially deliver case management services for jobseekers, mainly jobseekers on unemployment and related benefits. Not just in Australia, but also in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, quasi-market employment services: do not primarily deliver a job-matching service although case managers quite often do match clients with vacancies; do not primarily deliver long-term training, job creation or other types of labour market programme although these can to some extent be integrated; are not strongly focused on enforcing benefit eligibility criteria although providers recommend sanctions, in cases of failure to engage in the intensive case management. In this paper Section 2 provides a rapid overview of how Australia's Job Network developed historically and key features of the current arrangements; Section 3 argues that this approach has in the last few years been increasingly successful, reducing both unemployment and other related benefit caseloads, and identifies the reasons for this development; Section 4 highlights some risk factors with current arrangements and scope for further improvements. 2. The historical development of Job Network and key features of the current arrangements 2.1. Origins in the 1980s and early 1990s At the national level, Australia introduced some activation measures in the 1980s. A requirement for unemployed people to report their job-search efforts was introduced in Training programmes for the unemployed were often purchased from private providers, and the State government in Victoria in the late 1980s started contracted case management, 1 The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this paper are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the OECD. The author thanks May Lam for comments and suggestions.

3 2 funding community organizations on the basis of their placement outcomes (OECD, 2001, p. 88). In the 1990s, some key dates were: 1991: unemployment benefit was replaced by "Job Search Allowance" for the first year and "Newstart Allowance" for the long-term unemployed, with a requirement for Newstart clients to negotiate an "activity agreement" (i.e. return-to-work plan) with the public Commonwealth Employment Service. 1994: as part of the "Working Nation" package, an independent Employment Services Regulatory Authority was created to supervise a competitive market for case management services, and a Jobseeker Screening Instrument (JSI) was introduced to guide referrals to these services. By 1997, about half of the disadvantaged target group (those unemployed for more than eighteen months and other profiled by the JSI) were entering "Case Management Activity Agreements" with more than 320 "contracted case management" organizations, while others were still handled by Employment Assistance Australia, an entity within the employment ministry (DEETYA) The first Job Network contract, Under the "Working Nation" initiative, training and job creation programmes had been expanded and case managers were rewarded for client entries to them. Evaluations subsequently reported that case managers had often concentrated upon achieving programme placements, with insufficient emphasis on regular employment outcomes (DEETYA, 1996). The Howard government, soon after coming into office in 1996, abolished all the main existing training and job-creation programmes for the unemployed. Much of the savings went into funding a single large tender, conducted in 1997, under which organizations competed for contracts to provide employment services from 1 May A newly-created public agency, called Centrelink, now referred clients to private, non-profit or public-sector-owned 2 "Job Network" (JN) service providers. The main Job Network service (taking 85 per cent of spending, not counting the self-employment start-up scheme NEIS 3 ) was Intensive Assistance (IA) case management for the disadvantaged unemployed. Early evaluations of Intensive Assistance reported that a majority of clients had participated in job-search training and 18 per cent had received computer training, but few received other training. Few providers offered clients work experience or hiring subsidies. Job Network was achieving similar placement outcomes to its predecessor, albeit at lower cost (since only part of the savings on training and job-creation programmes had been reinvested in Job Network). 2 A government-owned entity called Employment National, which took over many staff from the former public employment service, had a third of the business in the first Job Network but lost market share and was wound up in Australia's Job Network until 2003 included a Job Matching service. Since 2003, Job Network members which are automatically "Job Placement Organizations", as well as "Job Placement Licence Only" organizations (which are often private employment agencies), have been paid for placements of eligible unemployed jobseekers into vacancies which they have listed on Australian JobSearch, Australia's public vacancy website (see note 10 below concerning the level of spending on these payments).

4 3 Probable reasons that results were not better at first were (OECD, 2001): Although payments to providers were partly outcome-based, the majority of provider income came from fixed (per-client) fees. 4 Provider spending patterns were not regulated or supervised (they were a "black box") and providers could make profits by spending relatively little on services. Providers could not easily sanction clients who failed to attend, and this too may have discouraged many of them from maintaining high levels of contact. Clients were often "parked" after the first few contacts they remained on a provider's books, but receiving few services. For disadvantaged clients, participation in IA case management was often one episode within a longer spell of unemployment: 40 per cent of unemployed people had been on benefit for two or more years. Several interventions in the unemployment spell were separately organized by Centrelink (job-search reporting, Job Search Training after three months unemployed, and "Mutual Obligation" requirements applying from the seventh to the twelfth months). IA providers could not use these instruments; and Centrelink could not benefit from case managers' knowledge of individual clients, since this was not transmitted when clients returned to Centrelink (after twelve to twenty-one months with an IA provider). Outcomes that arose during the Intensive Assistance could be due to earlier interventions, and outcomes due to IA services could occur after clients had returned to Centrelink, so the measurement of providers' impacts on outcomes was blurred. Invitation-for-tender, bidding and contracting processes and the start-up of new operations absorbed large amounts of government and provider energy in and The second Job Network period, The 1999 invitation to tender, for employment service contracts to run from 2000, required bids to include a "Declaration of Intent". This could be, for example, a commitment to have one case manager for each 50 clients, and to have in-person contact with clients once per month. From 2000, government supervised the implementation of these commitments. This was a retreat from the earlier approach where provider behaviour was in a "black box". The change partly addressed the problem of "parking". Also in the second period, IA providers were allowed to specialize (e.g. for blind or non-english background clients): in the first period, all providers had to work with all clients. However, neither of these changes was fundamental. Probably the most significant change after 2000 was that providers with relatively poor placement results in 1998 and 1999, generally those who had failed to find effective strategies, were not given contracts to operate from 2000 onwards. Some adjustments to the broader framework were implemented during this contract period. In 2001, many more places for people with severe non-vocational barriers (e.g. drug or 4 The concept of "fixed (per-client)" fee here refers to the "commencement" fee in the first two Job Network periods and more generally to fees related to the number of clients receiving services rather than the number achieving employment outcomes. The "fixed" fee can vary along a number of other dimensions (e.g. its level may be set during contract negotiations, and be higher for more disadvantaged client groups). 5 There were sharp dips in monthly placement outcomes achieved by Job Network associated with the and bidding process and start-up of operations under the new contracts.

5 4 alcohol addiction) became available under the new Personal Support Program. 6 In 2002, new procedures allowed a temporary suspension of benefit payments when the client failed to attend an appointment with the Job Network provider The third Job Network period, 2003 onwards Change in 2003 (following on evaluations by OECD and the Australian Productivity Commission) 8 was "revolutionary rather than evolutionary". Under the new arrangements: The unemployed are referred to a Job Network provider from the start of their unemployment spell and remain with this provider even if they experience multiple spells of employment and unemployment. The former two-part fee system with "commencement" fees (paid in full as soon as the provider had established an "activity agreement" with the jobseeker) and "outcome" fees was replaced by a three-part fee system with (i) "fees for services", i.e. in-person appointments with clients, which must be booked in a new national computer system used by all providers in order to claim payment; 9 (ii) a "Job Seeker Account", earmarked for spending on goods and services such as training; (iii) payments for employment outcomes, as before Performance management through "star-rating" The comparative performance of providers is rated in terms of the outcomes that attract outcome fees mainly (not exclusively) 13-week and 26-week employment outcomes for "Intensive Support" clients (who are long-term and some other disadvantaged unemployed). "Star ratings" based on unadjusted comparisons first became available in 1999; ratings with regression adjustments for local labour market and client caseload characteristics first became available in The first "star ratings" were used to determine awards of second period ( ) contracts. In the context of wide variations in performance IA providers in the same region had after six months placement rates typically varying from about 9 per cent to 25 per cent 6 The PSP replaced the Community Support Program (CSP), which had been designed as a service to refer clients on to other existing community services and was funded accordingly. 7 This suspension procedure, described in DEWR (2005), had been recommended by OECD (2001). 8 Caldwell (2005) gives a brief history of Job Network, describing evaluations conducted from 2000 to 2002 and the findings taken into account in the design of the third Employment Services Contract. 9 The "fee-for-services" element has led to complaints that providers now have to implement a bureaucratic schedule with little freedom to develop independent strategies. But the requirement for fortnightly attendance (in the case of the long-term unemployed on Intensive Support customised assistance) arguably has advantages in terms of horizontal equity and motivation effects (i.e. the general requirement encourages some short-term unemployed to find work before becoming long-term unemployed). Efficient providers can comply with it while still having some room for implementing their own independent or innovative strategies. 10 Although budgetary detail is not regularly published, figures in ANAO (2005) and information in DEWR (2005) suggest that total Job Placement and Job Network funding in was distributed roughly as follows: 10 per cent as Job Placement fees and bonuses (of which about four-fifths was earned by Job Network organizations and the remainder by "Job Placement Licence Only" organizations), 5 per cent as fees for Job Search Support (for relatively short-term unemployed), per cent as Service Fees, per cent as Employment Outcome fees, and 20 per cent as payments to the Job Seeker Account.

6 5 (OECD, 2001, note 80) the elimination of poorer-performing providers by itself increased average Job Network performance by 25 per cent ex ante. The regression-adjusted ratings were available to select providers for contracts running from 2003 onwards, when 60 per cent of the contracts were "rolled over" to the best providers from the period and the other 40 per cent were subject to tender, resulting in reallocation of business and seven new providers entering the market (Bruttel, 2005). In 2006 the majority of Job Network contracts were extended to 2009 under existing contractual conditions; a smaller proportion of business was opened to tender resulting in two new organizations being chosen to enter the market. According to current plans, in future a significant minority of business (relating to poorly-performing providers) will be subject to a system of "rolling local area tenders" conducted every six months until Increasing success of the Job Network model after Job Network placement outcomes Long-term performance comparisons are uncertain, but total placements did not significantly increase in as compared with the pre-1998 years (OECD, 2001, Chart 3.2). Over this period total unemployment fell, but only in line with the earlier trend of cyclical recovery from the 1990s recession, and long-term unemployment according to the administrative definition remained high. From 2000 to 2002 (which was a recession year) the total number of recorded 13-week employment outcomes increased modestly. It then nearly doubled from 2002 to Comparing the current contract period (2003 onwards) with the first ( ) contract period, hazard rates to employment have doubled (see Chart 1). Placements from disadvantaged groups (long-term unemployed, people with disabilities and lone parents) increased particularly strongly in (DEWR, 2005). The data for 13-week employment outcomes for disadvantaged unemployed may somewhat exaggerate the overall net improvement because Job Network providers and the labour market have probably progressively adapted to the incentive structure, which primarily rewards 13- and 26-week outcomes (rather than for example 8-week or 52-week outcomes or increases in client earnings). This type of adaptation takes place over a number of years For example Kuhn and Riddell (2006) use 1940 to 2001 data to argue that the current prevalence of seasonal employment and unemployment in Eastern Canada, as compared to neighbouring states of the United States, is a long-term response to incentives in Canada's unemployment benefit (Employment Insurance) system.

7 6 Chart 1. Hazard rates to employment have doubled 35 Cumulative 13 Week Job Outcome Rates by Contract Period - 31Dec05 30 ESC3 Intensive Support (1Jul03 to 31Dec05) 374,700 jobs for 1,152,700 IS Starts 32.5% 13 Week Job Outcome Rate % % 22.0% ESC2 Intensive Assistance (28Feb00 to 30Jun03) 218,000 jobs for 884,000 comms 14.6% 15.1% ESC1 Intensive Assistance (1May98 to 27Feb00) 78,000 jobs for 516,000 comms 5 0 Mth 4 Mth 8 Mth 12 Mth 16 Mth 20 Mth 24 Mth 28 Mth 32 Mth 36 Mth 40 Mth 44 Months Since Contract Period Began (outcomes continued post ESC1&2 contract end dates) Source: Durbin (2006) Key reasons for success Much of the sharp increase in employment outcomes since 2000 does appear to indicate overall improvement in employment service performance, and likely key causes are: Government and providers are now concentrating on the stable implementation of strategies which have been progressively refined on the basis of earlier experience. By 2003, after two rounds of selection at contract renewal, only committed, wellmanaged provider organizations had survived in the market. The principle of "survival of the fittest" both directly and through awareness that it is operating has been more critical for performance than financial incentives alone. One indication that "survival of the fittest" has operated has been a reduction of the number of Job Network providers from around 300 in the first contract period starting May 1998 to 200 in the second period starting October 2000 and 110 in the third period starting September Given that only the best-performing providers have survived at each tender, it has become increasingly difficult for new entrants to compete with the standard set by the market leaders.

8 Aggregate labour market outcomes By September 2003, unemployment had already fallen to its lowest level for thirteen years. At that time, Mature Age Allowance (MAA) (early retirement for unemployed aged 60 plus) and Partner Allowance (PA) (for older spouses of the unemployed) were closed to new entrants. Benefit dependency has continued to fall (Table 1). Table 1. Unemployment and related benefit payments (thousands), September September Unemployment benefits Mature age allowance (MAA) Partner allowance (PA) Total (000s) Source: Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), Labour Market and Related Payments, various issues ( Between September 2003 and September 2005, the MAA caseload fell by 24,000, but the numbers unemployed aged 60 and more rose by only 8,000. Apparently two-thirds of those who in order to claim income support now need to participate in employment services, have found an alternative probably in many cases by finding a new job or staying in work The 2006 Welfare to Work package In late 2004, policy responsibility for working-age income-replacement benefits was transferred to Australia s labour ministry (DEWR), and in May 2005 a "Welfare to Work" package was announced. From July 2006, lone parents whose youngest child is aged 8 to 15 and partly-disabled people who are able to work 15 hours or more per week, 13 who in the past would have qualified for Parenting Payment - Single or Disability Support Pension, may qualify instead for unemployment benefits (this applies to new claims, with transitional arrangements for existing recipients 14 ). This transfer affects a caseload of about 95,000 single parents and 81,000 partly-disabled people (ACOSS, 2005). In conjunction with the transfer, several administrative changes and new support measures were also introduced. If Job Network placement performance stays strong, in the longer term the increase in numbers on unemployment benefits is likely to be less than half of numbers transferred off "non-employment" benefits, in line with the experience with the progressive abolition of the Mature Age Allowance. 12 Statistical evidence for year-old males (the main group that received MAA) so far indicates an upturn in their employment rates that fits with this interpretation, and no increase in rates of dependency on Disability Support Pension. 13 From July 2006 a Job Capacity Assessment procedure, for initial claims and reviews of entitlement for Disability Support Pension and certain support programmes, will be implemented by public providers (80 per cent) and private providers (20 per cent). 14 Parents receiving Parenting Payment prior to 1 July 2006 will be able to remain on Parenting Payment until their youngest child turns 16. However while on this benefit they will, from 1 July 2007 or when their youngest child turns 7 (whichever is later), be required to seek part time work of at least 15 hours per week. No changes will apply for people who have been on Disability Support Pension on or before 10 May 2005.

9 8 These developments illustrate how successful employment service provision (in this case, delivered by private providers operating in a quasi-market and working primarily through case management) is the essential basis for a policy aiming to reduce dependency on a range of non-employment benefits, as well as unemployment. By contrast, if placement efforts for the unemployed are already ineffective, transferring new hard-to-place clients groups to the unemployment status can be counter-productive, overstretching employment services further and thus worsening placement performance even among the pre-existing caseload Some political economy of quasi-market provision In quasi-markets, provider incomes depend on client inflows. In Australia in 2003, when shortfalls in the number of unemployed clients attending appointments arose during the transition to the third contract period, some providers said they could not continue in operation or would need to cut staff, and the government in response modified funding arrangements (to reward providers' efforts to contact clients) (O'Neill, 2003). Not surprisingly providers who are now an important group in the debate over any proposed policy change seem sympathetic to the principle of engaging with new disadvantaged client groups, including older workers, partners of the unemployed, the disabled, and lone parents on benefits, as long as the financial conditions are reasonable. It is easy to imagine that a traditional public employment service, which considers that its operational budget is relatively fixed, will generally emphasize the difficulty of taking on new client caseloads. Community groups tend to argue that they should be paid higher fees than those currently paid for services or "intermediate" outcomes (e.g. achieving entries to education) in the case of hard-to-place clients. Government should probably maintain its focus on rewarding employment outcomes, but it should also ensure that employment outcomes for the hard-toplace are rewarded in line with their full long-term benefits The case management techniques used by high-performing providers Any characterization of case management techniques is somewhat arbitrary, but with this proviso, characteristics of successful providers in a competitive market appear to include: Strong management capabilities e.g. ability to conduct financial modelling and handle operational issues, together with a realistic view of labour market and client barriers and some psycho-social expertise and insight into client motivation. A focus on the employment outcomes that attract payments (local office managers actively track these outcomes, which may be continuously displayed within the local office). Prioritization of the more employable clients within disadvantaged client groups (if the period of provider responsibility is one year, usually less than half will enter work; case managers have some idea of who these will be, and give them less attention). Streamlined procedures for initiating benefit sanctions, if the benefit eligibility conditions and benefit administration allows this: providers see this as freeing time for working with clients who are interested in finding work.

10 9 An emphasis on contact with clients: a local office with 20 staff may have 15 case managers and only three to five other specialist, support and management staff. Flexible use of a variety of placement tools, e.g. CV preparation, job-search training and monitoring, collective sessions, individual assessment and psychological/motivational counselling, direct assistance (with child-care, transport, etc.) to resolve barriers, acquire vacancies and match clients to jobs. The "mix" of strategies varies, partly in line with differences in the local labour market situation and client groups, and partly reflecting differing management philosophies. 4. Risk factors and scope for improvements 4.1. Basic conditions for a quasi-market to operate For quasi-market provision of employment services to be effective: The purchaser must maintain significant management and operational capabilities, in order to: Allocate clients across providers (if providers can select their own clients without tight central supervision, they will "cream") 15 Measure employment outcomes, and provider relative impact on them, accurately and comparably. Market mechanisms must ensure "survival of the fittest" (only high-performing providers survive). Australia has followed these principles in general terms, although with some flexibility occasionally too much flexibility e.g. recently a "scandal" arose when providers were allowed to reclassify their own clients as hard-to-place, thus attracting higher outcome fees ( Challenges for outcome measurement Accurate measurement of employment outcomes is the central challenge for effective operation of a quasi-market. Risk factors in the current outcome measurement framework include: Payments for employment outcomes are low for the short-term unemployed, higher for the long-term unemployed and higher again for the very long-term unemployed. Since 2003, clients remain with the same provider long term, which improves continuity and integration of services but creates some incentive for providers to allow the short-term unemployed to become long-term unemployed before placing them. 15 Providers can be allowed to choose clients in the sense of contracting to serve particular client groups (by sector, type of disability, etc.) if client needs are assessed by the purchaser (government). If clients are allowed to choose their provider, actions by providers to attract the most employable clients (on the basis of unobserved characteristics such as motivation) at the expense of other providers need to be restricted. In general, to avoid creaming while allowing some elements of flexibility in the referral process, government needs to maintain the capacity to assess client characteristics.

11 10 The government only measures and rewards employment outcomes up to twenty-six weeks. Often as the government argues placement for twenty-six weeks is a good proxy for a longer-term outcome. However in the case of disadvantaged clients, placement into a stable job may save years of benefit payments. If the full value of such outcomes is paid in cases of only twenty-six weeks of work, labour market distortions may tend to arise (e.g. churning, as providers offer wage subsidies for twenty-six weeks and employers offer jobs for twenty-six weeks): 16 if the full value is not paid, investment in service provision will tend to be too low. The government has individual data (independent of what is reported by providers) only for its benefit payments to clients, not client employment status or earnings after leaving benefits. Final performance measures, like "Star Ratings", depend not only on outcome measures but on regression adjustments to make raw data more nearly comparable on a national basis. In urban areas where five or more providers operate under comparable conditions, relative employment outcomes provide a fairly accurate measure of relative impact, and a high-performing newcomer has fairly frequent opportunities to break into the provider market. But in a remote area where only two providers operate, if both providers perform badly it remains hard to tell whether this is really due to bad performance or to idiosyncratic features of the area and its economy Improving the performance management framework Government should measure and reward a richer set of labour market outcomes (OECD, 2005b): Desirable client outcomes include not only lower benefit receipt but also higher earnings after return to work. Long-term individual outcomes (e.g. 5-year averages of these variables, and proxy measures which look even further ahead) are what matter. With an accurate outcome measurement/reward system, the size of outcome payments can safely be increased to the point where expensive services (e.g. low caseloads per counsellor) are profitable for providers, if they generate long-term a net benefit to society and net improvement in the public budget Changes in employment service techniques Increased emphasis on long-term outcomes and on improving client earnings would be likely to favour the following developments: Increased focus on the short-term unemployed. For the short-term unemployed it can be worth spending a few months searching for work, in order to increase the chances 16 In , 27 per cent of Job Seeker Account expenditure (about 5 per cent of total Job Network expenditure) was on wage subsidies paid to employers (DEWR, 2005). This not yet very high, but is sharply up on earlier years.

12 11 of finding a more suitable and well-paid job. 17 Remunerating providers only in terms of short-term savings on benefit payments might be counter-productive (it would over-reward a strategy of rapid placement into any job, as compared to a strategy of careful placement into the best job). This tension helps explain why countries which manage employment services through market forces have so far not fully included the short-term unemployed. 18 Increased use of longer-term training. Full-time training, lasting from a few weeks up to sometimes years, typically reduces entries to ordinary employment during the period of scheduled participation in the training. Positive effects tend to arise after a lag and may concern earnings more than employment rates. Australia's Job Seeker Account like provisions in the Netherlands for "trajectories" that include separate funding for training and for case management recognizes a need for some ad hoc encouragement of training, outside the system of employment outcome fees. But there are still incentives to prefer the type of training that can achieve a short-term impact on employment. 5. Summary Australia s quasi-market Job Network arrangements now appear to be delivering significant improvements in labour market outcomes including falls in both unemployment and rates of dependency on related non-employment benefits. Placements are achieved partly using a schedule of regular employment service interventions and partly through intensive case management. Results are good despite some weaknesses in the performance measurement and management framework. A framework that gave more weight to long-term outcomes and to increases in client earnings in work would probably result in increased attention to careful job-matching and longer-term training. Bibliography ACOSS "Welfare to Work Briefing", Australian Council of Social Services, 15 September ( ANAO (Australian National Audit Office). Implementation of Job Network Employment Services Contract 3 ( Audit Reports). Bruttel, O "Managing Competition in a Public Service Market: the Job Network in an International Perspective", Centre for Labour Market Research Discussion Paper No. 05/3 ( Caldwell, J "Employment Services in Australia", in Keum, J. (ed.), Employment Insurance and Public Employment Services in Selected Countries, Korea Labor Institute, Seoul ( Forums and Seminars 2005). DEETYA "Working Nation: Evaluation of the employment, education and training elements", Evaluation and Monitoring Branch Report, No. 2/96, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs. 17 This trade-off may also apply to longer-term disadvantaged clients: in US welfare-to-work experiments, the Portland programme which encouraged clients to seek stable and higher-paid jobs, rather than necessarily taking the first job available, performed well particularly in terms of long-term earnings outcomes (OECD, 2005a). 18 In Australia the full-time placement of a short-term unemployed person attracts an outcome payment of AUD440 (equivalent to the minimum wage for one week) during the first three months rising to AUD990 during the nine following months. During this period there is also some countervailing incentive to allow the spell duration to run over twelve months, as noted above.

13 12 DEWR Annual Report ( Durbin, A "Creating and Managing an Employment Services Market", paper presented at the International Conference of the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, "Innovations in Labour Market Policies: Challenges in Times of Globalisation", Vienna, February. Kuhn, P. and Riddell, C "The long-term effects of a generous income-support program: unemployment insurance in New Brunswick and Maine, ", NBER Working Paper, No OECD Innovations in Labour Market Policies: the Australian Way, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris a. "Labour Market Programmes and Activation Strategies: Evaluating the Impacts", Employment Outlook, Paris ( 2005b. "Public Employment Services: Managing Performance", Employment Outlook, Paris. O'Neill, S "Job Network, the 3rd Contract", Parliamentary Library e-brief (