Resilient Botnet Command and Control with Tor
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1 Resilient Botnet Command and Control with Tor Dennis Brown July /14/10 1
2 Who am I? Dennis Brown Security Researcher for Tenable Network Solutions Toorcon 10, 11 Defcon 18 PaulDotCom Podcast Rhode Island's Defcon Group DC401 Disclaimer Not affiliated with the Tor project
3 Tor is a wonderful tool! Most people that use it aren't malicious Anonymity becoming increasingly important Can't say enough good things about it! Tor can be abused! Just like most security tools Anonymity works for good and evil I Really Like Tor!
4 Overview Focus on botnet command and control Case studies using Zeus and IRC bots Techniques to use Tor to anonymize servers Primary focus on Hidden Services Goal of keeping servers up, and botnets alive Examine advantages/disadvantages to methods Other options Tor provides to botnets
5 Why is this important? Malware using Tor has been discussed for years If it exists, it is not being exposed publicly/at all Potential for devastating impact Technology widely available Trivial to deploy (in most cases) Minimal work to add anonymity Safeguards can be taken to detect this activity Varying levels of complexity
6 Doesn't it stink when your botnet gets shut down? Lots of time lost Proper planning Setting up servers Building the bot Crypting, binding, etc. Spreading Lots of money lost Upfront costs may be wasted No communication with bots means no money!
7 How do botnets get taken down? Hosting provider de-peered Example: McColo, Troyak Server hosting botnet cleans up/kicks off Public IRC servers, free web hosting DNS Revoked Some jerk took it over IP of C&C server banned Like if your ISP shuts down your cable modem...
8 Seriously, people do that.
9 Tor to the Rescue!
10 What is a Hidden Service? Added to Tor in 2004 Allows user to run a server anonymously Resolves to a.onion domain Only routable through Tor Hidden Services Works behind NAT, Firewalls, etc. No need to expose services to the network We can use this to our advantage to stay hidden Need to watch out for leaking identifying data!
11 Hidden Services Technical details: A hidden service advertises to Tor Uses a public key, communicates with relays Act as induction points to route traffic properly Simple configuration In torrc: Locating Hidden Services - Overlier and Syverson
12 Zeus/Zbot/Wnspoem The #1 Crimeware toolkit in use today Hooks into various APIs to capture data Not a single botnet Malware creation kit Primarially focused on stealing banking info Can be configured to steal anything Configurable via webinjects
13 Zeus Monoculture
14 Zeus Configuration File
15 So where does Tor come in? Zeus on its own doesn't support proxies Can't use Tor directly Only allows for valid URLs Need some sort of intemediary Fortunately, there's a free solution!
16 Tor2Web Tor2Web is a proxy to redirect.onion web traffic Not a part of Tor; 3 rd party tool Web redirection service Scripts to set up your own proxy! Command and Control happens via Tor2Web Configure bot to connect to Bot connects to Tor2Web, and is then redirected to Hidden Service via.onion address
17 Not very hard to do! Simple script to reformat requests via Squid From Tor2Web.com
18 Live Demo Failure Incoming Zeus (2009 vintage) C&C Server Ubuntu Server LAMP package no custom config Tor running a hidden service for port 80 Windows XP SP2 Build Zeus binary to go to a Tor2Web URL Execute Zeus binary If all goes well, should see a bot appear on the CP! Here we go...
19 Strengths and Weaknesses Strengths Hides the C&C server Nearly impossible to track down C&C server virtually immune to takedown Weaknesses Easy to filter Tor2Web traffic Who knows what Tor2Web is logging? Running your own Tor2Web proxy is better Still a single point of failure
20 Better Solution! Build proxy support into the bot! Load Tor onto the host Some way to resolve.onion domains Privoxy, Polipo, mapaddress Access.onion domains directly Will require SOCKS 5 support Not aware of any bots that support proxies
21 IRC Bot Socks 5 support Connecting to mapaddress Joins #EvilHackerChannel Things to note IP address of bot Country bot is reporting to be from Demo #2
22 Strengths Traffic directly from host to server via Tor No middleman as before Works for more than just HTTP! Very hard to stop Block Tor traffic? Consider Tor a virus? Weaknesses May require code to be added Not accessible to kit users Need to load Tor on the system, configure and run Traffic pattern changes Great job!
23 Private Tor Networks When you want to keep it even more secret Stay off the public Tor network Great for the paranoid Can be faster than the public Tor network Track bandwidth of infected hosts High bandwidth hosts act as relays Blocking Exit nodes won't be published Smaller network will be easier to discover/block
24 (Not So) Stupid Hidden Service Tricks
25 Public Keys Tor creates a private key when hidden services are enabled Does so when no key is available Added to the HiddenServiceDir If no key is available, a new key is created Backups can be redistributed Keys can be generated up-front What can we do with this?
26 Stay Alive! Takedown Resilience C&C server can be easily moved Load public key on new server Maintain communication with bots Potential to lose data returned to C&C server Small price to pay Issue multiple.onion domains for C&C Give the appearance that the botnet is larger than it is! Frequent domain swapping
27 Hidden Services on Bots If bots are running Tor Run hidden services locally! Zeus Back Connect model RDP/VNC Socks Proxy Web server Have bots report.onion domain to C&C Model update distribution after P2P botnets Tell bots of some.onion domains NAT is no concern!
28 Since they're all running Tor... How about turning them all into relays? Increase bandwidth of Tor overall Could have positive benefits to your botnet How about turning them all into exit nodes? Control a majority of available exit nodes? Probably not a good idea! Expose identities of infected hosts Other Thoughts
29 Conclusion Trivial to control existing HTTP bots via Tor With some risk Possible to get much more protection easily Add SOCKS support to bot clients Keeping a C&C server up is easier Controlling bots with hidden services has benefits Defenses do exist, but they may not be easy
30 Thanks for attending! Q&A Contact Info Twitter: br0wnd
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