Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends
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1 Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends Elliott Peterson, Michael Sandee, Tillmann Werner August 5, 2015
2 Cui Honorem, Honorem Dr. Brett Stone-Gross, Dell SecureWorks Frank Ruiz, Fox-IT Dr. Christian Rossow, Saarland University Dennis Andriesse, VU University Amsterdam Dr. Christian Dietrich, UK NCA US DOJ CCIPS The ShadowServer Foundation And many others... B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 1 of 36
3 The Gameover Zeus Operation B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 2 of 36
4 Brief History of Zeus Evolution of the Zeus Family Version Date Description Zeus 1 Emerged in 2005 Sold as crimeware kit Zeus 2 Emerged in 2009 Sold as crimeware kit, code for leaked in 2011 Murofet, Licat September 2010 September 2011 Private builds Gameover Zeus September 2011 June 2014 Private builds, introduced P2P protocol POST /gameover2.php HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* X-ID: 5555 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1;.NET CLR ) Host: pinkmite.com Content-Length: 3091 Connection: Keep-Alive B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 3 of 36
5 The Operation Technology JabberZeus crew / Zeus x Domain generation algorithm (DGA) Regexp targets file infector September 11, 2011: Upgrade x to Mapp 13 Initially peer-to-peer + traditional comms via gameover2.php Five years of existence Monetization Focus on corporate banking, additionally affiliate-specific attacks Individual operators often dropped other malware CryptoLocker first in-house development, destructive Not everybody used it: After locking the system, no fraud... B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 4 of 36
6 The Organization Group Composition Experienced criminal organization A mix of mainly Russian and Ukranian actors Dual leadership Support staff More than 20 groups 3 rd Party Services 3 rd party techs to set up and secure systems Preferred suppliers like loaders, exploit kits and spammers B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 5 of 36
7 Infrastructure Bulletproof Hosting Exclusive servers together Virtual IP addresses New address in 2 business days Exclusive and also very expensive Proxies, Proxies Everywhere! Proxies towards peer-to-peer network Proxies towards customers Multiple physical servers Zeus backend instances B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 6 of 36
8 Peer-to-Peer Network Gameover Zeus (Mapp) Builder Internal name Mapp command line application (still called zsb.exe) Builder gets kbucket peer list from a bot kbucket: distributed hash table (DHT) terminology Gameover Zeus uses hashes, but no table Used to control the peer-to-peer network using a private RSA key Can also enumerate peer-to-peer nodes Peer-to-Peer Network Monitoring Debug builds of bots to spot and fix issues with the peer-to-peer layer Backend had kbucket.php to extract reachable nodes Backup DGA system to retrieve signed seed peerlists Webinjects were able to use peer-to-peer functionality, too B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 7 of 36
9 C2 Protocol c7 d0 e2 7f e6 75 bd 0f 02 b1 f6 e2 90 ec 9b 72...u...r a7 5b b8 e bf cc 1a a1 70.[...$5.0...x.p d3 96 ee 80 e4 40 1e 7f 9d 80 ab 35 fb 0f fe c 27 6a b2 a2 e0 42 8e aa 7c df 17 3c 3e j...b....<> bd 4e 33 f7 5c da e ee 5b e8 d4 ce.n3.\...xi.[ ca ed e8 20 5a b8 42 a0 66 b8 c e f2 ee... Z.B.f...%N f ce fb 7d 6e 0d 03 ca a fc 71..G...n...% *.q a ee 10 d7 7b b 5d f6 40 cb d a 61 a7 17 de 55 e8 2f vFh.a...U./ e 3d 1b 3c ca 4d cf e d 04 3a F.=.<.M.X.nw.-.: 0000a0 9d d9 5c be c0 99 1c a c 7a 75 a6.xw.\...x.lzu. 0000b0 36 8d 78 0b bf 53 a9 df fe cf e be e1 7b 6.x..S...yX c0 44 d6 42 0a e c a 4d d0 bb c2 43 0a 47 0c 8c 68 3f 5b d a2 4e af..c.g..h?[.a..n. 0000e0 dd 6a b5 c7 d f 0c 4d a0 0b 02 e9 51 9b.j...FSO.M...Q. 0000f e cf c3 0a 26 bb 42 aa c1 95 (!x.77...&.b c e8 a6 b1 b6 76 fb 23 db 5d 0d Lu!B h...v.#.] d0 6f 0f 87 4a 86 c7 5a b4 c0 86 1f ba 32 ba 89.o..J..Z d7 06 d8 e7 d0 f5 9b 0d c1 ff fa b e c1...t.~ cc 94 e6 c6 58 ab f2 54 b9 6c ac 28 1f 5a 75...X..T.l.(.Zu e 4b 5e b2 1d 35 3c fc 8b db 7b 15 ^K^..5<..d B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 8 of 36
10 C2 Protocol f f POST /write HTTP f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 48 6f a /1.1..Host: defa c 74 0d 0a d 45 6e 63 6f ult..accept-enco e 67 3a 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e f ding:..connectio e 3a c 6f d 0a 43 6f 6e e n: close..conten d 4c 65 6e a d 0a 58 t-length: 238..X d a d 0a 0d 0a f4 -ID: e7 98 b8 f e3 9a a 11 5c be U *.\ aa ee c d6 3f <.? a b7 2f 62 c4 1a 5e d4 3f 9b 5e 88 8e /b..^.?.^..e a c...6B 0000b0 9a e e d.$E.QCy.S6..# c c RB f d c f2 55 b1 13 1d b1 4f ad f L.U...O..a 0000e0 d4 3f cd 9b ef c8 69 3d ?...i=g f f 5d a e e2...o]..t c ee 07 3c d6 c < e a8 f f3 9f 6e 0f T..n a df 4a 5e ca J^ ca 07 3c d6 cb < B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 9 of 36
11 Configuration B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 10 of 36
12 Commands B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 11 of 36
13 Espionage Things you do not expect to see in financial malware: Additional malware dropped to spy on systems. Georgia Turkey Ukraine OPEC Targeting intelligence agencies and other government information Targeting government information but also information pertaining to conflict in Syria Started with recent conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, specifically looking for information from intelligence agencies Older campaigns seemingly related to all countries involved with OPEC B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 12 of 36
14 P2P Poisoning Attack B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 13 of 36
15 Botnet Topology P2P Layer Daily configuration updates Weekly binary updates B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 14 of 36
16 Botnet Topology P2P Layer Daily configuration updates Weekly binary updates Proxy Nodes Announced by special messages Route C2 communication Stolen data Commands B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 14 of 36
17 Botnet Topology P2P Layer Daily configuration updates Weekly binary updates Proxy Nodes Announced by special messages Route C2 communication Stolen data Commands C2 Proxies Plain HTTP proxies Additional layer between botnet and backend B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 14 of 36
18 Peer-to-Peer Protocol Primitives Message Types No. Meaning Comment 00 Version Request Ask for binary/config version 01 Version Report version information 02 Peerlist Request Ask peer for some neighbors 03 Peerlist Report up to 10 neighbor peers 04 Data Request Ask for binary or config 05 Data Current binary or config 06 Proxy List Contains list of proxy nodes 50 Proxy Announcement Used to propagate a proxy node 204 C2 Message Sent to proxy nodes, wraps C2 data B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 15 of 36
19 Peerlist Request Type 02 Padding Length 50 Session ID c577aabe9d03a499601d2df4139e9c816bef8ce7 Bot ID e74bce83d aac4b7b238f14d89cf55eb f c5 77 aa be 9d 03 a d 2d f e 9c 81 6b ef 8c e7 4b ce 83 d aa c4 b7 b2 38 f1 4d 89 cf 55 eb 53 4d 31 9b c f a 6b bd 3a 24 0a 3b d2 f6 9a a6 b5 e0 ab 4e a ca 4c 9e b3 d8 a1 4a f0 ee c9 b6 72 c2 4b 9a c6 52 e ed fd da 17 dc 98 b ab 1e 0a 4f 6c 7d 8e f b3 a2 a a f7 2e b1 44 cf fe e d c 35 de ff e2 b4 8d b 35 8a ca f7 4a cb 29 af 99 a7 ba 10 e a0 8d 9f b 65 ad 1b ef ef b7 a2 ae 2b b0 df ea 28 8a 2f 4a 06 2a ed 5b aa da 51 a7 a c0 76 be 4a a bf 09 9d 67 b3 c6 01 5f d0 d6 48 7e b8 65 d f 01 B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 16 of 36
20 Peerlist Response Type 03 Padding Length 02 Session ID c577aabe9d03a499601d2df4139e9c816bef8ce7 Bot ID b78f557456f15c7a65f370b8150d261b5f Peerlist b78f557456f15c7a65f370b8150d261b5f : f1dab7004aaad6381c703a639dc758146cbd4f : d1bf2fb998c4b d7eb603efd7a : bc0620feef71b6a5d087d6f48637e95af1c5d : b0c1d8b7fb6cda19ea4407dc82f24a67008f : ca13970ab b9bafc70537fed2a85c : c363c17e8b3528f2e20080e5fbc32eef6fcb : ce43f39cc89e3335ef2e36bf4ec5a9166f7c1b : df3e87386c6c9d862126d00cabafb2344e82a : d9de127d908485aede02865d5725db684290b :1048 B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 17 of 36
21 Attack Sinkholing through Peer-to-Peer Poisoning Goal: Isolate bots, prevent normal operation Method: Replace peerlist entries with sinkholes B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 18 of 36
22 Attack Sinkholing through Peer-to-Peer Poisoning Goal: Isolate bots, prevent normal operation Method: Replace peerlist entries with sinkholes B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 18 of 36
23 Sinkholing Attack Poisoning Example Bot peerlist before the attack: Bot ID IP address Port c2ad2c7621e8cc9057e8ee0fe678acdf216f8d0f c28df459e506e3fbaf0fe4e09c3e8a1fcc697f e6684b8016ad93410bc94803d1da f c19aff3ecf6a2e baad118ee528ccd43ce d0445ac21017cf fc045e23a4d65dba b dc1a0e19d1461ccb5688e e10fa5a555f ceef2380da034dc c1ff72dda a43079ed aaf b d876a9dd4a3b01b f189aed c3575bcd52b97c1484bee81dfa1bfcf5d3fd B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 19 of 36
24 Sinkholing Attack Poisoning Example Bot peerlist after the attack: Bot ID IP address Port f1d2d2f924e986ac86fdf7b36c94bcdf32beec e242ed3bffccdf271b7fbaf34ed72d089537b42f B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 20 of 36
25 Sinkholing Attack Things to Consider Peer-to-peer poisoning prevents propagation of information between peers But C2 communication still possible B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 21 of 36
26 Controlling the Proxy Layer Proxy Layer Poisoning Attack Peers maintain sorted lists of up to 20 proxies, regular checks if still active Proxy list poisoning similar to peer list poisoning Must force a switch to a new proxy Happens only if current proxy (or backend) becomes unreachable Requires collaboration with Internet Service Providers B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 22 of 36
27 Controlling the Proxy Layer Proxy Layer Poisoning Attack Peers maintain sorted lists of up to 20 proxies, regular checks if still active Proxy list poisoning similar to peer list poisoning Must force a switch to a new proxy Happens only if current proxy (or backend) becomes unreachable Requires collaboration with Internet Service Providers B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 22 of 36
28 Controlling the DGA Layer Backup Channel Takeover Reverse-engineered and reimplemented Domain Generation Algorithm Pointed pre-computed DGA domains to a web server Served a special seed peerlist from there Top-Level Domains 5 US-based (.com,.org,.net,.biz,.info)... and.ru Required collaboration with domain registries Some volunteered Others required a court order B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 23 of 36
29 Putting It All Together B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 24 of 36
30 Putting It All Together B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 24 of 36
31 Putting It All Together B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 24 of 36
32 Putting It All Together B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 24 of 36
33 Putting It All Together B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 24 of 36
34 Putting It All Together B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 24 of 36
35 Putting It All Together B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 24 of 36
36 The Criminal Investigation B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 25 of 36
37 Fraud Cycle Modus Operandi Spam, infection, account takeover, fraud, international wire, DDoS attack against FI, funds laundered Losses ranged from $10,000 to $6,900,000 B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 26 of 36
38 Infection Method Blackhole Exploit Kit Specific configuration for Gameover Zeus cron update.php file Redirect to Google s Chrome page without proper referrer wget -qo - update.php./files/175dacb26 md5 is 796cddf7239eca64025cadce41d361d5 written./files/1e105e4bba md5 is 58787c143811f537b3fe529d52e755dd http: 58787c143811f537b3fe529d52e755dd equal md5./files/705a0d5d31 md5 is d77 module=exetask&id=102&mode=getloader&name=/ldr int2.exe md5 is d b 35e239b4a819601dc35b00f96087f26c 35e239b4a819601dc35b00f96087f26c equal md5./files/d2d2b83280 md5 is b29 module=exetask&id=53&mode=getloader&name=/ldr ninja.exe md5 is b29ce ea29c1d4bb0c84f129b347ca7bff9 B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 27 of 36
39 Business Club Superadmin Panel Starting on September 19, 2011, we are beginning to work through the panel where you now find yourselves. (fraudulent) Money transferors and drop (mule) managers are synchronizing their work through our panel, which enables a much greater optimization of the work process and increase in the productivity of our work. Starting from this moment, all drop (mule) managers with whom we are working, and all (fraudulent) money transferors who work with us are working through this panel. We wish you all successful and productive work. B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 28 of 36
40 Business Club Superadmin Panel Starting on September 19, 2011, we are beginning to work through the panel where you now find yourselves. (fraudulent) Money transferors and drop (mule) managers are synchronizing their work through our panel, which enables a much greater optimization of the work process and increase in the productivity of our work. Starting from this moment, all drop (mule) managers with whom we are working, and all (fraudulent) money transferors who work with us are working through this panel. We wish you all successful and productive work. B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 28 of 36
41 Business Club B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 29 of 36
42 Business Club B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 29 of 36
43 Business Club B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 29 of 36
44 Ledger System B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 30 of 36
45 MegaPlan B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 31 of 36
46 Connecting the Dots Personal Account Evgeniy Bogachev Otradnaya Evgeniy Bogachev Otradnaya Evgeniy Bogachev Otradnaya Evgeniy Bogachev Otradnaya Businessclub root Login {29/Sep/2011: HTTP/1.1" "-" "Mozilla/ (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/ [29/Sep/2011 /sadmin.php?act=drops&wft HTTP/ Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:8.0a2) [29/Sep/ "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macin B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 32 of 36
47 Evgeniy Bogachev B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 33 of 36
48 Civil Action Temporary Restraining Order Ordered defendants (Bogachev) to cease activity Authorized establishment of substitute server Ordered Registries to redirect DGA traffic Ordered Registries to cease CryptoLocker DGA registration Ordered Internet Service Providers to block connections with DGA.ru domains B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 34 of 36
49 Profit? B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 35 of 36
50 Thank You. B. Stone-Gross, T. Werner Gameover Zeus Bad Guys and Backends 36 of 36
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