Legal Watch: Disease. May Issue: 001

Transcription

1 Legal Watch: Disease May 2014 Issue: 001

2 The post Mitchell landscape has there been a shift in the judicial approach? We are all now getting used to litigating in a post Mitchell world, more than four months after the decision in that case was made. In Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Limited (2013) the Court of Appeal decided that the courts should still consider all the circumstances of the case and ensure that the parties are on an equal footing but also held that a sanction ordered will apply unless: (i) the breach is trivial or (ii) there is good reason for it. Panic broke out among litigators on both sides, including those dealing with disease claims, as draconian orders were made by judges around the country. Applications had to be made In This Issue: The post Mitchell landscape has there been a shift in the judicial approach? Dockworker fails to overcome limitation hurdle The Plexus NIHL guide to success under s33 of the Limitation Act Widow succeeds in second action against husband s employer whenever it was feared that any court deadline would not be met. This was the case even if such deadlines were likely to be missed by a few hours or days or the parties had agreed a short extension that had no effect on the court timetable. The Plexus Disease team has, in recent months, been involved in various hearings where Mitchell issues have been debated. We thought it would be helpful to share our experience of the courts in the post Mitchell era. It is clear that the courts will continue to act robustly if parties are not complying with court orders but these cases and several other reported cases, show that in the main judges are being sensible and not going as far, or being as harsh, as many initially thought they would. Events Plexus and Greenwoods hold a series of events which are open to interested clients. See below for those being held in the next months: Personal Data Training Peninsular House MBIG Seminar Royal College of Physicians Credit Hire Training Milton Keynes

3 Serving medical evidence seven days late deemed trivial mesothelioma claim H v F High Court of Justice (March 2014) Our co-defendant had agreed to obtain medical evidence on behalf of all the defendants. Medical evidence was served seven days late. An application for relief was made one working day after the order expired. The hearing was before Master McCloud who accepted that as part of the High Court mesothelioma list, directions are by necessity tight to the point of being onerous. Inevitably there would be occasions when compliance would not be possible. Master McCloud found that the breach was trivial. The application for relief was prompt. It had no effect on the timetable. She was happy to grant relief. The claimant s solicitor who opposed the defendant s application was mildly rebuked. The Master regarded some co-operation between the parties in these circumstances as part of the overriding objective. She refused an application for costs from the claimant and made no order for costs. It is precisely this sort of satellite litigation which according to the Master is deeply unattractive. Master McCloud discouraged parties from making applications for debarral or other sanction where an opposing party is in breach. She was clearly of the view that this is not a sensible use of court time. She accepted that as the judge in the Mitchell hearing originally, she may be partly to blame for this. One consequence of a refusal to grant relief in this particular case is the possibility of a right of action by other innocent defendants against the defaulting solicitor. It is precisely this sort of satellite litigation which according to the Master is deeply unattractive. (David Jackson). Reluctance to strike out despite more than one breach work-related stress claim C v S Central London County Court (April 2014) At a directions hearing on 24 May 2013 the parties were ordered to file their pre-trial checklist by 4pm on 10 January It was also stated in the notice of trial that if the court fees were not paid by 10 January, the claim would automatically be struck out without further order, pursuant to CPR 3.7. No automatic sanction had been included in the original order. The claimant failed to comply with the deadlines and on 12 February 2014 made an application requesting a declaration as to whether the case was struck out and, if so, requesting relief from sanction. Deputy District Judge Wallis judged that the claim was not struck out. The notice of trial date was incorrect; it was not an order and neither was it a practice direction or rule. CPR 3.7 does not provide for automatic striking out if the fee is not paid. The court should send out a form N173 to remind a defaulting party to pay the fee and if this is not complied with, the claim would be struck out. The original order did not impose the sanction, therefore as far as the notice of trial purported to impose a sanction, it was a nullity. DDJ Wallis directed that if the claimant did not file her pretrial checklist, pay the fees and serve a copy of the former and a copy of the court fee receipt on the defendant by a specified date, the claim would be automatically struck out and she would pay the defendant s costs on an indemnity basis. In relation to costs of the application, the claimant pointed to the decision in Summit Navigation Limited v Generali Romania Asigurare Reasiguare SA and Another (2014), 03

4 arguing that as its application had been successful, costs of the application should be met by the defendant, which had opposed the application and lost. The defendant argued that as the application had only been necessary due to the claimant s default, she should bear her own costs of the application in any event. In Summit, the defendant s conduct in opposing the claimant s application for relief was deemed unreasonable, and the claimant was awarded its costs. In this case, the judge found that both parties had failed to follow through the rules and decided there would be no order as to costs. However, in obiter remarks, the judge commented that but for the fact that this claimant was over two months late filing her pre-trial checklist and paying the court fees, the judge would have made the usual costs order in favour of the claimant. No application to vary the order had been made and the default was not trivial. The implication is that had the default been seen as trivial, costs of the claimant s application would have been ordered against the defendant. (Mark Bush) Court declines to follow Mitchell in similar circumstances asthma claim C v L - Manchester County Court (January 2014) The court ordered that the parties file and serve a case summary and precedent H cost budget form, three clear days before the case management conference listed to take place on 16 January In circumstances not unlike the Mitchell case, the claimant s solicitors failed to comply with the order and did not actually serve their costs budget at all prior to the hearing. The district judge declared that Mitchell did not apply because the claim was issued prior to implementation of the new rules on 1 April 2013 and declined to criticise the claimant at all, despite ignoring the court order. Directions were ordered and the claim is proceeding without any costs penalties. (Neil Kochane) District judge takes sensible approach after strike out deafness claim H v S Coventry County Court (December 2013) After a clear order from the court, the claimant s solicitor failed to set up a telephone case management conference and, as the court heard nothing from them in the subsequent few days, the claim was struck out. Shortly thereafter an appeal was made and a hearing was listed. At the hearing that took place shortly after Mitchell hit the headlines, the district judge declined to follow its lead and was sympathetic to the claimant. He allowed the claim to be re-instated and stated that it would be wholly unfair to deny the claimant the chance of being compensated for a minor administrative error that could be remedied by an appropriate costs order. (Neil Kochane) the judge found that both parties had failed to follow through the rules and decided there would be no order as to costs. Judgment set aside as application made promptly deafness claim C v C Mansfield County Court (February 2014) In this claim, the insurer failed to respond to service of proceedings and the claimant s solicitors applied to enter judgment, which was approved by the court. On receipt of the notice, Plexus was instructed and an application to set aside judgment was promptly made. At the hearing, counsel for the claimant argued that the court should follow Mitchell and that we should fail in our application, being in effect one for relief from sanctions. We were, however, successful in getting judgment set aside. 04

5 The judge noted that the application was made promptly and thought that the breach was trivial, in particular as there were some prospects of a successful defence. We had reasonable arguments as to medical causation as it appeared that the audiogram taken by the claimant s expert did not comply with the Coles Guidelines. These arguments were helpful in persuading the district judge to set aside the judgment. (Neil Kochane) Further changes on the horizon There have been other recent developments that show that a sensible approach is being taken by the courts. It is also possibly an attempt to prevent so many applications being made for relief from sanctions, which have inundated the courts. At a meeting on 4 April the Civil Procedure Rule Committee reached an agreement to amend the CPR with a new buffer rule. This will alleviate the effects of Mitchell by allowing parties to extend certain case management directions by up to 28 days by agreement without the need for court approval. The proposed rule has been approved by the committee, but it is unlikely to come into force until late May or early June 2014, as it still requires parliamentary approval. We attended a hearing recently where the district judge agreed to an order that the parties be allowed permission to agree an extension of any direction without having to apply to the court, so long as it does not impact on the filing of pre-trial checklists and the trial window. We expect that similar orders are starting to be common place. of the courts are playing hard but fair. The rules will apply whether a claim is in litigation or not and insurers should be warned about the consequences of dealing with pre-action disclosure applications and the deadlines imposed by the court on that front too. Until the post Mitchell landscape is clearer, it is better to ensure that no court deadlines are missed. Neil Kochane The courts are therefore discouraging the opposition of minor and inconsequential breaches and frowning upon attempts to take advantage of situations where deadlines are narrowly missed. It appears that trivial breaches which have no effect in terms of prejudice to the other side or the timetable should not have the draconian Mitchell approach imposed on them. It was also emphasized in the Summit case that the courts should firmly discourage parties from taking futile and time wasting procedural points. The courts are therefore discouraging the opposition of minor and inconsequential breaches and frowning upon attempts to take advantage of situations where deadlines are narrowly missed. Although there are still some district judges who are taking the approach in Mitchell to the extreme, it appears that most 05

6 Dockworker fails to overcome limitation hurdle In Collins v Secretary of State for Business Innovation & Skills for purposes of limitation. What was in question was the The claimant, a former dockworker who was exposed to the lung cancer, which he had developed by May 2002, was the defendants succeeded with their limitation defence. asbestos and diagnosed with terminal cancer 35 years later, had delayed after becoming aware of his cause of action. The court refused to exercise its discretion to extend the time under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to allow his personal injury claim to proceed. His claim had significant weaknesses and the costs of defending it would outweigh the claimant s recoverable loss by a large margin. claimant s actual or constructive knowledge of the fact that attributable in whole or in part to his alleged exposure to asbestos. The court considered both the claimant s actual knowledge and his constructive knowledge. Actual knowledge In Mr Justice Nicol s judgment, the claimant did not have actual knowledge of the possible link between his lung The critical issue in this case was when the claimant had, or was deemed to have had, the necessary knowledge for purposes of limitation cancer and the exposure to asbestos until July 2009 when Background to have the necessary knowledge because of section 11(3) In May 2002 the claimant was diagnosed with terminal lung cancer and told that he only had a few months to live. Hospital records stated that he had worked with asbestos the advert was published. His medical records showed that the subject of his work with asbestos was raised on one occasion but perhaps not again. At the time of his diagnosis in 2002 it was quite understandable that his (and the treating doctors ) attention was focussed on his prognosis rather than the cause of the cancer. Constructive knowledge As the claimant did not have actual knowledge, it was necessary for the court to consider whether he was deemed of the Limitation Act. The leading authorities of Adams v Bracknell Forest (2005) and Johnson v Ministry of Defence (2012) were followed. in Tilbury docks. The claimant stated that the doctors There was an assumption that a person who had suffered a make the link between his exposure to asbestos and the Once the original shock of the diagnosis was over and the and he instructed solicitors in July 2009 after seeing a his condition would have prompted curiosity as to its cause and engineering expert reports were obtained by April 2010 to embark on inquiries and a certain amount of response Legal principles would have had the necessary knowledge by the middle of The critical issue in this case was when the claimant had, questions about his work history did not cause him to significant injury would be sufficiently curious to seek advice. cancer. His treatment was more successful than expected claimant responded so well to treatment, the seriousness of newspaper advertisement from a firm of solicitors. Medical in the mind of the reasonable man. Allowing for thinking time but proceedings were only issued in May time for the doctors, Nicol J considered that the claimant or was deemed to have had, the necessary knowledge Therefore the primary limitation period expired in mid- 06

7 Section 33 The claimant s action could still proceed if the court exercised its discretion to exclude the limitation defence. The fundamental test which the court had to apply was whether it would be equitable to allow the action to proceed. This requires consideration of the balance of prejudice to both parties. All the facts of the case are to be taken into account. Section 33 lists non-exhaustive factors which the judge had to consider. The judge held that the opening words of section 33(3) meant that the court could take account of the totality of difficulty which the defendants would have in defending the claim, including the full passage of time. The additional delay from 2006 to 2012 caused further prejudice to the defendants, even against the background of a lengthy lapse of time before the primary limitation period expired. In itself the period of some 35 years from around 1967 to 2002 hampered the defendants ability to defend the claim. The court also took account of the following factors: The claimant needed an extension of time of six years which was a significant period Commentary This is a useful decision for insurers defending asbestosrelated claims. It is often difficult to succeed with a limitation defence in these cases, particularly bearing in mind the length of time which will already have elapsed before the primary limitation period expired. However, the court in Collins confirmed that the full passage of time needs to be considered when reviewing the factors listed under section 33, not just the time after expiry of the primary limitation period. Nicol J also noted that the difficulty of properly assessing contribution between defendants due to the delay was a further aspect of prejudice, which the court was entitled to take into account (Buckler v Finnigan (2004)). The following article provides guidance on preparing a limitation defence in noise-induced hearing loss claims but the majority of the helpful practice points are equally relevant to the defence of asbestos-related claims. George Collins v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills (1) & Stena Line Irish Sea Ferries Ltd (2) [2013] EWHC 1117 (QB). Karen Scott Events occurred 46 to 66 years ago The claim had significant weaknesses None of the delay was attributable to procrastination by the defendants The claimant s memory was imprecise on many matters and he was not assisted much by contemporary records He had the burden of proving his case His claim did not have a good chance of success There was a disproportion between the likely recoverable loss and the litigation costs. The court was also permitted to take into account any difficulties in resolving apportionment between the defendants caused by the delay. Taking into account all those reasons, the court declined to exercise its discretion to extend time and the claimant s action was dismissed. 07

8 The Plexus NIHL guide to success under s33 of the Limitation Act Plexus Law have won several limitation trials in occupational noise induced hearing loss (NIHL) claims this year. On each occasion we have successfully argued that the claim is statute barred as a result of the claimant (C) failing to bring the claim within three years of the date he knew or ought to have known that he was suffering a disability. It is therefore worth highlighting a few relevant practice points which appear to significantly increase the chance of successfully persuading the court not to exercise its section 33 discretion to disapply the three year time limit under the Limitation Act It is not enough for the defendant s (D s) insurers to note the defendant company to be long since dissolved and simply argue that the prejudice must therefore speak for itself. The section 33 burden is on D to show exactly how C s delay has adversely affected D s investigations. In order to show this prejudice, you must be able to demonstrate the searches you have carried out in tracing documents and witnesses. These should ideally include Companies House searches for the named directors who should then be written to. In your letter to the directors include a detailed explanation of the documents you are trying to locate and why. It is not sufficient to ask that they contact you upon receipt of your letter to discuss their recollections, as they are probably unlikely to bother. If they don t reply, use all (proportionate) search tools available to you. For example, 192.com is useful in checking whether they have changed address recently. Google searches may show if they are directors of other companies, which may also assist. The court will not require that you take disproportionate steps (to the value and complexity of the claim) in tracing witnesses. For example, one firm of claimant solicitors will invariably send a list of names of up to 20 or so purported colleagues of the claimant and expect you to contact them all, arguing that you have not taken reasonable steps if you fail to do so. Unless such names are coupled with geographical references and some distinguishable features, such as age, marital status etc, you will not be expected to write to all 20,000 David Jones. However, it is important not to simply ignore any list of names the other side might offer. Actively try to get them to narrow the search effort down for you. Invite them to also contact these witnesses. After all, C has a duty to prove his case as much as you have a duty to show the prejudice suffered. If you have been unable to trace any witnesses for the defendant company but wish to raise limitation at trial (whether at a preliminary hearing or full trial) don t forget that, for the purposes of s33, you will be a witness in relation to the (fruitless or otherwise) searches and investigation attempts you have made. Your witness statement must be disclosed at the time of standard exchange of witness evidence. Post Mitchell you cannot wait to see if a preliminary hearing will be granted and then hope to make an application to rely on your limitation statement just before the trial. Be prepared, therefore, at an early stage to give evidence and ensure your searches have been thorough. Don t leave your searches to the last minute; expect to be cross examined on when you started searching. Remember that you can also contact the administrators/ liquidators and ask to attend their offices, if relatively nearby, to search through any documents retained by them. Under regulation 16(2) of the Insolvency Regulations 1994, a liquidator only has a duty to retain documents for 12 months after dissolution of the company, but some hang on to a surprising amount of documents. If you have been able to trace documents or witnesses, focus on how the information may be less cogent than if it had been obtained earlier i.e. might a document require a representative from the defendant company to interpret how it was implemented on a day-to-day basis? Might the witnesses memory have faded? How good is C s own memory? Put part 18 questions 08

9 to C to establish areas of vagueness and use this to highlight cogency issues (on both sides) resulting from C s delay. Remember that s33 is not simply about the prejudice to D arising out of C s delay in bringing his claim. This is only one of the six factors listed within s 33(3) that the judge will consider in deciding whether to exercise his discretion in disapplying the three-year time limit. It is useful to address each factor in turn within your defence and witness evidence. i.e. (a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff (c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent (if any) to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff, (e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages; (f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received... Note also that s33(3) allows the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case. The judge will therefore also take the value of the case into consideration or should be invited to. It is useful to highlight this in the defence. In a recent Plexus limitation trial the judge found that whilst 15,000 is a significant sum of money to the claimant if the claim were allowed to proceed, the defendant would be prejudiced as it would be at risk of paying out significant damages and costs to the claimant (as a result of its inability to investigate). It may be worth using QOCS to add some new emphasis to this point. In addition, you can use the recently revised overriding objective to give added advantage to your limitation defence. The court must now consider the question of proportionality to a greater extent than in previous years. It is therefore worth highlighting the case of Adams v Bracknell Forest BC [2005] 1 AC at paragraphs 53 to 54 per Lord Hoffman. Within those paragraphs he refers to the case of Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] PIQR P128, where Sir Murray Stuart-Smith said: The Limitation Acts are designed to protect defendants from the injustice of having to fight stale claims especially when any witnesses the defendants might have been able to rely on are not available or have no recollection and there are no documents to assist the court in deciding what was done or not done and why. These cases are very time consuming to prepare and try and they inevitably divert resources from the education authority to defending the claim rather than teach. Under section 33 the onus is on the claimant to establish that it would be equitable to allow the claim to proceed having regard to the balance of prejudice. The question of proportionality is now important in the exercise of any discretion, none more so than under section 33. Courts should be slow to exercise their discretion in favour of a claimant in the absence of cogent medical evidence showing a serious effect on the claimant s health or enjoyment of life and employability. The likely amount of an award is an important factor to consider, especially if, as is usual in these cases, they are likely to take a considerable time to try. The contesting of such a claim would be both expensive and likely to divert precious resources. Courts should be slow in such cases to find that the balance of prejudice is in favour of the claimant. Both the Adamson and Robinson cases involved claims against local authorities for alleged failures to diagnose dyslexia, but the same considerations apply to a case for noise-induced deafness. Such claims are time consuming and expensive to try. Accordingly, use this to argue that if C is allowed to proceed with his claim, significant further cost will be involved. For example, D will have to apply for a further medical expert, C will seek to instruct an expert engineer; both parties will have to carry out extensive and therefore costly further efforts to identify potential witnesses and hunt for documents. Such costs (and the resources of the parties and the court which will need to be allocated in order to deal with it) are likely to be disproportionate to the value of the case and its importance. On the precise issue of costs to the defendant, it is also worth bearing in mind that a claimant with a cast-iron claim against a defendant will suffer much greater prejudice than one whose claim is more speculative. As a judge in one recent limitation trial we ran noted It is not appropriate for me to form any firm view on liability at this preliminary stage, however, it does in my 09

10 judgment seem appropriate to recognise that this claimant has some significant hurdles to jump in order to establish her claim. Therefore, risk-assess your limitation defence at an early stage. Claims which have a reasonable defence on liability and causation are more likely to succeed on limitation for this reason. The above practice points demonstrate that, in order to successfully argue limitation, the onus is very much on the defendant to actively show why and how the discretion to extend the time limit should not be granted. It is not enough to simply say the claimant is out of time and therefore statute barred. Proceedings may actually be abandoned altogether if you start the searches early and exhaust all reasonably possible leads in searching for witnesses and documents, before settling the limitation witness evidence. Ultimately, early preparation for a limitation defence can lead to a significant costs saving in the post Jackson climate. Katherine van Aardt The above practice points demonstrate that, in order to successfully argue limitation, the onus is very much on the defendant to actively show why and how the discretion to extend the time limit should not be granted. 010

11 Widow succeeds in second action against husband s employer In the recent case of Monica Haxton v Philips Electronics UK Limited, the claimant succeeded in bringing a second action against the same defendant. This was an unusual asbestos case raising a point of some novelty. The court had to consider whether a wife who developed mesothelioma could claim for lost dependency on her late husband s earnings, based on her own curtailed life expectancy. Background The claimant s husband was exposed to asbestos whilst employed with the defendant. Mr Haxton worked as an electrician for the company for over 40 years until he retired in He developed symptoms of mesothelioma and died from the disease in Mrs Haxton (H) was never employed by the defendant but she had come into contact with asbestos when she washed her husband s work clothing. She too developed mesothelioma as a result of her secondary exposure. A medical report dated February 2013 estimated her life expectancy at between 6 and 12 months. H issued two separate proceedings against the same defendant, Philips (P). One was in her capacity as widow and administratrix of her late husband s estate under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, and also as a dependant under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (FAA). The claims were settled by consent, and damages for loss of dependency were based on the claimant s remaining life expectancy of only 0.7 years because of the mesothelioma. Further proceedings were brought in her own right for her damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty. Liability was again conceded and damages agreed at 310,000, save for one disputed item which was the subject of the appeal; the second action included a claim for the diminution of the value of her claim in the first action due to the reduction in her life expectancy. Legal Principles H argued that but for P s negligence, her life would not have been cut short and the assessment of her dependency claim in the first action would have been significantly greater. P should therefore compensate her for that loss. The issue was whether the claimant s common law dependency claim in her own right was a recoverable head of damage in law. The parties agreed damages in principle under this head (resulting from lost earnings and pension benefits), in the sum of 200,000. In the High Court, recovery was denied in relation to the claimant s future dependency claim. The High Court Judge, Mr David Pittaway QC, decided that the claimant ought not to be able to recover dependency for a period when she would never, in fact, be dependent. It would also be wrong to import the dependency loss which arose from the first proceedings into the second common law claim. The claimant appealed. The Court of Appeal (CA) therefore had to decide whether a claim for diminution in value of a dependency claim under the FAA was a recoverable head of damage at common law. Court of Appeal Findings The underlying principle in assessing the value of a dependency claim is laid down by section 3(1) of the FAA. Section 3(1) of the Act provides for the courts to award: such damages as are proportioned to the injury resulting from the death to the dependants respectively. Lord Justice Elias held that the wording of s 3(1) was to compensate the claimant for the loss suffered during the period of dependency and therefore could not be calculated by reference to a period beyond the claimant s lifetime. The significance of Mrs Haxton s own death is that 011

12 dependency would in any event have ended at that point even had her husband still been alive, and the widow suffers no loss after that date. The claimant was necessarily limited to damages calculated by reference to her own life expectancy. Therefore, she could not have claimed for the additional years of lost dependency in the first action. The CA therefore had to consider if it was a recoverable head of loss in the second action. It was common ground that there was no claim for dependency in common law. The FAA was intended to remedy that defect. The appeal court ruled that there was no policy reason which deprived a widow, who had contracted mesothelioma from contact with her husband s work clothes, from recovering common law damages for the loss she could not recover in a statutory cause of action, as the damages for future dependency in that action had been curtailed by her own shortened life expectancy. The court analysed the claimant s claim not as a claim for dependency but as a claim for the diminution of a chose in action. The FAA conferred a statutory right to recover for the loss of dependency and in the claimant s claim under that Act she could not recover more than her actual loss. However, there was no reason why the diminution in the value of that right resulting from P s negligence cannot be recovered as a head of loss in H s personal action. That did not interfere with the principles governing the payment of compensation under the legislation. These principles were left wholly unaffected. H s claim was a common law claim for damages for loss of dependency; it was a claim for diminution in the value of a valuable chose in action, a statutory right. The court confirmed that it is in principle legitimate to allow as a head of damage a diminution in value of a chose in action resulting from the negligent act. as he finds him. The particular facts of this case meant that it would be difficult to argue that the loss might be too remote. Commentary Although this was an unusual case in that the same defendant was common in both claims, it was not a material factor. The CA did not consider it material that the defendant was the same. However, there appear to have been important policy considerations. Refusing the claimant damages for her substantially reduced dependency claim, would have resulted in a windfall to the tortfeasor in this case. The judgment is therefore not surprising given that both the claimant and her husband s mesothelioma were caused by the same defendant s negligence. Although the court applied common law principles, the result is that a novel head of damage has been created. The case has potentially far reaching consequences particularly because the court said that it was immaterial that it was the same defendant in both sets of proceedings. The same principles will therefore apply in other cases where a claimant has a legal claim for damages against one defendant which is reduced in value because of a later negligent act by a second defendant. It is likely that remoteness of damage arguments will however carry more weight in such cases. Mrs Monica Haxton v Philips Electronics UK Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 4 Karen Scott The defendant did not argue that the claimant s loss was too remote but the court briefly considered this issue. It was reasonably foreseeable that curtailing someone s life might lead to the reduction in the value of a litigation claim. If a claimant has such claim, the wrongdoer must take his victim 012

13 Contact Us For more information please contact: Steve Phillips Partner T: E: Neil Kochane Partner T: E: Katherine van Aardt Associate Partner T: E: Publications If you would like to receive any of the below, please indicating which you would like to receive. Weekly: Legal Watch: Personal Injury Monthly: Legal Watch: Property Risks & Coverage Quarterly: Legal Watch: Counter Fraud Legal Watch: Disease Legal Watch: Health & Safety Legal Watch: Marine Legal Watch: Professional Indemnity Karen Scott Knowledge Management Lawyer T: E: To unsubscribe from this newsletter please The information and opinions contained in this document are not intended to be a comprehensive study, nor to provide legal advice, and should not be relied on or treated as a substitute for specific advice concerning individual situations. This document speaks as of its date and does not reflect any changes in law or practice after that date. Plexus Law and Greenwoods Solicitors are trading names of Parabis Law LLP, a Limited Liability Partnership incorporated in England & Wales. Reg No: OC Registered office: 8 Bedford Park, Croydon, Surrey CR0 2AP. Parabis Law LLP is authorised and regulated by the SRA.