Ordinary DNS: A? k.root-servers.net. com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net A Client's Resolver
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1 Ordinary DNS: A? com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net A k.root-servers.net
2 Ordinary DNS: A? com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net A k.root-servers.net A? google.com. NS ns1.google.com ns1.google.com A a.gtld-servers.net
3 Ordinary DNS: A? com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net A k.root-servers.net A? google.com. NS ns1.google.com ns1.google.com A a.gtld-servers.net A? A ns1.google.com
4 DNSSEC (with simplifications): A? DO! com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net
5 DNSSEC (with simplifications): A? DO com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net Delegation Signer identifies.com's public key (name and hash)
6 DNSSEC (with simplifications): A? DO com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net Retrieving.com's public key is complicated (actually involves multiple keys)
7 DNSSEC (with simplifications): A? DO com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net Specifies signature over another RR here, the above DS record
8 DNSSEC (with simplifications): A? DO com. NS a.gtld-servers.net a.gtld-servers.net. A com. DS description-of-com's-key com. RRSIG DS signature-of-that- DS-record-using-root's-key k.root-servers.net Note: no signature over NS or A!
9 DNSSEC (with simplifications): A? DO google.com. NS ns1.google.com ns1.google.com. A google.com. DS description-ofgoogle.com's-key google.com. RRSIG DS signatureof-that-ds-record-using-com's-key a.gtld-servers.net
10 DNSSEC (with simplifications): A? DO A RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-records-usinggoogle.com's-key ns1.google.com
11 DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! A? DO A ns1.evil.com
12 DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! A? DO A ns1.evil.com observes that the reply didn't include a signature, rejects it as insecure
13 DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! A? DO A RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usingevil.com's-key ns1.evil.com
14 DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! A? DO A RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usingevil.com's-key ns1.evil.com (1) If resolver didn't receive a signature from.com for evil.com's key, then it can't validate this signature & ignores reply since it's not properly signed
15 DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! A? DO A RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usingevil.com's-key ns1.evil.com (2) If resolver did receive a signature from.com for evil.com's key, then it knows the key is for evil.com and not google.com and ignores it
16 DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! A? DO A RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usinggoogle.com's-key ns1.evil.com
17 DNSSEC - Mallory attacks! A? DO A RRSIG A signature-of-the-a-record-usinggoogle.com's-key ns1.evil.com If signature actually comes from google.com's key, resolver will believe it but no such signature should exist unless either: (1) google.com intended to sign the RR, or (2) google.com's private key was compromised
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25 Credit: Steve Friedl
26 Credit: Steve Friedl
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