Risk & Hazard ID Management Program

Transcription

1 BMA Gregory Crinum Risk & Hazard ID Management Program ICMM Safety & Health Conference 2006 Matt Piscioneri

2 Gregory Crinum Mine

3 Gregory Crinum Mine Open cut operational since 1979 Underground commissioned 1997 Total of 330 employees Produces 5.5 million tonnes of coking coal per annum

4 The problem Risk management process was not consolidated Root cause of incidents identified as poor recognition of hazards and control of risks No defined team structure for risk assessments No defined process for authorisation and escalation of risk assessments

5 The Process Team Safety Manager 2 x Safety Advisors 5 x Site Safety and Health Representatives Assigned task Develop a risk management standard for site Develop all tools/forms required Develop training and assessment packages Roll out training Developed specific for the site by site personnel

6 Outcomes of team Risk Management Standard Clear, concise Kept simple and practical Used known matrix and consequence tables Risk based decision process for Determining RA team make up Authorisation / sign off Escalation to higher level risk assessment Training and Competency requirements Written assessment Practical components to prove competence

7 Flowchart GREGORY CRINUM RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW Risk Category JSA Team requirements determined by Risk Category Authorisation and escalation level determined by highest Residual Risk Category following JSA Authorisation and level determined by highest Residual Risk Category following SQRA or QRA EXTREME HIGH EXTREME: Conduct JSA involving a minimum of 3 team members, including a supervisor. HIGH: Conduct JSA involving a minimum of 3 team members, including a supervisor. Extreme High Consequence are High or Extreme High Consequences are Low, Minor or Moderate Manager escalates to SQRA/QRA Superintendent escalates to SQRA/QRA Superintendent Authorises Extreme High Consequence are High or Extreme SSE Authorises Manager Authorises MODERATE MODERATE: Conduct JSA involving a minimum of 2 team members. Moderate Low Supervisor Authorises Supervisor Authorises LOW Note: JSA team must be amended if higher risk categories are determined during the JSA LOW: Further risk assessment not required Perform an estimation of risk to determine the highest risk category associated with the task (use risk matrix)? The level of action and appropriate controls strategies must be formulated using the principles of ALARP (As Low As is Reasonably Practicable) CONSEQUENCE A H H E E E PROBABILITY B M H H E E C L M H E E D L L M H E E L L M H H NO NO NEED TO DO A TASK Do you UNDERSTAND the task? YES Is a documented procedure, JSA or work instruction available? YES Are you familiar with the procedure, JSA or work instruction? YES Conduct Pre-Task Risk Assessment (eg. GCM Take 5) Are all residual risks assessed as low? YES DO THE JOB Be alert for any changing circumstances (unsafe acts or unsafe conditions) that may introduce additional hazards or increase the risk of doing the job. NO Clarify with leader NO Review procedure, JSA or work instruction Where a current and authorised Procedure, work instruction, JSA or higher level risk assessment has already been reviewed, are all residual risks ALARP? SAO Process Monitoring, auditing & coaching

8 Outcomes of team Pre task risk assessment (Take 5) Simple prompts Key questions to focus on identifying hazards On the spot hazard ID & risk assessment Built in escalation process Training includes practice at identifying Obvious Hidden Developing and Unquantified hazards.

9 Outcomes of team Revised Job Step Assessment (JSA) format Defined team requirements Record of who was involved Approval process built in Non-consensus provision Compulsory sign-off by team Authorisation level defined based on residual risk.

10 JSA Minimum Team Requirements JSA Team requirements determined by Risk Category EXTREME: Conduct JSA involving a minimum of 3 team members, including a supervisor. HIGH: Conduct JSA involving a minimum of 3 team members, including a supervisor. MODERATE: Conduct JSA involving a minimum of 2 team members. Note: JSA team must be amended if higher risk categories are determined during the JSA All JSA teams must involve at least one content expert LOW: Further risk assessment not required

11 JSA Authorisation & Escalation Authorisation and escalation level determined by highest Residual Risk Category following JSA Authorisation and level determined by highest Residual Risk Category following SQRA or QRA Extreme Manager escalates to SQRA/QRA Extreme SSE Authorises High Consequences are major or critical Superintendent escalates to SQRA/QRA High Consequences are major or critical Manager Authorises High Consequences are low, minor or moderate Superintendent Authorises Moderate Supervisor Authorises Low Supervisor Authorises

12 Outcomes of team Hazard Reporting process Simple one page written report Sign off required by individual and supervisor Escalation built in for high risk hazards Data entered into reporting database

13 Training Four distinct modules Risk Management Overview Why? How? What? When? Hazard Identification Obvious, hidden, developing, unquantified Pre-task Risk Assessment (Take 5) Job Step Analysis

14 Training cont Focus on training for competency not compliance Limited sessions to a maximum of 15 Each session opened by GM or Production Manager Session took as long as required, production stopped if needed Average session approximately 6 hours Longest 11 Hours Shortest 4 hours Assessment included theory and practical exercises for Hazard Identification Pre-task risk assessment (Take 5) JSA process

15 Results Outcomes Increasing regular use of pre-task risk and JSA tools Increased hazard reporting (2000+ since implementation) 900+ JSA developed, documented and authorised Clear understanding of requirements for escalation and authorisation of risk assessments

16 Results - Training Exit Survey 82% agree they have a clear understanding of the RA policy 86% understand the concept of obvious, hidden, developing and unquantified hazards 89% agree they are confident that they could complete a Take 5 effectively 85% understand the JSA process including authorisation and escalation requirements 81% of attendees believe the training improved their ability to identify hazards and assess risk

17 Results Safe Day Survey (April 2006) 68% of respondents regularly used the Take 5 and JSA tools Greater acceptance and regular use of tools by contractors Risk & Hazard ID program identified as a major contributor to safety improvement Q9: I regularly use the Level 1 risk and hazard tools (e.g. Take 5 and JSA) 100% 90% 80% 78% 80% 70 Q20: What are the top 3 things that have recently lead to improvements in safety in the mine? 70% 60% 68% 61% % % 30% 27% 33% 40 20% 10% 0% 20% 17% 4% 6% 2% 3% Agree Undecided Disagree Agree Undecided Disagree Agree Undecided Disagree Agree Undecided Disagree All Crinum Mine Gregory Mine Contractor 10 0 Risk Management and Take 5 training Fatal Risk control protocols Fit for Work Policy New Hazard Reporting forms Engineering improvements Other Greater visibility of management Gregory's Mine

18 Challenges Culture acceptance of risk as part of industry Workforce acceptance of the process Interruptions to production Data entry Flow on effect (actions & follow up) Maintaining the quality & consistency of training

19 Next Steps Refresher training in Risk Management (all personnel) Supervisor training what needs to be covered before authorising a JSA Work continuing on identifying the Barriers to Zero Harm

20 Thank you