Analyzing Targeted Attacks through Hiryu An IOC Management and Visualization Tool. Hiroshi Soeda Incident Response Group, JPCERT/Coordination Center
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1 Analyzing Targeted Attacks through Hiryu An IOC Management and Visualization Tool Hiroshi Soeda Incident Response Group, JPCERT/Coordination Center
2 Agenda 1. Advanced attacks specifically targeting Japanese organizations APT Campaigns Getting IOC Motivation to Develop a Tool 2. Development of the tool Components Structure 3. Introducing Hiryu Web UI Import/Export Data Visualization 2
3 1. ADVANCED ATTACKS SPECIFICALLY TARGETING JAPANESE ORGANIZATIONS 3
4 APT Campaign (1) Cloudy Omega (Symantec) / Blue Termite (Kaspersky) Various targets Government, Defence industry, Energy sector, Think tank, Media TTP Before intrusion Malware called Emdivi used Malware attached s disguising medical bill notifications Drive-by download attacks After intrusion Steal domain administrator s account Active directory privilege escalation Kerberos KDC vulnerability (MS14-068) Behavior Gather information from network Exfiltration Using password protected RAR file Domain credentials, sensitive information 4
5 APT Campaign (2) Winnti (Kaspersky) / Axiom (Novetta) Target TTP Online gaming company Pharmaceutical industry Use malware signed by legitimate code signing certificates Register a task to install malware on the server Create a service to activate the malware and execute Behavior Steal code signing certificates Steal information 5
6 Getting IOC Victim Organization Firewall logs: -IP address of Source & Destination Proxy server logs: -IP address of Source (& Destination) -Destination URL C2 has: -Malware -Information of victim DNS server logs: -IP address of client -Query Access to C2 Query Connect Malware has: -C2 information Infected PC has: -Malware -Event log 6
7 Motivation to Develop a Tool Organizing information What types of malware are used in which attacks Correlation among IOCs in different incidents Overall picture of attack campaigns Collecting public information Need to organize IOCs published in blogs/reports by security vendors, as they sometimes link to the incidents Need to sort out attack groups and campaigns that are named uniquely by different security vendors 7
8 2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOOL 8
9 Components Django Web application framework vis.js Visualization library Neo4j (Optional) Graph Database Python modules pythonwhois ipwhois Py2neo for domain whois for ip whois Neo4j client library ioc_writer export IOC as OpenIOC format python-stix export IOC as STIX format 9
10 Neo4j Graph DB stores Nodes and Relations Using Cypher query language 10
11 Structure (1) Node Components include Relation Host name Domain name IP address Organization Malware (hash) File name Relation of Nodes Host name tied to IP address Organization tied to IP address Host name tied to domain name Malware connecting to IP address Multiple Properties can be registered to Nodes/Relations Property Combination of an arbitrary key and value e.g. Property of malware A Node md5: sha1: sha256: type: HTTP bot Relation B Property key1:value A key2:value B 11
12 Structure (2) Cluster Includes SubClusters e.g. Campaign name APT-x Operation X Data source SubCluster Include Nodes/Relations e.g. Incident Communication with C2 Malware attached s System s ticket 12
13 3. INTRODUCING HIRYU 13
14 Cluster 14
15 SubCluster(1) 15
16 SubCluster(2) 16
17 Additional Processing of Nodes Additional processing is performed when registering a specific type of Node Register host name Extracts domain names Searches whois for the domain name Extracts registrant s address from whois results DNS lookup for IP address Searches whois for the IP address Extracts organization name from whois results Hostname parse Domain whois Registrant lookup IP Address whois Organization 17
18 Schema 18
19 Import/Export Data CSV Able to import/export Node, Relation, Cluster, SubCluster Neo4j Able to push/pull Need to register an Index (a combination of the Node s label and main key) to import data OpenIOC Need a table of how OpenIOC terms and Index correspond STIX Able to import/export the following data Host name, Domain name, IP address 19
20 OpenIOC/STIX Correspondence Table Hiryu OpenIOC STIX & CybOX SubCluster metadata report:header name short_description Title description description Description Node Index term Cybox:Object Label Key IP address PortItem/remoteIP AddressObj Host name DnsEntryItem/Host HostnameObj Domain name - DomainNameObj 20
21 Visualization IP address Malware Registrant Domain Hostname Filename Organization 21
22 Visualization 22
23 ToDo Improve import/export of OpenIOC, STIX Currently, only limited data can be imported from STIX Import/Export is irreversible Implement a new feature on incident response timeline Record date/time and events A suspicious file created on the server A suspicious communication performed from the server May be achieved to a certain extent by adding time information to the Relations field Some events may be difficult to fit in Relations Received a malware sample from victim organization Reported analysis results to victim organization 23
24 Thank you for your attention My address Repository of Hiryu Incident report notifications 24
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