Targeted Intrusion Remediation: Lessons From The Front Lines. Jim Aldridge
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1 Targeted Intrusion Remediation: Lessons From The Front Lines Jim Aldridge
2 All information is derived from MANDIANT observations in non-classified environments. Information has beensanitized where necessary to protect our clients interests.
3 Remediating intrusions by targeted, persistent adversaries requires a different approach
4 Targeted Non-Targeted Criminals (e.g. attacking banks) Espionagemotivated, e.g. the APT Botnet herders Opportunists Hacktivists Disgruntled insiders Spammers
5 Targeted The adversary chose your organization for a reason Today, they want some piece of electronic information And will likely want more in the future They are not opportunistic intruders
6 Persistent (adopted from Richard Bejtlich s definition of APT) The adversary is formally tasked to accomplish a mission Like an intelligence unit, they receive directives and work to satisfy their masters Persistent does not necessarily mean they need to constantly execute malicious code on victim computers They maintain the level of interaction needed to execute their objectives
7 Threat (adopted from Richard Bejtlich s definition of APT) The adversary is not a piece of mindless code. This point is crucial. Some people throw around the term "threat" with reference to malware If malware had no human attached to it, then most malware would be of little worry (as long as it didn't degrade or deny data) The adversary here is a threat because it is organized and funded and motivated Some people speak of multiple "groups" consisting of dedicated "crews" with various missions
8 Traditional IR Doctrine
9 updated for the modern era
10 Agenda Targeted attack lifecycle Recommended approach Background: IR = Investigation + Remediation Prioritizing: The Remediation Planning Matrix The Remediation Event Posturing Strategic Activities
11 TARGETED ATTACK LIFECYCLE
12 Maintain Presence Move Laterally Initial Recon Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Recon Complete Mission 12
13 Company A High tech manufacturer Global presence 20,000 employees 24,000 workstations and laptops, 3,000 servers Company B Supplier to company A
14 Company C A service provider Targeted, Persistent Attacker Works on a regular schedule this is a job 14
15 APT Attack: Day One Company B Company A 15 1 Attacker has compromised Company B. 2 Attacker sends phishing s from Company B to a handful of employees of Company A, subject line: Re: Explanation of new pricing. contains malicious PDF attachment. 3 Bob opens the attachment. 4 A backdoor installed on Bob s workstation calls home by making an HTTPS request to a website. 5 The attacker, via the command and control (C2) server, executes commands on the victim PC. bad.dynamic-dns.com 6 The attacker now owns Bob s workstation. ( Hop point infrastructure was already deployed.) Company C
16 APT Attack: Days Two Four 1 Attacker queries Active Directory for a user and computer listing. 4 Attacker dumps all users password hashes from Active Directory, using the domain admin s credentials. Company A 5 Attacker infects another system with a different malware variant, using the domain admin credentials. another.bad.com bad.dynamic-dns.com 2 Attacker uses WCE to obtain admin and service account passwords from Bob s system. 3 Attacker connects to IT admins PCs using a service account he obtained from Bob s system. Uses WCE to obtain hashes. 16 (network boundary) 6 Attacker connects to engineer s workstation using compromised account; confirms location of crown jewels 7 Connects to Alice s system, using her password 8 from there connects to the server, and pulls back engineering data 9 and encrypts them into RAR archives. (network boundary)
17 Takeaways: The organization was targeted for a reason The attacker s goals Accomplish their mission Remain undetected Maintain access to the network Defense is not what it used to be Cannot prevent instead think inhibit And, focus on detecting and responding quickly 17
18 Win by: Inhibiting Make the attacker s job difficult but realize he will succeed in establishing a foothold Detecting Capability to proactively identify anomalies Ability to quickly answer investigative questions Enhancing response capabilities Investigate + remediate in hours, not months/years 18
19 RECOMMENDED APPROACH
20 Response = Investigate + Remediate Investigation Scope of compromise Attacker TTPs Data loss Attribution and attacker motivations Remediation Mitigate current threat Make it more difficult for future attackers More rapidly detect future activity Analyze lessons learned and strengthen security program 20
21 Attacker TTPs drive the approach Attacker TTPs Established a foothold Lateral movement capability Methods of evading detection Specific malware and tools deployed Specific command-and-control (C2) networks Key Remediation Tactics Isolate environment during remediation Execute contain/eradicate activities over a short time period Block C2 and implement rapid alerting mechanism Inhibit attacker and improve visibility to detect future attacker activities 21
22 Remediation phases Remediation encompasses containment, eradication and recovery. A remediation eventas a short, defined period of time during which an organization Mitigates the current threat Implements enhancements to directly frustrate attackers techniques Posturing Remediation Event(s) Strategic 22
23 The Remediation Event 1. Isolate WAN from the Internet. 2. Block egress traffic to attacker C2 addresses & domains. 3. Replace compromised systems. 4. Reset passwords. 5. Implement technical countermeasures that directly address the attack lifecycle: a) Secure Windows local administrator accounts b) Patch third-party desktop applications c) Implement application whitelisting (critical systems) d) Block workstation-to-workstation communication 6. Validate effective implementation of tasks 7. Reconnect Internet *NB: One size does not fit all. 23
24 The Remediation Event Execute event when: Thorough understanding of the extent of the compromise Know the attacker s tactics Can reliably detect the attackers malware and tools 24
25 Remediation phases Remediation is preceded by posturing Implement triage countermeasures that do not disrupt the investigation Plan for the remediation event(s) Instrument the environment to make it more investigation-ready Remediation is followed by the implementation of strategic initiatives Longer-term security improvements that are not tactically necessary for remediation Posturing Remediation Event(s) Strategic 25
26 Caveats Some situations warrant immediate containment, e.g. when Attacker knowing that you are remediating [has less impact than] Consequences of not containing
27 Caveats in Action Example: financial breach, smash-and-grab Attackers are about to steal millions in cash Attackers are not interested in maintaining access Immediate containment is likely justified
28 Prioritizing initiatives
29 Maintain Presence Move Laterally Initial Recon Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Recon Complete Mission Initial Recon Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Recon Move Laterally Maintain Presence Complete Mission Inhibit Detect Respond Threat Intelligence Operational Visibility Operational Complexities Business Drivers Resource Constraints
30 Plan the remediation workstream Posturing
31 Enhance logging and monitoring Posturing
32 Prepare enterprise-wide password change Posturing
33 Posturing Focus on the most impactful defensive measures
34 Investing in people Strategic
35 Creating an investigation-ready environment Strategic
36 Enhancing authentication and authorization Strategic
37 Improving the network architecture Strategic
38 Summary Targeted, persistent threats require a different approach for remediation success. Redefine winning: such attackers will return. Plan countermeasures that directly address the attack lifecycle to optimize chances of success.
39 Contact information Jim.Aldridge at Mandiant.com About MANDIANT: MANDIANT is the information security industry s leading provider of incident response and computer forensics solutions and services. MANDIANT provides products, professional services and education to Fortune 500 companies, financial institutions, government agencies, domestic and foreign police departments and leading U.S. law firms. To learn more about MANDIANT visit read M-unition, the company blog: or follow on Twitter@MANDIANT.
All Information is derived from Mandiant consulting in a non-classified environment.
Disclaimer: All Information is derived from Mandiant consulting in a non-classified environment. Case Studies are representative of industry trends and have been derived from multiple client engagements.
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