Subject: State-Level Information on Negative Home Equity and Loan Performance in the Nonprime Mortgage Market

Transcription

1 United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC May 14, 2010 The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney Chair Joint Economic Committee House of Representatives The Honorable Charles E. Schumer Vice Chairman Joint Economic Committee United States Senate Subject: State-Level Information on Negative Home Equity and Loan Performance in the Nonprime Mortgage Market The decline of home prices in many parts of the country has left millions of homeowners with negative home equity, meaning that their outstanding mortgage balances exceed the current value of their homes. As we reported to you previously, a substantial proportion of borrowers with active nonprime mortgages (including subprime and Alt-A loans) had negative equity in their homes as of June 30, For example, among the 16 metropolitan areas examined, we estimated that the percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity ranged from about 9 percent (Denver, Colorado) to more than 90 percent (Las Vegas, Nevada). Research indicates that negative home equity substantially increases the risk of mortgage delinquency, making it an important dimension of ongoing problems in the nonprime market. To provide insight into how negative equity and loan performance among nonprime borrowers have varied by location and over time, this report examines, at the state level, the estimated proportion of nonprime borrowers with active loans that were in a negative equity position and the proportion that were seriously on their loan payments from 2006 through the end of This report is part of our broader examination of the evolution and condition of the nonprime market segment. 3 As agreed with your offices, in a subsequent report we will provide more detailed 1 GAO, Loan Performance and Negative Home Equity in the Nonprime Mortgage Market, GAO R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2009). 2 We considered loans to be seriously if borrowers were 90 days or more late on their mortgage payments or in the foreclosure process. 3 See GAO R and GAO, Characteristics and Performance of Nonprime Mortgages, GAO R (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2009).

2 information on the performance of nonprime mortgages through the end of 2009, the influence of nonprime loan and borrower characteristics and economic conditions on the likelihood of mortgage default, and the features and limitations of primary sources of data on nonprime mortgage performance and borrower characteristics. To conduct our work, we used data from CoreLogic s (formerly LoanPerformance) Asset-Backed Securities Database for nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007 and CoreLogic s state-level Single Family Combined House Price Index (CoreLogic index). The CoreLogic database contains loan-level data on a large majority of nonagency securitized mortgages in subprime and Alt-A pools. 4 For example, for the period January 2001 through July 2007 the CoreLogic database contains information covering, in dollar terms, an estimated 87 percent of securitized subprime loans and 98 percent of securitized Alt-A loans. Researchers have found that nonprime mortgages that were not securitized (i.e., mortgages that lenders held in their portfolios) may have less risky characteristics and better performance histories than those that were securitized. For purposes of our analysis, we defined a subprime loan as a loan in a subprime pool and an Alt-A loan as a loan in an Alt-A pool. 5 We focused our analysis on first-lien purchase and refinance mortgages for one-to-four-family residential units. We included only loans that were active in a given quarter; loans that were inactive because they had been paid off or had completed the foreclosure process were excluded. The CoreLogic index, like other house price indexes, measures house price changes in a geographic area based on sales of the same properties at different points in time. The use of repeat transactions on the same homes helps to control for differences in the quality of the houses in the data. The CoreLogic index is based on all usable transactions from CoreLogic s public record, servicing, and securities databases of single family attached and detached homes with all types of financing, including prime and nonprime loans. 6 4 Nonagency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), also known as private-label MBS, are backed by nonconforming conventional mortgages securitized primarily by investment banks. Nonconforming mortgages are those that do not meet the purchase requirements of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac because they are too large or do not meet their underwriting criteria. About 75 percent of subprime and Alt-A mortgages originated from 2001 through 2007 were securitized. 5 The CoreLogic database has a loan-level indicator for loan class (i.e., subprime or Alt-A), but it is not well populated. Therefore, we used the pool-level classification. According to mortgage researchers, some of the loans in subprime pools may not be subprime loans, and some of the loans in Alt-A pools may not be Alt-A loans. 6 Single family attached and detached homes include condominiums, townhouses, and cooperatives. Newly constructed homes are necessarily excluded from the index because they have not been sold repeatedly. The CoreLogic index uses a value-weighted regression model that gives greater weight to price trends for more expensive homes than other homes. To limit the influence of atypical changes in the value of individual homes, the CoreLogic index also excludes certain transactions, such as nonarms length sales, those with outlier prices, closely spaced sales that may represent investor churning or flipping, and sales with unusually high appreciation rates that likely indicate significant property improvements. Page 2

3 To estimate the proportion of nonprime borrowers with active loans that had negative equity, we used the CoreLogic index to adjust the appraised value of each home at loan origination to an estimated value at the end of each quarter from March 2006 through December 2009, the most recent quarterly data that we could analyze within the time frames of our review. We then subtracted the unpaid mortgage balance from the estimated house value as of each quarter to estimate the borrower s home equity. We divided the number of nonprime borrowers with negative home equity by the total number of active nonprime loans in each quarter to determine the proportion with negative equity (negative equity rate). 7 Due to data limitations, our analysis did not account for nonprime borrowers with second liens or multiple mortgaged properties. 8 Additionally, the CoreLogic index that we used represents price trends at the state level. Depending on the degree to which homes financed with nonprime loans were concentrated in areas with house price trends that differed from statewide trends, our estimates could overstate or understate the number of nonprime borrowers with negative equity. To determine the proportion of nonprime borrowers that were seriously on their mortgage payments, we divided the number of nonprime loans that were more than 90 days past due or were in the foreclosure process by the total number of active nonprime loans in each quarter (serious delinquency rate). In addition, we analyzed the extent to which changes in estimated negative equity rates were associated with changes in serious delinquency rates from the first quarter of 2006 through the end of Specifically, we measured the statistical correlation between percentage point changes in the estimated proportion of nonprime borrowers with negative equity in each state and the proportion of nonprime borrowers that were seriously in each state. 9 We assessed the reliability of the data used in this report by reviewing documentation on the process CoreLogic uses to collect and ensure the reliability and integrity of the data and by conducting reasonableness checks on data elements to identify any missing, erroneous, or outlying data. We also interviewed CoreLogic representatives to discuss the interpretation of various data fields. We concluded that the data we used were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted this engagement in Washington, D.C., and Chicago, Illinois, from March 2010 through May 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 7 Our analysis focused on whether or not a nonprime borrower was in a negative equity position. We did not estimate the extent to which a nonprime borrower s outstanding loan balance exceeded the estimated value of the home, a factor that could affect the probability of serious delinquency for a given loan. 8 To the extent that nonprime borrowers had second liens, our analysis may understate the extent of negative home equity. To the extent that some nonprime borrowers had more than one mortgaged property, our results may overstate the actual number of individual nonprime borrowers with negative home equity. 9 Correlation is the degree to which two variables movements are associated. Our analysis used a statistical measure of association the Pearson s correlation coefficient which ranges in value from negative 1 to positive 1, with negative 1 indicating a perfect negative correlation, 0 an absence of correlation, and positive 1 a perfect positive correlation. Page 3

4 require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. Summary For most states and the District of Columbia, the estimated percentage of nonprime borrowers with active loans that were in a negative equity position increased from 2006 through mid-2008 and then remained fairly stable through the end of Growth in negative equity rates during that period varied widely among the states. Negative equity rates rose by at least 30 percentage points in 7 states, by 10 to 29.9 percentage points in 17 states, and by 5 to 9.9 percentage points in 9 states. Eighteen states negative equity rates grew by less than 5 percentage points, including 3 states where the percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity increased negligibly. For all states and the District of Columbia, the percentage of nonprime borrowers that were seriously 90 days or more late in payments or in the foreclosure process increased from the first quarter of 2006 through the end of 2009, with growth ranging from 5.3 percentage points in Louisiana to 43.3 percentage points in Florida. Additionally, across all states and the District of Columbia, our measures for increases in estimated negative equity and serious delinquency rates exhibited a positive statistical correlation. Consistent with this observation, 6 of the 10 states that experienced the largest percentage point increases in negative equity rates also were among the 10 states with the largest percentage point increases in serious delinquency rates. However, the remaining 4 states ranked from 12th to 26th in their increases in serious delinquency rates. Background The nonprime mortgage market has two segments: Subprime. Generally serves borrowers with blemished or limited credit histories, and the loans feature higher interest rates and fees than prime loans. Alt-A. Generally serves borrowers whose credit histories are close to prime, but the loans have one or more high-risk features, such as limited documentation of income or assets or the option of making monthly payments that are lower than would be required for a fully amortizing loan. Active mortgages can fall into any one of several payment categories: Current. The borrower is meeting scheduled payments. Delinquent. The borrower has missed one or more scheduled payments. Page 4

5 Default. The borrower is 90 days or more. 10 At this point, foreclosure proceedings against the borrower become a strong possibility. In the foreclosure process. The borrower has been for more than 90 days, and the lender has elected to foreclose in what is an often lengthy process with several possible outcomes. For instance, the borrower may sell the property or the lender may repossess the home. In this report, we describe borrowers whose mortgages are in default or in the foreclosure process as seriously. Typically, home equity that is, the difference between the value of a property and the amount still owed on the mortgage increases over time as the mortgage balance is paid down and home values appreciate. However, if the home value falls below the mortgage balance, the borrower will be in a position of negative equity. Borrowers with nonprime loans may be particularly vulnerable to negative equity because they typically make small down payments and thus have less equity at the outset than a typical prime borrower. Also, some nonprime borrowers have loans with payment options that allow them to defer payment of accrued interest, thereby increasing the outstanding loan balance and decreasing equity. In general, lower levels of home equity (as a percentage of home value) are associated with relatively poorer loan performance. Homeowners with negative equity may find it difficult to sell or refinance the property to avoid foreclosure. They may also have incentives to stop making mortgage payments to minimize their financial losses. Across States, Negative Home Equity Generally Increased from 2006 through Mid-2008 before Leveling Off, While Serious Delinquency Rates Continued to Grow through the End of 2009 Estimated Rates of Negative Equity Generally Increased through Mid-2008 and Then Remained Relatively Stable The estimated percentage of nonprime borrowers in a negative equity position generally increased from 2006 through mid-2008, with negative equity rates holding more steady through the end of Across all states and the District of Columbia, the estimated percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity increased from 13 percent in the first quarter of 2006 to 35 percent in the first quarter of 2008, and 10 There is no uniform definition of default across the lending industry. For purposes of this report, we use the definition provided. 11 Our quarterly estimates of negative equity include only borrowers whose loans were active at the end of each quarter. Page 5

6 then remained between 36 and 37 percent through the end of 2009 (see fig. 1). 12 The number of nonprime borrowers in a negative equity position increased from about 940,000 in the first quarter of 2006 to about 2.52 million at the end of 2007, and then declined to about 1.86 million by the end of The percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity remained relatively stable while the number with negative equity decreased because the total number of active nonprime loans also decreased from mid-2007 through the end of 2009, as mortgages were prepaid or completed foreclosure. Figure 1: Estimated Number and Percentage of Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Home Equity from March 31, 2006, through December 31, 2009 in millions 3.0 Percentage Estimated number of borrowers Estimated percentage Note: The analysis includes nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007, so the number of active nonprime loans increased from about 7 million in the first quarter of 2006 to nearly 8.4 million in the second quarter of As loans became inactive as a result of prepayment and completed foreclosures, the number of active nonprime loans decreased to about 5.1 million by the end of The decrease in the number of active loans accounts for the stable percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity even as the number decreased. 12 Using a different house price index, we previously estimated that 25 percent of borrowers who obtained nonprime mortgages from 2000 through 2007 and whose loans were active as of June 30, 2009, had negative equity as of that date (see GAO R). That estimate used the Federal Housing Finance Agency s (FHFA) All-Transactions Index for 384 metropolitan areas covering approximately 84 percent of the U.S. population. The FHFA index does not include data for homes with certain types of financing, including subprime mortgages. We noted that our estimates using the FHFA index likely understated the extent of negative equity among nonprime borrowers. The CoreLogic state-level house price index, by contrast, includes all types of financing and transactions outside of metropolitan areas. 13 At the end of 2009, 66 percent of the borrowers with negative equity had mortgages on homes in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada, the four states with the largest percentage point increases in negative equity rates. Page 6

7 The extent to which estimated negative equity rates increased varied widely among the states. Seven states had an increase of at least 30 percentage points from the first quarter of 2006 through the end of 2009 (see fig. 2). The largest increases occurred in Arizona and Florida, each of which saw negative equity rates rise by 44 percentage points (from 24 percent to 68 percent in Arizona and from 28 percent to 72 percent in Florida). Eighteen states had an increase of less than 5 percentage points during the period including North Dakota, South Dakota, and Oklahoma, which had negligible increases of less than 1 percentage point. Across all states, the median increase was about 9 percentage points, represented by South Carolina (rising from 1.6 percent to 10.4 percent). 14 In general, the states negative equity rates grew through the second quarter of 2008 and then held relatively steady through the end of For example, California s negative equity rate increased by 4.2 percentage points per quarter from the first quarter of 2006 through the second quarter of 2008 (rising from 23.5 to 60.9 percent), and then grew just slightly (0.06 percentage points per quarter) to end 2009 at 61.3 percent. See Enclosure I for quarterly information on the estimated number and percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity in each state from 2006 through That is, South Carolina ranked in the middle (26th) among the 50 states and the District of Columbia in the increase in negative equity rates. 15 Some states experienced a modest decrease in their negative equity rates from the second quarter of 2008 through the end of For example, Hawaii s rate decreased by 0.4 percentage points, Kentucky s decreased by 0.2 percentage points, and Mississippi s decreased by 0.9 percentage points. Page 7

8 Figure 2: Percentage Point Change in the Estimated Percentage of Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Home Equity by State, March 31, 2006, through December 31, 2009 >0 to 4.9 percentage points 5.0 to 9.9 percentage points 10.0 to 19.9 percentage points 20.0 to 29.9 percentage points 30.0 or more percentage points Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index; MapInfo (map). Note: Our quarterly estimates of negative equity include only nonprime borrowers whose loans were active at the end of each quarter. Serious Delinquency Rates Rose from 2006 through 2009, and Some States with the Most Growth in Negative Equity Rates Were Among Those with the Most Growth in Serious Delinquency Rates From 2006 through 2009, serious delinquency rates among nonprime borrowers increased in all states and the District of Columbia. Across the states, the serious delinquency rate the percentage of nonprime borrowers with active loans that were at least 90 days or in foreclosure increased throughout the period, from 4 percent (280,000 loans) in the first quarter of 2006 to 28 percent (1.4 million loans) at the end of Among the states, the growth in serious delinquency rates ranged from 5 percentage points (Louisiana) to 43 percentage points (Florida). Michigan s increase of 17.1 percentage points represented the median change. Enclosure I includes quarterly information on serious delinquencies in each state from 2006 through Page 8

9 Across all states and the District of Columbia, our measures for increases in estimated negative equity and serious delinquency rates exhibited a positive statistical correlation. 16 Consistent with this observation, 6 of the 10 states with the largest percentage point increases in negative equity rates from 2006 through 2009 also were among the 10 states with the largest percentage point increases in serious delinquency rates over that same period. 17 For example, Arizona experienced the largest increase in negative equity rate (rising by 44.3 percentage points over the 4- year period) and the fifth largest increase in serious delinquency rate (rising 28.7 percentage points) (see fig. 3). However, the remaining 4 states ranked from 12th to 26th in their increases in serious delinquency rates. 18 Figure 3: Estimated Percentage of Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Home Equity and Delinquent in Arizona, March 31, 2006, through December 31, 2009 Percentage Negative equity Serious delinquency In addition, 5 of the 10 states with the smallest growth in negative equity rates also were among the 10 with the smallest growth in serious delinquency rates. 19 North Dakota, for instance, had virtually no increase in its negative equity rate from 2006 through 2009 (0.2 percentage points) and the fourth smallest increase in serious 16 Specifically, the correlation coefficient between our measures for increases in negative equity rates and serious delinquency rates was (The correlation coefficient is a statistical measure of association, with a value of 1 indicating a perfect positive correlation.) 17 The six states were Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and Nevada. 18 The four states were Idaho, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Virginia. 19 The five states were Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Page 9

10 delinquency rate (10.5 percentage points) (see fig. 4). However, the remaining 5 states (including the District of Columbia) ranked from 11th to 41st in their increases in serious delinquency rates. 20 Figure 4: Estimated Percentage of Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Home Equity and Delinquent in North Dakota, March 31, 2006, through December 31, 2009 Percentage Negative equity Serious delinquency Research has shown that negative equity is one of several factors that affect loan performance. As previously noted, in a forthcoming report, we will examine the influence of a broader range of factors including loan and borrower characteristics and economic conditions on the likelihood of mortgage default. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested congressional parties and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO s Web site at 20 The five were the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, and Montana. Page 10

11 If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) or Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. In addition to the individual named above, Steve Westley (Assistant Director), William Bates, Jan Bauer, Julianne Dieterich, DuEwa Kamara, John McGrail, Marc Molino, Bob Pollard, and Jennifer Schwartz made key contributions to this report. William B. Shear Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment Enclosure Page 11

12 Enclosure I: Estimated Negative Equity and Serious Delinquency Rates by State and Quarter from 2006 through 2009 Figure 5 contains the results of our analysis of the extent to which borrowers with active nonprime mortgages were estimated to be in a negative equity position or were seriously on their payments that is, they were 90 days or more late on payments or were in the foreclosure process. The analysis uses CoreLogic s loan-level data and the CoreLogic state-level house price index and covers nonprime mortgages originated from 2000 through Due to data limitations, we could not identify borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties. For purposes of this analysis, we treat the number of borrowers and the number of loans as equal. To the extent that some nonprime borrowers had more than one mortgaged property, our results may overstate the number of individual nonprime borrowers with negative equity. For additional information on the methodology for this analysis, see pages 2 and 3. Page 12

13 Figure 5: Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Equity and Delinquent Loans by State and Quarter, 2006 through 2009 Alabama Alaska loans 66, , ,756 1,026 75,749 1,433 78,174 1,868 78,222 2,361 74,314 2,433 70,271 2,444 66,014 2,443 62,150 2,423 58,877 2,416 56,183 2,393 53,510 2,325 51,228 2,259 49,156 2,156 47,390 2,047 7,388 7,970 8,485 8,965 9,295 9,433 8,927 8,340 7,716 7,133 6,698 6,383 6,015 5,710 5,426 5, ,409 4,496 4,917 5,468 5,122 5,581 6,367 7,120 7,046 7,050 7,313 8,074 8,161 8,609 9,052 9, % % % % Page 13

14 Arizona Arkansas loans 250,669 60, ,808 81, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,576 26,943 28,141 29,159 30,221 31,244 32,000 30,501 28,950 27,295 25,798 24,532 23,476 22,498 21,581 20,792 20, ,141 1,365 1,405 1,415 1,411 1,384 1,360 1,327 1,273 1,219 1,164 1,126 2,329 2,661 4,039 6,358 8,272 11,429 17,281 25,876 31,438 35,217 38,675 45,771 49,669 49,616 49,883 50,139 1,494 1,560 1,778 1,996 2,005 2,224 2,612 2,980 2,911 2,915 3,097 3,237 3,274 3,321 3,546 3, % % % % Page 14

15 California Colorado With active loans 1,393,739 1,436,446 1,497,959 1,557,729 1,618,116 1,660,868 1,602,499 1,527,338 1,439,545 1,345,041 1,258,514 1,197,317 1,139,357 1,076,878 1,024, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,889 With negative equity 327, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,342 2,151 2,959 4,307 5,659 6,868 8,499 8,914 9,058 8,850 8,458 8,074 7,772 7,366 6,744 6,418 6,156 17,551 23,109 34,584 51,901 66,909 90, , , , , , , , , , ,926 8,051 8,277 9,511 11,556 12,239 12,640 13,683 15,250 15,669 16,157 15,353 15,970 17,119 18,134 18,955 19, % % % % Page 15

16 Connecticut Delaware loans 78,883 5,428 80,912 7,466 83,505 9,909 85,530 12,055 87,695 13,956 89,238 16,287 85,334 16,877 80,821 17,060 76,450 16,973 72,430 16,705 69,087 16,574 66,520 16,421 64,240 16,120 61,873 15,511 59,704 15,087 57,749 14,728 18,349 19,117 20,232 21,056 21,927 22,499 21,437 20,256 19,086 18,057 17,251 16,569 15,964 15,378 14,870 14, ,041 1,390 1,454 1,488 1,481 1,464 1,452 1,433 1,402 1,356 1,302 1,267 2,859 3,125 3,843 4,769 5,147 5,950 7,319 8,645 9,516 9,842 10,546 11,963 13,073 13,947 15,204 16, ,090 1,184 1,397 1,719 2,073 2,251 2,434 2,622 2,965 3,143 3,360 3,628 3, % % % % Page 16

17 District of Columbia Florida loans 13, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,180 1,347 1,459 1,612 1,837 1,987 2,052 2,109 2,211 16,087 17,116 21,839 31,410 41,534 59,833 89, , , , , , , , , , % % % % Page 17

18 Georgia Hawaii loans 248,154 16, ,866 20, ,104 26, ,691 32, ,092 38, ,337 45, ,569 46, ,943 46, ,510 46, ,692 45, ,129 44, ,277 43, ,014 42, ,825 40, ,390 38, ,534 37,523 33,186 34,436 36,285 37,645 38,849 40,289 38,884 37,201 35,365 33,725 32,501 31,506 30,342 29,187 28,123 27, ,020 12,853 15,359 18,371 18,941 21,618 25,219 28,492 29,047 29,377 30,350 33,879 35,477 37,377 40,021 42, ,048 1,264 1,670 2,213 2,629 2,935 3,570 4,519 5,402 6,064 6,542 6, % % % % Page 18

19 Idaho Illinois loans 38,986 1,287 41,043 3,008 42,956 5,007 45,126 7,068 46,712 9,194 47,158 11,566 44,684 12,057 42,053 12,220 39,346 12,194 36,842 12,081 34,890 11,894 33,293 11,726 31,508 11,426 29,778 10,854 28,224 10,285 26,767 9, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,749 20,386 28,174 38,808 49,727 61,007 72,645 74,864 75,334 74,856 73,495 72,273 71,237 69,725 66,854 65,108 63, ,072 1,216 1,430 1,893 2,488 2,928 3,134 3,577 4,389 4,961 5,397 5,638 5,619 14,768 16,108 19,120 23,029 24,196 27,194 32,957 38,222 40,305 41,408 43,292 47,414 50,173 52,246 55,919 58, % % % % Page 19

20 Indiana Iowa loans 124,601 10, ,730 13, ,245 16, ,667 19, ,193 22, ,111 25, ,015 25, ,978 25, ,902 25, ,865 24, ,874 23,912 96,751 23,024 92,424 21,926 88,286 20,686 84,593 19,879 81,466 19,222 34,071 34,642 35,255 35,755 36,281 35,976 33,612 31,307 29,358 27,554 26,033 24,794 23,622 22,635 21,713 20, ,555 12,047 12,915 14,262 14,328 15,237 16,972 18,900 18,547 17,993 18,015 18,407 18,277 18,715 19,091 19,290 2,397 2,508 2,815 3,098 2,975 3,199 3,662 3,956 3,940 3,826 3,842 3,906 3,781 3,811 3,964 4, % % % % Page 20

21 Kansas Kentucky loans 38, ,556 1,208 40,282 1,665 40,931 2,082 41,075 2,525 40,568 3,008 38,244 3,123 35,959 3,140 33,776 3,137 31,699 3,065 30,057 2,995 28,713 2,928 27,504 2,801 26,253 2,710 25,170 2,597 24,196 2,487 53,606 55,849 57,950 59,592 61,170 60,536 57,255 53,947 50,654 47,463 44,765 42,427 40,524 38,723 37,133 35, ,428 1,836 2,215 2,514 2,562 2,571 2,525 2,390 2,303 2,192 2,056 1,900 1,796 1,738 2,044 2,147 2,243 2,582 2,486 2,647 2,913 3,237 3,151 3,128 3,101 3,369 3,353 3,458 3,718 3,799 3,890 4,109 4,598 5,173 5,194 5,740 6,434 6,970 6,878 6,776 6,693 6,803 6,574 6,733 7,142 7, % % % % Page 21

22 Louisiana Maine loans 57, , , ,442 1,032 63,736 1,349 64,273 1,640 61,310 1,692 58,506 1,706 55,432 1,696 52,642 1,621 50,445 1,601 48,685 1,598 47,005 1,508 45,491 1,431 44,060 1,422 42,832 1,392 19,950 20,652 21,264 21,821 22,549 23,163 21,994 20,854 19,679 18,600 17,780 17,091 16,436 15,772 15,213 14, ,691 8,661 7,922 7,702 6,981 6,793 7,027 7,597 7,398 7,492 7,952 8,563 8,354 8,647 9,400 10, ,122 1,387 1,653 1,834 2,167 2,484 2,858 3,166 3,221 3,314 3,522 3,603 3,660 3,797 3, % % % % Page 22

23 Maryland Massachusetts , , , , , , , , , , ,170 99,268 95,736 92,244 89,035 85,826 loans 166,555 7, ,591 15, ,017 25, ,580 35, ,872 45, ,749 56, ,745 57, ,743 58, ,413 58, ,994 57, ,307 57, ,385 56, ,977 56, ,653 53, ,508 52, ,717 50,372 12,072 14,463 17,116 19,452 21,367 23,455 23,679 23,572 23,064 22,295 21,710 21,202 20,560 19,265 18,721 18,182 2,858 3,379 4,622 6,289 7,285 9,711 13,381 17,569 19,943 22,573 26,379 30,400 32,376 33,242 35,142 36,273 4,941 5,658 7,162 9,053 9,888 11,237 13,849 16,680 18,220 19,156 19,972 21,575 22,880 23,996 25,568 26, % % % % Page 23

24 Michigan Minnesota loans 232, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,123 97,870 91,831 86,619 82,169 78,097 74,284 70,801 15,624 19,604 24,381 28,626 32,297 35,593 35,951 35,845 35,358 34,189 33,227 32,308 31,272 29,287 27,629 26,377 17,627 19,195 21,975 24,983 24,211 26,345 29,829 32,567 31,174 29,473 29,025 30,309 31,421 32,541 34,940 35,607 5,733 6,344 7,661 9,212 9,892 11,248 13,334 14,411 14,544 13,993 13,755 14,146 14,723 15,577 15,811 15, % % % % Page 24

25 Mississippi Missouri With active loans 34,556 35,898 37,022 37,932 38,686 39,049 37,184 35,324 33,496 31,759 30,267 29,070 27,998 27,051 26,157 25, , , , , , , , , ,554 95,806 90,216 85,442 81,349 77,659 74,372 71,430 With negative equity ,165 1,563 1,867 1,910 1,927 1,915 1,851 1,786 1,678 1,545 1,408 1,297 1,243 6,073 8,295 10,898 13,569 16,200 18,769 19,190 19,142 18,754 17,970 17,343 16,762 15,930 14,941 14,293 13,775 5,589 5,081 5,059 5,079 4,518 4,531 4,950 5,514 5,378 5,103 5,239 5,613 5,609 5,821 6,183 6,547 5,990 6,286 7,490 8,751 8,290 9,462 10,944 11,869 11,303 10,836 11,460 12,378 12,310 12,570 13,465 14, % % % % Page 25

26 Montana Nebraska loans 11, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,872 23,647 24,213 24,599 24,938 24,651 23,207 21,805 20,565 19,338 18,344 17,534 16,854 16,153 15,479 14, ,137 1,267 1,329 1,374 1,243 1,315 1,467 1,716 1,642 1,725 1,938 2,162 2,149 2,018 2,066 2,168 2,155 2,281 2,392 2, % % % % Page 26

27 Nevada New Hampshire ,619 28,288 29,341 30,138 31,093 31,505 29,857 28,071 26,402 24,967 23,767 22,767 21,877 20,982 20,235 19,508 loans 157,510 63, ,728 77, ,208 91, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,796 99, ,823 93, ,225 88,965 1,033 1,314 1,681 2,024 2,289 2,603 2,638 2,615 2,549 2,445 2,358 2,270 2,171 2,020 1,947 1,897 2,424 3,066 4,374 6,729 8,716 11,543 15,894 22,090 25,873 27,842 29,484 34,330 38,765 40,390 40,795 42, ,069 1,365 1,547 1,714 2,058 2,411 2,780 2,900 2,826 2,948 3,358 3,492 3,681 4,086 4, % % % % Page 27

28 New Jersey New Mexico loans 166,581 8, ,893 12, ,419 19, ,242 24, ,289 29, ,238 34, ,113 36, ,894 36, ,194 36, ,115 35, ,217 35, ,112 34, ,968 34, ,511 33, ,742 32, ,617 31,858 30,688 31,805 32,944 34,111 35,367 35,910 33,917 31,889 29,824 28,010 26,643 25,490 24,414 23,367 22,399 21, ,234 1,930 2,876 3,124 3,163 3,155 3,088 3,025 2,941 2,851 2,743 2,633 2,534 5,832 6,645 8,271 10,289 12,001 14,467 18,466 23,057 26,325 28,853 31,157 34,946 38,927 41,330 43,834 45, ,098 1,126 1,276 1,493 1,933 2,193 2,369 2,606 3,042 3,346 3,594 3,793 3, % % % % Page 28

29 New York North Carolina , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,043 loans 256,904 4, ,774 7, ,069 11, ,638 15, ,792 19, ,238 24, ,685 25, ,844 25, ,456 25, ,129 25, ,980 25, ,082 25, ,280 25, ,900 24, ,274 23, ,570 23, ,392 2,128 3,044 4,363 4,664 4,782 4,771 4,713 4,699 4,675 4,605 4,421 4,309 4,170 10,892 12,212 14,957 18,266 20,647 24,340 29,921 36,123 40,068 43,160 46,766 52,936 58,519 62,725 66,911 71,234 7,145 7,614 8,458 9,650 9,175 10,055 11,551 13,199 13,226 12,874 13,578 15,286 16,530 17,678 19,139 20, % % % % Page 29

30 North Dakota Ohio loans 3, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,838 31,149 35,745 41,518 46,439 50,757 53,780 53,619 52,990 51,521 48,957 47,538 45,985 43,733 40,762 39,131 37, ,434 24,746 27,480 30,315 30,390 32,371 35,382 37,976 37,139 35,793 34,556 34,664 34,589 34,688 35,986 36, % % % % Page 30

31 Oklahoma Oregon loans 51, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,577 97,952 91,759 86,785 82,590 78,719 74,571 70,930 67, ,718 3,533 5,614 7,813 10,843 11,631 11,930 11,912 11,822 11,714 11,555 11,353 10,868 10,365 9,973 3,268 3,372 3,614 3,990 4,092 4,330 4,812 5,405 5,440 5,258 5,175 5,323 5,553 5,761 6,125 6,369 1,936 1,911 2,105 2,492 2,797 3,475 4,384 5,568 6,625 7,288 8,158 9,753 11,799 12,685 13,136 13, % % % % Page 31

32 Pennsylvania loans , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,506 1,812 2,799 4,455 6,405 8,221 10,023 10,399 10,514 10,458 10,255 10,088 9,941 9,743 9,444 9,191 8,995 Rhode Island 27,133 27,701 28,321 28,461 28,799 28,919 27,144 25,261 23,390 21,860 20,669 19,600 18,674 17,853 17,180 16,590 5,193 6,561 8,090 9,364 10,609 11,753 11,899 11,847 11,625 11,320 11,038 10,538 10,042 9,605 9,244 8,925 10,890 11,489 12,922 14,598 14,760 16,241 18,557 21,263 22,095 22,890 23,901 25,864 26,812 28,471 30,527 32, ,128 1,402 1,820 2,020 2,454 2,952 3,465 3,553 3,573 3,707 3,940 3,995 4,077 4,364 4, % % % % Page 32

33 South Carolina South Dakota loans 74,095 1,184 77,637 1,966 80,981 3,071 83,608 3,944 86,335 5,158 87,757 6,608 83,852 6,900 79,414 6,979 74,573 6,921 70,201 6,763 66,779 6,665 64,096 6,541 61,487 6,366 59,391 6,132 57,321 5,930 55,452 5,775 5,977 6,257 6,533 6,767 6,947 6,865 6,410 5,968 5,563 5,157 4,832 4,529 4,281 4,042 3,827 3, ,633 4,678 5,156 5,847 5,810 6,358 7,370 8,401 8,456 8,502 8,689 9,500 9,859 10,808 11,695 12, % % % % Page 33

34 Tennessee Texas loans 124, ,056 1, ,739 2, ,100 3, ,102 5, ,855 6, ,431 6, ,718 6, ,819 6, ,450 6, ,391 6, ,082 6,362 99,021 6,134 94,680 5,798 90,781 5,597 87,268 5, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,891 3,511 7,042 11,389 15,439 19,706 25,317 26,364 26,680 26,623 25,846 24,975 24,145 23,058 22,068 21,387 20,590 7,766 8,227 9,649 11,122 10,757 12,219 13,726 15,341 15,069 15,100 15,963 17,114 17,185 17,721 18,539 19,011 25,183 26,621 28,877 31,926 31,515 34,221 39,490 45,081 44,077 42,459 44,830 51,594 50,081 52,452 57,460 61, % % % % Page 34

35 Utah Vermont loans 75, , ,113 1,832 84,501 3,487 87,599 6,383 88,619 10,948 82,612 12,050 76,011 12,372 69,437 12,350 63,439 12,220 58,640 12,029 54,611 11,779 50,940 11,463 47,642 10,841 44,886 10,333 42,389 9,837 6,404 6,502 6,659 6,817 7,063 7,245 6,847 6,515 6,170 5,850 5,577 5,356 5,169 4,929 4,731 4, ,336 2,083 2,093 2,280 2,264 2,525 3,097 4,027 4,613 5,022 5,566 6,507 7,475 8,271 8,774 9, , % % % % Page 35

36 Virginia Washington loans 182,012 26, ,710 36, ,395 46, ,736 55, ,857 63, ,632 70, ,130 71, ,000 71, ,931 70, ,658 68, ,209 66, ,343 63, ,449 59, ,879 55, ,210 52, ,789 50, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,472 5,644 9,358 13,723 19,826 21,645 22,351 22,351 22,222 22,045 21,843 21,512 20,721 20,020 19,452 3,127 3,608 4,844 6,651 7,902 10,549 14,503 18,888 20,604 20,857 21,239 23,778 25,289 25,725 26,243 26,715 4,100 4,174 4,802 5,562 5,987 6,713 8,548 10,663 12,053 13,174 14,696 17,897 21,440 23,696 25,251 26, % % % % Page 36

37 West Virginia Wisconsin loans 10,516 1,142 10,994 1,320 11,612 1,640 12,336 1,948 12,716 2,220 12,961 2,465 12,411 2,499 11,751 2,449 11,106 2,404 10,556 2,331 10,124 2,281 9,722 2,252 9,355 2,214 8,943 2,122 8,581 2,039 8,273 1,972 71,766 74,395 77,953 80,259 82,662 83,262 78,243 72,957 67,914 63,384 59,768 56,623 53,803 51,303 48,998 46,992 2,400 3,451 5,002 6,368 7,802 9,094 9,305 9,362 9,158 8,803 8,626 8,447 8,180 7,657 7,362 7, ,040 1,290 1,254 1,305 1,464 1,557 1,571 1,589 1,618 1,689 4,477 4,886 5,822 6,789 7,131 8,188 9,706 10,948 11,181 11,056 11,338 11,592 11,608 11,912 12,531 12, % % % % Page 37

38 Wyoming With active loans 7,989 8,294 8,563 8,918 9,311 9,291 8,654 8,012 7,425 6,832 6,375 5,970 5,655 5,330 5,039 4,792 With negative equity Total (all states and the District of Columbia) ,042,247 7,332,583 7,660,361 7,949,339 8,221,852 8,358,373 7,992,184 7,577,782 7,143,347 6,728,294 6,374,170 6,090,063 5,821,670 5,556,210 5,319,566 5,106, ,794 1,215,056 1,539,004 1,845,318 2,145,353 2,453,835 2,514,270 2,523,852 2,497,956 2,412,966 2,314,600 2,229,881 2,143,119 2,039,041 1,946,828 1,861, , , , , , , , , ,626 1,021,676 1,077,138 1,204,241 1,294,916 1,342,652 1,400,282 1,439, % % % % (250532) Page 38