Pillar Integration and Retirement Income Protection

Transcription

1 Pillar Integration and Retirement Income Protection - multi-pillarism in four pension systems ICPM forum, Paris, June Ole Beier Sørensen, Chief Pension Researcher, ATP.

2 A misconceived common narrative - Free of charge translation service: The prize of two children: $ 50,000 worth of pensions Women loose out on pensions by taking out maternity leave Maternity and children will cost you 1

3 spurred research into the interplay of pillars - Key initial research questions What replacement rates will s and households be looking at? What will the public/private composition of their pension income look like? How will life choices and life events affect financial well being in old age? Pursued by way of microsimulation Detailed modelling of all relevant regulation and private pension accrual Describing long term results under different financial scenarios and different wage, work life and household scenarios 2

4 thereby touching on a classic balancing act 3

5 to which the answer can only be political and contextual Parallel studies in Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden National analyses based on similar methodology Research questions in the second comparative research phase How and to what extent - are pension effects mitigated? What are the mechanisms applied? How is the balancing of distribution and efficiency structured? 4

6 In the Danish case... 5

7 Aggregate gross income incl. housing benefit (EURO) universal and targeted public benefits play a key role The income test - singles ,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 Housing allowance, heating benefit etc. Special supplementary benefit Pension supplement Private pension and ATP 30,000 Basic amount 20,000 10, ,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 Private pension income & ATP (EURO) Source: Single pensioner in ATP

8 Overall results for full time single s. Net-replacement rates for full time s No 2nd pillar 0.6 With second pillar Low income Semi-low income Mid income High income Source: Single pensioner having entered the labour market at age 25 in ATP

9 .reflect the overall rationale of the system Public pension fraction for full time s 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Low income Semi-low income Mid income High income Source: Single pensioner having entered the labour market at age 25 in ATP

10 Index 100 = average income.and how it changes relative income positions Pre- and post-retirement net-income positions Net income - last active year Net-income - first retirement year Low income Semi-low income Mid income High income Index 100 = Mid income Source: Single pensioner having entered the labour market at age 25 in ATP

11 The system assists s with disrupted careers Example: 2 maternities followed by 15 years of part-time work 0% -5% -10% Private pension loss Net-income loss -15% -20% Low income Semi-low income Mid income High income Source: Single pensioner having entered the labour market at age 25 in ATP

12 primarily through a higher public pension fraction - Public pension fraction 100% 80% 60% 40% Full time Worker with 2 maternities and part time 20% 0% Low income Semi-low income Mid income High income Source: Single pensioner having entered the labour market at age 25 in ATP

13 but still: Working career stability certainly matters Private pension and net-income loss (single) in a complex scenario 0% -20% -40% -60% Private pension loss Net-income loss -80% -100% Low income Semi-low income Mid income High income 2 maternities, 15 years on part time (50 pct.), 5 years of late career unemployment and early retirement without early retirement benefits. Source:. ATP

14 Targeting is important not only to the bottom tiers -. Basic security Poverty alleviation A basic benefit upon which other benefits can build Explicit social insurance Targeted support if work lives are not straight forward or if private income drops after retirement Implicit insurance and risk sharing between generations Protection in case of market shocks and other non-insurable risk 13

15 .but the tax implications are disturbing - Marginal income tax rate and implicit marginal tax rate after income testing 100% 80% Marginal income tax rate 60% 40% 20% Marginal tax rate on private pension benefits after pension income test 0% - 9,000 18,000 27,000 36,000 45,000 54,000 63,000 Private pension income and ATP (EURO) ATP

16 especially if housing benefits are taken into account Implicit marginal tax rate and average tax after housing benefits 100% 80% 60% 40% Average taxrate after housing benefits Marginal tax rate on private pension benefits after housing benefits 20% 0% -20% - 9,000 18,000 27,000 36,000 45,000 54,000 63,000 Private pension income and ATP (EURO) ATP

17 A commission is set to review the balance 16

18 Other countries have different systems - Net-replacement rates for full career single retirees 1,2 1,0 Net-replacement rate 0,8 0,6 0,4 Denmark Netherlands Canada (with 3rd pillar) Sweden 0,2 - Low income Mid income High income Source: Single pensioner having entered the labour market at age 25 in ATP, OSFI, CPB and the Pension Authorithy

19 Index - full time = 1,0 but mitigation effects are much the same Mitigation effects in three countries (mid-income career single retiree) Denmark Netherlands Canada (with 3rd pillar) Sweden Full time Permanent part time(50%) 2 maternities + 15 years part time 10 weeks of unemployment annually Source: Single pensioner having entered the labour market at age 25 in ATP, OSFI, CPB and the Pension Authorithy

20 A few conclusions Individual welfare is based on the totality of pillars, and 1 st pillar pensions will continue to play a key role Adequacy hinges on pillar interaction and participation A pension system without distortions is probably unthinkable but system design influences how destortions show Pillars have different potentials as regards solidarity and risk sharing a diversified pension system mixing public and private provision, and pay-asyou-go and pre-funding as sources of finance is not only the most realistic prospect but the best policy OECD, Pensions at a glance

21 and a set of questions Should client communication focus on the totality rather than the individual system element? or both? How should efficiency and distribution be balanced? Can and should redistribution and risk sharing be separated? 20