The National Data Center Preparedness Exercise a complex scenario for multi-technology analysis
|
|
|
- Alvin Cunningham
- 9 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 The National Data Center Preparedness Exercise 2013 a complex scenario for multi-technology analysis J. Ole Ross, Gernot Hartmann, Lars Ceranna, Nicolai Gestermann, and Christian Bönnemann BGR / B4.3, German NDC Science & Technology Vienna, 24 June 2015 Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 1
2 National Data Centre Preparedness Exercises (NPE) NPE are Ø Scenarios of potential CTBT violation (partially simulated) Ø Open to all NDCs and other Institutions engaged with CTBT verification Ø Discussed at NDC Workshops (former NDC Evaluation Workshop ) NPE can improve Ø Effectiveness of verification procedures at NDCs Ø Awareness of potential needs concerning data products and skills Ø Communication among NDCs and with PTS Ø Analysis of multi-technology scenarios Ø Exchange between experts from various disciplines Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 2
3 Initial Situation NPE 2013 Scenario A State Signatory points to a spatio-temporal connection of a waveform event in a certain area and (fictitious) radionuclide detections in Central Europe in September The NPE-community is asked to give technical advise and to verify whether the hypothesis of the accusing state is justified or not Verification Task Identification and characterisation of the waveform event Analysis of radionuclide detections, source characterization, ATM backtracking Decision on potential CTBT relevance Overall question: Would it be adequate to request an On-Site-Inspection? Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 3
4 Information provided with NPE 2013 Scenario Time of waveform event 4 September 2013 Region of waveform event The fictitious State of FRISIA in Central Europe Radionuclide Findings: Iodine 5-24 µbq/m³ 131 I first VIP00, Coll.Stop 8 Sep. Xenon highest SEP63,Coll.Stop 13 Sep mbq/m³ 133 Xe, first DEX33, Coll.Stop 11 Sep. highest SEX63, Coll.Stop 13 Sep. Some samples 131m Xe, ratio 131m/ Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 4
5 Challenges of NPE 2013 No REB for waveform event in FRISIA - Regional stations can be used - 2 IMS Primary, 4 Auxiliary stations Unfavourable meteorological conditions for ATM -long transport times to stations -ambiguous WebGrape PSR Xe-133 I-131 Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 5
6 NPE 2013 Supplementary Information Was provided to requesting paticipants only: Waveform analysis: W1 Waveform detection lists of relevant IMS Primary and Auxiliary Seismic Stations as provided by the PTS W2 Source parameter of the waveform event which caused the suspicion against FRISIA W3 Statement of FRISIA about the character of the event Atmospheric Transport Modelling: A1 Number of radionuclide release locations and emission pulses A2 Time of radionuclide release A3 Indication of radionuclide source region Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 6
7 W3 Statement by the state of FRISIA concerning the waveform event: Supplementary Information W3 The event in question is an earthquake which occurred in the vicinity of Groningen on 4 September Following the analysis of the local experts from KNMI (Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute), this seismic event is very likely to be connected with gas exploration activities in this area. Induced seismicity is regularly observed at natural gas production fields in "FRISIA". Therefore, no release of radioactive substances was connected with the seismic event. Furthermore, all nuclear facilities in "FRISIA" operated normally without any known incident or unusual release throughout the days before and after 4 September Source: KNMI Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 7
8 Waveform recordings at selected seismic stations P n P n P g 296 km 295 km 295 km Distance to epicentre P n P n P g P g S n S n S g 265 km 243 km 217 km P n 187 km P g P n P g S g S g S g 184 km 135 km 128 km 117 km Filter: 1 8 Hz Science & Technology 24 June 2015
9 Wavform event: Earthquake in gas field Appingedam Groningen Reference location from KNMI calculated with phases from 14 local stations unknown accuracy Inspection Area of 500 km2 size would be sufficient in case of an OSI Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 9
10 Atmospheric Transport Modelling / Radionuclide Analysis Xe-133 I-131 à Many possible source locations à Connection of xenon and iodine unclear à Northern detections consistent with release in Frisia Large variety of solutions presented at the NDC Workshop 2014 à Isotopic ratio analysis helps Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 10
11 131m Xe/ 133 Xe ratios measured at NOX49, SEX63 and RUX58 Solution of FOI, Swedish NDC Are consistent with xenon released after shutdown of a nuclear reactor, if the shutdown occurred several days before the event in Frisia. The conclusions of the Swedish NDC are: The observed seismic event is most likely an induced event in connection to the Groningen gas field The xenon isotope ratios are not consistent with a nuclear explosion, rather a nuclear power plant 11 Source FOI ( Anders Ringbom, Anders Axelsson, Anders Mörtsell ) Science & Technology 24 June 2015
12 Fictitious scenario very unlikely to happen in reality! Reactor incident at a Boiling Water Reactor location in Southern Germany: 48.5 N 10.4 E ~ 600 km distance to FRISIA seismic event Imaginary event sequence (INES 3): NPE 2013 radionuclide release scenario 1. reactor shut down because of fuel damage 2. temporal partial loss of primary coolant 3. contamination inside reactor building 4. cooling recovered, reactor under control Isotope I-131 Xe-131m Xe-133 Xe-133m Xe-135 Half-life Small (h) leakage in containment leads to atmospheric 52.6 release 9.1 of volatile substances (<0.1 % of core inventory) on 4 Sept 2013 Source Term 5 TBq 10 TBq 1 PBq < 25 TBq < 1 PBq MDC This release 5 is µbq/m³ pure NPE fantasy mbq/m³ nothing 0.35 mbq/m³ similar 0.15 occurred mbq/m³ in September 0.7 mbq/m³ 2013 Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 12
13 NPE 2013 forward ATM Xe-133 I mbq/m³ 10 mbq/m³ 1 Bq/m³ 1 µbq/m³ 100 µbq/m³ Forward ATM setup HYSPLIT (NOAA-ARL) Meteorology: NCEP GDAS horizontal resolution vertical levels Particles per simulation Model run Xenon A Xenon B Iodine release day 09/04 09/04 09/04 time (UTC) deposition No No Yes Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 13
14 NPE 2013 backward ATM Xenon WebGRAPE PSR Xenon 2013/09/ UTC FLEXPART- ECMWF 220 km Distance PSR source (only) 220 km Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 14
15 NPE 2013 backward ATM Iodine WebGRAPE PSR Iodine 2013/09/ UTC FLEXPART- ECMWF Distance Local PSR maximum- Source 440 km Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 15
16 Key station: VIP00 Vienna Differential Field Of Regard for VIP00 sample of Sep. 8 release time I /09/ UTC FLEXPART-ECMWF FLEXPART-NCEP Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 16
17 Discussions potentially triggered Waveform SEL event definition: include Auxiliary Seismic Stations? The event was detected at Primary Stations: GERES, NOA Auxiliary Stations: EKA, DAVOX, VRAC, HFS Radionuclide / ATM How to categorize collocated Particulate / Noble Gas Detections? Limitations of source localization Old explosions as detections in April 2013 following DPRK test after ~55 days Diplomacy How to react on false accusation? What is necessary/sufficient to request an OSI Role of National Technical Means Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 17
18 Evolution of NPE scenarios Next NPE scenario: - International control team - New ideas welcome - Discussion and planning at NDC Session on Friday morning NPE 2007 NPE 2008 NPE 2009 NPE 2010 NPE 2012 NPE 2013 Iran: Zagros Mountain Chile Kazakhstan USA, Wyoming Russia, South West Sibiria FRISIA, Central Europe Earthquake Earthquake Blast: Kara Zhyra Mine Blast: Black Thunder Mine (Double)-Blast: Mezhdurechensk Earthquake in gas field; unrelated RN reactor release S waveforms S waveforms ATM WMO exercise SI waveforms ATM / RN WMO exercise RN /ATM SI waveforms WMO exercise RN / ATM SI waveforms WMO exercise S waveforms RN / ATM Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 18
ANALYSIS OF FUKUSHIMA S ACCIDENT BY FRENCH NATIONAL DATA CENTER
ANALYSIS OF FUKUSHIMA S ACCIDENT BY FRENCH NATIONAL DATA CENTER G. LE PETIT, P. ACHIM, P. GROSS, G. DOUYSSET, M. MONFORT C. JUTIER, T. TAFFARY, X. BLANCHARD, C. MOULIN, T. HERITIER Commissariat à l Energie
The International Monitoring System noble gas network Matthias Auer, CTBTO, Vienna
Noble gas measurements for monitoring the CTBTO System (IMS) is a unique global network for surveillance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty. A major component of the IMS is the radionuclide monitoring
Radionuclide and Noble Gas Data Processing and Analysis
International Data Center 1 Radionuclide and Noble Gas Data Processing and Analysis Ulrich STOELHKER Scientific Methods Unit Software Applications Section, IDC/SA/SM Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Infrasound BY ELISABETH BLANC AND LARS CERANNA
Infrasound BY ELISABETH BLANC AND LARS CERANNA Infrasound ELISABETH BLANC AND LARS CERANNA FACT BOX The Infrasound topic area of the ISS project has carried out a series of studies on the detection and
Dates Venue Meeting/Event Target audience/participants Descriptions (Objectives, Deliverables, etc.) Lead Division(s) IDC
Disclaimer: The information was last updated on 3 July 2015. This list is updated on a regular basis. For the latest up-to-date information, please consult the web sites for Calendar of Events (http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/calendar-of-events/)
International Data Centre
International Data Centre Highlights in 2012 More robust and flexible data and product request services Improvement in reviewed noble gas products by implementing a scheme that categorizes the sample spectra
Simulating Aftershocks for an On Site Inspection (OSI) Exercise
LLNL-TR-677873 Simulating Aftershocks for an On Site Inspection (OSI) Exercise J. J. Sweeney, S. R. Ford October 5, 2015 Disclaimer This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency
RC-17. Alejandro V. Nader National Regulatory Authority Montevideo - Uruguay
RC-17 Radiation Protection in Waste Management and Disposal Implementing the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Alejandro V. Nader
Measurements for nuclear forensic characterisation: synergies between international security applications
Measurements for nuclear forensic characterisation: synergies between international security applications Vitaly Fedchenko Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Content of this talk Introduction.
Nuclear Power Plant Electrical Power Supply System Requirements
1 Nuclear Power Plant Electrical Power Supply System Requirements Željko Jurković, Krško NPP, [email protected] Abstract Various regulations and standards require from electrical power system of the
Government Degree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 717/2013
Translation from Finnish. Legally binding only in Finnish and Swedish. Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Finland Government Degree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 717/2013 Chapter 1 Scope and
A Review of Emerging Gamma Detector Technologies for Airborne. Radiation Monitoring
A Review of Emerging Gamma Detector Technologies for Airborne Steven Bell ANSRI Dublin 2015 12-14 January Radiation Monitoring Airborne radiation Particulates: sub-μm to sub-mm contaminated with fission
Position paper on the implications of deep sea disposal of radioctive waste
Agenda Item 4 English only OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic Meeting of the Radioactive Substances Committee (RSC) Stockholm (Sweden): 20-23 April
Response of SCK CEN to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in the Context of the Protection of Belgian Citizens
MELODI Workshop, 8-10 October 2013, Brussels Response of to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident in the Context of the Protection of Belgian Citizens Johan Camps Crisis Management and Decision support unit Belgian
Operating Performance: Accident Management: Severe Accident Management Programs for Nuclear Reactors REGDOC-2.3.2
Operating Performance: Accident Management: Severe Accident Management Programs for Nuclear Reactors REGDOC-2.3.2 September 2013 Accident Management: Severe Accident Regulatory Document REGDOC-2.3.2 Canadian
The integrity evaluation of the reactor building at unit4 in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station
The integrity evaluation of the reactor building at unit4 in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station May 2012 Government and TEPCO s Mid-to Long Term Countermeasure Meeting Management Council Outline
Provisional Agenda Speakers List
Provisional Agenda Speakers List Monday, 12 November (Room M3) 09:30-09:40 Welcoming Remarks, Genxin LI, Director, Legal and External Relations Division, 09:40-10:30 Political Framework of the CTBT and
Source Term Determination Methods of the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration Emergency Response Team
IAEA TM on Source Term Evaluation for Severe Accidents, Vienna, 21-23 October 2013 Source Term Determination Methods of the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration Emergency Response Team Tomaž Nemec Slovenian
Operation Tomodachi. and Lessons Learned. of Energy s Consequence. q Management Response Team (CMRT) to the. Reactor Accident
DOE/NV/25946--1560 Operation Tomodachi Japan Response Spring 2011 Operation Tomodachi A D t P d t Answers, Data Products, and Lessons Learned from the U.S. U S Department of Energy s Consequence q Management
Julia Carpenter and Rick Tinker
Assessment of the impact on Australia from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident Julia Carpenter and Rick Tinker Technical Report Series No. 162 Assessment of the impact on Australia from
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: National Response to I-131 from Japan Nuclear Power Plant March 27, 2011. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: National Response to I-131 from Japan Nuclear Power Plant March 27, 2011 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Are the levels we re seeing in precipitation likely to lead to
EPA Radionuclides Rule and the RadNet Program
EPA Radionuclides Rule and the RadNet Program Kelly Moran (215) 814-2331 [email protected] 7/20/2011 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1 What is a radionuclide (radioisotope)? element - any one of
EMERGENCY RESPONSE FOR THE AREA SURROUNDING THE CATTENOM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE FOR THE AREA SURROUNDING THE CATTENOM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Information for the population in Rhineland-Palatinate Issued by: Supervision and Service Directorate (ADD) Willy- Brandt- Platz
Belgian Stress tests specifications Applicable to all nuclear plants, excluding power reactors 22 June 2011
Belgian Stress tests specifications Applicable to all nuclear plants, excluding power reactors 22 June 2011 Introduction Considering the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, the European
Conference Call with Dr. Olli Heinonen Transcript
1 Conference Call with Dr. Olli Heinonen Transcript David Harris: Welcome ladies and gentlemen. I m absolutely delighted that The Israel Project is hosting Dr. Olli Heinonen for this conference call on
318 DECREE. of the State Office for Nuclear Safety of 13 June 2202,
318 DECREE of the State Office for Nuclear Safety of 13 June 2202, On details for emergency preparedness assurance at nuclear installations and workplaces with ionizing radiation sources and on requirements
( 1 ) Overview of Safety Measures ( 2 ) Overview of Measures for Attaining Greater Safety and Reliability
Contents 1 Effort for New Regulatory Requirements ( 1 ) Overview of a Gist of New Regulatory Requirements in Nuclear Regulation Authority ( 2 ) Major Requirements of a Gist of New Regulatory Requirements
Fukushima Accident: Radioactive Releases and Potential Dose Consequences
Fukushima Accident: Radioactive Releases and Potential Dose Consequences Peter F. Caracappa, Ph.D., CHP Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute ANS Annual Meeting Special Session: The Accident at Fukushima Daiichi
FKPE Recommendations on Seismic Monitoring of Induced Seismicity
FKPE Recommendations on Seismic Monitoring of Induced Seismicity Milestone Group "Seismic Monitoring" of the FKPE e.v. Working Group on Induced Seismicity GEOPHYSICAL INSTITUTE, FACULTY OF PHYSICS National
Assessment of environmental radiation monitoring data in Hungary following the Fukushima accident
Radioprotection 2013 Vol. 48, n o 5, pages S117 à S123 DOI: 10.1051/radiopro/20139918 Case studies in national experiences Assessment of environmental radiation monitoring data in Hungary following the
Published in the Official State Gazette (BOE) number 166 of July 10th 2009 [1]
Nuclear Safety Council Instruction number IS-22, of July 1st 2009, on safety requirements for the management of ageing and long-term operation of nuclear power plants Published in the Official State Gazette
8 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) - Issue 06
8-1 8 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) - Issue 06 Table of contents 8 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines
Safety of New Nuclear Power Plants
Safety of New Nuclear Power Plants Example: VVER-1200/V491 H. Hirsch A. Y. Indradiningrat Workshop on the Paks II NPP Project Budapest, Energiaklub, 08.10.2014 New NPP in Paks: Reactor Type In the EIA
RADON - 1 73- Although radon is agas, its decay products are not, and they occur either as unattached
RADON 1. ehemical and Physical Data 1.1 Introduction Radon is a noble gas that occurs in several isotopic forms. Only two of these are found in significant concentrations in the human environment: radon-222,
Application Note. Monitoring the Release of Radioactive Noble Gases Through the Stack of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP): Stack Monitor System
Application Note Monitoring the Release of Radioactive Noble Gases Through the Stack of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP): Stack Monitor System Based on the German KTA 1503.1 and respective international regulations,
Structure and Properties of Atoms
PS-2.1 Compare the subatomic particles (protons, neutrons, electrons) of an atom with regard to mass, location, and charge, and explain how these particles affect the properties of an atom (including identity,
Nuclear Safeguards. How far can Inspectors go?
Viewpoint Nuclear Safeguards How far can Inspectors go? by George Bunn A look at experience in Iran and North Korea and the origins of the NPT and safeguards in the 1960s offers insights into the authority
Institute for Science and International Security
Institute for Science and International Security ISIS Report Defining Iranian Nuclear Programs in a Comprehensive Solution under the Joint Plan of Action Drawn from Institute for Science and International
Nuclear power plant systems, structures and components and their safety classification. 1 General 3. 2 Safety classes 3. 3 Classification criteria 3
GUIDE 26 June 2000 YVL 2.1 Nuclear power plant systems, structures and components and their safety classification 1 General 3 2 Safety classes 3 3 Classification criteria 3 4 Assigning systems to safety
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1 Introduction 3 2 Scope of application 3 3 Development and use of the PRA 4 3.1 General requirements 4 3.2 PRA during the design
Requirements and solutions for laboratory analysis software
Requirements and solutions for laboratory analysis software Mika Nikkinen CTBT NDC Finland Task - To make full gamma spectrum analysis fulfilling CTBT requirements - Result to be traceable, conclusions
Atmospheric Radioxenon Measurements in North Las Vegas, NV
PNNL-15976 Atmospheric Radioxenon Measurements in North Las Vegas, NV B. D. Milbrath L. S. Lidey J. C. Hayes M. Cooper T. W. Bowyer J. I. McIntyre Pacific Northwest National Laboratory L. Karr D. Shafer
Fission fragments or daughters that have a substantial neutron absorption cross section and are not fissionable are called...
KNOWLEDGE: K1.01 [2.7/2.8] B558 Fission fragments or daughters that have a substantial neutron absorption cross section and are not fissionable are called... A. fissile materials. B. fission product poisons.
Boiling Water Reactor Systems
Boiling Water (BWR) s This chapter will discuss the purposes of some of the major systems and components associated with a boiling water reactor (BWR) in the generation of electrical power. USNRC Technical
SOLAR IRRADIANCE FORECASTING, BENCHMARKING of DIFFERENT TECHNIQUES and APPLICATIONS of ENERGY METEOROLOGY
SOLAR IRRADIANCE FORECASTING, BENCHMARKING of DIFFERENT TECHNIQUES and APPLICATIONS of ENERGY METEOROLOGY Wolfgang Traunmüller 1 * and Gerald Steinmaurer 2 1 BLUE SKY Wetteranalysen, 4800 Attnang-Puchheim,
Nuclear Energy: Nuclear Energy
Introduction Nuclear : Nuclear As we discussed in the last activity, energy is released when isotopes decay. This energy can either be in the form of electromagnetic radiation or the kinetic energy of
Hazard Classification of the Remote Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility
1 Hazard Classification of the Remote Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility Abstract Boyd D. Christensen Battelle Energy Alliance, Idaho National Laboratory P.O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 208
Public SUMMARY OF EU STRESS TEST FOR LOVIISA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
1 (8) SUMMARY OF EU STRESS TEST FOR LOVIISA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1 LOVIISA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Loviisa town is located approximately 90 km eastwards from Helsinki at the coast of Gulf of Finland. Loviisa
Belgian Stress tests specifications Applicable to power reactors 17 May 2011
Belgian Stress tests specifications Applicable to power reactors 17 May 2011 Introduction Considering the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, the European Council of March 24 th and
English version. Manual for Determination of Combined Heat and Power (CHP)
CEN/CENELEC WORKSHOP CWA 45547 September 2004 AGREEMENT ICS 27.100 English version Manual for Determination of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) This CEN/CENELEC Workshop Agreement has been drafted and approved
United States National Data Center (US NDC) Status
United States National Data Center (US NDC) Status A. L. Poffenberger The views expressed are the author s and not necessarily those of the United State Government US NDC Status Overview AFTAC Overview
AP ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 2012 SCORING GUIDELINES
AP ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 2012 SCORING GUIDELINES Question1 Read the following article from the Fremont Gazette and answer the questions that follow. (a) Identify and describe TWO water-related environmental
POWER TRANSMISSION FROM OFFSHORE WIND FARMS
POWER TRNSMISSION FROM OFFSHORE WIND FRMS Thorsten Völker University of pplied Sciences Bremerhaven Germany BSTRCT The future for wind power generation in Germany is offshore wind energy. The preferred
Status on Spanish Regulations and Industry. actions related to Filtered Containment. Venting Systems (FCVS)
Status on Spanish Regulations and Industry actions related to Filtered Containment Venting Systems (FCVS) Sara González Systems Engineering Department Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, Spain Technical Meeting
COMPARISON OF SOFTWARE FOR RESCUE OPERATION PLANNING DURING AN ACCIDENT IN A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
COMPARISON OF SOFTWARE FOR RESCUE OPERATION PLANNING DURING AN ACCIDENT IN A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 3 Richetta 3 ABSTRACT This work has been developed to determine proper analytical support instruments in
Towards an NWP-testbed
Towards an NWP-testbed Ewan O Connor and Robin Hogan University of Reading, UK Overview Cloud schemes in NWP models are basically the same as in climate models, but easier to evaluate using ARM because:
Application of Numerical Weather Prediction Models for Drought Monitoring. Gregor Gregorič Jožef Roškar Environmental Agency of Slovenia
Application of Numerical Weather Prediction Models for Drought Monitoring Gregor Gregorič Jožef Roškar Environmental Agency of Slovenia Contents 1. Introduction 2. Numerical Weather Prediction Models -
Cyber Security Design Methodology for Nuclear Power Control & Protection Systems. By Majed Al Breiki Senior Instrumentation & Control Manager (ENEC)
Cyber Security Design Methodology for Nuclear Power Control & Protection Systems By Majed Al Breiki Senior Instrumentation & Control Manager (ENEC) 1. INTRODUCTION In today s world, cyber security is one
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION (EPFAQ) NEI 99 01 REVISIONS 4 THROUGH 6; NUMARC/NESP 007
EPFAQ Number: 2015 001 DATE ACCEPTED 20 Apr 15 ORIGINATOR DAVID YOUNG ORGANIZATION Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) PHONE # 202 739 8016 RELEVANT GUIDANCE: NEI 99 01 REVISIONS 4 THROUGH 6; NUMARC/NESP 007
Activities of Nuclear Damage Compensation & Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF) Yasuharu Igarashi
Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation Activities of Nuclear Damage Compensation & Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF) June 3, 2015 Yasuharu Igarashi Executive
HOW DOES A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORK?
HOW DOES A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORK? O n t a r i o P o w e r G e n e r a t i o n P U T T I N G O U R E N E R G Y T O U S G O O D E O N T A R I O P O W E R G E N E R A T I O N What a Nuclear Reactor Does
A New Look at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
A New Look at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Group on Global Security (IGGS) Anthony Aust Masahiko Asada Edward Ifft Nicholas Kyriakopoulos Jenifer Mackby Bernard Massinon
TRANSIENT AND ACCIDENT ANALYSES FOR JUSTIFICATION OF TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
TRANSIENT AND ACCIDENT ANALYSES FOR JUSTIFICATION OF TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1 GENERAL 3 2 EVENTS TO BE ANALYSED 3 2.1 General requirements 3 2.2 Analyses of plant behaviour 4 2.3 Analyses
Elements of the Russian Emergency Preparedness Program
Elements of the Russian Emergency Preparedness Program Randolph L. Sullivan, NRC National Radiological EP Conference St. Louis, Missouri March 2006 2 3 4 5 6 Volgodonsk NPP 1000 MWe VVER, a PWR Large Staff
How To License A Nuclear Plant
Contents Introduction... 1 Two-Step Licensing Process (10 CFR Part 50)... 2 Construction Permit... 2 Operating License... 4 Additional Licensing Processes (10 CFR Part 52)... 4 Early Site Permits... 6
Nuclear Safety Council Instruction number IS- 23 on in-service inspection at nuclear power plants
Nuclear Safety Council Instruction number IS- 23 on in-service inspection at nuclear power plants Published in the Official State Gazette (BOE) No 283 of November 24 th 2009 Nuclear Safety Council Instruction
SARA (Spectroscopic Ambient Radiation Detection) Spectroscopic Monitoring Systems for Online Environmental Radiation Monitoring Edition 2008
SARA (Spectroscopic Ambient Radiation Detection) Spectroscopic Monitoring Systems for Online Environmental Radiation Monitoring Edition 2008 C. HOLZHEIMER and S. HARTMANN TechniData AG, ENVINET Hans-Pinsel-Str.
Developing a Safety Case for Ontario Power Generation s L&ILW Deep Geologic Repository
Developing a Safety Case for Ontario Power Generation s L&ILW Deep Geologic Repository T. Kempe, P. Gierszewski, R. Heystee, M. Jensen and H. Leung Ontario Power Generation, Canada NEA/EC/IAEA Symposium
RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS
RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS Area monitors Process monitors In-line, Adjacent-to-Line monitors Local/remote processors, Data Acquisition Systems NUPIC Certified, NRC Approved Vendor Wide Range Sensitivity
RENCEE SAFETY MARIES
IAEA MINISTE ERIAL CONFE RENCEE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY Vienna,, 20 24 June 2011 CHAIRPERSONS SUMM MARIES 1 The attached texts are the Chairpersons summaries of the main proposals that emerged from the Working
PNNL-23995. Radioxenon Detector. January 2015. MP Foxe JI McIntyre
PNNL-23995 Testing of the KRIdeveloped Silicon PIN Radioxenon Detector January 2015 MP Foxe JI McIntyre PNNL-23995 Testing of the KRI-developed Silicon PIN Radioxenon Detector MP Foxe JI McIntyre January
Questionnaire for NORM service providers
Questionnaire for NORM service providers This questionnaire is intended for institutes and companies providing services relevant for NORM industries in Belgium. Its objective is to give to Belgian NORM
This occurrence is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
Serial No. MNS-15-072 September 10, 2015,. DUKESteven Vice D. President Capps, ENERGYMcGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy MGOIVP 1 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 0: 980.875.4805 f: 980.875.4809
January 2014: Jeanne Briskin of the U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 The Upstate New York Society for Risk Analysis Webinar Series, Scientific Studies on Impact of Natural Gas Extraction from
Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants
Regulatory Document Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants February 2008 CNSC REGULATORY DOCUMENTS The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) develops regulatory documents under the authority of paragraphs
Maine Yankee INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL INSTALLATION (ISFSI) OFF-SITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL CHANGE NO. 32. Approved: Approval Date: 0"/06
Maine Yankee INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL INSTALLATION (ISFSI) OFF-SITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL CHANGE NO. 32 Approved: Approval Date: 0"/06 ABSTRACT The Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station Off-Site Dose Calculation
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NORTHSTAR #1 CLASS II INJECTION WELL AND THE SEISMIC EVENTS IN THE YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO AREA
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NORTHSTAR #1 CLASS II INJECTION WELL AND THE SEISMIC EVENTS IN THE YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO AREA Tom Tomastik, Geologist, ODNR, Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management PURPOSE AND
INES The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
INES The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale User s Manual 2008 Edition Co sponsored by the IAEA and OECD/NEA INES THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE USER S MANUAL 2008
IMPACT OF SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY-AMERENUE QUANTUM WEATHER PROJECT MESONET DATA ON WRF-ARW FORECASTS
IMPACT OF SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY-AMERENUE QUANTUM WEATHER PROJECT MESONET DATA ON WRF-ARW FORECASTS M. J. Mueller, R. W. Pasken, W. Dannevik, T. P. Eichler Saint Louis University Department of Earth and
Requirements and Challenges for a Nuclear Forensic System
Requirements and Challenges for a Nuclear Forensic System David Kenneth Smith Division of Nuclear Security Prepared for Seminar on Nuclear Forensics from a Nordic Perspective Oslo, Norway 5 6 October 2015
Report WENRA Safety Reference Levels for Existing Reactors - UPDATE IN RELATION TO LESSONS LEARNED FROM TEPCO FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT
Report WENRA Safety Reference Levels for Existing Reactors - UPDATE IN RELATION TO LESSONS LEARNED FROM TEPCO FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT 24 th September 2014 Table of Content WENRA Safety Reference Levels
Inventory of Performance Monitoring Tools for Subsurface Monitoring of Radionuclide Contamination
Inventory of Performance Monitoring Tools for Subsurface Monitoring of Radionuclide Contamination H. Keith Moo-Young, Professor, Villanova University Ronald Wilhelm, Senior Scientist, U.S. EPA, Office
IAEA INTERNATIONAL FACT FINDING EXPERT MISSION OF THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT FOLLOWING THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI
IAEA INTERNATIONAL FACT FINDING EXPERT MISSION OF THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT FOLLOWING THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI Tokyo, Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP, Fukushima Dai-ni NPP and Tokai NPP, Japan 24
GENERAL REGULATIONS ON ENSURING SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OPB-88/97, NP-001-97 (PNAE G- 01 011-97) Cover page. Contents
GENERAL REGULATIONS ON ENSURING SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OPB-88/97, NP-001-97 (PNAE G- 01 011-97) Cover page Contents Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority of Russia (Gosatomnadzor of Russia)
Nuclear Emergency Response Program
Nuclear Emergency Response Program NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS In California, there are two operating nuclear power plant sites: Diablo Canyon in San Luis Obispo County has two active units and San Onofre Nuclear
Training in Emergency Preparedness and Response
Working to Protect People, Society and the Environment Training in Emergency Preparedness and Response Nuclear Safety and Security Programme Nuclear Safety and Security Programme Training in Emergency
3.4.4 Description of risk management plan Unofficial Translation Only the Thai version of the text is legally binding.
- 1 - Regulation of Department of Industrial Works Re: Criteria for hazard identification, risk assessment, and establishment of risk management plan B.E. 2543 (2000) ---------------------------- Pursuant
