Intellectual Property News.

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1 October 2010 Intellectual Property News. EU Trade marks: Alpha bet A trade mark does not need to comprise a minimum number of characters in order to secure registration. The European Court of Justice ( ECJ ) has endorsed the ruling of the General Court that the Community trade mark office, OHIM, was wrong to assume, without taking into account the relevant facts, that a trade mark application consisting of a single letter could not have the necessary distinctive character (Case C , OHIM v BORCO- Marken-Import Matthiesen GmbH & Co. KG, 9 September 2010). Contents EU... 1 France... 3 UK... 5 Conference Papers and Publications The appellant, BORCO, applied for registration of the sign: α as a Community trade mark ( CTM ) in respect of alcoholic beverages. The examiner refused the application on the ground that the sign comprised the Greek lower-case letter α without graphical modifications and that Greekspeaking consumers would not detect in the sign an indication of the commercial origin of the goods described in the application. The OHIM Fourth Board of Appeal dismissed the applicant s appeal. The applicant appealed to the General Court and the ECJ essentially upheld the General Court s conclusions. Under Article 4 of the CTM Regulation (207/2009), a CTM may consist of any signs capable of being represented graphically, including letters, provided that they are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of another. A sign lacking distinctive character will be refused registration on absolute grounds (Article 7(1)(b) CTM Regulation) (for example, a sign depicting a banana might be distinctive for cars, but not for the eponymous fruit or even fruit generally). OHIM fell into error in finding, without citing any facts to support its view, that the relevant consumer might view the letter α as a reference to the quality, size or type of alcoholic beverage. OHIM wrongly assumed that the letter in its unmodified form lacked, by definition, any distinctive character. This conflicted with Article 4, which permits the registration of unmodified Intellectual Property News Issue 71 1

2 characters as a matter of principle. While the ECJ had previously recognised that it might be more difficult to establish distinctiveness in relation to certain categories of marks, for example, slogans (see e.g. Audi v OHIM C-398/08, reported in IP News, April 2010), this did not excuse trade mark registries from carrying out a thorough examination of their distinctive character based on the ability of the relevant consumer to distinguish the goods and services that it was intended to cover; mere doubts as to the distinctiveness of a sign did not provide a legitimate basis on which to refuse a trade mark application. Finally, the ECJ emphasised that it was for the registry to examine distinctiveness. Only where an applicant claimed that the subject matter of its application was distinctive despite the registry s analysis to the contrary following a proper examination did the burden fall on the applicant to prove distinctive character. mere doubts as to the distinctiveness of a sign did not provide a legitimate basis on which to refuse a trade mark application By Alex Batteson, London Trade marks: Another brick in the wall part two In the EU, the shapes of products are in principle entitled to trade mark protection. However, the rules generally disqualify those shapes that are functional in nature from registration in order to prevent perpetual monopolies being obtained over technical solutions, which do not meet the comparatively stringent conditions required for the shorter period of patent protection. The ECJ has now had the final word on Lego s long-running fight to register its iconic toy brick as a trade mark and refused registration on the ground that it is purely functional in nature (Lego Juris S/A v OHIM, Case C-48/09, 14 September 2010). The ECJ s decision should help clarify any lingering uncertainties over the correct interpretation of the rules left over by its previous decision in Philips (Case C-299/99) (which concerned the validity of a mark depicting a rotary shaver head). Under the CTM Regulation, signs which consist exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result must not be registered (Article 7(1)(e)(ii)). Lego s CTM application was originally filed in 1996 and registered in The OHIM Cancellation Division declared it invalid in 2004 on the basis of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) and this decision was upheld by the OHIM Grand Board of Appeal. The Court of First instance (as it then was) affirmed the Grand Board s decision in Lego s final appeal has now been rejected by the ECJ. As the ECJ noted, Article 7(1)(e)(ii) is particularly strict in that, unlike other grounds for absolute refusal of registrations, for instance non-distinctiveness, it is not possible for a functional sign that has acquired distinctive character through its use to obtain registration. In essence, the ECJ confirmed that the scope of the exclusion turned on the meaning of words exclusively and necessary. Exclusively A sign will consist exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result when all the essential characteristics of the shape perform a technical function, the presence of non-essential characteristics Intellectual Property News Issue 71 2

3 or one or more arbitrary elements in a three-dimensional sign being irrelevant. In other words, where a decorative or imaginative element plays an important role in the shape, the exclusion does not apply. The ECJ held that there was no simple rule for identifying the essential characteristics: depending on the complexity of the sign, the assessment could be carried out through a simple visual analysis or a more detailed examination involving consumer surveys or expert evidence. Whatever the approach undertaken by the relevant examining authority or tribunal, the perception of the notional average consumer was not decisive. Necessary The requirement that the shape must be necessary to obtain a technical result in order to be refused registration does not mean that the shape must be the only one capable of obtaining the intended technical result. If that were the case, an applicant could seek to register the complete range of alternative shapes that achieved the same technical solution and thus obtain a monopoly over the solution, perhaps perpetually. Instead the shape must, in itself, cause, and be sufficient to obtain, the intended technical result. the shape must, in itself, cause, and be sufficient to obtain, the intended technical result The ECJ drew support for this interpretation from the possibility that the shape sought for registration might constitute the technically preferable solution for the type of product, as in the case of the Lego brick. If such a solution could be registered as a trade mark, competitors would find it difficult to market products which presented real alternatives, namely, shapes which were dissimilar but which were nevertheless attractive to the average consumer. Finally the ECJ added (somewhat enigmatically) that while trade mark rights could not be used to prevent others from marketing slavish copies of a product s shape which incorporated a particular technical solution, alternative relief might be sought under unfair competition rules. By Alex Batteson, London France Trade marks: Google news The French Cour de Cassation has applied the ruling of the ECJ in Google and ors v Louis Vuitton and ors (Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 23 March 2010, reported as a Linklaters Hot Topic, 24 March 2010) and decided that Google s provision of its AdWords tool did not in itself amount to trade mark infringement. The facts Google supplies a keyword sponsorship service, AdWords, which enables advertisements to be displayed alongside the results of a search. Advertisers pay Google to display their advertisements; payments due are calculated on the basis of the frequency with which users click on the links to the advertisements. A number of trade mark owners, including Louis Vuitton, Intellectual Property News Issue 71 3

4 sued Google France in France on the ground that use of their marks as sponsored keywords amounted to trade mark infringement. Use in the course of trade The Cour de Cassation applied the ECJ s ruling that Google could not be held liable for trade mark infringement since its AdWords service did not use the trade marks in the course of trade. Although Google received payment for placement of the advertisement links, it did not use them for its own commercial communications, in particular, in order to enter a specific market. On the other hand, advertisers acquiring trade marks as keywords through the AdWords system may be liable for trade mark infringement where their advertisements do not easily enable users to ascertain whether the goods or services covered by the advertisements originate from the trade mark owner or unconnected third parties. The Cour de Cassation acknowledged the ECJ s ruling that Google could benefit from the hosting defence under Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC). This would exclude Google from any joint liability with an advertiser for infringement where it did not play an active role in the advertiser s activities. However, Google would need to act swiftly and remove infringing advertisements as soon as it became aware of them. The ECJ did not decide whether the provision of Google s AdWords service could be said to amount to an active role, since this was a matter for the national court. However, in light of its finding that Google did not use the claimants marks in the course of trade, the Cour de Cassation did not consider the question further. The new Google AdWords procedure In September, Google initiated a new policy for its AdWords service. Google will not permit trade mark owners to block the reservation of their trade marks as keywords. Instead Google has created a notification service allowing trade mark owners to notify Google of infringing, or at least misleading, advertisements. In September, Google initiated a new policy for its AdWords service The new procedure raises a number of issues. For instance, Google will be responsible for assessing and possibly withdrawing misleading advertisements despite having received payment for hosting their display. How the new procedure will play out remains unclear, but it may paradoxically expose Google to liability for infringement and deprive it of the benefit of the hosting defence. For example, the control carried out by Google prior to the publication of an advertisement may be considered to constitute an active role. By Sandra Georges, Paris Intellectual Property News Issue 71 4

5 UK Designs: Sucker punch Design features that are purely functional in nature are generally not entitled to registered design protection. This is a policy decision taken by the EU legislature to prevent design rights from being used to obtain monopolies over technical solutions which do not meet the comparatively stringent conditions required for patent protection. Following a recent decision of the Patents Court, it appears that this exclusion from protection may be broader than had previously been thought and more in line with a similar provision to be found in trade mark legislation (see Lego v OHIM, discussed above) (Dyson Ltd v Vax Ltd [2010] EWHC 1923 (Pat), 29 July 2010). this exclusion from protection may be broader than had previously been thought Dyson is the owner of the registered design in respect of a vacuum cleaner partially represented as follows: Dyson sued Vax for infringement of the registration on the basis of Vax s marketing of the following vacuum cleaner: Intellectual Property News Issue 71 5

6 Both the registration and Vax s cleaner possess a transparent dust collecting bin. The functionality exemption Article 7(1) Designs Directive (98/71/EC) (which is reflected in UK registered design legislation) provides that design right shall not subsist in features of appearance of a product which are solely dictated by its technical function. In Landor & Hawa International v Azure ([2006] EWCA 1285, FSR 9) Neuberger LJ (as he then was) appeared to interpret the equivalent Article 8(1) Community Designs Regulation narrowly by deciding that it applied only to a design which was the only design by which the product in question could perform its function; a functional design was entitled to protection where it could be shown that the same technical function could be achieved by other means, even though the design might, as a matter of fact, be dictated solely by the function of the product. Arnold J considered Neuberger LJ s interpretation to have been obiter and thus felt free to adopt the ruling of the OHIM Third Board of Appeal in Case R- 690/ Lindner Recyclingtech v Franssons Verkstader, which had rejected the approach taken in Landor on the basis that it could undermine the policy underlying the exclusion: if a functional design were entitled to protection where it could be shown that the same technical function could be achieved by other means, a monopoly over the function could still be obtained by the registration of each of those other means as designs. The Board had thus decided that Article 8(1) denied protection only to those features of a product s appearance that were chosen exclusively for the purpose of designing a product that performed its function, as opposed to features that were chosen, at least to some degree, for the purpose of enhancing the product s visual appearance. Lindner is persuasive and consistent with the approach taken by the ECJ in Lego to a similar provision contained within trade mark legislation. However, it is debatable whether the interpretation in Landor was indeed obiter and until the approach in Lindner is endorsed by a higher court, the correct position, at least as far as the UK is concerned, will remain unclear. Vax argued that Dyson s design registration did not extend to the transparent bin since the bin possessed the function of enabling the user to see when the bin was full of dirt and thus needed emptying. Arnold J rejected this on the basis of Lindner it was not clear that transparency had been chosen for purely functional reasons and not, at least to some degree, for the purpose of enhancing the cleaner s visual appearance. Lindner is persuasive and consistent with the approach taken by the ECJ in Lego Designer freedom That was not the end of the story, however. The scope of protection conferred by a design right includes any design which does not produce a different overall impression on the notional informed user (Article 9(1) Designs Directive). In assessing the scope of protection, the degree of freedom of the Intellectual Property News Issue 71 6

7 designer in developing his design is taken into consideration (Article 9(2)). The more the designer s freedom in developing an allegedly infringing design is restricted, the more likely minor differences between the designs at issue will be sufficient to produce a different overall impression on the informed user and thus preclude a finding of infringement (Case T-9/07, Grupo Promer Mon Graphic SA v OHIM, 18 March 2010). The Court found that the Vax cleaner was a machine with a high technical specification which imposed greater technical constraints and left the designer a lesser degree of freedom than a low specification machine. Since Vax s freedom in developing its cleaner was restricted, it was more likely that minor differences between it and the registered design would be sufficient to produce a different overall impression on the informed user. In conclusion, the Court held that the informed user would not consider the similarities between the two designs to be particularly significant and would instead notice many differences between them, a number of which would be considered to be significant. The Court thus held that the Vax cleaner did not infringe Dyson s registered design. the Vax cleaner was a machine with a high technical specification which imposed greater technical constraints By Alex Batteson, London Patents: Art rock In Schlumberger Holdings Limited v Electromagnetic Geoservices AS ([2010] EWCA Civ 819, 28 July 2010) the Court of Appeal overturned the Patents Court s decision to revoke the patent of the defendant, EMGS. The decision provides a helpful clarification in respect of two important areas of patent law, namely that (i) the person skilled in the art can differ when considering sufficiency and obviousness issues; and (ii) secondary evidence can be of real value when assessing obviousness. An invention is considered to involve an inventive step if it is not obvious to a notional person skilled in the art. Further, a patent must disclose its invention clearly and completely enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art. The skilled person may in fact be a notional team of people with different skills. EMGS is the owner of a patent directed to hydrocarbon (e.g. oil and gas) exploration techniques. Prior to the patent, seismic techniques were widely used to locate hydrocarbon reservoirs within sub-sea rock formations. While these techniques could reveal the size and shape of the reservoirs, they could not determine whether they held valuable hydrocarbons or merely water or brine. For that, it was necessary to drill expensive exploration wells. The patent relates to the use of controlled source electromagnetic surveying ( CSEM ) on reservoirs identified using seismic techniques, to determine whether they contain hydrocarbons. Intellectual Property News Issue 71 7

8 The skilled team At the filing date of the patent, the scientists faced with the task of locating sub-sea hydrocarbon reservoirs comprised exploration geophysicists. These geophysicists had only a vague knowledge of CSEM and no apparent use for it. On the other hand, only a very small group of academic geophysicists had expertise in CSEM. It was accepted that, for the purposes of performing the invention, the skilled team of exploration geophysicists necessarily included CSEM experts. The issue was whether the same skilled team was relevant for assessing obviousness. Jacob LJ held that the skilled team could differ for obviousness and sufficiency purposes. He dismissed Schlumberger s submission that because the European Patent Convention (and the Patents Act 1977) used the same phrase ( person skilled in the art ) in relation to sufficiency and obviousness, it must have the same meaning in relation to both. He held that it was wrong to think that the art was necessarily the same both before the invention was made (when obviousness was considered) and after (for the purposes of sufficiency) since some inventions were art changing. some inventions were art changing Jacob LJ considered two separate questions to assess whether CSEM was an obvious solution to the problem of characterising reservoirs. First, would the notional exploration geophysicist, having read the art, appreciate that there was a solvable problem and see that CSEM was the answer or at least had a sufficient prospect of success to merit seeking the views of a CSEM expert? Second, would the CSEM expert know of the exploration geophysicist s problem and appreciate that CSEM had a real prospect of solving it? Jacob LJ answered no to both questions and held that, because there had been a non-obvious marriage of skills, the invention involved an inventive step. It was therefore unnecessary to go further and ask whether a combined skilled team would see CSEM as providing a solution. Secondary evidence The case also involved a considerable amount of secondary evidence, such as contemporaneous letters and s from experts showing their excitement upon first learning of the invention. The trial judge treated this evidence with scepticism, in line with cases such as Nichia Corporation v Argos Limited ([2007] EWCA Civ 741; reported in IP News, September 2007). Jacob LJ, however, rejected the judge s approach on the basis that the contemporaneous reactions of real experts in the field would not have been tailored or selected for the trial and were always of real value when assessing obviousness. He considered it particularly telling that Schlumberger (one of the largest oil exploration companies) had not explained why CSEM had not been thought of as a solution earlier. The case is in line with the recent pro-patentee approach of the English courts. Jacob LJ s helpful clarification of the composition of the skilled team will likely be relevant only to similar art changing patents in most cases the person skilled in the art will be the same for obviousness and insufficiency Intellectual Property News Issue 71 8

9 purposes. However, his endorsement of secondary evidence as being of potentially real value is likely to be relied on more generally by parties when preparing cases and may lead to the need for careful case management in order to avoid disproportionate volumes of secondary evidence being relied on. By Dennis Schubauer, London Trade marks: Sun down The need for brand owners to consider their options carefully before seeking summary judgment against parallel grey goods importers who raise competition defences has been highlighted once again by a recent decision of the Court of Appeal (Oracle America, Inc formerly Sun Microsystems, Inc v M- Tech Data Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 997, 24 August 2010). Sun Microsystems sued M-Tech for infringement of its Sun trade mark for computer equipment on the basis of M-Tech s importation into the UK of Sun disk drives which it had obtained from a broker in the US. Sun applied for summary judgment, which M-Tech sought to resist on the following grounds (so far as they remained relevant on appeal): > Sun deliberately failed to make publicly available serial mark trackers that would enable independent resellers to identify whether drives had been placed on the EEA market by Sun or with its consent. At the same time it aggressively pursued unlicensed resellers for infringement. Thus independent resellers were deterred from dealing in Sun drives since they could not know whether they had been first marketed in the EEA with Sun s consent. This was contrary to the free movement rules under Articles 34 and 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU ( TFEU ). Article 34 TFEU provides that quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States. Article 36 TFEU provides in essence that Article 34 shall not preclude restrictions on imports justified on grounds of the protection of intellectual property, provided that such restrictions do not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade between Member States. The need for brand owners to consider their options carefully before seeking summary judgment against parallel grey goods importers who raise competition defences has been highlighted once again > Sun s agreements with its authorised distributors required that they buy new and second-hand equipment from within Sun s authorised network whenever possible. This had resulted in the artificial partitioning of the second-hand Sun equipment market contrary to Article 101 TFEU. A complete code? Kitchen J rejected the defences and granted Sun s summary judgment application. In his view, the ECJ had established that the Trade Marks Directive (2008/95/EC) ( TMD ) embodied a complete harmonisation of the rules relating to the rights conferred by a registered trade mark; there was nothing to suggest that additional reference needed to be made to Articles 34 and 36 TFEU. Further, there was no nexus between the alleged breach of Article 101 TFEU and M-Tech s infringement. Intellectual Property News Issue 71 9

10 The Court of Appeal allowed M-Tech s appeal. There was a real prospect that M-Tech would establish at trial that the TMD must be interpreted by reference to Articles 34 and 36 TFEU. It was arguable that the TMD represented a complete code only to the extent that it precluded Member States from legislating on matters that had been harmonised by the Directive. It was also arguable that a breach of Article 34 would be established that could not be justified under Article 36 TFEU or Article 7 TMD (in the sense that Sun s trade marks rights had not been exhausted): Sun s alleged practices arguably had more to do with restricting imports with the object of protecting its profit margins than with the right conferred by the TMD to control the first marketing of its products. While M-Tech s complaints might ultimately sound in competition rather than trade mark law, the space between the two sets of rights was not necessarily exclusively populated by the one or the other. Sun s alleged practices arguably had more to do with restricting imports with the object of protecting its profit margins Abuse of rights? An additional ground of appeal that Sun s conduct amounted to an abuse of the rights conferred by a registered trade mark (under Article 5 TMD) was also arguable. While the abuse of rights doctrine (derived from the VAT case Halifax v HMRC [2006] STC 919) was merely another way of putting M- Tech s Article 34/36 defence, it was a developing area of EU law, the application of which was fact-sensitive. It might provide another way of locating M-Tech s complaints within the TMD. Finally, it was arguable that M-Tech s allegation that Sun s distribution agreements formed part of an overall scheme for excluding secondary traders from the market in breach of Article 101 TFEU was sufficiently closely connected with the infringement claims to provide M-Tech with a defence (in accordance with Sportswear Spa v Stonestyle Ltd [2007] FSR 33). The Court of Appeal remitted the case to the High Court with an order that a case management conference be held as soon as practicable bearing in mind that a reference to the ECJ might be necessary. The decision provides an admonitory lesson for brand owners seeking to enforce their rights that EU competition defences may not easily be dismissed and that their boundaries remain far from clear. By Alex Batteson, London Trade marks: Eye dilution The claim of taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of a trade mark is emerging as an effective tool for brand owners dealing with infringers. In Specsavers International Healthcare Limited and ors v Asda Stores Limited ([2010] EWHC 2035 (Ch)), the High Court rejected Specsavers claims that a logo and various straplines used by Asda on posters and leaflets in its stores were confusingly similar to, or damaged the distinctive character of, Specsavers registered trade marks. However, the Court found that use of the strapline Be a real spec saver at Asda on a billboard did take unfair advantage of the Specsavers word mark. Intellectual Property News Issue 71 10

11 In addition to the word mark, Specsavers owns the registration for the following logo: Asda used the logo below on posters in its stores: It also displayed and distributed the following billboard and leaflet: Intellectual Property News Issue 71 11

12 Living dangerously Specsavers sued for trade mark infringement. In deciding whether Asda s logo and straplines were likely to cause confusion with Specsavers marks, Mann J considered the relevance of evidence that Asda were living dangerously in seeking to get as close as they could to Specsavers marks. He held that while such evidence was admissible, it was of limited relevance given that likelihood of confusion was an objective test. However, it was of greater value than survey evidence, since it was likely to be an assessment by someone with some expertise in the trade who knows the market. Mann J distinguished two scenarios: evidence that a defendant that liked a third party s mark, wanted something similar and looked for what they could get away with was relevant to confusion; on the other hand, evidence that a defendant wanted their own mark which might otherwise be thought to be similar to a third party s mark and asked whether it was far away enough to be safe was irrelevant. On the facts, the judge found that it was the plan of Asda s design teams to have a logo that at least resonated with Specsavers logo. They started from Specsavers logo and went to what their lawyers told them was a safe distance. Asda s conduct thus fell within the bracket of living dangerously cases and was therefore supportive, if not conclusive, of a claim to confusion. Overall, however, the judge held that the average consumer would not be confused by the two logos. Similarly, the average consumer would read the words spec saver in the billboard strapline in context as a play on words and not an advertisement for Specsavers. The case against the second strapline which used the words spec savings was even weaker. it was the plan of Asda s design teams to have a logo that at least resonated with Specsavers logo Unfair advantage As to whether Asda had taken unfair advantage of Specsavers marks, the judge interpreted the Court of Appeal in Whirlpool Corporation v Kenwood Ltd (reported in IP News, October 2009) as having decided that in order to show that unfair advantage had been taken, something more than mere advantage - whether intention or some other factor - was required to demonstrate the necessary element of unfairness. (This contrasts with Jacob LJ s obiter dictum in L Oréal v Bellure (reported in IP News, July 2010).) On the facts, Asda had gained an advantage by, at the very least, using Specsavers reputation for value as a reference point in its billboard strapline for its intended message - you will get a better deal at Asda. Asda s intention here made the advantage unfair. However, while the judge felt that Asda s logo brought Specsavers logo to mind, thus creating the necessary link between them to support an unfair advantage case as required by Intel v CPM (reported in IP News, January 2009), the link was insufficiently strong to indicate any unfairness despite the fact that it might have been intended. The link arose from the shape of the ovals only and was strongly countered by Asda s wording. The judge s reasoning here appears to be consistent with that of the Court of Justice in L Oréal (reported as a Linklaters Hot Topic, June 2009) and the Court of Intellectual Property News Issue 71 12

13 Appeal in Whirlpool: the presence or absence of intention to take advantage is merely a factor to be taken into account when considering liability. Finally, the judge decided that Asda s marketing had not damaged Specsavers marks since there was no evidence that it had caused (or was likely to cause) a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of Specsavers products or services (the test established by Intel). However, the overall result is encouraging for brand owners since it highlights the apparently low evidential threshold needed to establish liability in unfair advantage in comparison with claims of likelihood of confusion or damage to distinctive character or reputation. By Alex Batteson, London Intellectual Property News Issue 71 13

14 Contacts Conference Papers and Publications Marianne Schaffner and Romain Viret wrote an article entitled Validity of a saisie-contrefacon carried out after the expiry of the patent for the Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice. For further information please contact: Alex Batteson Professional Support Lawyer (++44) alex.batteson@linklaters.com Sandra Georges Associate (++33) sandra.georges@linklaters.com Editor: Alex Batteson This publication is intended merely to highlight issues and not to be comprehensive, nor to provide legal advice. Should you have any questions on issues reported here or on other areas of law, please contact one of your regular contacts, or contact the editors. Linklaters LLP. All Rights reserved 2010 Linklaters LLP is a limited liability partnership registered in England and Wales with registered number OC The term partner in relation to Linklaters LLP is used to refer to a member of Linklaters LLP or an employee or consultant of Linklaters LLP or any of its affiliated firms or entities with equivalent standing and qualifications. A list of the names of the members of Linklaters LLP together with a list of those non-members who are designated as partners and their professional qualifications is open to inspection at its registered office, One Silk Street, London EC2Y 8HQ or on and such persons are either solicitors, registered foreign lawyers or European lawyers. Please refer to for important information on our regulatory position. We currently hold your contact details, which we use to send you newsletters such as this and for other marketing and business communications. We use your contact details for our own internal purposes only. This information is available to our offices worldwide and to those of our associated firms. If any of your details are incorrect or have recently changed, or if you no longer wish to receive this newsletter or other marketing communications, please let us know by ing us at marketing.database@linklaters.com. One Silk Street London EC2Y 8HQ Telephone (+44) Facsimile (+44) Linklaters.com Intellectual Property News Issue 71 14