Segovia, Spain Wednesday 27 th Friday 29 th January 2010

Transcription

1 European Union Project Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners Conference on Radicalisation in Prison and Probation Segovia, Spain Wednesday 27 th Friday 29 th January 2010 With the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union European Commission - Directorate-General Home Affairs

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3 European Union Project Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners Conference on Radicalisation in Prison and Probation Segovia, Spain Wednesday 27 th Friday 29 th January 2010 Edited by Nick Lane, National Offender Management Service; Kalpana Kapoor, London Probation Trust; Nick Hammond, London Probation Trust 2

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5 Contents Foreword 5 1 Executive Summary of RIRP Project 7 2 Conference Agenda 9 3 Summary of talks from day one of the conference Wednesday 27 th January Summary of talks from day two of the conference Thursday 28 th January Summary of talks from day three of the conference Friday 29 th January Annex A Key Partners of RIRP Project 40 Annexx BA Power-Point slides from the presentations 42 4

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7 Foreword Alan Weston Project Manager of the Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners project On the 7 th July 2005 while I was driving on the motorway that circles London, suddenly signs began to flash on to roadside screens with the message London Closed. All mobile phone networks were jammed and my car radio only carried vague messages as to the true situation inside the capital. Yet slowly the chilling realisation dawned that there had been a series of coordinated suicide bombings on the London transport system, which bore all the hallmarks of an Al Qaeda inspired assault. This atrocity had a striking resemblance to the 2004 Madrid bombings. Both attacks had focused on essential transport infrastructure and both had killed and injured a great number of innocent people. As the situation clarified it became apparent that these were sophisticated attacks and would have involved a tangled web of many other people. No sooner had the dusts of that day settled than a further attempt was made that same month to kill and harm on an industrial scale, though this attempt failed to repeat the lethal precision of July 7 th. In the aftermath of these attacks Criminal Justice agencies were presented with the situation that a number of the perpetrators would receive prison sentences of no more than a few years before release on licence into the community. In the capital they would be supervised by London Probation Trust, yet how prepared were we for this, what was our knowledge base, and how should we engage with violent offenders whose motivation was both political and religious? In the Reducing Hate Crime in Europe 2 project London Probation had identified specialist organisations in Germany who engaged with young men serving prison sentences for violence inspired by extreme right wing political groups. Links had also been made with London Mosques in a concerted attempt to engage the Muslim community in a search for a lasting solution to violent extremism. The Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners (RIRP) project sought to continue this partnership in Germany and in London to develop a joined up response to engage those convicted of violent extremism while in custody and while on licence once released into the community. Richard Pickering Head of NOMS Security Group conference co-chair I was struck, throughout the conference, at just what an ambitious and challenging agenda this is for prison and probation services. Several challenges were highlighted during the course of our three days in the beautiful city of Segovia: How can offender management systems deal with people who choose not to integrate into, and remain in opposition to, modern European societies? What are we trying to achieve? Is it desistance stopping people from acting on anti-social ideas or is it something more fundamental the term occidentalisation was used at one point. How can we manage the risks presented by terrorist offenders, within the prison walls and to our societies at large, without a robust evidence base? Their numbers are so small we cannot yet say what works. How can we work effectively with non-statutory bodies, and in such a sensitive area? They have a tremendous amount to offer, and we need to get our relationships right. What does the future hold? What might future disruptive activity by our partner agencies look like, and what are the implications of that for criminal justice and offender management systems? Above all, and we returned to this several times over the course of the conference, I was struck by how important it is to get our language right. A loose use of language which conflates concepts such as terrorism and violence with the language of legitimate faith might suggest difficulties in conceptualising what we are trying to achieve. We risk doing the radicalisers work for them, and perpetuating perceptions of hostility to Islam, if prison and probation staff talk loosely about extremism and radicalisation in ways which do not respect religious and cultural diversity, and the proper place of faith and political ideology and activity in pluralist democracies. For me the conference reaffirmed our common aims. Yet we have different offender management systems, and the composition of our terrorist offender populations is varied. Ongoing bilateral dialogue between individual member 5

8 states, where we can share practice and experience of similar situations, is very helpful. I look forward to the next RIRP conference this autumn, and to engaging with an even broader set of European colleagues. In the meantime, we have a range of existing structures and programmes across Europe, where I hope the RIRP project can locate itself, through the remainder of the Spanish Presidency and beyond. Again, I express my thanks to our Spanish hosts, and to all those who organised this conference. Juan Antonio nio Marín Ríos Director of Internal Security and Prison Management, conference co-chair Within the framework of the Spanish Presidency of the European Union, during the 27 th and 29 th of January 2010 a European Conference was held on the topic violent radicalisation within Prison and Probation systems. During these few days, a group of experts from across Europe convened to analyse those factors which are believed to counteract the radicalisation process of offenders. The focus of these discussions was the development, modification, and improvement of current programmes and protocols. The wider strategic aim being to prevent our prison and probation systems becoming places where offenders becoming susceptible to the indoctrination and recruitment of violent religious extremists, becoming gradually more radicalised before joining terrorist groups. Discussion also focused on the design, structure and content of specific treatment programmes, which aim to promote and facilitate the social integration of Muslim prisoners. These are a necessary element in combating the radicalisation process. A further objective of the conference was to discuss proposals to strengthen the coordination and information systems between prison and probation administrations and other non-community administrations. The following proposals were drawn up and submitted by the Spanish Delegation: To create a coordination body in Europe in the area of the IIPP Probation Service, similar to Europol or Eurojust. To prepare a Manual on preventing radicalisation within Prison and Probation systems that is accepted by all countries in the European Union. To establish within the European Union an IIPP officer exchange programme for joint training and exchange of knowledge and professional experience. Commitment of the represented bodies to participate in conferences planned for continuing with the project. Other recommendations were also made during the conference: To establish a good practices catalogue. To increase the exchange of information with Security Forces and Non Governmental Organisations (NGO s). Since the monitoring of terrorist offenders is the task of different bodies (depending on whether they are in prison or on probation) it is absolutely necessary for everyone to share essential information. To develop a common methodological approach to prevent the radicalisation of offenders in Prison and Probation systems. To detect similarities and analogies in relation to this phenomenon in the different countries. To approve European regulations in relation to the Probation Service. I believe that by all measures this conference was a success. There was a high level of participation from a large number of European countries, with the level of professional expertise available to present and debate issues of a very high standard. It was a very productive few days, and I would like to convey my great appreciation and thanks to all those who were involved. Note from the Conference Report editorial team This report seeks to capture the discussions which took place at the Segovia Conference on radicalisation within prison and probation systems between 27 th and 29 th January Detailed notes of all presentations and debates were taken as the conference unfolded, and it is these notes which have formed the basis of this full report. As those who attended the conference will be aware, the type of vocabulary used to describe violent radicalisation is an area of constant debate. Wherever possible we have remained faithful to the original wording or phrasing of each speaker and in this light it is important to note that the language used in the body of this report reflects the views of the speakers and not the editorial team. The editors would like to take the opportunity to thank all those who participated in the Segovia conference. In particular we would like to thank the conference chairs and the presenters as well as the team who provided logistical support and linguistic interpretation. On a final note we would like to thank the Directorate General for Freedom, Security and Justice within the European Commission, who funded the RIRP project. Without this support the project and hence the conference would not have taken place. 6

9 1 Executive Summary of RIRP Project European Union Project - Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners Project Summary To research the key influencing factors that can radicalise prisoners and offenders To train criminal justice staff working in prisons or with prisoners released on licence in the community to be aware of these factors To provide recommendations for improved management and supervision of terrorist related offenders To develop a range of training materials that might be used in other EU countries To transfer information and learning to other EU countries through a network of interested practitioners within the UK, Germany, The Netherlands and other EU countries This EU funded project addresses the training and awareness-raising needs of Criminal Justice staff working in Prisons and in the community with prisoners and ex-prisoners released on licence. It seeks to raise awareness of the features of prison life and community supervision that could be factors or influences in violent radicalisation. The project has designed and is currently piloting staff training programmes for staff who work with prisoners, released prisoners and those on supervision. The training programme and materials are designed from an international standpoint to examine how transferable such training might be across a number of European criminal justice systems. The project uniquely brings together the expertise of an established and respected NGO in Germany, the Violence Prevention Network, with the criminal justice experience of the UK, through London Probation and the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), in delivering expert courses for prison and community based staff. The project is developing a unique "through the gate" high quality training package that can be used by staff working with prisoners in prison or those released on licence. Stockwell Green Community Services in the UK are an experienced NGO dedicated to offering resettlement routes into education and employment for those caught up in or in danger of becoming violent radicals. This combination will ensure that the training delivered to staff will provide sufficient awareness of the issues for staff working with prisoners, licensees or offenders in the community. Project Partners London Probation, UK (lead partner) Secretaría General de Instituciones Penitenciarias (SGIP), Spain National Offender Management Service (NOMS), UK Stockwell Green Community Services, UK CEP The European Organisation for Probation, The Netherlands Violence Prevention Network (VPN), Germany University of Bremen, Germany 7

10 Project Outputs To carry out research on what acts to radicalise prisoners and offenders; current practice and experiences in Europe, with a particular focus on the UK, Germany and the Netherlands; and recommendations for management and supervision of terrorist related offenders. To develop a transferable range of training package and materials for use in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and possibly wider EU countries to support Criminal Justice staff working with radicalised offenders. 85 Criminal Justice staff trained in the UK and Germany. Expert seminars held in the UK and Germany to highlight issues and share learning of working with violent right-wing extremists and those from a Muslim background. 1 st trans-national Conference held in Spain, January 2010, to inform and develop the training course and to disseminate information. 2 nd trans-national Conference held in the UK, October 2010 (date to be confirmed), to showcase project s training pilots, learning and best practise outline and share research in relation to extremism and radicalisation and look at examples of current practice. Evaluation of training pilots by the University of Bremen. Best practise network of interested practitioners established between partner countries and other EU members states. Timeline Project Start Date: December 2007 Project End Date: December 2010 RIRP Project Management For further information please contact; Ms Kalpana Kapoor, European Projects Officer; or Project Manager, Nick Hammond, Equalities & Community Engagement, [email protected] 8

11 2 Conference Agenda European Union Project - Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners (RIRP) Conference on Radicalisation in Prison and Probation Segovia, Spain Wednesday 27 th Friday 29 th January 2010 Agenda Wednesday 27 th January Registration and reception with cocktail lunch Formal opening of the Conference. Mercedes Gallizo Llamas, Secretary General of Penitentiary Institutions Overview on the importance of addressing issues of radicalisation and extremism. Leo Tigges, Secretary General of CEP (European Organisation for Probation) Overview of the Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners project. Alan Weston, Project Manager, UK London Probation Trust. Linda Pizani Williams, European Institute on Social Services. Judy Korn, Project Partner, Violence Prevention Network, Germany Coffee Break Overview of the situation surrounding extremism and radicalisation in UK and Spain. Policies and best practises on radicalisation in the prison and probation service. Virgilio Valero, Director General of Territory Coordination and Open Facilities, SGIP. Rosie Hanna, Head of NOMS Extremism Unit, Short presentations by other EU countries on the challenges posed by extremism and radicalisation in their penitentiary systems. Sweden Martin Hallqvist, advisor to the Swedish Prison Service and Per-Olov Humla, Head of Security Section, Swedish Prison Service. Italy Santi Consolo, Deputy Head of the Department of Penitentiary Administration. Denmark Michael Fønss Gjørup, Head of Security Department, Prison Service Close of the day. 9

12 Thursday 28 th January Conclusions from previous day and overview of day two of the conference. Richard Pickering, Head of NOMS Security Group Overview of the situation surrounding extremism and radicalisation across the European Union and the global context. Peter Neumann, Institute for Countering Radicalisation and Political Violence Workshops: 1. Prison regimes - working with violent extremists. Chaired by:head of Intervention for Special Groups Unit, SGIP. Speaker:Head of Service for Intervention and Monitoring, SGIP. Speaker: Rosie Hanna, Head of NOMS Extremism Unit. Speaker: Marc Cerón Deputy Director General for Reparation and Criminal Enforcement in the Community, Justice Department, Catalonia. 2. Interventions and treatments inside prisons. Chaired by:deputy Director General for Penitentiary Treatment and Regimes, SGIP. Speaker:Psychologist, Penitentiary Institution of Alama, SGIP Speaker: Lindy Maslin, Intervention and Substance Misuse Group, NOMS Speaker: Judy Korn, Violence Prevention Network Coffee Break Workshops: 3. Staff training and offender manager techniques for handling violent extremists. Chaired by: Alan Weston, London Probation Trust Speaker: Juan Antonio Marín Ríos, Coordinator of Security Programmes inside Prisons and Penitentiary Management, SGIP Speaker: Liz Dixon, Hate Crime Co-ordinator for London Probation Trust 4. Offenders on release in the community. Chaired by: Linda Pizani Williams, European Institute of Social Services Speaker: Sara Robinson, Assistant Chief Officer with lead on Extremism, London Probation Trust Speaker: Toaha Qureshi, Stockwell Green Community Services Speakers: Jacco Groeneveld, Regional Manager in Dutch Corrections and Leo Jansen, Project Manager in Dutch Corrections Feedback and conclusions from the morning s workshops. Chaired by: Richard Pickering Feedback and conclusions from: Alan Weston and Linda Pizani Williams Lunch Visit to Segovia Penitentiary Institution and Centre of Social Rehabilitation These prisons hold approximately 480 and 80 male offenders respectively, with the visit providing the opportunity for delegates to talk with prison staff. 10

13 18.00 Close of the day Gala Dinner hosted by Ms. Mercedes Gallizo, Secretary General of the Secretariat General of Penitentiary Institutions, accompanied by Mr. Virgilio Valero, Director General of Territory Coordination and Open Facilities. Friday 29 th January Conclusions from previous day and overview of day three of the conference. Juan Antonio Marín Ríos, Coordinator of Security Programmes inside prison and Penitentiary Management, SGIP Plenary Session: Working with Partners to Combat Extremism The Role of Government Institutions and Community Groups. Head of Security Coordination, Secretariat General of Penitentiary Institutions, Spain. Sara Robinson, Assistant Chief Officer with lead on Extremism, London Probation Trust Hanif Qadir, Active Change Foundation Question and answer panel with: Chaired by:head of Service for Intervention and Monitoring, SGIP Juan Antonio Marín Ríos, Coordinator of Security Programmes inside prison and Penitentiary Management, SGIP Sara Robinson, Assistant Chief Officer with lead on Extremism, London Probation Trust Richard Pickering, Head of NOMS Security Group Ulrich Dovermann, Federal Agency for Civic Education, Germany (on behalf of the Violence Prevention Network). Leo Tigges, Secretary General of CEP (European Organisation for Probation). Toaha Qureshi, CEO of Stockwell Green Community Services. Dr Peter Neumann, Institute for Countering Radicalisation and Political Violence Coffee Break Closing remarks and next steps: - Details of next conference. - Identifying developments to be taken forward at the EU, Bi-lateral, and National level. Chaired by:head of Service for Intervention and Monitoring, SGIP Richard Pickering, Head of NOMS Security Group Antonio Puig Renau, Director General of Resources Management, SGIP Lunch delegates are free to leave when required. 11

14 3 Summary of talks from day one of the conference Wednesday 27 th January 2010 Juan Antonio Marín Ríos conference co-chair Introductory words Welcome everybody and thank you for being here. I have been assigned to chair this first session of the conference a conference organised by the UK National Offender Management Service, the CEP (the European Organisation for Probation) and the Spanish Secretariat General for Penitentiary Institutions (SGIP) - which belongs to the Ministry of the Interior. This work is taking place within the framework of the European Commission funded project Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners. Radicalisation in prison is a growing factor of the jihadist threat to our societies. This is the reason why we need to implement global measures. It is of vital importance to join forces on initiatives and measures in order to build up a common project which can be applied to all prison services in the European Union. After the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11 th 2004 I accepted the post of the Spanish Secretary General of Penitentiary Institutions. The recent events made evident the need to restructure security in prisons; we needed to restructure it to meet the challenges that Spain was facing: jihadist terrorism and ETA. Therefore, in 2004 we started to work on the design and implementation of measures which would allow us to detect proselytism, recruitment and radicalisation of prisoners and to establish the risk factors associated with this. The papers which are to be presented during this conference aim to summarise the results of the project so far. During these three days we are also going to have 4 workshops, visit two prisons, make a tour of Segovia and enjoy the Spanish and Segovian cuisine. Without further ado, I would like to introduce Ms. Mercedes Gallizo, the Spanish Secretary General for Penitentiary Institutions, who, ever since she was given the job six years ago, has been working tirelessly for the improvement of the prison system. Her work has aimed to enhance mainly three areas: 1. Infrastructure: we have built new prisons and Centros de Inserción Social (Centres for Social Resettlement or open prisons) 2. Treatment: we have developed new intervention programmes, created the Respect Wings (wings managed by prisoners who work in teams or commissions) and have promoted the use of alternative measures to imprisonment. 3. Management: we have introduced new projects and programmes which have led to our prison system becoming more innovative and humanitarian. Ms. Gallizo, the floor is yours. Mercedes Gallizo Secretary General of Penitentiary Institutions Opening speech I would like to welcome you all to Spain and to this the Minister of the Interior and on my own behalf. As has been said before, this conference has been organised by NOMS, London Probation Trust, the CEP and the Spanish SGIP (which is part of the Ministry of the Interior), during this semester of the Spanish presidency of the EU. This conference aims to gather proposals and develop initiatives jointly to face this threat. In Spain, as I said, we opted for analyzing and redesigning our security structures to improve the control and monitoring of prisoners and their activities, which may threaten security both inside and outside prison. In this sense, we concluded that we had to improve our intelligence procedures for gathering and analysing information. Nevertheless, all our activities in security matters need to ensure the following: They need to be entirely respectful towards religious beliefs and prisoners need to feel that. Our work aims are to protect the safety and security of society at large. We need to work hard in assessing risk, since the Spanish government considers the prison system as one of the main pillars of its security policy. All our activities need to be based on the principles of necessity, proportionality, jurisdictional control and respect to constitutional principles. We need to devote resources, both human and economic, to our activities. 12

15 Bearing all this in mind, we set up a project between September 2008 and September 2009 to create staff teams which would monitor prisoners. These staff groups have received very positive assessment and feedback. We are also improving and developing our intervention programmes for these prisoners, which aim to move them away from extremism and integrate them in the prison social structure. Leo Tigges, Secretary General of CEP Overview on the importance of addressing issues of radicalisation and extremism It is a pleasure for me to be here today, because this is a special conference included in the programme of the Spanish presidency of the EU, and thus I would like to congratulate Spain for conducting such an important task. I would also like to thank the Spanish organisers of the conference, and to welcome you all on behalf of the CEP. For us, this conference is also special because it is related to an EU-funded project, which shows the commitment of the EU in this matter. In all our previous CEP conferences we have dealt with issues on probation which applied similarly to all our members (e.g. electronic monitoring), but this topic is different. There are low numbers of prisoners that radicalise and thus it is very difficult to learn from our own experiences in our own countries. This is why we are all gathered here today: to learn from each other s experiences. It is also special because prison and probation have come to work closely together. We have begun to understand that prevention and rehabilitation is truly effective when we work together. In probation we have recently understood that we need both the prison system and the community to be effective. And I mention the community because it is essential to include communities in the process of resocialisation, for they may have a great influence on prisoners. First of all we need to learn how to detect radicalised prisoners or prisoners who are in the process of radicalisation. And, at the same time, we need both to distinguish different kinds of radicalism and to detect their numerous similarities. We need to answer the question of how to manage these prisoners in prisons: should we concentrate them all in two or three prisons so that our monitoring and control can be stronger or should we disperse them? Both models have advantages and disadvantages. We need to find out how to manage de-radicalisation, which is different form re-socialisation. We need to find out proper ways to reach the communities and empower them. But we always need to bear in mind the fact that there are groups in the communities contributing to radicalisation. We need to find best practices in all these matters, which is something I am really looking forward to. Thank you. Virgilio Valero, Director General of Territorial Coordination and Open Facilities: Overview of the situation surrounding extremism and radicalisation in Spain. Virgilio highlighted the how Jihadist terrorism is a major danger and source for concern in many countries and is a phenomenon which has become global. Since the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, followed by the 2001 New York attacks and the later Madrid and London bombings, international terrorism has gradually become more and more dangerous. One important feature of this phenomenon is the capacity to recruit new members to the cause. Reports from different countries state that prisons may become convenient places for proselytism and radicalisation. Following the attack in Madrid in 2004 this also became apparent in one of the Spanish Prisons. Virgilio then gave an overview of the penal policies in Spain. The Penal Code and the Penitentiary Act did not include, in their initial provisions, specific rules to regulate terrorism-related offenses and their sentences. It was only after March 11 th 2004 that specific provisions were introduced. A new act was passed which lengthened sentences and introduced the way they were to be served in terrorism cases. For instance, the maximum length of a sentence was increased to 40 years and access to parole for terrorist offenders became subject to one condition: the prisoner must show unmistakeable signs of having abandoned the goals and means of terrorist activities and must have cooperated with the authorities against terrorism. This may be accredited by a public statement by the prisoner condemning terrorism and apologising to the victims together with expert reports on their conduct. The Spanish government has also passed a draft bill (which will need to be passed by the Parliament to become an Act) where provision is made for a security measure to be added to the sentence once it has been served: i.e. to supervise and monitor their freedom. This extra measure can last up to 10 years and may be linked to some restrictions or obligations in the community, such as the prohibition of getting closer than X meters to somebody; or the obligation to live in a certain place; or attend specified treatment programmes. The definition of offences related to terrorism were also modified following the Framework Decision 2008/919, whereby public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism are considered terrorist offences as well. Several measures have been taken in relation to terrorism in Spanish Prisons. There is a difference between the measures taken to deal with jihadist terrorist offenders and those implemented to prevent radicalisation in prisons. The measures taken so far can be summarised as follows: 13

16 They are assigned to a high-security regime except in cases where mental or physical health conditions discourage it. They are dispersed throughout the prison system. They are included in a database so that they can be more easily monitored. There is system to monitor communications and control information. There are also more specific measures for Muslim community as a whole within prisons - Framework Plan for Educational Intervention with Foreign Prisoners. This plan includes 3 programmes: 1. A language and primary education programme. 2. A training programme on multiculturalism and human rights. 3. A programme on values within education and cognitive development (including respect of beliefs, the rule of law, and universal human values). Any willing foreign prisoner can join these programmes, and vulnerable Muslim prisoners are especially encouraged to do so (following the recommendations of the parliamentary committee in charge of studying the March 11 th 2004 bombings). In regard to religious practices, the Spanish government has a Decree which recognises the practice of Islam in prisons. The Decree also requires that Imams are accredited by a religious authority outside the prison. Virigilio ended by saying that the prison system needs to contribute effectively to safeguarding the country s security by fighting against extremist ideologies. All initiatives however need to be undertaken under the umbrella of human rights. Alan Weston Project Manager, London Probation Trust Overview of the Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners project My hope for this meeting is that we develop a network to share positive developments in our field of endeavour. My task is simple today; it is to provide you with some background information on the Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners (RIRP) project. The project started as a reaction to hate crime and the attacks on Madrid and London. Even if the number of victims could be considered small, in relation to the total population of those cities, great numbers of people were deeply impacted by these attacks. On the day of the London bombings, the 7 th July 2005, I was a senior probation officer and was driving into the capital when I saw a sign, London Closed. At that time our only thoughts were to catch those responsible and to imprison them. It is only recently that we have begun to think of when these people will be released into the community. These offenders are not alien to us, they were brought-up in the UK, will remain in the UK post-release and it will be the responsibility of the National Offender Management Service for England and Wales, to manage and supervise them on release. The RIRP project brings together a pool of talents: The University of Bremen, which was already working with London Probation Trust on a project on hate crime The CEP: a unique European probation organisation which we considered essential to work across national barriers and promote best practise Spain, due to their experience in this field London Probation, which had been the lead partner in two previous EU projects The National Offender Management Service, UK Violence Prevention Network (Germany), which had a long tradition of working with right-wing violent offenders, and more recently working with Islamic ones. What we needed was to acquire knowledge about the Muslim community, to understand what it is to be a Muslim and to learn how life is viewed through the eyes of the perpetrators. It is wrong to think that all Muslims are violent and that all non-muslims are not. We needed to be aware of all these aspects in order to start working towards establishing a project which would examine how we work in criminal justice, with violent extremists and those at risk of being involved in violent extremism, to 14

17 prepare for their release, rehabilitation and supervision in the community. As part of the RIRP project, we commissioned and undertook two research papers: one focused on experiences of radicalisation while the other surveyed what was being done in this area across the EU. Through the RIRP project we want to build networks to learn from each other. The more we share, the safer our societies will be. Linda Pizani Williams European Institute of Social Services, UK Overview of the Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners project research I have worked in translational European projects for over fifteen years. My role in this project was to conduct the second stage of the research. Alyas Karmani conducted the first stage research and the final report will include both of our results. Its aim was to understand the process of radicalisation and to consider violent extremism in an EU and global context. these projects was a uniformly complex and difficult area. It is worth mentioning that it appears that prison administrations were the first bodies to undertake research in this field. The UK appears to be the first country to study this issue in the community context examining how engagement with community groups can enhance the management of radicalised prisoners both pre and post release. My research demonstrates that internationally there is much work in progress, especially in finding an effective way to engage with the community in both preventing radicalisation and violent extremism, and in using expertise within the community to assist the management of prisoners, both pre-and post release. Lastly, the issue also arose in my research as to how the media represents the activities of the groups involved. Judy Korn Project Partner Violence Prevention Network, Germany Overview of the Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners project The project research had various stages: 1. Interviews were carried out with men who had been convicted under the Terrorism Act 2006 to understand both their experiences of the Criminal Justice System and what pushed them into carrying out the offence. 2. A questionnaire was sent to EU member states to gain knowledge of what projects or research were being conducted in this field. 3. A literature search to put all the information in a EU and global context In regard to the questionnaires, we have received thirteen responses to date (including three from the Netherlands). There were countries where this issue did not seem very high on the agenda. When asked if it was an issue in the country they answered positively, but when asked if the issue was treated in a targeted manner by the organisation, informants stated that in their opinion it was not. Concerning the literature review, it was interesting to note that those countries which have rising concerns in this area are drawing on the experience from other countries who have responded to terrorist threats such as ETA in Spain and the IRA in the UK. This approach can be useful, but it should be remembered that differences may arise later in addressing violent extremism from other quarters. While undertaking my research, I was surprised at the quantity of work done so far in countries such as Indonesia and Australia. In particular there was good work developing in the Netherlands as well as projects in Scandinavia and Germany. Measuring the success of In these conferences I cannot help but feel a little bit alien, because I am not part of a Prison Administration or any Government Ministry. I created an NGO which works with young and juvenile violent offenders in eleven German states. I feel alien because in these conferences I meet people from Prison Administrations and different Ministries, but that makes me think that we can only succeed if we all work together. The work of our NGO, the Violence Prevention Network (VPN), is two-fold: anti-violence work and civic education. VPN works with juvenile male offenders, regardless of ethnicity or nationality, who have committed biasmotivated/hate crimes, are susceptible to extremist or radical Islamic ideologies and are members of antidemocratic groups and movements. Through our techniques of individual work with prisoners, in groups, with follow-up contact post-release, and through the training of prison staff, we have a record of proven achievement in this area. If we look at the general statistics of recidivism among young offenders in Germany, we will see a rate of 78%, whereas, amongst those young prisoners with whom we work in prison and on their release, that rate is 30%. Why have we joined this RIRP project? Because if you try to de-radicalise and counteract violence (the roots of which include the disintegration and loss of identity), you need to work closely with prison staff who manage these prisoners on a daily basis. We believe that we have much to contribute to this EU project and to learn from our involvement with other project members. Thank you. 15

18 Harald Weilnböck Project Partner, Violence Prevention Network Overview of the Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners project I am a researcher and my aim is to find interventions and treatments that work and to analyse them in relation to hate crime and also in the context of ideologically motivated crime. My function is to undertake in-house research with the Violence Prevention Network, analysing how it works and achieves its undoubted success, through its effective psychodynamic and group dynamic approaches, and to see how this knowledge can be disseminated. This will prove beneficial in our contribution to the RIRP project. Even if we are not experts of the German context, we are going to make a few remarks on Germany from our perspective. We have to deal with two fields: right-wing extremisms and migrational extremism (linked mostly to Muslim groups). Right-wing extremism is embedded in mainstream society. According to some figures, 20-25% of our population support anti-democratic pro-violent activities. And this figure may be similar to that in other countries. There are significant differences between East and West Germany. In the Eastern German states (Länder), where 25% of our national population live, about 50% of all the right-wing extremism offences committed in Germany as a whole take place. In this region being a nationalist is part of mainstream youth culture. It is a national problem, though more important in the East, which is integrated in mainstream society and especially in youth culture. This makes the problem bigger since they are our future. people are killed and injured. There are also particular areas where the population suffers more anxiety and businesses are scared to set up. As far as Islamist violence is concerned, there have not been suicide bombings in Germany. However, the Sauerland group is a new extremism group whose main leading figures were converted to Islam. In terms of figures: 140 people went to training camps in Pakistan and came back to Germany and it is estimated that there are 300 people considered dangerous in our country. Rosie Hanna Head of NOMS Extremism Unit Overview of the situation surrounding extremism and radicalisation in UK Radicalisation has been an issue on all our agendas for some time. Until recently, in Europe we have dealt with different types of terrorism, such as ETA and the IRA, as well as the lone-wolf character, who does not act as a part of group and conducts acts of violent extremism on their own. In the UK we have been struggling to tackle this issue properly, because we are acutely aware that we run the risk of stigmatising people if we label them under an inflexible set of definitions. That is why in the UK we talk about violent extremism and consider only criminal offenders in this category. Since 2000, the UK has passed four pieces of legislation which have criminalised certain activities. We need to clarify that radicalisation is a process which has many different forms and results. It does not necessarily only relate to committing a specific terrorist act but can also mean steering events leading to an attack, and it is essential not to confuse the different kind of radicalised offenders. We also need to make clear what our definition of radicalisation is, and there is much interesting and important work being done in the UK in this area. In the UK, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), which is the headquarters for both the prison and probation service, there are 140 prisons with 84,000 prisoners and 42 probation areas, supervising 180,000 offenders who have committed a great variety of offenses. Among these huge numbers of offenders and prisoners, there are only a few terrorist offenders: about 130 people who have committed acts of violent extremism or terrorism are being held in our prisons and about 25 who are released and being supervised by our probation services (half of these are in London). There are different violent organisations in Germany involving, on our estimate 50,000 people, who are active at the moment. Even if the numbers involved have decreased, the number of offences has increased and offenders are younger and more violent. As a result, It is very difficult to ascertain what unites these individuals and to identify who we should target. It is easy to identify those who have already committed a terrorism-related offence, but not those at risk of radicalisation or violent extremism. This is why it is so important to train NOMS staff. 16

19 In England and Wales we have a national policy on terrorism called CONTEST, which involves all agencies, because no agency can do it alone: we need to work with the police and our local partners. In fact, this idea is reflected in the fact that prison and probation services in the UK have been united into NOMS, which provides endto-end offender management. The two agencies cannot work separately; they need to share knowledge, information and solutions. Short presentations by other EU countries on the challenges posed by extremism and radicalisation in their penitentiary systems Martin Hallqvist Advisor to the Swedish Prison Service Our last seminar took place in Uppsala during the Swedish presidency. Both there and here we had a double purpose: to discuss a topic of common interest and to decide how to conduct future exchange and cooperation. Until now a lot has been done in the police sector but the prison service has not proved to have much cooperation. It would be interesting to develop the idea of EUROPRIS, similar to the already working EUROPOL and EUROJUST. We tried to include something about prisons in the Stockholm programme and, even if it was not easy, we managed to do so with the help of other countries, such as Italy. Both government agencies and the community need to enhance their efforts to work closely in an attempt to determine which factors encourage this phenomenon. The prison and probation services in particular have important roles to play when it comes to facing those challenges together. Per-Olov Humla, Head of Security Section, Swedish Prison Service International cooperation in the field of radicalisation and violent extremism is increasing and the Swedish would be pleased to explore further the potential benefits of such projects. In fact, I would like to take the liberty of suggesting that we should develop a common agenda to set up measures to send prisoners to their home countries. Radicalisation is certainly not unique to Islam; it should be set in a global context in which greater numbers of people are becoming vulnerable to radicalised activity. This is why we would need to develop early warning systems to minimise this effect. I am thus convinced that the most constructive approach is for all agencies to work together in order to identify and control those who we call senders and to protect the socalled receivers. The latter are an easy target for religious and political subversion, and need to be offered protection and a new group identity. We need to challenge and remove stereotypes which do not assist our work and which only sustain radicalisation. Santi Consolo, Deputy Head of the Department of Penitentiary Administration, Italy The fight against terrorism has been a priority since September 11 th 2001 and it received further impetus after the attacks in Madrid and London. The Italian Prison Service, whose main aim is rehabilitation, ensures that the prison population is divided into homogeneous categories. We conduct scientific observation of prisoner personality types and tailor prison interventions and treatment in order to avoid recidivism. In order to ensure homogeneous separation, we have four different types of prisons: maximum security; high security; common; and low security. Offenders engaged in organised crime are assigned to the high security prisons. This is done to avoid having mafia members and terrorists together with common prisoners so as to prevent intimidation, exploitation and criminal recruitment of the more vulnerable prisoners. A directive in April 2009 restructured the high security circuit. Since then, highly dangerous prisoners assigned to this circuit would be separated into subcircuits. These three subcircuits are located in different sections with no communication between them. For example, offenders convicted for terrorism or acts of violence which subvert the democratic order are assigned to the second subcircuit. At present we have 15,000 prisoners from Islamic countries, many of which are exposed to the risk of radicalisation, which is a problem that we have been unable to solve by separation. According to Jihad, one needs to save and redeem their soul after committing a crime; a crime is considered a good deed if it is to fulfil the objectives of the holy mission. This is why staff training can be a key to understanding and preventing the processes of radicalisation within prisons. However, overcrowding makes it more difficult. Our President has recently announced a national state of emergency in our prisons. This has become a starting point for a national government plan to build new prisons and additional wings in existing prisons, to increase the number of staff members and to promote and enforce alternative measures to imprisonment. In the Italian prison service we are aware that we need to facilitate access to prison interventions for foreign nationals. Presently there are restrictions on this due to their pending deportation, in addition to some other factors. In particular, we need to develop structures to provide housing for foreign nationals and homeless people so that they become eligible for release on prison licences and be engaged in volunteer work. Also, we have 17

20 provisions to speed up deportation procedures for non EUcitizens with sentences shorter than two years. Michael Fønss Gjørup Head of Security Department Danish Prison Service It was six years ago that terrorists started to attack Danish interests. Prisons have become an environment to radicalise young ethnic minorities who feel marginalised and there is a high risk this process will take place. Since the number of young Muslim offenders is increasing, we need to understand their culture while at the same time preventing prisoners dominating others through the abuse of religious authority. Clearly this does not mean that all and only Muslims are problematic. We also have radicalisation risks related to political views held by the extreme left and right. Our Prison and Probation Services and the Security and Intelligence Service (PET) have joined efforts to improve staff training and have used their experience to create a training handbook. We are also about to introduce a new procedure to use accredited Imam s to help us counter radicalisation. We need to have a careful selection procedure for Imams, who can have a powerful impact on inmates. We have also implemented several different measures to counteract radicalisation: Richard Pickering Head of NOMS Security Group conference co-chair We can perceive from these stimulating national presentations, some common themes from different countries, but also significant differences, for example in terms of demographics. We talk about Muslims, about EUcitizens, about foreign national prisoners. Are we conflating race, nationality, religion in an unhelpful way here? We need to be aware of the risk of false positives and of the need to respect human rights. We also need to be aware of the impact of language in assessing and analysing the challenges that face us. Some of the other key issues raised: How do we access intelligence within prisons? What do we do with it? How do we share it to assess risk? How can we do more to share intelligence? It is not the case that one size fits all, but we can share learning & training materials bearing in mind that we do not need pseudo-academic conceptual materials, but clear and concrete guidance for our staff. We avoid large concentrations of particular inmates to avoid problems for all inmates and staff. Prisoners convicted for terrorist offences are not imprisoned together. Information brochures are available in different languages, including Arabic. Monitoring and surveillance. Promoting contact with families. Creating a common understanding of different religions (through cultural events). Enabling possibilities to practice religion. Providing activities and education to all prisoners. Influencing inmates attitude to life through cooperation between prison schools and imams. Enabling more structured Muslim religious services. Conducting special pre-release programmes for young offenders. However, we need to keep sharing experiences and promoting active collaboration at all levels. 18

21 4 Summary of talks from day two of the conference Thursday 28 th January 2010 Richard Pickering Head of NOMS Security Group conference co-chair Conclusions from day one and overview of day two Some thoughts on previous day to be dealt with during workshops: Issue of language: Radicalisation: are we really clear of our terminology here and know what we each mean? Extremism, violent extremism, terrorism, jihadist terrorism: are we using these terms interchangeably? Do we need to discuss what we understand by our use of these terms to ensure we are addressing issues accurately? We have common concerns, yet also have differences in the numbers of target individuals, judicial and criminal justice responses, frameworks in which we operate, components of the threat (home-grown threat, foreign presence, foreign nationals etc), and dynamics (static or dynamic phenomenon). What is the perspective from which we talk about radicalisation? Is it a social perspective? Is it only limited to the prison and probation contexts? Rosie Hanna explained yesterday that it is a much broader phenomenon grounded in complex factors that can be location or generation-specific. What happens in prisons? Is this a prison-specific phenomenon or is it a reflection of what happens in society? If it happens in society, how do we establish connections with stakeholders: community, police, administration and the third sector? Faith: how do we deal with angry individuals who use the language of faith wrongly? Related to faith, there is a narrative of victimisation of Muslims by the West, which mean we may run the risk of having our work used against us. It is evident that radicalisation is much more difficult the closer we look at it. Another issue would be how to integrate our activity in the broader work of the EU, which will be dealt with by our next speaker. Damian Gadzinowski European Commission, DG JLS From the Commission s point of view, the issue of radicalisation has become a priority following the Stockholm programme. In particular, there is an urgent need to share information and best practices between the two main actors, prison and probation services, but also with other stakeholders. We consider that information should be shared not only horizontally but also vertically. Our job is to support your activity and project funding is one of the ways. Soon we are going to publish a call for proposals on radicalisation leading to terrorism (including vulnerable arenas, such as prison and probation). Following its publication, candidates will have a month to submit proposals. We are aware that filling in forms is a headache, but our financial department is there to help. Dr Peter Neumann International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence Overview of the situation in the EU and in a global context I am the director of a Centre at King s College London which focuses on radicalisation, though this does not make me an expert in prisons. Being an academic has the disadvantage of possibly being too conceptual, but the advantage is that you can speak freely and for yourself. My Centre is currently running a programme studying radicalisation and de-radicalisation in fifteen different countries (though not only in prisons). Today, I am going to focus on the issue of de-radicalisation, starting outside the EU and then move to focus on the EU itself. Many countries have programmes of de-radicalisation in prisons. We have studied seven of them to see what works: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, Singapore, Iraq, Afghanistan and Egypt. My conclusion is that their programmes will not work in the EU, but some ideas may be useful. I will try to show you these ideas and the obstacles linked to them. We can learn five lessons: 1. No programme is perfect: The Saudis are telling everyone that their recidivism rate is 0%. However, during Christmas it was found out that two people who had gone through the Saudi programme had been involved in planning an attack. It is important to bear in mind that some individuals may go through the process and fail. Any politician should be aware of that. 19

22 2. All programmes are expensive: In successful programmes, two-thirds of the budget of these programmes is spent outside: they are devoted to the offenders wellbeing after they complete the programme. Are we ready to spend these large sums? 3. Cultural context matters: We cannot copy their programmes. They follow the same lines but are adapted locally. All have elements of a social/cultural nature, religion, re-socialisation, and threat of punishment if they return to terrorism. In Singapore, the family is enormously involved. In Iraq, the tribes their families belong to are asked to guarantee the offenders good behaviour before release. In Saudi Arabia, they are allowed to have their wives stay with them before release. All these programmes would need to be adapted to EU culture. 4. Not everyone qualifies to be included in the programme: In Saudi Arabia, blood offenders are excluded. In Indonesia, having committed a violent act is a condition to join. This obviously affects your success rate; if you exclude the most problematic offenders, it is natural to achieve high success rates. Besides, a programme cannot fully transform people: they can consolidate and speed up a process of transformation, but if the person involved does not want to go down that road, no programme will make him. It is just like giving up smoking. 5. Religious authority is the key: In many programmes for jihadist offenders, religious authority is the key. They believe that they are acting as good Muslims, and so we need to make them doubt their ideas are correct. But where would this religious authority come from in the EU? From the prison imam? He has a key role in casting doubt on their previous ideas, but he is not Superman and when it comes to more extreme attitudes, he will not be considered a high enough religious authority. These are the obstacles why I would advise against a fullyfledged programme (such as the Saudi one) in the EU. But we are privileged in that we can pick and choose the good inspiring elements. Some of them are: 1. Emphasis on aftercare: Some of the most successful programmes, even if prison-based, have important afterrelease work and involve families and communities. 2. Ideas matter: All programmes acknowledge that dealing with radicalisation is dealing with ideas. I would like to see prisons exposing prisoners to new ideas by translating literature or bringing speakers to converse with them. In order to blow yourself up on the underground you need to believe 100% in your ideas. If you have 5-10% of doubt, you would not do it. We cannot make them believe 100% of our ideas, but 5% would be enough. 3. Approach is positive and outward-looking: In my conversations with EU experts I have often noticed that there is an approach which focuses only on how to deal with radicalisation in prisons. It gives me the feeling that people do not care about radicalisation as long as it does not happen in their prison. Prisons are not just an incubator of radicalisation. Having these people in our prisons is an opportunity to achieve something positive inside and outside. It is not just about containment and preventing bad things from happening inside prisons, but using this environment to achieve things which are difficult to achieve outside. Questions and Answers Linda Pizani Williams: I am aware of the two pieces of research you are doing: the one about the fifteen EU countries and the one about understanding radicalisation in North America. When will the latter be ready? Peter Neumann: We are releasing an executive report in April 2010 and a book in 2011 on the first project. Concerning the second project Pathways into Radicalisation in Western society - we are dealing with the fact that USA have spent years saying that Muslims are well integrated and love America and that only EU has problems with Muslim population. Is that true given the home-grown cases in the latest years? We will possibly conclude this project by the end of Liz Dixon: You talk about religious authority: how do you define it and find it? Peter Neumann: In Northern Ireland they used to speak of terrorists and ODCs (ordinary decent criminals). Authority is in the eyes of the beholder. We have learnt important lessons from Egypt, where two major groups stood down in the 1990s and 2000s because their leaders did not justify their activities anymore. And even people who had not read the books and papers by these leaders which outlined their rejection to these methods would assume this position just because they believed what they said. It is not so much to do with the theological arguments but with who has that authority. Harald Weilnböck: You said that ideas matter and thus psychology matters. Radicalisation has been defined as a psychological phenomenon and not only sociological. Do the most successful approaches include psychotherapy in their pedagogical approach? Peter Neumann: Yes, psychological elements are deliberately worked into many programmes. For example in Singapore Imams are qualified counsellors and in Saudi Arabia psychologists are part of the teams. Leo Tigges: I have two questions: 1) The Imam is not a Superman what kind of Imam should we look for? 2) What are the characteristics of an effective aftercare process and how does this differ from normal aftercare? Peter Neumann: In my opinion the main characteristics of an effective prison imam would be: Good understanding of basic Islamic theology and the jihadist interpretation and twist. 20

23 The ability to relate to individuals at a personal level and empathise, because radicalisation does not only happen because of ideas, but also because of group connections and loyalties. The ability to relate to the experiences of Western Muslims, because the experiences of this group are different to those of imams who grew up and were trained in Asia. The main characteristics of efficient aftercare should contain an element of continuing ideological religious supervision and guidance. The Imam has to follow up. It is about friendship as much as it is about ideas. Toaha Qureshi: I have been working on de-radicalisation since 1999 and I believe there is another factor: the global aspect of radicalisation is affecting minds regardless of their location. How do we use our knowledge of global aspects for the purposes of deradicalisation? Peter Neumann: It is of the utmost importance that everyone who works in this process is aware of what happens outside. There are several organisations, such as RICU (Home Office, Research, Information and Communication Unit) in the UK, which have networks and can disseminate ideas. The Home Office may be helpful in that sense as well. Santi Consolo: I agree on the positive approach. In prisons, psychologists and educators have a good cultural background and can relate well to prisoners; the penitentiary police, who spend a lot of time with the prisoners, are aware of prisoners' problems and we carry out projects to train staff adequately. The community on the whole should overcome its prejudices with regard to Muslim prisoners. Peter Neumann: I agree. A key way to prevent radicalisation is to run orderly prisons where prisoners are treated with respect. Orderly prisons provide better intelligence and help in the sense that they expect to be treated badly because of their faith and would use that for propaganda. So we need to treat them with decency and respect so that we do not give them the opportunity to use our behaviour against us. WORKSHOP 1: PRISON REGIMES: WORKING WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISTS Chaired by: Presenter1, Head of Intervention for Special Groups Unit, SGIP. Speaker: Marc Cerón, Deputy Director General for Reparation and Criminal Enforcement in the Community, Justice Department, Catalonia. Speaker: Presenter 3, Head of Service for Intervention and Monitoring, SGIP. Speaker: Rosemary Hanna, Head of NOMS Extremism Unit. Presenter 1 Head of Intervention for Special Groups Unit, SGIP When we were planning the outline of the workshops, we had a long debate concerning whether prison regimes and treatment should go together or be separate. Our final conclusion was that, since the main aim of the prison system is treatment, and security is subject to this, we should have two different workshops. In this workshop, we are aiming to engage with the issue of security. Marc Cerón Deputy Director General for Reparation and Criminal Enforcement in the Community, Justice Department, Catalonia presenter In Spain, since 1984 the responsibility for the prison systems and their institutions has been transferred to Catalonia from the national level. Catalonia does share a legal framework with the rest of Spain, and has a similar approach to work in this area. However, we have some specific difficulties that impact our common goals. Context: In Catalonia we have over 10,500 prisoners (out of a total population of 7 million). Only in the UK and in Spain is the prisoner rate per 100,000 inhabitants higher. However, this is not a consequence of an increase in offending rates, but due to a hardening of sentences, which was brought about by more than twenty recent amendments to the penal code. It is also the case that 43.2% of the offender population are foreign national prisoners, which has a great impact in determining our approaches and policies. There is in fact a significant difference in foreign national rates compared to the Spanish prison system. Most of the offenders come 21

24 from the Maghreb regions and South America, and this has an impact on radicalisation. Our main goals concerning radicalisation are: 1. Identify possible senders (in the words of our Swedish colleagues) as soon as they arrive; 2. Identify possible receivers (and to be on the constant look out for these). The main aim is to identify these senders and receivers so that we can prevent the prison atmosphere from altering and in turn damaging our treatment programmes. What are our target groups? We have two main target groups (maybe our Spanish counterparts have more groups): 1. Islamic extremists It is not easy to identify these people. There are only a few prisoners who are sentenced for Islamic terrorist crimes, and so we have to uncover if these offenders belong, or have once belonged, to a terrorist group. One indicator which may guide us is that 14.7% of foreign nationals are practicing Muslim. However, it is incredibly important to stress the fact that there is no direct correlation between being Muslim and being a terrorist, yet this information may help. 2. Latin gangs This is more common among young offenders; those under the age of 21 or sometimes under 23. For example, in our only juvenile prison 68% are foreign nationals and 30% of these come from South America. If we take into consideration both first and second generations of immigrants, 27% of the total number of our juvenile prisoners come from South America. About 40% of them are directly or indirectly related to Latin gangs. That amounts to 10% of our total population. In light of the above, we have developed a comprehensive approach which integrates security and treatment. However, in concern to our radicalised prison population we focus and develop the security component much more. Security measures: We have a single information and security unit, where both regional police and prison staff members work. The operational leadership of the unit falls to the operational leadership of the unit falls to someone with a lot of experience in the direction of prisons. This ensures that its work is oriented towards meeting prison needs and not simply those of the police. This unit has strong links with different security-related bodies such as the local police, national police, Ministry of Interior, and intelligence services. Security measures (continued): Our action plan establishes three main tasks: 1. The collection of available data (from the prison system and the police) in order to identify risks. We try to avoid gaps or duplication within our system. 2. The assessment of trends: how the radicalised population evolves (both inside and outside of prison); what happens outside affects the inside of the prison and vice versa; what are the connections between the outside and the inside worlds. 3. Analysis of information to anticipate risk situations (both inside and outside of prison). Treatment measures: these are based on two principles: 1. The Constitutional principle that nobody can be excluded from rehabilitation and resettlement. 2. A calm climate is a requirement to tackle this issue. Actions: we have a unified system to assess risk and general needs. It is called RISCANVI (risk-change). There is no specific tool to identify risks in the radicalisation process, but RISCANVI may help to detect who belongs to a target group. Treatment programmes: their aim is to prevent the development of an atmosphere in which radicalisation can occur. These programmes include: Multicultural education (for all prisoners): prisoners are taught that diversity is enriching Intercultural mediator programmes. Religious assistance programmes. These have been running for 4-5 years already and are coordinated by the Directorate General for Religious Affairs (part of the Ministry of the Presidency). This directorate ensures that all religious ministers are appropriately accredited. Presenter 3 Head of Service for Intervention and Monitoring, SGIP Presenter 3started with an overview of the changes in Spanish legislation. As far as the relevant laws are concerned there are no specific rules to deal with terrorism. He suggested that we abandon the idea that they are political prisoners; they are prisoners just like any other and so are subject to the aims that the Constitution sets for the prison system (Section 25). In 2003, there was a reform of penal and penitentiary legislation. This meant that: terrorists now serve sentences up to 40 years 22

25 in order to be granted parole, according to Section 72 of the Penitentiary Law and Rule 90 of the Prison Rules) they must: reject violence apologise to the victims pay civil liability cooperate with authorities in the fight against terrorism The Central Court for Penitentiary Monitoring was created. The Central Court is now the only one responsible for supervising these matters in cases of terrorism and organised crime. Allocation of dangerous prisoners to the highsecurity closed regime (unless they have a medical or mental condition that prevents this). In regard to violent extremists of Muslim background their first attack in Spain was in They killed 18 people and injured 82 in a restaurant in Madrid. Since the 1980s prisoners related to terrorist crimes have been held in maximum-security prisons and were considered political prisoners. In 1997, the members of an armed group who were gathering funds through low level crime to support a terrorist group in Algeria were arrested in Valencia. After 9/11, a group of Syrians who had been granted asylum to live in Spain were found to be in touch with senior members of Al Qaeda and most of them are now in prison. Then on 11 th March 2004 the train bombings took place in Madrid which led to the deaths of 192 people and the conviction of nine terrorists. and the creation of a Deputy Director for Security in each Prison 2. Internal measures such as data management, intervention programmes and translators and interpreters to focus on problems arising from language and culture. 3. Awareness including staff training with a focus on how to detect radicalisation patterns and how to take measures to prevent it. Presenter 3 explained the aims behind the dispersion of terrorist prisoners which were to weaken organisations by preventing contact between prisoners, and to prevent groups from being created. Offenders are sent to different prisons and placed them in different wings within each prison. Presenter 3 remarked that from their experience, the numbers involved in the radicalisation processes are low. Very few of our prisoners have become radicalised and later go on to commit crimes. Although we cannot put a definitive end to prison acting as a breeding ground for radicalisation, we can empower vulnerable prisoners to avoid this scenario by providing training in human rights and multiculturalism, and cooperate with all public authorities. Rosie Hanna Head of NOMS Extremism Unit I am going to speak only about England and Wales, since Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own systems. What are the threats that these criminals pose in prisons? External threats such as the organisation of new attacks, operational control, recruitment and verbal threats to public prosecutors Internal threats such as prison riots, escape planning and aggression towards prison staff. Measures implemented to resolve the challenges this group poses: 1. General measures such as cooperation with public security forces, monitoring and control Some facts and figures: NOMS (which belongs to the Ministry of Justice) has 42 probation areas and 140 prisons (10 are privately run and 8 are high-security prisons for dangerous offenders). Our prisons are divided into 4 categories: o Category A (most dangerous prisoners, who pose a threat to society); o Category B and Category C (where the o majority of prisoners are held); Category D (trusted prisoners who live in open conditions). Our probation service supervises 180,000 people per year and our prisons hold 84,000 prisoners. In our prisons there are 10,000 Muslim prisoners, whose ethnic composition is different from that of Muslims living in the community. In our prisons there are around 130 extremist prisoners who have committed terrorist offences or offences driven by a terrorist agenda. 90 of those belong to Al Qaeda (some top-end extremists are included in this group). We also have 15 right wing extremist offenders, which is a group which presents its own challenges. Top-end extremists are a focus for us, but we also need to take into account vulnerable prisoners. 23

26 CONTEST strategy This strategy can be summarised with four Ps : 1. Pursue: disruptive activity by the police: stop it and prosecute it; 2. Prepare: readiness to react if there is a terrorist attack; 3. Protect: reduce vulnerability to attack; 4. Prevent: a long-term solution which is difficult but essential and is related to wider socioeconomic policies. This leads to questions of whether radicalisation is only a prison and probation problem? NOMS extremism strategy: Our core business is twofold: to apply the CONTEST strategy and to protect the public and reduce reoffending. Measures: Most extremists are categorised as Category A Prisoners. Some are in categories B or C and some who have served years already are in open prisons. We also try to disperse these offenders, to prevent them from being surrounded by extremist ideas in order to disengage them. Prison intelligence: we have increased the numbers of intelligence staff; we have developed a partnership with the police both in prison and probation. Training and support: we have developed training tools for prison staff, we have published awarenessraising packages for prison and probation and we provide specialist training (for specialist staff and Muslim chaplaincy). We run orderly, safe and fair prisons. We make sure we employ skilled Muslim chaplains from a range of backgrounds. We design risk-assessment programmes. It is important to remember that not all radicalisation processes start because of ideology, but because of the need to be included in an activity - ideology comes later. Our main challenges are: prison should not see itself in isolation and should keep good relationships with the police and other bodies; we need to set a threshold of concern, which will act as a safety net for vulnerable prisoners (who need to be empowered and have their ideas challenged); to learn what works in intervention programmes. we need to recognize the risks, be honest about our capabilities, build those relations and try the best we can. Question: In the Spanish context, could you tell us about the system which allows terrorist prisoners to access parole, and what conclusions you have drawn? Or is the system too new to have conclusions? Presenter 3: Since the amendment of Rule 90 of the Prison Rules, we have not granted parole to terrorist prisoners. Before Rule 90 was amended, for a terrorist prisoner to be granted paroled an expert report was drawn up and the prisoner had to formally renounce terrorism. Nowadays there is more of a focus on the victims of terrorist crimes, which means that a terrorist prisoner has to apologise to the victims. As yet this has not happened. These conditions are also applicable if they are to be transferred to an open prison, and in this case we do have experience. We hold ETA prisoners who have signed documents rejecting terrorism, have paid their civil liability and have apologised to the victims. They are now serving their sentences closer to their homes and have short prison licences. Both victims associations and opposing political parties have agreed with this strategy. Marc Cerón: We need to control which elements influence their relationships with the population and how these security measures affect such relationships. Presenter 1: The tactic of either dispersing or concentrating terrorist offenders is a recurring topic of discussion. We have seen that the countries who have presented this morning favour dispersion. Is there anyone who would favour concentration? Presenter 1: In Spain we favour dispersion because this tactic has served us well in regard to ETA and extreme-left wing networks. However, in regard to jihadist terrorism this tactic poses a problem. The dispersion of members of the same group can put them in touch with members of different groups and thus promote the passing of information. Therefore, we currently hold nine prisoners from the 11 th March 2004 attacks in two high security prisoners. We hold together prisoners who belong to the same group but we disperse them within the each prison. This is achieved by holding them in different wings and separating the soldiers from the generals. We have found that it is good to have the leaders held together, because this often leads to conflicts among them, which benefits us. Rosie Hanna: In the UK we tend not to concentrate them, though it is true that due to their categorisation they are mostly sent to Category A Prisons. However, we are very aware of who is where and we try to disperse them around all of our Category A Prisons as much as we can. We are somewhere in between the two extremes. Linda Pizani Williams: It is more difficult to disperse prisoners on remand. Rosie Hanna: Yes, as they have to be held close to the court where their case is being held. It used to be a big issue and could be again. Presenter 3: Since 2004 we have divided targeted prisoners into three groups: 24

27 Group A: violent extremists, who are subject to a high-security closed regime, monitored by control groups and whose communications are also monitored. Every decision about them is taken on an individual basis and takes into account all information available. Group B: non-terrorist offenders who have proved to be recruiters. They are included in the FIES file, also dispersed (and separated from large groups of Muslims), but not assigned to the high-security closed regime (with a few exceptions). Group C: prisoners who have shown indicators of becoming radicalised (as spotted by staff by direct observation or after searches, where tapes and books have been found). We do not have special mechanisms to deal with them. They know that we are watching them, but we do not disperse them. Question: Are there intervention programmes in place or are these being developed? Rosie Hanna: NOMS has intervention programmes in place, such as anger management and cognitive skills development. However, we have to assess if extremist prisoners benefit from these programmes, and in addition to develop further programmes to offer to these prisoners. We would also need to add in pathways to reduce radicalisation by education, professional training and faith support. WORKSHOP 2: INTERVENTIONS AND TREATMENTS INSIDE PRISONS Chaired by: Presenter 1, Deputy Director General for Penitentiary Treatment and Regimes, SGIP. Speaker: Presenter 2, Psychologist, Penitentiary Institution of Alama, SGIP Speaker: Lindy Maslin, Intervention and Substance Misuse Group, NOMS Speaker: Judy Korn, Violence Prevention Network what do we do with this subgroup? And what do we do with this religious group? Presenter 2 Psychologist, Penitentiary Institution of Alama, SGIP Presenter 2 works in the area of practical interventions with terrorist prisoner in Alama. At the end of 2007, seven convicted offenders from the Madrid bombings in March 2004 went to Alama. Five of these prisoners are still there. They are held in the isolation ward but are allowed to speak to each other. To start with there was a high degree of cohesion within the group. They rarely asked for anything and were respectful. In initial interviews with them they only answered yes or no and demonstrated a deep religious faith, making constant reference to the Koran. As a woman they would not talk directly to her, but would look away in another direction. They would not shake her hand and in general kept their distance. Keeping them isolated however did not seem to work and that they did not want to change. Therefore they were involved in activities such as sports and painting t-shirts. These interventions were done collectively and they were allowed to speak to other prisoners. This meant they became more integrated and they began to open up and express their opinions. In May 2009 a more specific interventions programme was created. Group sessions were held with the five terrorist prisoners twice a week. They spent more and more time outside their cells, though they still did not look at her directly and she had to keep her distance when interviewing them. They would talk about racist ideology and universal ideas such as respect, diversity, tolerance and intercultural dialogue. Their ideology means they reject female authority, but as the sessions progressed they began to communicate more. They did more activities, such as the gym, table tennis, and judo. As they became more responsive they began to dress in western style, did not grow a beard any more and the Presenter 1 Deputy Director General for Penitentiary Treatment and Regimes, SGIP Before we get into the detail of the topics that the speakers are due to present on I would like to say a few words of introduction. I have worked in this field for thirty years and over that time a great deal has changed in Spain. I believe that we currently need more interventions in closed regimes, and the key questions we need to be asking are 25

28 group became less cohesive. The men began to ask for individual interviews and will now look her in the eyes, shake her hand and express their doubts. There is still a long way to go but it is much better to intervene with this type of offender than to ignore them. Lindy Maslin Intervention and Substance Misuse Group NOMS I am a forensic psychologist and am part of an interventions team which work with extremist offenders. Our aim is to understand, reduce, and manage the risks presented by extremist offenders and develop and risk assessment and intervention approaches. The number of extremist offenders that we work with is very small which means it is hard to validate our research. We have carried out a literature review, learnt from other jurisdictions, interviewed convicted extremist offenders, as well as a couple of people who have left a New Religious Movement after nearly 20 years of involvement. This is very much in progress, and we are continuing to develop risk assessment tools. This work is designed to understand what types of interventions are required and to produce a series of modules for each type of offender. We believe that there are twenty-one factors that need to be considered. These include issues such as, emotional resilience, problems with relationships, susceptibility to indoctrination. For each one of these factors we have developed a booklet with further information. This work appears to be going well. For example we have made great progress with a man who was publically humiliated by his father and ran away to a training camp. In this particular case the father s relationship with the man was key. Our work with him focused on judgemental and non judgemental attitudes, which has brought some very strong emotions out of him. Judy Korn Violence Prevention Network My organisation, the Violence Prevention Network (VPN), has predominantly focused on right wing extremism, but since 2006 has looked at radical Islam. We work in nine of the German states and have put 400 people through our programmes. The VPN model is a modularised group-work programme which takes place in a custodial environment, facilitated by two highly trained workers, and a twelve month 'stabilization care' on an individual basis after release supporting a process of reintegrating these people into society. The phrase that Peter Neumann used earlier on sowing doubt reflects the approach that we take. We question their beliefs and ideas and get into a deep discussion with these people. Every person can develop if you assist them, but they have to want to change. Before we admit them to our programme we will ask if they want to take part and if they answer no we will not work with them. We will only work with those who volunteer. We have found several similarities between these types of offenders. They have few or no positive relationships in their life. They are not well integrated into their families or in the community. The groups they join give them that integration. We have also found that on the whole they are poorly educated. One of the main differences we have noted concerns the role of the family. In the case of right wing offenders we have found that they have a history of neglect by the family. However, in the case of Muslim extremists we found that the family had tried to impose control over that person and they rebelled. In general these offenders have low self confidence, and this factor can be exploited by the group. Loss of identity is the root of radicalisation. Religious authority is important, and the Imam has a part to play in this respect. We also need integrated Muslim politicians who can act as positive role models and in a sense represent democracy. In conclusion a stable relationship is key for these people. Therefore the aftercare process will need to continue for up to two years after they come out of prison, and needs to be with the same trainer as they had in prison. We need to sow doubt in their minds and treat them with respect to make them feel important. Developing their powers of empathy is one of the most important factors here in order to get them to walk in the shoes of someone else. In the case of juveniles it is especially important to get them in contact with their family while they are in prison. Questions and Answers Question: I would like to learn from the experiences of Presenter 2. When you began working with the group did you begin with discussing everyday things, before talking about emotions? And linked to this, do we understand the impact of what we were doing? Do we know why we are successful in order that we get the dosage right? Presenter 2: To begin with we did not advance much as we did not understand the roles of each prisoner within the group. They spoke about the we and not the I. So we though that group discussion would be a better approach to find out who was the leader and who has authority. We worked with psychotherapy and found that group topics made it easier for each offender to participate. Peter Neumann: It sounds like there is a difference between the UK and German programmes. VPN goes much further and does not just attempt to get offenders to turn away from violence but to embrace democracy. Is this too ambitious a task? 26

29 Judy Korn: We need to work with offenders from an early age. We are very ambitious and think it is possible to change people. It is difficult to prove that you have changed their minds, but this change is still possible. We have to offer them another door to democracy. Liz Dixon: In England and Wales we work with all offenders and have to get a contract to do this. This means you can try many approaches with offenders and can use a tool-kit of skills, such as education and training. Lindy Maslin: Not everyone at this conference has a probation service as we do in the UK. It is the case in England and Wales that offenders may only be in prison for a short time before release on probation. We therefore have to engage with them. Question: I would like to ask Presenter 2 what were the root causes of their radicalisation? And what can we do once they are back in the community? Presenter 2: Some of the offenders showed a specific attitude to Islam. Others were drug traffickers. They all saw themselves as innocent victims reacting to situations forced upon them by the West and were therefore not ultimately responsible for the attacks. In the UK these types of offenders are home grown, where as in Spain they come from overseas, from Morocco and other Muslim countries. Presenter 1: Have we done enough with these offenders in prison? Should we invest more in families, in education, in the values of democracy? Judy Korn: Yes we have to invest more in the system to assist these people once they leave prison. WORKSHOP 3: STAFF TRAINING AND OFFENDER MANAGER TECHNIQUES FOR WORKING WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISTS Chaired by: Alan Weston, London Probation. Speaker: Juan Antonio Marín Ríos, Coordinator of Security Programmes inside Prisons and Penitentiary Management, SGIP. Speaker: Liz Dixon, Hate Crime Co-ordinator for London Probation Service. Juan Antonio Marín Ríos Coordinator of Security Programmes inside Prisons and Penitentiary Management, SGIP A presentation was provided on security measures within Spanish prisons, including intelligence and staff training. A counter-radicalisation Handbook has recently been produced, in addition to several interventions programmes. This Handbook contains a huge amount of information, for example: Profiles and typologies Phases of radicalisation Behaviours (individuals and groups) The Handbook has its strengths but lacks some fundamental indicators. We would welcome any feedback you have on this book and would be interested to hear if it is of relevance in other countries. Liz Dixon Hate Crime Co-ordinator London Probation Trust Liz Dixon spoke of the training programme that has been piloted through the RIRP Project. There was a clear organisational need for staff training following the release of offenders who had been convicted under the Terrorism Act 2006 and subsequently released on licence. The pilot training programme is aimed at Prison and Community based Criminal Justice workers. It is a three day training event with an input from Community partners who focus on raising awareness of Islam. The training looks at push and pull factors into radicalisation, typologies and exit strategies. It also focuses on risk management, supervision issues and case studies. Questions and Answers Question: This highlights the importance of continuity. How can learning from the training be developed in Prisons to ensure continuity? Liz Dixon: Day one is essential. There is a need to limit the us and them mentality and therefore reduce anxiety and foster understanding. Swedish Delegate: Looking at the facts and figures from 2007 you mentioned an increase in the number of radicalised offenders. However, when it comes to training staff is it possible to begin this training before radicalisation has become a real issue in a prison? Liz Dixon: Content of the training is critical. Staff became more mature from experience and learn to distinguish between what is a major concern and what is not. It is also important to have staff from the offender s community who can add to the understanding. Comment: Often prison staff jump to conclusions, for example if they see two people talking to each other or greeting each other in a different language. The training needs to be balanced and raise awareness of this. Question: Could you please expand on the control of religious practice? What sort of activities do you control? How do you measure this? 27

30 Juan Antonio Marín Ríos: The prisoners have the freedom to practice but it is important this is free from manipulation by other groups. In terms of measuring, we try to identify if radicalisation is taking place. We have had many meetings on this but often without the Prison staff themselves. As yet there is no information indicating that radicalisation is actually taking place within our prisons. However, we are trying to de-radicalise those prisoners we already hold, not because they are trying to radicalise others but because we are trying to change their behaviour. WORKSHOP 4: OFFENDERS ON RELEASE IN THE COMMUNITY Chaired by: Linda Pizani Williams, European Institute of Social Services Speaker: Sara Robinson, Assistant Chief Officer with lead on Extremism, London Probation Trust Speaker: Toaha Qureshi, Stockwell Green Community Services Speakers: Jacco Groeneveld, Regional Manager in Dutch Corrections and Leo Jansen, Project Manager in Dutch Corrections. Linda Pizani Williams European Institute of Social Services I would like to suggest three issues to focus discussion: 1. How do we manage risk in the community? 2. What is the value of working with community partners? 3. How transferable are these strategies to your countries? Sara Robinson Assistant Chief Officer with lead on Extremism, London Probation Service I am responsible for the development of the extremist unit in the London Probation Service, where we monitor and track actual and potential terrorist offenders in the community. We have a joined-up approach with the Third Sector and we are starting to create a framework. Our context: The CONTEST strategy is applied in all sectors of criminal justice. We work in the Prevent branch and are funded by the Office for Security and Counter- Terrorism, which is part of the Home Office. It is important to bear in mind that London Probation deals with 22% of the total probation caseload for England and Wales. Our goals: Challenge ideology and support mainstream voices. Disrupt promoters and strengthen vulnerable institutions. Support individuals prone to being recruited (those who are disenfranchised), and think how they can be radicalised and create mechanisms to prevent it. Increase resilience of communities by means of a joint effort with the local authorities Effectively address grievances. Risk assessment: The role of London Probation is to assess risk, to protect the community and to prevent recidivism. We do so through our statutory and community partners, with whom we try to deal with criminogenic issues. Why do we work with the Third Sector? 1. Their help is essential in understanding ideological issues in order to appropriately assess risk. They have detailed knowledge about these issues. 2. Faith groups can be of help in challenging ideology, since we are in a difficult position to do this. 3. They provide effective support for offenders who are willing to participate, not only in terms of ideology or faith, but also in connection with education, work, sports, and other activities. Different organisations use different systems to encourage offenders, but they all share a common core approach. 4. They have the flexibility to provide a holistic approach. We need flexibility to meet the needs of all people in the programme and to change the strategy if it seems not to be working. Issues we have learnt: Our programmes do not fit all offenders concerning faith and culture. We need to accommodate different cultures, even if they have a shared faith. We also need to accommodate different ages. We are developing a new risk-assessment framework, because we have become aware of the fact that we need to look at all aspects of each person. We need to bear in mind that there are different understandings of risk, and the community may understand risk differently. Information sharing is of vital importance: we need to gather information from different sources, make sense of it and contextualise it. We need to be aware of how groups are perceived and how they relate and are involved with the State. 28

31 Issues we have learnt (continued): We have not tested our methodology yet. We are building relationships with new providers. We need to work in the context of the tension rehabilitation vs. public protection. We need to deal with the resilience of community groups to meet London s needs. How do we manage all this? 1. We set up service level agreements, where we state what our expectations in regard to outcomes. 2. We have an information-sharing section. 3. There is a community group s forum where best practice can be shared and groups can receive support. 4. We build a relationship with the people in the programme (the diversity team and the senior probation officer make sure we do this and go to visit them) 5. We provide training and consultancy (for example in our training programme we have a one-day session devoted to faith). We also arrange practitioners meetings. 6. We communicate: if we do not communicate in an honest way, we cannot move forward. Toaha Qureshi MBE Chief Executive of Stockwell Green Community Services have a range of partners, both for Stockwell Green and for London College of Business Management and IT. We offer conferences to raise awareness in the community, not only among Muslims, but also among Jews and Catholics. In fact, at the beginning, religious groups were more open to these conferences than other non-religious groups. When no one else was speaking of terrorism, we were. We also held a conference in Pakistan and brought a Pakistani expert to London for another conference. We have many diversionary programmes. We contribute to the training of the Metropolitan Police and London Probation Trust. The SEED and PROSEED projects: The SEED project was the first EU project on radicalisation, and aimed to divert people at risk from the path to radicalisation. We dealt with the causes of disenfranchisement, such as foreign policy, discrimination, and racism. The ethos of the project was the encouragement of responsibility among the community. Some terrorists came to our Mosque in early In 2003 we informed the police that this group was trying to change our Mosque into another Finsbury Park style Mosque (where Abu Hamza used to preach), but their receptiveness left a lot to be desired and in 2005 these guys did what they did. There was another group, however, who were arrested and we are now rehabilitating them. We define who the target individuals are and we devise methods to work with them, such as religious mentoring. We also have discussions about different issues, such as the Palestinian question, with members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office. I work at the Stockwell Green Community Services, a community-based organisation which works closely with London Probation. In 1999 we started working with the socially excluded and since then we have been working with different categories of people, from the disenfranchised to terrorists. In that year we started a three-year plan focusing on capacity-building of communities. Between 1999 and 2001 we developed a model of containment, which was formed by three partners, each of which was equally important. This model was implemented in other communities. We have conducted many programmes, some of which have been very important, such as: PROSEED: funded by the EU, London local authorities and our Mosque. PALM: promoted by the Home Office. It offered social and religious support and guidance, education and training, and helped to set up a business. We have three universities working very closely with us (Staffordshire University, Middlesex University, and Anglia Ruskin University) and we provide a route to enter the London College of Business and Management. We also Leo Jansen Project Manager in Dutch Corrections People think that prison systems are the same in every country, but there are differences among them and I am going to explain what happens in the Netherlands. 29

32 Our main rule is to create a decent and humane climate based on a peaceful environment, humane treatment, minimal restrictions, legal procedures and social orientation. Social orientation has suffered a big shift in the last ten years and this explains the decrease in the number of custodial offenders. A prisoner will not be released without an agreement in place with the community concerning housing and employment opportunities. The cornerstones of our system are: safety, normalisation, and openness. Our main goal is to reach a balance between harmony values (which the inmates appreciate) and security. The principles of our approach are: Respect: to create a good climate and increase safety. This also allows us to get information from prisoners because they have different interests. Trust and Humanity. Support: they do not leave the prison until they have housing, documentation, and education / training / job opportunities waiting for them in the community. Contact between staff and prisoners (from our figures it appears that the rate is almost one to one, but this is not really true since we have staff in our headquarters who do not deal directly with prisoners). The principles of the work of prison officers: Balance between harmony and security. Focus on: Radicalisation and recruitment. Disturbed and vulnerable prisoners. Suicide risk. Hate crime and racism. Terrorism: The instances of terrorism that we have suffered in the Netherlands are not numerous: In 2002 Pim Fortuyn was assassinated by an animal-rights activist. In 2004 Theo Van Gogh was assassinated by Mohammed Bouyeri. In 2006 the Hofstad network members were sentenced by a Dutch court. We have two high-security prisons, each of them with fourteen places equipped to hold terrorists: Vught (currently holding four terrorists) and Rotterdam (currently holding no terrorist). Some facts and figures: Out of 130,000 trials, almost 90% of those accused have been convicted. Since 2004, terrorist crimes have been tried differently. Since 2001: 153 have been arrested for Islamic terrorist crimes: 20 were sentenced irrevocably. 22 were acquitted. 111 were released before prosecution commenced. Prevention: We have produced a leaflet which looks a lot like the European Handbook for Extremism. Prison managers have to discuss the leaflet in their meetings. In this handbook there are notes which aim to make the reader aware that radicalisation and religion are inseparably intertwined. However, it is in no way suggested that someone who holds a religious belief or adheres to a philosophy of life is naturally involved in radicalisation. Conclusions: Ensure that experts inform prison staff. Keep contact with experts in case things change. Prevent stereotyping. Involve local Imams. Separate fundamentalists from the other prisoners in order to prevent them from persuading others to join their cause. Ensure that radicalisation is an item on the agenda in all meetings. Questions and Answers Question: (To Leo Jansen) Do you have any programmes which involve the four terrorist prisoners? Leo Jansen: At present there are no programmes for them. Indeed we have a job to do on this when we go home; here we can gather ideas. It is such a small problem in our country that many think there is no problem at all. Toaha Qureshi: The question is are they going to rehabilitate or retaliate when they leave prison? You need to start as soon as possible in contacting and working with the community; in fact, it should be done before they are released This means we can be prepared and you can teach us about the mechanisms that should be implemented. Leo Jansen: We are thinking of organising a staff meeting in the Netherlands in May, where we would invite scientists and people working in London. Question: And there would be a follow-up conference to this one in London in October Linda Pizani Williams: How do you relate with the community in Spain? Spanish participant: We have here three representatives from anti-terrorist organisations here today. In an earlier workshop, the psychologist from the Spanish prison of Alama was asked whether there is any provision for these people when they leave prison. I explained that there was one person who was arrested in Syria and imprisoned in Morocco and when released came back to Spain, radicalised a person and sent him to Iraq. We know what we can do in our organisations, but not what happens in 30

33 the community. In this matter the UK and Germany are taking the lead. Linda Pizani Williams: Is that because you do not have a probation system in Spain? Marc Cerón: There is supervision during parole but resettlement is an issue that needs development in respect to all offenders and not simply those in terrorist cases. The follow-up on convicted terrorists is more focused on security and activities that may lead to new terrorist attacks. Little attention is given to resettlement. This morning, Peter Neumann talked about creating doubts in their ideology. How could the community be engaged to create this doubt, both at an individual and group level? Spanish participant: Our case is quite different to that of the UK: we have very small numbers of home-grown terrorists and we have the legal instruments to deport those who are not Spanish citizens, so resettlement in the community is not a problem now. It will be in the future. Linda Pizani Williams: Taking that last comment from Marc Cerón, how can we plant the seeds of doubt? Toaha Qureshi: Peter Neumann said that 5-10% of doubt is enough. But there are two issues that we should consider: 1) Deportation: if radicalisation is to be considered a global phenomenon, we need to tackle it even if they are going to be deported. 2) Doubts: we need people with credibility. And how can we do it? We need to understand why they do it. Is it anger? One of our cases admitted that he did so because he was very angry at what was happening in Palestine. Another case expressed a great concern about what was happening in Afghanistan, in Guantanamo Bay and in the Gaza strip. We had a meeting with Members of Parliament, a local constable and a Christian leader to show this offender that these people (all white and European) were also concerned about these very same issues and that they were on his side. We need to engage them to participate in the democratic process: that is why we meet with Members of Parliament and ministers of all religions. We need to give them examples of practical solutions, such as dialogue and pacts. Peter Neumann: We need: To raise doubts in those already prone to extremism. To address the societal components (e.g. show secular Muslim role models to undermine the narrative of Muslims being victimised). To enhance them in the non-muslim community. Comment: In Berlin, we have two Imams working with us and who attend a course on vocational training with a psychological component. Leo Tigges: We can see that we have two types of systems: 1. UK: a large group of 120 prisoners and 20 offenders in the community. We can learn a lot from them. 2. Netherlands: only 4 prisoners (which may be related to their humane treatment and the cooperation of local Imams). Across the EU we have countries in the middle of these two extremes, and France, who denies everything. How should we proceed? How can we start working in those countries which do not have a problem yet, but soon will? How do we persuade their leaders to focus on this issue even if the numbers of terrorist prisoners are very low? Sara Robinson: In the UK we had a group of prisoners who have become eligible for release on Licence much sooner than previous terrorists have (many of these received life sentences). This is because we are not only dealing with acts of violence linked to terrorism, but other offences, for example attendance at training camps, attendance at rallies and possession of literature which may insight religious hatred, etc. Linda Pizani Williams: When we received replies to our questionnaires some countries said they were not ignoring the problem, but were not complacent either. Spanish participant: We all agree that a key factor in the treatment of terrorist prisoners is the role of the Imam. I would like to lay the issue of training Imams on the table: can the State provide this training? Should we all participate? We all agree that Imams should have democratic values. The problem is that in Europe, or at least in Spain, there is no ideology that goes alongside the process of deradicalisation. There are no spiritual leaders who may provide a narrative who would attract these (potential or not) Islamic terrorists. Linda Pizani Williams: That could be the topic of our next project. Feedback Session and Summary of Day Chaired by Richard Pickering Head of NOMS Security Group Presenter 1 Head of Intervention for Special Groups Unit, SGIP In the workshop I chaired the audience must have agreed with the speakers because there was little discussion. Since the presentations are going to be made available, please forgive me if I make any mistake in this summary. In Spain we may have focused on security and put aside 31

34 the issue of treatment in the community when they are released. Marc Cerón set out Catalonia s goals concerning identifying those prisoners who are at risk or are vulnerable when they enter prison. Catalonia has implemented a comprehensive approach to combine treatment and security, which is based on cooperation with the police and senior prison managers. They have three main tasks: gathering information, monitoring and prevention. They have four programmes which cover: multicultural education, foreign national prisoners, intercultural mediation, and religious assistance. Presenter 3 talked about the threats to security inside and outside of prisons and the intervention measures which are in place. His presentation led to an interesting debate on whether to concentrate prisoners or disperse them. He also stated that it is incredibly important to differentiate between religion and Islamist militancy. At the end of his presentation he told us about the measures used to deal with these offenders: the categorisation and different monitoring levels (terrorist offenders, recruiters and vulnerable prisoners), the importance of information exchange protocols, and the use of control groups. Rosie Hanna informed us about the situation in England and Wales, whose demographic patterns are similar to those of Spain. She explained that their strategy was focused in four P s: Pursue, Prepare, Prevent and Protect. They have built a close relationship with the police and other stakeholders and provide training and support for staff. Particular approaches worth highlighting include: information sharing; analysis of the strategies that work within the legal framework; identification of risk and deciding when to start implementing measures. Deputy Director General for Penitentiary Treatment and Regimes, SGIP. In the workshop I chaired the speakers were three female psychologists who provided an excellent explanation of what happens in their different countries (the UK, Germany and Spain). Their presentations demonstrated that there are more similarities than differences when it comes to dealing with violent or Islamist prisoners. In my opinion the most useful conclusion that we drew was that in prisons, intervention programmes should reach all prisoners including terrorists. Even if their crimes are far more serious, they should not be labelled or stigmatised. We do not want our prisons to be human warehouses, not even for the most extreme cases. We can only start to deal with radicalisation when we include these offenders in the programmes. If we isolate them their hatred against the criminal justice system may increase. After our workshop concluded I had the feeling that we are on the right road, even if we have a long way to go yet. Linda Pizani Williams European Institute of Social Services Sara Robinson provided a very interesting presentation on how to engage with the community and the Third Sector. The strategic reason for this engagement is based on challenging the offenders ideas, disrupting their behaviours, protecting those that are vulnerable or at risk, increasing the resilience of communities and addressing their grievances. She discussed how we should manage risk in the community and how important it is. She also spoke of establishing community forums, building relationships with the community and social partners, involving the Third Sector in staff training and above all establishing good communication. Toaha Qureshi described how since 1999 Stockwell Green Community Services has worked to encourage Muslim communities to own this problem and to assist in its resolution. He described many different projects to engage young Muslims on a wide range of issues. One crucial remark he made is that within the Muslim community there is a great amount of information which would be of use to statutory agencies. However, communities should be responsible for gathering this information. It is not easy to begin this relationship between a community and a statutory body. As Toaha stressed, if a community makes even one step towards an agency, that agency should be prepared to run a mile towards the community. Leo Jansen updated us on the situation in the Dutch prison service and shared with us the incredible fact that their prisoner numbers are so low that they have rented a prison to the Belgians! They have developed rules on how to manage the prison population, all of them related to the environment created in prisons to reduce radicalisation. For example, peaceful environment, social orientation, etc. In addition, all prisoners are released when intensive community support has already been arranged, in terms of housing, money and benefits, documentation, job prospects, and so on. In the Netherlands they have two prisons with facilities for terrorists (each with fourteen places), but they only hold four terrorist prisoners. However as yet they have no intervention programmes for them. They have produced a leaflet for prison and probation staff and a list of tips, which is a useful basis for training. The debate was interesting and varied. Eventually we concluded that there are remarkable differences amongst systems (from the Netherlands to Spain or the UK - the latter having ex-terrorist offenders in the community) and that there may be a risk of complacency. Thus we need to think global, not local. 32

35 Alan Weston Project Manager of the Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners project completely different from the armed or violent Jihad. We should be very careful with these issues because narratives and counter-narratives are essential in the whole radicalisation and de-radicalisation process. The workshop I chaired dealt with the issue of how to handle violent extremists by focusing on the experiences of Spain and the UK. It is easy to be struck by the different experiences, but there are also many underlying similarities. For example, the challenges we all face are the same. The approach to dealing with these offenders needs to be holistic, because the risk they pose is the same, whether they are radicalised inside or outside of prison. We need to understand, however, the cultural differences and the differences between countries and amongst the Muslim population. We should also not forget that not all extremists are Muslim. Our knowledge base is new, and so is our capacity to use it for de-radicalisation goals. There is a need for control. The gathering and exchange of information is of vital importance, not only inside prison but also outside, where we need to build trust with the community. The statutory agencies face barriers of unwillingness to cooperate amongst the community, because those who cooperate run the risk of losing their position in the community. An emphasis was made on the training of staff, who need to be informed and able to engage. We need to understand the whole picture and engage with these offenders in order to help them build a future away from their past. Statutory agencies need to have risk assessment in mind and risk management should be carried out holistically. We will only succeed if we take care of the needs of both individuals and the community and are flexible. Richard Pickering: There is a Single Narrative among these extremists: we are permanently under attack and this means we should fight. Are we contributing to this narrative of the West threatening the Muslim community? The wrong use of terminology does so; that is why we should be very careful. Toaha Qureshi: I have been observing the use of terminology in this conference and the term Islamic terrorism is often used. If we use that term, we are moving the Muslim community away from us instead of encouraging them to become part of the solution. Also, the term Jihad is being incorrectly used. Within Islam, there is a Jihad inside yourself - you fight your inner self. That is 33

36 5 Summary of talks from day three of the conference Friday 29 th January 2010 Juan Antonio Marín Ríos Director of Internal Security and Prison Management conference co-chair Conclusions from day two and overview of day three Yesterday was an intense day as far as content is concerned: Peter Neumann s talk aroused great interest from the audience, since he did not only speak about radicalisation, but about de-radicalisation, offering examples of specific programmes. The workshops provided very interesting ground for discussion. The prison visit was very useful for my Spanish colleagues as it gave us the opportunity to hear your thoughts and comments on our prison regime. The dinner was excellent! Today looks promising as well. Therefore, I would like to give the floor to the Lieutenant Colonel of the Guardia Civil and Head of Prison Security (a body formed by the Policía Nacional and the Guardia Civil) Plenary Session: Working with partners to combat extremism Lieutenant Colonel of the Guardia Civil and Head of Prison Security In Spain, there is an increasing concern about new forms of crime stemming from globalisation and migration flows. As already discussed in this conference, the fight against ETA has continued for well over thirty years and experience with Islamic terrorism dates back to the 1980s. Then, the restaurant El Descanso was attacked by an Islamic group from the Lebanon. However, now the phenomenon of Jihadist terrorism, which began locally, has become a global threat. Since the attacks in the USA, Madrid, and London, the relevance of Islamic terrorism has increased significantly. One of the main features of this form of terrorism is the active recruitment process and according to expert reports prisons have now become a place for recruitment and radicalisation. Foreign prisoners who are away from their families and feel frustrated are an easy target for recruiters. They offer them support which in turn leads to recruitment. Within the unit some terrorist networks, which had been created inside a prison, have been dismantled and several people arrested. In order to deal with this issue, his unit has implemented the following measures: Cooperation with NGOs to prepare for the release of offenders into the community; Dispersion of target prisoners to break their ties and to prevent some from becoming leaders within prisons; Agreements with different religious authorities (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim) in the framework of protocols signed by the Government. These protocols are in turn implemented in different spheres of social life such as education (these religions are taught in schools); police forces (language and culture training courses for officers); and communities (programmes for citizen involvement); Units to control cyber-terrorism; Introduction of Arabic-Spanish staff translators in different prisons and Spanish courses available for foreign prisoners; and Establishment of certain requirements for prison Imams. The unit focuses on the cooperation between the prison system, the security forces and the intelligence services. Within the Secretariat General for Penitentiary Institutions, security is handled by three bodies: 1. Interventions with Special Groups Unit (Área de intervención con colectivos especiales). 2. Prison Security Coordination Unit (Coordinación de seguridad penitenciaria). 3. Deputy Directors for Security (one in each prison). The Prison Security Coordination Unit is formed by members of the security forces (Guardia Civil and police) and prison staff. Its tasks are: to be the link between prisons and statutory agencies to gather and analyse information to write security reports on high risk prisoners to write security reports about external organisations, individuals or NGOs who conduct activities inside prisons. Results in prisons have been positive and they look to build on successful co-operations to continue to ensure high quality security. 34

37 Sara Robinson Assistant Chief Officer with lead on Extremism, London Probation Trust I would like to show you our model of practice to manage risk. It involves a close relationship between agencies, because given that nobody has the right answer, we have to develop a culture of mutual learning. There are three categories of target offenders in London: 1. Those convicted for terrorism offences. 2. Those convicted for other offences, but somehow involved in terrorist activities. 3. Those convicted for other offences and vulnerable to recruitment. We have implemented the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangement (MAPPA). Each of the 32 London boroughs has a MAPPA. These are made up of experts from different agencies (police, probation, prison, local authorities, drug agencies, employment and education bodies) who meet in order to share and manage information. No one group holds all the information, let alone all the answers. These meetings are chaired by senior police and probation agents and we target offenders with a high-risk threshold. This threshold is determined by taking into account different parameters: if the conviction is over twelve months, the type of offence, and other issues for example running training camps. Protocols and clear-cut definitions of roles are established. In order to manage risk in relation to these prisoners, we balance: Restrictive factors (no contact with the outside, monitoring of conversations, etc). Protective factors (involving the family or faithsupport groups in the process of rehabilitation). In the case of violent extremist offenders, we have recently developed new dynamics, whose main features are: Keeping a close relationship with Counter-terrorist Police Units. Implementation of new information-sharing patterns. Traditionally intelligence units liked to take information from other sources but not to share it. However, they are beginning to understand the need for communication and are changing their attitude. Inclusion of the Third Sector. However, the fact that we are different agencies, each with different ways of working, different agendas and different perceptions of risk builds up some tension, which can be problematic. Possible solutions to the shortcomings that we face are: To increase communication (otherwise we will be failing our communities). To subject community groups to security checks by the Home Office. To establish our common ground stemming from clarifying our agendas. To establish protocols. To use probation and its ability to manage risk (we hold statutory authority to manage prison licenses and community orders). To increase our professional influence. Within London Probation we have established the Central Extremism Unit. Bearing in mind that in London there are 32 areas with 4000 staff members, our role is essential in setting the direction of strategy: We coordinate the activity in London. We develop relationships, protocols and agreements with voluntary and statutory agencies We offer advice to operational staff. We deliver training and provide forums for staff so that they can discuss their practices. We attend MAPPA meetings and try to provide consistency (because offenders are released into different boroughs and different groups are thus in charge of monitoring them). We hold agreements and cooperate with government departments (e.g. NOMS, Home Office). Even if this is a UK initiative, it is a principle that is applicable to all: to promote communication among us in order to reduce risk and rehabilitate these offenders. Hanif Qadir Active Change Foundation When it comes to combating extremism, we need to be very careful in two ways: 1. We need to understand the mindset, methodology and the nature of the problem of the people we are dealing with. 2. We need to use language carefully in such a sensitive area, because language can become a recruiting tool: Jihad cannot be equalled to terrorism! It is very important to develop and maintain partnerships between the Community/Voluntary Sector and Government agencies because it helps these offenders to resettle properly. Trust plays a key role these relationships. In order to build this trust, you need the right people who have an understanding of the mindset of these individuals. It is equally important to establish communication amongst us because we all need to know 35

38 what each other discussed directly with these exoffenders. It is crucial to reform former terrorists, because they can also be useful to our purpose. For example, a man who was released one year ago has progressed so much, thanks to the flow of communication and partnership between agencies, that he is currently assisting the police and the probation service to detect radicalisation in other individuals. When we had no experience, we had to learn from other countries, and we had to learn fast. One thing we learnt was to maintain consistency with the individual. It is crucial to maintain the officers working with him from the beginning until the end. Thanks to our partnership, we had successes (such as the example above), but we have also come across individuals who will not change, and these we will monitor. Crucial in building that partnership is taking advice and implement it. In cases of terrorism and radicalisation, the solution proposed by the community will be the one which will work. Communities want to take ownership of the problem and assist in the solution. This problem needs to be eliminated. If it is put to one side they will come for us. Questions and Answers Question: (To Hanif Qadir) What do you actually do with these youngsters? Which kinds of activities? How often do you meet? In the Netherlands for example youngsters reject society and thus probation officers. If you are rejected, it is difficult to build a relationship. Hanif Qadir: I understand this problem and I know the mindset. Here, we have activities in schools and we built on them. We create an environment where the individual becomes paramount. We understand them, relate to them and challenge their narrative. They do not know why, or are aware of how, they have been recruited; we make them aware of the fact that recruiters rip away their faith, family ties and individuality. We work both with exoffenders and with non-offenders. Sara Robinson: The probation service manages the whole case, from beginning to end. We assess all needs and risks. What we do is to challenge offending behaviour (we cannot enter an ideological debate because we do not know ideology well enough) and to help with overcoming grievances. For example we try to meet their needs in terms of housing, employment, and so on. We withdraw when the licence ends and the offender has a place in the community supported by the community. In terms of how we engage with those who see you as part of the State and thus as part of the problem, we have to deal with this issue through consistency, building trust, and listening. We have strategies and techniques for that and they seem to work. Some may still not want to engage, so that is when monitoring is used. Question: (To Hanif Qadir) Is there a potential personal risk to you due to your visibility? Hanif Qadir: I love my country and my faith. I know it is risky business. We have found very good opportunities by taking some calculated risk: we have changed their lives and turned them into role models. The results are there waiting for us and we are more than willing to take some calculated risks and maybe other ordinary risks. Question: Can you give an example of a calculated risk? Hanif Qadir: When a young man comes out of prison it is very risky to send him straight to the community where he was trained. In one of our cases, we waited a little bit, but then few months later we sent him to the Lake District with four other high-risk youngsters (not yet offenders) to explain his case. He broke down, got emotional and neutralised the other four completely. Sara Robinson: We are subject to high political risk. Imagine the consequences if we failed, especially when we are so closely followed by the media. This is one of the reasons why we need to work as a partnership: if something goes wrong (and sometimes things go wrong) we can all, as a partnership, assume the responsibility. Spanish participant: Is there any economic compensation to those who serve as agents or role models? Are women involved in your programmes? May women be useful as agents of change? Hanif Qadir: We are funded by the Home Office and the funds we get go to the organisation. We have salaries but no other compensation. It is a Jihad for us to protect our country and our faith. Indeed, women play an essential role in identifying risk, not as spies or information gatherers, but as mothers, wives, sisters and friends. There are female-based organisations of this kind in the UK. Question: (To Lieutenant Colonel of the Guardia Civil & Head of Prison Security) Could you get into more detail about the monitoring of cyber-terrorism? Lieutenant Colonel of the Guardia Civil &Head of Prison Security: There are special units within the Police to monitor the development of websites devoted to promoting terrorism. It is not something done by the prison service. We do not monitor cyber-terrorism; we only monitor prisoners inside the prison. Question: Are those security-oriented measures or treatment-oriented ones? Comment: Security-oriented. 36

39 Questions and Answer Panel Presenter 1: The Spanish approach is mainly prison-oriented. We need a lot to learn from approaches which involve the communities. We need to learn to provide respectful treatment to Muslim groups (in order to avoid victimisation), including respecting their religion. It is essential to understand the roots of the problem and to be aware of their narrative in order to challenge it. We also need to learn to use terminology better and speak, as our colleagues suggest, of violent extremism of a Muslim background. We need to learn to cooperate with other agencies and to train our staff so that they can learn what Islam is and what its message is, which is not necessarily similar to what the media portrays. Spanish participant 1: Am I right to understand that we are in favour of replacing the word terrorism by violent extremism of Muslim background? Presenter 1: If we are talking about someone who has been convicted for a terrorist offense, we would call him terrorist. But we do not call ETA terrorists Basque separatist terrorists. Spanish participant 1: But we have been very careful in our legislation to call terrorism terrorism. Toaha Qureshi: There is no problem in calling terrorism terrorism. The problem is the use of phrases Islamic terrorism, because terrorism is against Islam, and Jihadist terrorism, because Jihad is something different. Hanif talked about our Jihad against terrorism. If we use those phrases, we run the risk of creating a barrier between us and the Muslim community and then they will never want to cooperate with us to solve the problem. Spanish participant 1: But it seems to me that the phrase violent extremism is replacing terrorism, regardless of the adjective. Richard Pickering: The key is to avoid alienating people by using the correct use of language. We had painful discussions in the UK about this issue and we reached the conclusion that violent extremism works better. Liz Dixon: It is the same example with IRA terrorists: they were never called Catholic terrorists. Spanish participant 2: In Spanish we have two terms: Islamic, which means Muslim and Islamist, which applies to a radical interpretation of Quran. There seems to be only one term in English and there seems to be a slight problem when we try to translate it. Toaha Qureshi: If you have a look at the graph I provided, you can see the Muslim population curve. In one end, we have the disenfranchised. One step ahead, we have the radicalized, who are not a threat and do no harm. One step ahead we have the extremists, who do no harm either. Then we have the violent extremists and then the terrorists, at the other end. As you see, the number of people in each category decreases with each step. None of those terms you are suggesting are going to engage the Muslim community. If you prefer to keep using them it is fine; but it may make things more difficult. Ulrich Dovermann: We have problems with right-wing and Muslim extremists, and the term we use is PMK (Politically-Motivated Crime). It has worked for us. It engages the community. Young Muslims feel excluded from democracy, they have no system of hierarchies, and that needs to be dealt with in the community. Spanish participant 1: What I mean is that it seems that we want to replace the word terrorist by violent extremist. The word terrorist cannot be replaced by euphemisms, because we would lose our battle in society. It is terror. Richard Pickering: The Research, Information and Communication Unit of the Home Office have done a lot of research on language to inform this debate. We can bring them to the next conference to deal with this issue. Spanish participant 3: I work in the Anti-terrorist Unit of the Guardia Civil. My question is: we investigate violent extremists who are not terrorists yet and these investigations are very long and sometimes unsuccessful because there is no evidence to prosecute them. What is being done in the UK to deradicalise these people? Is it the job of the police forces or of some other agency? Richard Pickering: From the governmental point of view we have the CONTEST strategy, which has four strands (the four Ps). We are talking here of Prevent and a bit of Pursue, which means prosecuting. We use the security forces and the police as disruptive tools and we prosecute them for small offenses. However the key is the flow of intelligence between agencies. Sara Robinson: Prevent is not only a duty of the criminal justice system, but of us all. We work with local authorities, the community and the police. We also use the exchange of information. For example we are about to begin sessions to share information about flagged individuals. We also have CHANNEL, which is a panel in the community where anyone with a particular concern can come forward and raise issues. CHANNEL assesses the risk and takes measures accordingly. We also use role models, which are having a good influence and steer individuals at risk in the right direction. However, there is a fine balance, because the community knows that security agents are involved. Toaha Qureshi: In the UK the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) runs the Channel Project with funding by the Home Office. We refer people to the Channel project to run certain checks. There was a young person who was referred to us from Channel. He called himself a terrorist, but only to feel more important and to frighten 37

40 people. The school got worried and sent him to Channel and they sent him to us. Alan Weston: One of the problems we are dealing with is release. How do we link education opportunities to our exit programmes? Ulrich Dovermann: We had serious problems in that sense. What we did was not to build new programmes ourselves, but to fund the civil organisations to develop them. Now we have over 4,000 regional and national initiatives. Our picture was as follows: at one end we had rage (and our university experts insisted on the fact that rage is not a problem of the youth but of the adults who promote these ideas), and at the other end we had the understanding of that rage. We united psychology, social work and pedagogy to teach them that democracy was for them too and to elicit questions from them so that we could explain what rage is about. We need freedom of experiment: any kind of experiment should be supported, because it can give us a lot of ideas. If we give youngsters an aim, we overcome problems of the past. Marc Cerón: The aim of this project is to harmonize actions, both from the semantic and from the practical points of view. I was wondering if we could envisage, given that this is an EU-funded project, including recommendations not so much directed to policy-making but to international forums where the EU participates. For instance, there was a meeting in London yesterday to discuss the funding of projects in Afghanistan. We may run the risk of focusing only in prevention in the EU and forget about the countries of origin. Richard Pickering: How can we refine our work? Through intelligence. The Spanish handbook insists on the ease of travel and of instantaneous communications. We need to strengthen our intelligence and map communication roads. We also need to increase the visibility of the prison system. If prosecution and arrest are disruptive factors, prison should be one too. We need to go to European and international governments and tell them that we are here, because from our experience cooperation between different agencies has led to positive results so far in the UK. We need to tackle the issue of deportation and removal, because it might be a problem. Ulrich Dovermann: Funding is needed, but it is a challenge for us to get the money to the right places. Toaha Qureshi: Firstly, no strategy will be effective if they do not involve the local communities. Secondly, concerning the country of origin, we need to look at the root causes - what happens there? For example, I was in Pakistan once at the time of an attack. These attacks were a response to the attacks of foreign nations. Pakistan tells these foreign nations and the international community to stop, but they continue. Then the youngsters take the lead and attack in their own countries because they see how powerless their governments are. Liz Dixon: Our Spanish colleagues have talked about new regulations concerning surveillance after having served the sentence and mechanisms by means of which terrorists need to apologise to victims. Do you find these conferences useful to spot models that you would like to import? Presenter 1: After the Madrid attacks many people who were starting to create terrorist groups were arrested. However, as we had not regulated that activity as an offense, they were released. We would like the new Penal Code to include recruitment with terrorist purposes as an offence. The Spanish Prison Service is in favour of alternative measures to imprisonment (open prisons, electronic monitoring, etc) for less serious offenders, but I do not think that these alternative measures would be applied to terrorist offenders. At the moment, we are planning measures which can be applied to terrorists when they finish their sentences, such as prohibition of living in certain places. In addition, we have problems with young Latin gangs such as the Ñetas and the Latin Kings. We may need to work with them in the community and, if so, we may use the models and approaches discussed here. Closing Remarks and Next Steps Juan Antonio Marín Ríos Director of Internal Security and Prison Management I would like to share three proposals with you: 1. To create a EU organization to deal with prison policy (like EUROPOL) 2. To produce a joint handbook on prevention and eradication of radicalisation. There are individual initiatives, but the ideal scenario would be to produce one jointly. 3. To set up a joint staff training programme in EU countries (one short course per year which two representatives of each country would attend) Richard Pickering Head of NOMS Security Group We had an ambitious agenda: we have covered a lot of issues. Each of you will take home whatever they find more useful considering their circumstances. My personal reflections are that it has been a useful conference, and an ambitious one, where we have received input from other countries, which may have been both interesting and frustrating. I think we need to give equal space to all 38

41 countries and this seems to have been a bit UK and Spanish dominated. It has taken place in a beautiful city whose microcosms are reflected in the city and its architecture, whose diversity also applies to our societies, where we have to assess risk. On the first day, we achieved a better understanding of how our systems operate. We have a common aim but different legal frameworks, institutions and measures. We tackled challenging areas and innovative ideas, such as the psychologist who raised the issue of how to engage with those who do not want to participate in a programme. These ideas also raised questions about faith, ideology, identity and society. This all comes with a great challenge: we have to learn as we go along. There is no firm evidence of what will work and we need to assess what risks we are willing to run. On day two we dealt with how to work with partners; how to manage risk before, during and after conviction; how to work internationally (obviously, internal circumstances shape each approach); and how to join forces with the community. Related with this last issue, it was said that we need to reach out to them and be very respectful about what we ask them to do, because the community is creating a risk for themselves if they become visible and thus vulnerable. There are still a few challenges we need to face: The issue of language, where not only naming but also defining is incredibly difficult (maybe we should have discussed further the definition of radicalisation). The need to treat individuals with decency and respect should be a guiding principle for all our actions. How to work with agencies, the community and also internationally. My last thoughts are words of gratitude to the hosts, contributors, participants, hotel staff, the organising team (from NOMS, London Probation, and SGIP) and to the interpreters. Nick Hammond London Probation Trust RIRP Project Manager (March 2010 onwards) This EU project was Alan Weston s idea, which started over two years ago. We are currently conducting pilot training sessions in London and in Berlin soon, and there will also be a second conference in London in October. In your folders, there are evaluation forms for you to fill in so that we can build on this conference. These forms also include the suggestion to attend pilots or to host demonstration projects, so please let us know if you are interested. The outcome of this project (information and research) will become available on the CEP, London Probation and EU websites. Leo Tigges Secretary General of CEP There are some issues which I believe should be dealt with more deeply in future conferences and working groups: How prison and probation systems, the municipalities and the communities should work together; Information-sharing schemes and mechanisms between prison and the police. We see the need but we do not really know how to persuade our colleagues; Methodology - we need to see practical cases; How to bridge the gap in the approaches to radicalisation between countries? As we have seen over the last few days, given the number of cases Spain and the UK are facing, these countries have established specialised teams to tackle this problem. However, most EU countries are not facing the same volume of cases, which makes it hard in these countries to justify allocating resources to deal with this problem. How do we convince senior officials of the seriousness of this problem when it is currently not perceived as important? Make a list of recommendations (we will have the reports of both conferences but we need a list of ten recommendations). And let me add one final comment: On 20 th January the Council of Ministers has accepted the Probation Rules of the Council of Europe. This means that we in probation services have European rules just like our prison colleagues. Antonio Puig Director General of Resources Management, SGIP I would like to express my gratitude to all participants for contributing and sharing your knowledge. Our challenge is twofold: dealing with radicalisation both at a national level and at an international level. However we should not forget to also focus on organised crime and the effective use of the open regimes. I would also like to thank Leo Tigges and the CEP, Richard Pickering and NOMS, of course the SGIP experts and all the conference organisers. On behalf of the Secretary General, I express our willingness to cooperate with all of you to improve our ability to react to challenges. Thank you. 39

42 Annex A Key partners of RIRP Project CEP The European Organisation for Probation CEP is the European Organisation for Probation. It aims to promote the social inclusion of offenders through community sanctions and measures such as probation, community service, mediation and conciliation. CEP is committed to enhance the profile of probation and to improve professionalism in this field, on a national and a European level. CEP therefore promotes pan-european cooperation by organising conferences on actual topics in probation. By making the reports of these events available, by publishing its digital newsletter and through its website, CEP stimulates the exchange of ideas on probation. In this way it makes an important contribution to the development of community sanctions and measures. Its members are organisations working in the field of probation and interested individuals. CEP thus brings together practitioners, managers, academics, stakeholders and others working in the field of probation and criminal justice from all over Europe. Together they represent a unique network of expertise about positive ways of working with offenders in the community. Their common concern is how to protect society without resorting to the expense of prison. To European bodies such as the European Union and the Council of Europe, CEP is the spokesperson for the sector of probation, providing expertise and comparative data. It is therefore the voice of probation in Brussels'. London Probation Trust London Probation was created in The organisation covers 32 boroughs in London, employs approximately 3000 staff, works from over 80 offices and manages 47,000 offenders at any one time. Our vision: We will be visible in the communities we serve, earning respect and raising confidence in our work We will be high on performance and high on the duty of care for staff Our staff will be proud to work for London Probation London will be a safer place because of the work we do. Our mission: to cut crime for a safer London. London Probation reduces reoffending and protects the public by: Enforcing community sentences designed to punish and rehabilitate offenders Keeping victims informed Delivering quality, innovative services, including providing professional assessments to the courts Managing risk and influencing positive change in offenders behaviour. Our values: Protection protecting the public is our top priority and we are answerable to the communities of London. Listening seeking and responding to the views of others makes our work more effective. Continuous development learning and innovation is essential to our success. Equality we believe in providing services and employment that are free from all prejudices. 40

43 National Offender Management Service (NOMS) NOMS is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice, bringing together the headquarters of the Probation Service and HM Prison Service to enable more effective delivery of services. The two bodies remain distinct but have a strong unity of purpose to protect the public and reduce reoffending. Prison and probation services ensure the sentences of the courts are properly carried out and work with offenders to tackle the causes of their offending behaviour. NOMS is responsible for commissioning and delivering adult offender management services, in custody and in the community, in England and Wales. It manages a mixed economy of providers. Decisions on what work is to be done and who it will be done by are based on evidence and driven by best value. Responsibility for delivering a reduction in reoffending and the management of offenders is devolved to 10 regional offices in England and one office in Wales. Each is responsible for commissioning services, developing a reducing reoffending delivery plan and coordinating partnerships in their area. Violence Prevention Network The Violence Prevention Network (VPN) works with juvenile male offenders, regardless of ethnicity or nationality, who have committed bias-motivated/hate crimes, are susceptible to extremist or radical Islamic ideologies and are members of anti-democratic groups and movements. The VPN works to achieve lasting changes in individuals behaviour through extensive educational training during their imprisonment. This training is designed to teach, among other things, taking personal responsibility. The VPN employ a variety of methods and approaches including: reawakening feelings of empathy; fostering the ability for self-reflection; questioning the personal justifications for criminal behaviour; building reliability and dependability in personal relationships; learning personal acceptance while engaging in constructive self-criticism; and, strengthening one s commitment to discussion and debate. The VPN strongly believes that it is the responsibility of every member of society to address and hinder violent criminal acts stemming from ethnocentricity and intolerance. Any form of extremism is a danger to a democratic society and must be countered with conviction. The VPN s first and foremost goal in working with juvenile offenders is preventing recidivism. There are around 1000 young perpetrators who are convicted of committing serious crimes annually in Germany. These youth constitute a comparatively larger financial burden for the state because they are incarcerated for a proportionally longer period of time, and often become repeat offenders with their crimes adversely impacting a greater number of people. It is in everyone s interest to contain the economic costs associated with the crimes committed by this relatively small group. For this reason, an aim of the youth correctional system should be to provide adequate and meaningful assistance to violent youths that facilitates their transition back into society and thus avoiding further criminality. The Violence Prevention Network has developed an educational training and coaching programme, entitled Taking Responsibility Leaving Hate and Violence Behind, which has significantly reduced recidivism rates and consequentially the financial costs born by communities. Of the 300 participants in our training programs between 2001 and 2008, 80% have been released from custody. Of these released individuals, only 7% have been rearrested and only 1% reconvicted for a newly committed offence. These success rates are even more impressive when compared to the national juvenile reoffending rate of 78% in Germany. If a large automobile producer had to recall 78% of their annually manufactured cars, they would immediately loose the trust of the public and face bankruptcy. 41

44 Annex B Power-Point Slides Presentations from Day One Alan Weston Project Manager, London Probation Service Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners (RIRP) Project December Alan Weston European Projects Manager, London Probation Who are the partners? London Probation (LP), UK UK National Offender Management Service (NOMS), UK Violence Prevention Network (VPN), Germany Stockwell Green Community Services, UK Who are the partners? University of Bremen, Germany Conference Permanente Europeanne de la Probation (CEP), pan-european based in the Netherlands Secretaría General de Instituciones Penitenciarias, Spain What are the key objectives? To research the key influencing factors that can radicalise prisoners and offenders To train criminal justice staff working in prisons or with prisoners released on licence in the community to be aware of these factors To provide recommendations for improved management and supervision of terrorist related offenders What are the key objectives? To develop a range of intervention materials that can be used in other EU countries To transfer information & learning to other EU countries To build a network of interested practitioners within the UK, Germany, the Netherlands & other EU countries What are the main outputs? 1. In-depth research report 2. Training package & materials developed for use with Prison and Probation staff Criminal Justice staff trained 4. Evaluation report on effectiveness of training 5. Two European conferences to share learning 6. Network of experts between partner countries & other EU countries 42

45 For further details or information please contact London Probation Trust With the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union European Commission - Directorate-General Home Affairs 52