Policy Instruments & (Side)-Effects

Transcription

1 Policy Instruments & (Side)-Effects EU Parl. LIBE Hearing on the fight against terrorism and the challenges for EU internal security Quirine Eijkman, Centre for Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Faculty Campus the Hague - Leiden University (speaking in personal capacity)

2 Existing instruments (distinguish reality from desired effect!) - what threat do foreign fighters pose? - surveillance & interception programmes - lack emprical research New EU instruments needed? Today - many new measures seek to anticipate to prevent & control risk - side-effects Debate

3 Potential Treat Foreign Fighters Pose? Mitigating factors - many die, blowing themselves up in suicide attacks or perishing quickly in firefights with opposing forces - many never return home, but continue to fight - many become disillusioned + many of those who return are (often) not violent - others are arrested (law enforcement) & disrupted (intelligence services) Be realistic: almost inevitably, there will be some terrorist attacks in Europe or the United States carried D. Byman & J.Shaprio (2015) Be Afraid. Be a Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Brookings Institute, rn-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-byman-shapiro EU Terrorist attacks deaths 152 terror attacks 2 religiously motivated 535 arrests 216 religiously inspired Europol TE-SAT, 2014

4 Mass or Targeted Surveillance / Interception Programmes? Have mass & targeted surveillance programs prevented terrorist attacks? Council of Europe (2015). Mass Surveillance, Provisional version, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 26 Jan.2015 Monitoring internet & social media fe in Dutch context: inspiring foreign fighters (but role of human recruiters + most are self-driven!) AIVD (2014). The Transformation of Jihadism in the Netherlands: Swarm Dynamics and New Trends,

5 Lack of Empirical Terrorism Research Most publications normative +talk amongst themselves Secondary sources + newspaper articles often used source: - lack detail - factual accurracy contested - bias? [A] dearth of empirically grounded research on terrorism Schulze 2004 Since 9/11, 65% articles a are still essentially just [literature] reviews Silke 2008 research lack first-hand, empirical data necessary for accurate and reliable B.Schuurman & Q.Eijkman (2013) Moving Terrorism Research Forward: The crucial role of primary resources? ICCT paper, Moving-Terrorism-Research-Forward-June-2013.pdf

6 Hofstadgroup: a homegrown terrorist network? Homegrown salafi-jihadist network Neth. ca loose organizational structure strong online radicalization participants held frequent meetings some possessed firearms attempts to travel to AFPAK region most noted Theo van Gogh murder + use of handgrenade vs SWAT-team (11/2004) Conclusion: - between no clear ideological, organizational or operational characteristics of a homegrown jihadist terrorist group - in 2005 (Piranha case) did some Hofstadgroup participants display the first clear signs of a basic org. structure begin to more closely resemble the inherently ambiguous jihadist network Schuurman, B.. Eijkman, Q. & E.Bakker. The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning its Status as a Quintessential Homegrown Terrorist Network?, Journal Terrorism and Political Violence, (online August 2014), pp gh

7 Current Policy Trends EU CT Policies Prevention - increased internet surveillance & interception ( incl. encryption debate) - resilience fe dialogue with EU Muslims about freedom of expression & speech Information management - info. exchange between intelligence and security services + private actors - data retention & mining fe EU-wide PNR database of passenger travel information Criminal justice response Cooperation with third countries Missing? reflection on (side)effects

8 Current Trends EU CT: Anticipation Crime control paradigm shift: from prosecution, solving & punishing crime, to prevention, identifying dangerous people + depriving of liberty crime is committed (risk management) (Janus, 2004) - > authority police & security services to intervene fe intelligence sharing - punishing uncommitted crimes Pre-emption (= act before threat materializes) post 9/11 security strategy (international relations discourse - acting in the face of an imminent threat (war / national security) - form of self-defense - erosion external & internal security (blurring intelligence work + policing) - nat. security integrated in criminal justice + administrative approach Lomell, H. (2012). Punishing the uncommitted crime. Prevention, pre-emption, precaution and the transformation of criminal law. In B. Hudson & S. Ugelvik (Eds.), Justice and security in the 21 st century. Risks, rights and the rule of law.new York: Routledge.

9 Trends Side-Effects 1) Repressive approach extra punishment: criminal + administrative + financial methods - extra punishment finances / soc. benefits / child protection services 2) More power to the executive less judicial review? fe who labels who is a foreign fighter - checks and balances fe notice + take down & youth law - accountability fe right to remedy - demonstrate effectiveness fe. info. management Fundamental rights: - right to security - right to privacy / data protection - freedom of expression & right to information - equality - freedom of religion - fair trial

10 Side-Effects: Equality Issue: understanding impact CT policies on UK Muslim communities Methodology: qualitative study 4 case studies CT policies, focus groups & interviews Conclusions: - some measures specifically target Muslim communities + may breach human rights & equality laws disparity Muslim & non-muslim experience who live in same local areas fe encounters with CT policing CT laws and practices are not experienced in isolation - contribute to a wider sense among Muslims, who participated in this study, of being treated as a suspect community Side-effects: - risk undermining trust + confidence security services - disconnect - level of importance given to key social issues within those communities and the CT emphasis of law & policymakers Choudhury, T.& H. Fenwick (2011), The Impact of Counter-terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities, Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report Series, nr.72.

11 Notice and Take Down: Evaluate Existent Policy Instruments Evaluate existent policy instruments on the basis of emprical research, no effect take them down! - no hiding behind secrecy (open files security agencies for research + evaluation purposes) What is the real issue? - can policy instruments anticipate to prevent & control risk? fe. improve information-sharing (is that the issue or acting upon this information?) - do intelligence and security agencies really want to cooperate fe. research - side-effects 1) more power executive legitimacy democracy 2) fundamental rights 3) check and balances fe democractic oversight + judicial entitiy New EU instruments needed - more not per sé better - targeted instead of more or mass

12 Questions?