Protective Marking: Overview:

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1 1 Office of the Police Crime Commissioner Briefing Paper TITLE: Strategic Policing Requirement DATE: 1 st October 2015 AUTHORS: Vanessa Jardine, Russ Jackson, John O Hare, Anthony Mole Protective Marking: LEAD OFFICER: ACC Ian Wiggett Not Protectively Marked. This is a summary version of a protectively marked report considered by the Police Crime Commissioner on 1 October Operationally senstive information has been removed from this version of the report. Overview: The latest Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) was issued in March 2015, it outlines the national threats the appropriate national policing capability required to counter those threats. Whilst many threats can be tackled individually by forces, threats that are viewed as national require resources to be brought together from multiple police force areas in order to be countered efficiently effectively. The SPR draws on the National Security Strategy (NSS) but does not include all threats identified in the NSS. This report to the PCC on the SPR is an annual report which enables the PCC to hold the Chief Constable to account through which the PCC can consider his own duty to have regard to the SPR. The objective of this report is to provide assurance about GMP s ability to meet the SPR requirements to identify risk to maintain our ability to meet the requirements. Some of the SPR requirements are overlapping in terms of, for example, capabilities training/exercising the SPR itself does always make the requirements distinct. For example: aspects of the public order civil emergencies requirements overlap, some also overlap with counter-terrorism aspects of the serious organised crime child sexual abuse requirements overlap, including the requirements in respect of cyberenabled/on-line crime. We have therefore aggregated responses from several branches to complete this report; we have followed the approach of the SPR in setting out the risk the requirements for the 5 C s (capacity contribution, capability, consistency connectivity) on a best fit basis for each threat identified in the SPR.

2 2 Recommendations: That the Commissioner considers notes the report. Detail: TERRORISM The force, together with the counter-terrorism network, has the capacity it needs to contribute to the national counter-terrorism effort. The force considers threats risks from international terrorism domestic extremism in its strategic threat risk assessment Counter Terrorism (CT) is included within the Police & Crime Plan GMP s strategic priorities. The CT / Domestic Extremism (DE) Network local force Special Branches play a leading role with partner agencies to counter the threat from domestic extremism. The CT / DE policing network, working alongside MI5 other key partners, provides a UK wide capability which has strengthened the UK response to terrorism. CT capability in the North West region is provided by the North West Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU). These Units are nationally aligned assets, regionally based to meet the current threats. Greater Manchester Police has, or has access to, the necessary capability to conduct complex investigations into terrorism. The force has sufficient officers to deal with counter-terrorism intelligence it provides a link between the national counter-terrorism network force staff. Since its inception in 2007, the NWCTU has developed a full range of policing capabilities in order to deliver the HM Government Strategy for countering international terrorism: CONTEST (Prepare, Pursue, Prevent Protect). NWCTU has lines of accountability at both a force, regional national level. This is in relation to performance operational activity. National CT / DE guidance around policy, process governance stards are established across the Network with regards to CT investigations operations management. The Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU) utilises the National Tasking process to share information across the region with national bodies. The force neighbouring forces in the North West region have various networked secure communication channels to co-ordinate mobilise resources from within region the wider network to deal with incidents of terrorism. The North West Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU) participates in the National Office for Security Counter Terrorism (OSCT) Exercise Schedule, supports military exercises, delivers supports regional exercises, delivers its own exercise regime works closely with the Force in developing Force level exercises.

3 3 NWCTU provides regional CT / DE staff with the necessary training to conduct their roles to ensure that Greater Manchester the North West are able to effectively respond to a CT incident. will be updated in the CTU update due at the November 2015 OPCC Public Forum. SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME Greater Manchester Police provide a high level of capability skill in relation to the on-going threats of organised crime, for example criminal use of firearms, threats to life management, kidnap extortion, hostage negotiation. We also have entered into a regional collaboration to provide certain capabilities where appropriate expedient. As Titan is the collaboration of six regional forces (Merseyside, Lancashire, GMP, North Wales, Cumbria Cheshire) certain functions are now delivered at a regional level, activity is directed through the regional tasking coordination process. Programme Challenger is the Greater Manchester multi agency approach to tackling serious organised crime. GMP leads hosts the programme which has received national recognition as a model of good practice. GMP s Sexual Crime Unit (SCU) is the force lead for online child sexual exploitation will triage establish through risk assessment those cases which require specialist investigation. Investigations which escalate from initial intelligence to reveal networks of abusers sharing indecent images of children (IIOC) or multiple online grooming have been typically dealt with by SCU or in some cases the Major Incident Team (MIT). GMP has developed effective partnerships to tackle serious organised crime (SOC), including our response to organised illegal immigration modern slavery, where we have developed co-located partnerships with Home Office Immigration, Home Office Crime investigation integrated working with UK Border Force. This is informing Greater Manchester regional approaches. Through the use of multi-agency approaches at every stage of our response to SOC we have an increased capability to underst the problem develop the most effective response. The Modern Slavery Coordination Unit (MSCU) is an example of how GMP has been able to increase capability through effective integrated working with partners. GMP has set up a team of highly trained cyber-crime investigators; they are focussed on cyber dependant crime support the force response to cyber enabled crime. The Digital Investigations Governance Group coordinates GMPs response to emerging threats. GMP has capabilities to deliver the HM Government Serious Organised Crime

4 4 Strategy (Prepare, Pursue, Prevent Protect). HMIC Recommen dations Programme Challenger the associated force governance process for organised crime ensure force wide national consistency. GMP is continuing to develop improve the current OPUS intelligence system the long term plan is to introduce a new integrated comm control intelligence system as part of the Force Integrated Operational Policing System (IOPS). This will collate all intelligence data held on police systems be able to connect to the Police National Database (PND). Challenger has delivered front line awareness raising training for multi-agency staff in every borough across GM some additional health partners, also commissioning the delivery of awareness raising sessions for modern slavery in targeted areas. GMP is developing training for officers involved in tackling modern slavery including Modern Slavery Tactical Advisors Modern Slavery Witness Liaison Officers. Following on from HMIC inspection recommendations, GMP now produces a quarterly assessment of all recorded digital crime incidents. This assessment is used to focus the development of our resources capabilities. GMP also has a cyber-policing group which provides coordination on all matters of cyber policing. Please also see the section on Child sexual Abuse for information on HMIC recommendations in relation to CSE. For risks related to CSE please see the child sexual abuse section of this report. A NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY INCIDENT A Cyber Policing Group (CPG) has been constituted which represents the professional leads across cyber policing activity including digital investigations. It is charged with providing professional guidance, policy strategic direction the coordination of training research into GMP s infrastructure. This enables different areas of the cyber policing arena to underst changes developments in a rapidly changing environment, to ensure they are aligned. GMP has cyber investigation capabilities. The training provided to thstaff has been approved by the College of Policing or is in line with their course content. The training the systems utilised by the staff engaged in research investigations is in line with national guidance. GMP has worked alongside regional assets. GMP remains acutely aware that communication with the regional national agencies is vital to ensure consistency connectivity are aligned.

5 5 THREATS TO PUBLIC ORDER OR PUBLIC SAFETY THAT CANNOT BE MANAGED BY A SINGLE POLICE FORCE ACTING ALONE Annually GMP prepares a Public Order Public Safety Strategic Threat Assessment in relation to perceived risk, harm threat. This process requires the Force to consider foreseeable threats around public order public safety then to prepare for these threats. This includes the resourcing training of sufficient officers to mitigate this threat the procurement of the necessary equipment to be effective. This exercise is repeated at regional at national levels reviewed every quarter. GMP reviews resourcing levels within key specialist roles. An agreed level of resourcing together with specific skill sets has been established regionally nationally. GMP has sufficient resources trained equipped to meet these requirements. The force has a national commitment to maintain Police Support Units (PSU) has sufficient trained PSUs to meet mutual aid local requirements. There is a regular frequent requirement to police public order major events within the force area, which is why it is necessary to maintain this level of capability. The force has sufficient specialist public order staff accredited senior officers with the experience competence to comm responses to major events public disorder. GMP s Operational Planning Section within the Specialist Operations Branch is responsible for ensuring that the Force maintains its capability to meet dems. Monthly governance meetings are held to confirm these levels are maintained that there are suitably accredited commers trained to national stards. In addition to public order dems, the Force has an armed capability, these officers are all trained to national stards have immediate access to specialist equipment allowing them to meet dems. Comm of these resources requires specific skills GMP maintains a cadre of commers trained to national stards. Public Order Firearms training provided to GMP officers meets national stards set out by the College of Policing. Officers Commers are trained where necessary accredited to ensure that they meet authorised professional practice (APP) national stard. This ensures that all officers are trained to a consistent stard can perform their duties with other forces in an interoperable deployment. In support of other emergency services improved effectiveness, commers at various levels undertake joint multi-agency training as directed by Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP). Nationally, mutual aid deployments are coordinated through an established structure. At the centre is the National Point of Contact (NPOC). This calls on support through each region then down to each Force. As of September 2015, GMP holds the responsibility at regional level for coordinating mutual aid requests/ responses.

6 6 A number of exercises have taken place. Nationally, regionally at local Force level an annual Strategic Threat Assessment process is undertaken. The assessment is completed based on nationally agreed guidance using an approved template. Once this process is undertaken, a review is then conducted to ensure that the force is prepared to meet these foreseeable dems. Resources, equipment training are provided to meet these dems. CIVIL EMERGENCIES THAT REQUIRE AN AGGREGATED RESPONSE ACROSS POLICE FORCE BOUNDARIES The force, together with the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum, (GMRF) has the capacity to respond to local civil emergencies to contribute deployments to national emergencies. GMRF works to the Community Risk Register (CRR) this is reviewed annually on receipt of the National Risk Assessment National Resilience Planning Assumptions. After the review of the CRR, the Greater Manchester Strategy is produced. It is a Cabinet Office recommendation that the risk register is updated at least every four years. The Greater Manchester Police Civil Contingencies Unit also assesses the GMRF priorities for the year in conjunction with the North West Counter Terrorism Unit. An executive summary document is produced by the NWCTU discussed with the Local Resilience Forum. This then feeds into a review of the Community Risk Register. The force has arrangements to request mutual aid the provision of resources from other police forces any specialist skills required for dealing with civil emergencies. All of the forces in the region have sufficient numbers of trained staff to deliver basic chemical, biological, radioactive nuclear capabilities. This capability is to be reviewed to ensure a more effective efficient collaborative arrangement is developed. All staff commers are trained to national stards. All equipment provided meets national requirements. GMP regularly trains its specialist staff together with other emergency services. GMP follows the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) is able to deploy at incidents ensure an interoperable approach. See Public Order. A number of exercises have taken place.

7 7 CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE GMP its local authority partners have developed Project Phoenix to tackle Child Sexual Abuse (CSE) provide consistency across the ten local authority areas. Phoenix is a collaboration of public third sector agencies throughout Greater Manchester each local authority area now has a dedicated, colocated multi-agency team to proactively reactively investigate CSE safeguard young people. Under the comm of the Public Protection Division, a new Force CSE team has been commissioned to augment the work already done by Phoenix the Force CSE Coordinator. The team is undertaking single-agency peer reviews to ensure consistency identify any gaps in provision. The Force CSE team has developed links with Titan (ROCU) now have regular dialogue with regional CSE leads coordinators. has also been increased through the training of staff across GMP. Project Phoenix operates with a principal aim of bringing public third sector agencies together to collaboratively work towards tackling child sexual exploitation (CSE). The Phoenix Charter addresses the potential issues in attaining consistency between the ten different local authority areas defines the data information sharing protocols required to operate effectively. These arrangements ensure that the multi-agency, co-located CSE teams working on divisions operate as one team are managed lead jointly by police children s services. Each team has their own terms of reference most have a steering group (or similar) that feeds into the Local Safeguarding Children s Board group meetings whilst also informing local delivery plans. Most of the divisions have separate Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) to discuss assess new safeguarding referrals (including child abuse), with work ongoing through the Public Service Reform Programme to ensure each division has this ability in the future. The Phoenix operating model ensures that GMP their partner agencies remain connected work together, with each local CSE team holding daily governance meetings which also feed into daily Pacesetter meetings. Regionally, the Force CSE team is developing links with each regional force CSE coordinator the ROCU (Titan) coordinator. Each Phoenix team is led by a detective inspector trained to upper PIP2 level. A number of staff have received the SCAIDP (Serious Child Abuse Investigators Development Programme) training, with others enrolled on courses. The force continues to invest heavily in training. HMIC Recommend ations In the last 12 months, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has published several reports in relation to child sexual abuse. Through these reports HMIC have made numerous recommendations these recommendations have covered a range of themes.

8 8 Locally, our progress towards implementing HMIC recommendations is monitored through GMP's Inspection Audit Board is reported to the Office of the Police Crime Commissioner. Governance around implementation of recommendations is also provided through GMP's Child Protection action plan which tracks the recommendations ensures the Force is working in support of those emanating from other inspections reports. Furthermore, the Project Phoenix Executive Board provides oversight of Greater Manchester's multi-agency response. There is also a tactical monthly meeting which drives performance, provides national regional updates identifies cross border links to share good practice. The accelerated development of new technology with greater capacity efficiency in law enforcement maintaining the capability to keep pace target offenders using the internet to exploit abuse children. This can be mitigated with GMP s own technological improvements being assured along with provision of the necessary volume of skilled specialist resources to investigate these cases. With an increase in cases of internet based sexual abuse of children, there are organisational risks specifically related to capacity due to increased detection prosecution of offenders who will be required to sign the Sex Offenders Register. With increased focus in this area there is also a risk around the management of suspects. Self-harm suicide of such offenders is a highlighted issue over the past 2 years. Processes are in place to discharge our obligations in accordance with Article 2 Human Rights Act but the risks in this area are recognised. Risk: are highlighted within the relevant sections the report. Legal Financial Advice: Not applicable Implications regarding vulnerable people: The implications for vulnerable people are highlighted throughout the report with child sexual exploitation being a key area of vulnerability. Wider Communications: Not applicable. This report is Restricted to be considered under Part 2 of the agenda. A Public Interest Test has been completed. Attachments:

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