Security Target: Symantec Endpoint Protection Version 11.0

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1 Security Target: Symantec Endpoint Protection Version 11.0 ST Version 1.6 June 2, 2008 Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 1 of 68

2 Prepared For: Prepared By: Symantec Corporation Stevens Creek Blvd. Cupertino, CA Apex Assurance Group, LLC 5448 Apex Peakway Drive, Ste. 101 Apex, NC This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Symantec Endpoint Protection Version This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements. Document Revision History REVISION DATE DESCRIPTION 1.0 September 23, 2007 Initial release 1.1 November 8, 2007 Address initial verdicts from EWA-Canada 1.2 January 14, 2008 Minor updates 1.3 February 21, 2008 Update with details to address PD March 11, 2008 Clarify roles and descriptive mapping to PP roles 1.5 May 13, 2008 Remove proprietary marking and other final edits 1.6 June 2, 2008 Clarify final validator comment; release for publishing Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 2 of 68

3 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION IDENTIFICATION OVERVIEW CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM ORGANIZATION DOCUMENT CONVENTIONS DOCUMENT TERMINOLOGY TOE DESCRIPTION PRODUCT TYPE PRODUCT DESCRIPTION Symantec Endpoint Protection Client Operating System Support Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager Operating System Support Operator Roles in the TOE Central Administrator Workstation User Network User TOE BOUNDARIES Physical Boundary Configuration Logical Boundaries Antivirus Audit Cryptographic Operations Management Protection of the TOE TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SECURE USE ASSUMPTIONS THREATS TO SECURITY Threats Addressed by the TOE Threats Addressed by Operating Environment ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES SECURITY OBJECTIVES SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE NON-IT ENVIRONMENT IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS Security Audit (FAU) FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage FAU_STG.4 Site-Configurable Prevention of Audit Loss Antivirus (FAV) Explicitly Stated FAV_ACT_EXP.1 Anti-Virus Actions FAV_ALR_EXP.1 Antivirus Alerts Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 3 of 68

4 FAV_SCN_EXP.1 Antivirus Scanning Cryptographic Support (FCS) FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation Security Management (FMT) FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles Protection of the TSF (FPT) FPT_SEP_EXP.1 Partial TSF Domain Separation SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT Security Audit (FAU) FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage User Data Protection (FDP) FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection Identification and Authentication (FIA) FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before any Action FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before any Action FIA_PLA_EXP.1 Performance and Log Alerts (EXP) Protection of the TSF (FPT) FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection FPT_RVM.1 Non-Bypassability of the TSP FPT_SEP.1 TSF Domain Separation FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps TOE Access (FTA) FTA_SSL.1 TSF-Initiated Session Locking FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NON-IT ENVIRONMENT TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS Antivirus Audit Cryptographic Operations Management Security Roles Security Audit Access Control TSF Protection SECURITY ASSURANCE MEASURES PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS RATIONALE RATIONALE FOR SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF THE TOE, IT ENVIRONMENT, AND NON-IT ENVIRONMENT Summary Mapping of Security Objectives Rationale for Security Objectives of the TOE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE Summary of TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency of Security Requirements Summary of IT Environment Security Requirements Sufficiency of Security Requirements for the IT Environment TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 4 of 68

5 8.3.1 Sufficiency of IT Security Functions RATIONALE FOR IT SECURITY REQUIREMENT DEPENDENCIES Rationale for Unsupported SFR Dependencies RATIONALE FOR EXPLICITLY STATED REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE FOR SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE FOR STRENGTH OF FUNCTION CLAIM RATIONALE FOR PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS List of Tables Table 1 ST Organization and Description... 8 Table 2 Acronyms Used in Security Target... 9 Table 3 Symantec Endpoint Protection Client: Supported Operating Systems Table 4 Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager: Supported Operating Systems Table 5 Evaluated Configuration for the TOE Table 6 TOE Security Functional Requirements Table 7 FAU_GEN.1 Events and Additional Information Table 8 Security Assurance Requirements Table 9 Available Reports Table 10 Description of Roles Supported in the TOE Table 11 Assurance Measures Table 12 Modifications from Protection Profile Table 13 Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, and OSPs to Security Objectives Table 14 Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objective Table 15 Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives Table 16 Rationale for TOE Objectives Table 17 Mapping of IT Environment Security Functional Requirements and Objectives Table 18 Rationale for IT Environment Objectives Table 19 Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to IT Security Functions Table 20 Sufficiency of IT Security Functions Table 21 TOE SFR Dependency Rationale Table 22 Unsupported SFR Dependency Rationale Table 23 Rationale for Explicitly Stated Requirements List of Figures Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 5 of 68

6 Figure 1 TOE Boundary Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 6 of 68

7 1 Introduction This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), conformance claims, Security Target organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the evaluated product. 1.1 Identification This section provides information necessary to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation. ST Title: Security Target: Symantec Endpoint Protection Version 11.0 ST Revision: 1.6 ST Publication Date: June 2, 2008 TOE Identification: Symantec Endpoint Protection Version 11.0 Vendor: CC Version: Author: PP Compliance: Keywords: Symantec Corporation Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 and applicable international and NIAP interpretations as of November 23, Apex Assurance Group U.S. Government Protection Profile for Anti-Virus Applications for Workstations in Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.1, April 4, 2006 Symantec, antivirus, endpoint protection 1.2 Overview The TOE is Symantec Endpoint Protection Version 11.0, which delivers a comprehensive antivirus/endpoint security solution with a single agent and a single, centralized management console. Symantec Endpoint Protection Version 11.0 may hereafter also be referred to as the TOE in this document. 1.3 CC Conformance Claim The TOE meets the following claims: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended Common Criteria Part 3 EAL2 conformant with augmentation to include ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_MSU.1. Conformance to U.S. Government Protection Profile for Anti-Virus Applications for Workstations in Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.1, April 4, Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 7 of 68

8 1.4 Organization This Security Target follows the following format: SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION 1 Introduction Provides an overview of the Security Target 2 TOE Description Defines the hardware and software that make up the TOE as well as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE 3 TOE Security Environment Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational security policies that affect the TOE 4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment 5 IT Security Requirements Contains the functional and assurance requirements for this TOE 6 TOE Summary Specification Identifies the IT security functions provided by the TOE and also identifies the assurance measures targeted to meet the assurance requirements. 7 PP Claims Specifies Protection Profile conformance claims of the TOE 8 Rationale Provides a rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives satisfy the threats; provides justifications of dependency analysis and strength of function issues Table 1 ST Organization and Description 1.5 Document Conventions The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are consistent with those used in Version 2.3 of the Common Criteria. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to aid the Security Target reader. The Common Criteria allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements: The allowable operations defined in paragraph of Part 2 of the Common Criteria are refinement, selection, assignment and iteration. The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. An assignment operation is indicated by showing the value in square brackets, i.e. [assignment_value(s)]. The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text. Any text removed is indicated with a strikethrough format (Example: TSF). The selection operation is picking one or more items from a list in order to narrow the scope of a component element. Selections are denoted by underlined italicized text. Iterated functional and assurance requirements are given unique identifiers by appending Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 8 of 68

9 to the base requirement identifier from the Common Criteria an iteration number inside parenthesis, for example, FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) refer to separate instances of the FMT_MTD.1 security functional requirement component. Application notes provide additional information for the reader, but do not specify requirements. Application notes are denoted by italicized text within the functional requirements and are preceded with the text Application Note Italicized text is used for both official document titles and text meant to be emphasized more than plain text. 1.6 Document Terminology The following table provides a list of acronyms used within this document: TERM AVPP CC CMVP EAL FIPS NIAP NTP OSP PP SEP SFR SHA SOF ST TOE TSF TSP DEFINITION U.S. Government Protection Profile for Anti-Virus Applications for Workstations in Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.1, April 4, 2006 Common Criteria Cryptographic Module Validation Program Evaluation Assurance Level Federal Information Processing Standard National Information Assurance Partnership Network Time Protocol Organizational Security Policy Protection Profile Symantec Endpoint Protection Security Functional Requirement Security Hash Algorithm Strength Of Function Security Target Target Of Evaluation TOE Security Function TOE Security Policy Table 2 Acronyms Used in Security Target Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 9 of 68

10 2 TOE Description This section describes the Target of Evaluation (TOE), the provided security functionality (logical boundaries), and the physical TOE boundaries. 2.1 Product Type Symantec Endpoint Protection combines Symantec AntiVirus with advanced threat prevention to deliver a defense against malware for laptops, desktops, and servers. It provides protection against even the most sophisticated attacks that evade traditional security measures, such as rootkits, zero-day attacks, and mutating spyware. The product type of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) described in this Security Target (ST) is an antivirus application running on workstations (e.g., desktops and laptops), along with a management component running on a central server to control and monitor execution of the antivirus application. 2.2 Product Description The evaluated features of Symantec Endpoint Protection are comprised of the following components: Symantec Endpoint Protection Client Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager (and management console) The following sections describe each component in more detail Symantec Endpoint Protection Client The Symantec Endpoint Protection Client is software that protects servers, desktops, and laptops systems on an internal network Operating System Support OPERATING SYSTEM 32-BIT 64-BIT Microsoft Windows Vista Microsoft Windows 2003 Microsoft Windows XP (SP2 1 ) Microsoft Windows 2000 (SP3 and higher) Table 3 Symantec Endpoint Protection Client: Supported Operating Systems 1 Tested on Service Pack 2 but compatible with previous versions of Windows XP Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 10 of 68

11 2.2.2 Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager The management functions of the Central Administrator may execute on a separate system from the portion of the TOE performing virus scanning on workstations; this portion of the TOE is called Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager (SEPM). The SEPM communicates with individual workstations via an agent over HTTPS that is installed with the Symantec Endpoint Protection Client software. The SEPM is managed via Console application running on a host computer, which communicates with the SEPM via HTTPS Operating System Support OPERATING SYSTEM 32-BIT 64-BIT Microsoft Windows 2003 Microsoft Windows XP (SP2 2 ) Microsoft Windows 2000 (SP3 and higher) Table 4 Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager: Supported Operating Systems Operator Roles in the TOE The TOE supports the roles defined in the following sections Central Administrator The Central Administrator controls the operation of all instances of the TOE under their authority. This role has the authority to: Remotely manage operation of the TOE on workstations Schedule scans of existing files Manually invoke scans Control the minimum depth of scans Update virus signature files Receive alert notifications from the centralized management system Acknowledge alert notifications from the centralized management system Review the TOE audit information in the centralized management system Application Note: When the workstation is stand-alone (i.e., not network-attached), the local 2 Tested on Service Pack 2 but compatible with previous versions of Windows XP Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 11 of 68

12 administrator for the workstation assumes the privileges of the Central Administrator for that workstation. The Central Administrator privileges associated with the centralized management system do not apply to this scenario, and operation of the TOE is administered locally Workstation User This role is defined as the user utilizing the workstation on which the SEP Client is installed. This role has the authority to: Manually invoke scans Increase the depth of scans on manually invoked scans Receive alert notifications for events on the workstation being used Acknowledge alert notifications for events on the workstation being used Review the TOE audit information on the workstation being used Network User This role is defined as a remote user or process sending information to the workstation via a network protocol. This role has the authority to: Send information to the workstation 2.3 TOE Boundaries Physical Boundary Configuration The TOE is defined as Symantec Endpoint Protection Version In order to comply with the evaluated configuration, the following components should be used: COMPONENT VERSION NUMBER SEPM Software Version Client Software Version: Operating System Please see Table 3 Symantec Endpoint Protection Client: Supported Operating Systems and Table 4 Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager: Supported Operating Systems for a list of operating systems supported in the evaluated configuration Table 5 Evaluated Configuration for the TOE Figure 1 TOE Boundary illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the Symantec Endpoint Protection solution and harnesses the TOE components and the elements of the TOE Environment. The essential physical components for the proper operation of the TOE in the evaluated Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 12 of 68

13 configuration are as follows: Symantec Endpoint Protection Client Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager Console = TOE Boundary = IT Environment Figure 1 TOE Boundary Logical Boundaries This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical boundary of the TOE includes the security functionality described in the following sections Antivirus The TOE is designed to help prevent memory-based and file-based viruses. The TOE can be configured to perform various actions if a virus is detected Audit The audit services include details on actions taken when a virus is detected as well as administrative actions performed while accessing the TOE. The TOE generates audits when Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 13 of 68

14 security-relevant events occur, stores the audit information on the local system, transmits the audit information to a central management system, generates alarms for designated events, and provides a means for audit review. Protection of audit data in the audit trail involves the TOE and the Operating System (OS). The TOE controls the insertion of audit events into the audit log and the deletion of audit events from the audit log. The OS provides basic file protection services for the audit log Cryptographic Operations The TOE implements FIPS-approved cryptographic functionality to verify the integrity of the signature files download from Symantec Security Response / Live Update Management The TOE provides administrators with the capabilities to configure, monitor and manage the TOE to fulfill the Security Objectives. Security Management principles relate to Antivirus and Audit Protection of the TOE Protection of the TOE is required to ensure the TOE security services are not bypassed or tampered with. The TOE and the OS cooperatively provide this service. Between separate portions of the TOE, secure communication is provided by the IT Environment. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 14 of 68

15 3 TOE Security Environment In order to clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve, this section describes the following: Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the manner in which the TOE is intended to be used Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE or its environment is required Any organizational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must comply 3.1 Secure Use Assumptions This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used. The secure use assumptions include assumptions for personnel, physical environment, and operational concerns. The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in a co-operative non-hostile environment only if it is installed, managed, and used correctly. The operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirements documentation for delivery, operation, and user/administrator guidance. The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed. A.AUDIT_BACKUP A.NO_EVIL A.PHYSICAL A.SECURE_COMMS Administrators will back up the audit files and monitor disk usage to ensure audit information is not lost. Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all administrator guidance. It is assumed that appropriate physical security is provided within the domain for the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE and the value of the stored, processed, and transmitted information. It is assumed that the IT environment will provide a secure line of communications between distributed portions of the TOE and between the TOE and remote administrators. A.SECURE_UPDATES Administrators will implement secure mechanisms for receiving and validating updated signature files from the Anti-Virus vendors, and for distributing the updates to the central management systems. 3.2 Threats to Security The TOE or IT environment addresses the threats identified in the following sections. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 15 of 68

16 3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE The TOE addresses the following threats: T.ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERROR An administrator may incorrectly install or configure the TOE resulting in ineffective security mechanisms. T.AUDIT_COMPROMISE A user or process may gain unauthorized access to the audit trail and cause audit records to be lost or modified, or prevent future audit records from being recorded, thus masking a security relevant event. T.MASQUERADE T.POOR_DESIGN A user or process may masquerade as another entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. Unintentional errors in requirements specification or design of the TOE may occur, leading to flaws that may be exploited by a casually mischievous user or program. T.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION Unintentional errors in implementation of the TOE design may occur, leading to flaws that may be exploited by a casually mischievous user or program. T.POOR_TEST T.RESIDUAL_DATA Lack of or insufficient tests to demonstrate that all TOE security functions operate correctly (including in a fielded TOE) may result in incorrect TOE behavior being discovered thereby causing potential security vulnerabilities.. A user or process may gain unauthorized access to data through reallocation of memory used by the TOE to scan files or process administrator requests. T.TSF_COMPROMISE A user or process may cause, through an unsophisticated attack, TSF data or executable code to be inappropriately accessed (viewed, modified, or deleted). T.UNATTENDED_SESSION A user may gain unauthorized access to an unattended session. T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS Failure of the authorized administrator to identify and act upon unauthorized actions may occur. T.VIRUS A malicious agent may attempt to introduce a virus onto a workstation via network traffic or removable media to compromise data on that workstation, or use that workstation to attack additional systems. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 16 of 68

17 3.2.2 Threats Addressed by Operating Environment The TOE Operating Environment is not required to explicitly address any threats, although the TOE Operating Environment is constrained by the assumptions made above in the Secure Use Assumptions section. 3.3 Organizational Security Policies The organizational security policies relevant to the operation of the TOE are as follows: P.ACCESS_BANNER The system shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the system. P.ACCOUNTABILITY P.CRYPTOGRAPHY P.MANUAL_SCAN P.ROLES The authorized users of the TOE shall be held accountable for their actions within the TOE. Only NIST FIPS validated cryptography (methods and implementations) are acceptable for key management (i.e.; generation, access, distribution, destruction, handling, and storage of keys) and cryptographic services (i.e.; encryption, decryption, signature, hashing, key exchange, and random number generation services). The authorized users of the workstations shall initiate manual anti-virus scans of removable media (e.g., floppy disks, CDs) introduced into the workstation before accessing any data on that removable media. The TOE shall provide an authorized administrator role for secure administration of the TOE. This role shall be separate and distinct from other authorized users. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 17 of 68

18 4 Security Objectives This section describes the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE s operating environment. The security objectives are divided between TOE Security Objectives (i.e., security objectives addressed directly by the TOE) and Security Objectives for the Operating Environment (i.e., security objectives addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means). 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE The IT security objectives for the TOE are addressed below: O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE The TOE will provide administrators with the necessary information for secure management. O.ADMIN_ROLE The TOE will provide an authorized administrator role to isolate administrative actions. O.AUDIT_GENERATION The TOE will provide the capability to detect and create records of security relevant events. O.AUDIT_PROTECTION The TOE will provide the capability to protect audit information. O.AUDIT_REVIEW The TOE will provide the capability to selectively view audit information. O.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATION The configuration of the TOE is fully identified in a manner that will allow implementation errors to be identified. O.CORRECT_TSF_OPERATION The TOE will provide the capability to test the TSF to ensure the correct operation of the TSF at a customer s site. O.CRYPTOGRAPHY The TOE shall use NIST FIPS validated cryptographic services. O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN The design of the TOE is adequately and accurately documented. O.MANAGE The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized users in their management of the TOE. O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TEST The TOE will undergo some security functional testing that demonstrates the TSF satisfies some of its security functional requirements. O.PARTIAL_SELF_PROTECTION The TSF will maintain a domain for its own execution that protects itself and its resources from external interference, tampering, or unauthorized disclosure through its own interfaces. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 18 of 68

19 O.VIRUS The TOE will detect and take action against known viruses introduced to the workstation via network traffic or removable media. O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS The TOE will undergo some vulnerability analysis to demonstrate the design and implementation of the TOE does not contain any obvious flaws. 4.2 Security Objectives for the IT Environment The IT security objectives for the IT environment are addressed below: OE.AUDIT_ALARM OE.AUDIT_BACKUP The IT Environment will provide the capability to produce an audit alarm before the audit log is full. Audit log files are backed up and can be restored, and audit log files will not run out of disk space. OE.AUDIT_STORAGE The IT environment will provide a means for secure storage of the TOE audit log files. OE.DISPLAY_BANNER The IT environment will display an advisory warning regarding use of the system. OE.DOMAIN_SEPARATION The IT environment will provide an isolated domain for the execution of the TOE. OE.NO_BYPASS OE.NO_EVIL OE.PHYSICAL The IT environment shall ensure the TOE security mechanisms cannot be bypassed in order to gain access to the TOE resources. Sites using the TOE shall ensure that authorized administrators are nonhostile, appropriately trained and follow all administrator guidance. Physical security will be provided within the domain for the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE and the value of the stored, processed, and transmitted information. OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The IT environment will ensure that any information contained in a protected resource within the TOE Scope of Control is not released when the resource is reallocated. OE.SECURE_COMMS The IT environment will provide a secure line of communications between distributed portions of the TOE and between the TOE and remote administrators. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 19 of 68

20 OE.SECURE_UPDATES Enterprises using the TOE shall ensure that signature file updates are received from the vendor via secure mechanisms, the updates are validated before being used, and the updates are distributed to central management systems within the Enterprise via secure mechanisms. OE.TIME_STAMPS OE.TOE_ACCESS The IT environment will provide reliable time stamps. The IT Environment will provide mechanisms that control a user s logical access to the TOE. 4.3 Security Objectives for the Non-IT Environment There are no security objectives for the non-it environment. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 20 of 68

21 5 IT Security Requirements The security requirements that are levied on the TOE and the IT environment are specified in this section of the ST. The functional security requirements for this Security Target consist of the following components from Part 2 of the CC, and those that were explicitly stated, all of which are summarized in the following table. These security requirements are defined in Sections CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION Security Audit Antivirus FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.4 FAV_ACT_EXP.1 FAV_ALR_EXP.1 FAV_SCN_EXP.1 Audit Data Generation User Identity Association Audit Review Restricted Audit Review Selectable Audit Review Protected Audit Trail Storage Site-Configurable Prevention of Audit Loss Antivirus Actions Antivirus Alerts Antivirus Scanning Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation Security Management FMT_MOF.1 FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior Management of TSF Data Specification of Management Functions Security Roles Protection of the TSF FPT_SEP_EXP.1 Partial TSF Domain Separation Table 6 TOE Security Functional Requirements 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Security Audit (FAU) FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 21 of 68

22 events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the minimum level of audit; and c) [The events identified in Table 7 FAU_GEN.1 Events and Additional Information. ] FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at last the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [the additional information identified in Table 7 FAU_GEN.1 Events and Additional Information]. SFR AUDITABLE EVENTS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FAU_GEN.1 None Not Applicable FAU_GEN.2 None Not Applicable FAU_SAR.1 None Not Applicable FAU_SAR.2 None Not Applicable FAU_SAR.3 None Not Applicable FAU_STG.1 None Not Applicable FAU_STG.4 Selection of an action Action selected FAV_ACT_EXP.1 Action taken in response to detection of a virus Virus detected Action taken File or Process where the virus was detected FAV_ALR_EXP.1 None Not Applicable FAV_SCN_EXP.1 None Not Applicable FCS_COP.1 None Not Applicable FMT_MOF.1 None Not Applicable FMT_MTD.1 None Not Applicable FMT_SMF.1 None Not Applicable Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 22 of 68

23 SFR AUDITABLE EVENTS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FMT_SMR.1 None Not Applicable FPT_SEP_EXP.1 None Not Applicable Table 7 FAU_GEN.1 Events and Additional Information FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review FAU_SAR.1.1(1) FAU_SAR.1.2(1) FAU_SAR.1.1(2) FAU_SAR.1.2(2) The TSF shall provide [the Central Administrator] with the capability to read [all audit information] from the audit records on the central management system. The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. The TSF shall provide [the Central Administrator and Workstation Users] with the capability to read [all audit information] from the audit records on the workstation being used. The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. Application Note: The Workstation User is permitted to review all audit records saved on the workstation being used by that user. The Central Administrator is permitted to review all logs on a specific workstation (which will only apply to that workstation) or on the central management system (which will apply to all workstations within that domain) FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. Application Note: This SFR applies to read access to the audit records through the TSFIs. The IT Environment (OS) is responsible for prohibiting read access to the audit file via OS interfaces FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to perform searches and sorting of audit data based on a) [Date and time of the event, b) Type of event, and Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 23 of 68

24 c) Subject identity. ] FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage FAU_STG.1.1 FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion via the TSFI. The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the audit records in the audit trail via the TSFI. Application Note: FAU_STG.1 applies to both the central management system and the individual workstations. Application Note: This instance of FAU_STG.1 applies to protection of the audit records via the TSFI. The IT Environment (OS) is responsible for preventing deletion of the audit file via OS interfaces FAU_STG.4 Site-Configurable Prevention of Audit Loss FAU_STG.4.1 FAU_STG.4.2 The TSF shall provide the administrator the capability to select one or more of the following actions overwrite the oldest stored audit records and [no other actions] to be taken if the audit trail is full. The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records if the audit trail is full and no other action has been selected Antivirus (FAV) Explicitly Stated FAV_ACT_EXP.1 Anti-Virus Actions FAV_ACT_EXP.1.1 Upon detection of a memory-based virus, the TSF shall prevent the virus from further execution. FAV_ACT_EXP.1.2 Upon detection of a file-based virus, the TSF shall perform the action(s) specified by the Central Administrator. Actions are administratively configurable on a per-workstation basis and consist of: a) Clean the virus from the file, b) Quarantine the file, c) Delete the file, d) [Perform no action]. FAV_ACT_EXP.1.3 The TSF shall actively monitor processes attempting to access a remote system using TCP or UDP remote port 25 (SMTP) and block traffic from unauthorized processes defined by [TOE policies] and simultaneously permit traffic from authorized processes defined by [TOE policies]. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 24 of 68

25 FAV_ALR_EXP.1 Antivirus Alerts FAV_ALR_EXP.1.1 Upon detection of a virus, the TSF shall display an alert on the screen of the workstation on which the virus is detected. The alert shall identify the virus that was detected and the action taken by the TOE. FAV_ALR_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall continue to display the alerts on the screen of the workstation until they are acknowledged by the user of the workstation, or the user session ends. FAV_ALR_EXP.1.3 Upon receipt of an audit event from a workstation indicating detection of a virus, the TSF shall display an alert on the screen of the Central Administrator if a session is active. The alert shall identify the workstation originating the audit event, the virus that was detected and the action taken by the TOE. FAV_ALR_EXP.1.4 The TSF shall continue to display the alerts on the screen of the Central Administrator until they are acknowledged by the Central Administrator, or the Central Administrator session ends FAV_SCN_EXP.1 Antivirus Scanning FAV_SCN_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall perform real-time scans for memory-based viruses based upon known signatures. FAV_SCN_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall perform real-time, scheduled, and on-demand scans for filebased viruses based upon known signatures. FAV_SCN_EXP.1.3 The TSF shall perform scheduled scans at the time and frequency configured by the Central Administrator. FAV_SCN_EXP.1.4 The TSF shall perform manually invoked scans when directed by the Workstation User Cryptographic Support (FCS) FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [a message digest calculation to verify the integrity of the signature files] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1] and cryptographic key sizes (not applicable) that meet the following: [FIPS 180-2, Certificate Number 248]. Application Note: Conforming STs should specify the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validated algorithm certificate number. Application Note: Message digests use hash functions, which do not have keys. Therefore, the assignment related to the cryptographic key size has been set to not applicable. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 25 of 68

26 5.1.4 Security Management (FMT) FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior FMT_MOF.1.1(1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to determine the behavior of, disable, enable the functions [ a) Auditing, b) Real-time virus scanning, and c) Scheduled virus scanning] to [the Central Administrator]. FMT_MOF.1.1(2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior of the functions [manually invoked virus scanning] to [Workstation Users] FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data FMT_MTD.1.1(1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, modify, delete the [ a) Actions to be taken on workstations when a virus is detected, b) Files to be scanned automatically on workstations, c) Minimum depth of file scans on workstations, d) Scheduled scan frequency on workstations, e) Processes authorized to transmit data to a remote system using TCP or UDP remote port 25 (SMTP). f) Virus scan signatures, and g) Audit logs on the central management system] to [the Central Administrator]. FMT_MTD.1.1(2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the [ a) Depth of file scans on manually invoked scans on workstations, and b) Files to be scanned manually on workstations] to [the Central Administrator and Workstation Users]. FMT_MTD.1.1(3) The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, delete the [audit logs on the workstation being used] to [the Central Administrator and Workstation Users] FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [ a) Enable and disable operation of the TOE on workstations, Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 26 of 68

27 b) Configure operation of the TOE on workstations, c) Update virus scan signatures, d) Acknowledge alert notifications from the central management system, e) Review audit logs on the central management system, f) Increase the depth of file scans on manually invoked scans, g) Acknowledge alert notifications on the workstation being used, and h) Review audit logs on the workstation being used ] FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Central Administrator, Workstation User, Network User]. Application Note: The Workstation User is defined by the Central Administrator installing a SEP Client on a Workstation and specifying a Group for that workstation within the SEPM Console Protection of the TSF (FPT) FPT_SEP_EXP.1 Partial TSF Domain Separation FPT_SEP_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects initiating actions through its own TSFI. FPT_SEP_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TOE Scope of Control. 5.2 Security Functional Requirements for the IT Environment Security Audit (FAU) FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage FAU_STG.1.1 FAU_STG.1.2 The IT Environment shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail file(s) from unauthorized deletion. The IT Environment shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the audit records in the audit trail file(s). Application Note: This instance of FAU_STG.1 applies to the audit trail file(s) as a whole, while the instance levied against the TOE applies to individual records within the files. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 27 of 68

28 5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP) FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection FDP_RIP.1.1 The IT Environment shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects: [all objects used by the TOE] Identification and Authentication (FIA) FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling FIA_AFL.1.1 FIA_AFL.1.2 The IT Environment shall detect when [3] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [the unsuccessful authentication attempts since the last successful authentication for the Central Administrator or Workstation User]. When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the IT Environment shall [lock the respective account and prevent future authentication attempts until reset by an administrator] FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets FIA_SOS.1.1 The IT Environment shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [strong passwords sufficient to satisfy SOF-basic requirements] FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before any Action FIA_UAU.2.1 The IT Environment shall require each Central Administrator or Workstation User to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. Application Note: Network Users are not subject to the I&A requirements. The Central Administrator and Workstation User are authenticated via the host Operating System FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1 The IT Environment shall re-authenticate the Central Administrator or Workstation User under the conditions [the session is locked due to inactivity] FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before any Action FIA_UID.2.1 The IT Environment shall require each Central Administrator or Workstation User to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. Application Note: Network Users are not subject to the I&A requirements. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 28 of 68

29 FIA_PLA_EXP.1 Performance and Log Alerts (EXP) FIA_PLA_EXP.1.1 The IT environment shall alert the administrator before audit storage reaches capacity Protection of the TSF (FPT) FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection FPT_ITT.1.1 The IT Environment shall protect TSF data from modification when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE FPT_RVM.1 Non-Bypassability of the TSP FPT_RVM.1.1 The IT Environment shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed FPT_SEP.1 TSF Domain Separation FPT_SEP.1.1 FPT_SEP.1.2 The IT Environment shall maintain a security domain for the TOE s own execution that protects the TOE from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. The IT Environment shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps FPT_STM.1.1 The IT Environment shall be able to provide reliable time-stamps for the TOE s use TOE Access (FTA) FTA_SSL.1 TSF-Initiated Session Locking FTA_SSL.1.1 The IT Environment shall lock an interactive session of the Central Administrator or Workstation User after [30 minutes] by: a) Clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable; b) Disabling any activity of the user s data access/display devices other than unlocking the session. FTA_SSL.1.2 The IT Environment shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the Central Administrator or Workstation User session: [reauthentication]. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 29 of 68

30 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing a user session, the IT Environment shall display an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the system. 5.3 Security Requirements for the Non-IT Environment There are no security requirements for the non-it environment. 5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are taken from Part 3 of the CC. The TOE assurance requirements are the Basic Robustness Assurance Package and are equivalent to EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_MSU.1. The assurance components are summarized in the following table: ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENTS Configuration Management ACM_CAP.2 Configuration items Delivery and Operation Development Guidance Documents ADO_DEL.1 ADO_IGS.1 ADV_FSP.1 ADV_HLD.1 ADV_RCR.1 AGD_ADM.1 AGD_USR.1 Delivery procedures Installation, generation, and start-up procedures Informal functional specification Descriptive high-level design Informal correspondence demonstration Administrator guidance User guidance Lifecycle Support ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures Tests Vulnerability assessment ATE_COV.1 ATE_FUN.1 ATE_IND.2 AVA_MSU.1 AVA_SOF.1 AVA_VLA.1 Evidence of coverage Functional testing Independent testing sample Examination of guidance Strength of TOE security function evaluation Developer vulnerability analysis Table 8 Security Assurance Requirements Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 30 of 68

31 Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 31 of 68

32 6 TOE Summary Specification This section presents the Security Functions implemented by the TOE and the Assurance Measures applied to ensure their correct implementation. 6.1 TOE Security Functions The security functions described in the following subsections fulfill the security requirements that are defined in Section 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements. The security functions performed by the TOE are as follows: Antivirus Audit Cryptographic Operations Management Protection of the TOE Antivirus The TOE is designed to help prevent memory-based and file-based viruses. If a memory-based virus is detected on a host machine, the TOE will prevent the virus from further executions. The TOE also provides for administrator-defined actions upon detection of a virus-infected file; the administrator can configure the TOE to clean the file, quarantine the file, delete the file, or take no action on the file. Configuration of these options is performed by the Central Administrator via the SEPM console. The TOE monitors the host machine s files and processes over TCP or UPD remote port 25 (SMTP) to ensure unauthorized processes are not executed. The Antivirus function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements: FAV_ACT_EXP.1 FAV_ALR_EXP.1 FAV_SCN_EXP Audit The TOE provides robust reporting capabilities to provide the Central Administrator with insight on the Server and Workstation antivirus-related activities. Additionally, the TOE supports the provision of log data from each system component. The reporting functions give you the up-to-date information that you need to monitor and make informed decisions about the security of your network. The management console Home page displays the automatically generated charts that contain information about the important events that have happened recently in your network. You can use the filters on the Reports page to generate predefined or custom reports. You can use the Reports page to view graphical representations and statistics about the events that happen in your network. You can use the Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 32 of 68

33 filters on the Monitors page to view more detailed, real-time information about your network from the logs. Reporting runs as a Web application within the management console, and TOE reporting features include the following: Customizable Home page with your most important reports, overall security status, and links to Symantec Security Response Summary views of reports on antivirus status, firewall/ids status, compliance status, and site status Predefined quick reports and customizable graphical reports with multiple filter options that you can configure The ability to schedule reports to be ed to recipients at regular intervals Support for Microsoft SQL or an embedded database for storing event logs The ability to run client scans, to turn client firewall and Auto-Protect on, and to restart computers directly from the logs The ability to add application exclusions directly from the logs Configurable notifications that are based on security events The TOE generates audit data for various events, and this audit data is aggregated into a series of pre-defined reports. An authorized administrator can view and filter the following reports: REPORT TYPE Application Control and Device Control Audit Compliance Computer Status Firewall Risk DESCRIPTION Displays information about events where some type of behavior was blocked. These reports include information about application security alerts, blocked targets, and blocked devices. Blocked targets can be registry keys, dlls, files, and processes. Displays information about the policies that clients and locations use currently. Displays information about the compliance status of your network. These reports include information about Enforcer servers, Enforcer clients, Enforcer traffic, and host compliance. Displays information about the operational status of the computers in your network, such as which computers are infected. These reports include information about versions, clients that have not checked in to the server, client inventory, and online status. Displays information about attacks on the firewall and about firewall traffic and packets. Displays information about risk events on your management servers and their clients. It includes information about Proactive Threat Protection. Document Version 1.6 Symantec Corporation Page 33 of 68

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