Hijacking Arbitrary.NET Application Control Flow. Topher Timzen
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1 Hijacking Arbitrary.NET Application Control Flow Topher Timzen
2 #whoami Topher Timzen Security Researcher, Intel Security TopherTimzen.com
3 Overview.NET? Runtime Attacks Modify Control Flow Machine Code Editing Managed Heap
4 Why are we Here? Tools Released Use.NET to attack Using Objects on the Heap
5 CLR Attacks Controlling the Common Language Runtime Accessing raw objects on Managed Heap Manipulate AppDomains Controlling all Loaded Code Controlling Just-In-Time Compilation
6 Attack With ASM Manipulate Resources Attack methods at ASM level Hybrid C# -> ASM -> C# call chains Alter application control flow
7 Runtime.NET Process CLR (2.0/4.0) & AppDomains Assemblies (.EXE and.dll(s)) Objects Properties Fields Instance Methods Classes Methods Logic
8 The Tools Gray Frost & Gray Storm
9 Gray Frost
10 Gray Frost Payload delivery system C++.NET CLR Bootstrapper Creates or injects 4.0 runtime Capability to pivot into 2.0 runtime Contains raw payload
11 Gray Frost Payload delivery system C++.NET CLR Bootstrapper Creates or injects 4.0 runtime Capability to pivot into 2.0 runtime Contains raw payload 2 Rounds GrayFrostCpp GrayFrostCSharp C# Payload
12 Round 1.NET Process
13 Round 1 GrayFrostCpp Mscoree
14 GrayFrostCpp Round 1
15 Round 1 GrayFrostCpp GrayFrostCSharp
16 Round 2.NET Process
17 Round 2.NET Process GrayFrostCSharp
18 Round 2.NET Process GrayFrostCSharp payload void main()
19 Round 2.NET Process Payload
20 Pivoting Between Runtimes.NET Process
21 Pivoting Between Runtimes GrayFrostCpp Mscoree
22 Pivoting Between Runtimes GrayFrostCpp
23 Pivoting Between Runtimes GrayFrostCpp GrayFrostCSharp
24 Pivoting Between Runtimes GrayFrostCpp GrayFrostCSharp
25 Pivoting Between Runtimes GrayFrostCpp
26 Pivoting Between Runtimes GrayFrostCpp GrayFrostCSharp
27 Gray Storm
28 Gray Storm Reconnaissance and In-memory attack payload Features Attacking the.net JIT Attacking.NET at the ASM level ASM and Metasploit payloads Utilize objects on the Managed Heap
29 Gray Storm Usage
30 Controlling the JIT Method Tables contain address of JIT stub for a class s methods. During JIT the Method Table is referenced We can control the address Lives after Garbage Collection
31 Controlling the JIT
32 Controlling the JIT
33 Controlling the JIT
34 Control Flow Attacks.NET uses far and relative calls 0xE8; Call [imm] (x86) 0xFF 0x15; Call dword segmentregister[imm] (x86) relcall = dstaddress - (currentlocation+ lenofcall)
35 ASM Payloads Address of a method known through Reflection Overwrite method logic with new ASM Steal stack parameters Change events
36 ASM Payloads Change return TRUE to return FALSE Password validation Key & Licensing validation SQL Sanitization Destroy security Mechanisms Overwrite logic Update Mechanisms
37 ASM Payloads
38 ASM Payloads Metasploit Hand Rolled Portable Environment Block (PEB) changes
39 Portable Environment Block
40 Object Hunting in Memory
41 Managed Heap Storage point for.net Objects New reference objects added to heap Garbage Collector removes dead objects
42 Managed Heap Storage point for.net Objects New reference objects added to heap Garbage Collector removes dead objects Let s manipulate it!
43 Structure
44 Structure Example System.Double
45 Object Hunting in Memory Objects are IntPtrs Point to Object Instance on Managed Heap All instantiated objects of the same class share the same Method Table
46 Object Hunting in Memory Objects are IntPtrs Point to Object Instance on Managed Heap All instantiated objects of the same class share the same Method Table Win Reflection Object Hunting
47 Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
48 Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
49 Construct an Object Use Reflection to invoke a constructor Can instantiate any object Being mindful that some constructors can invoke a lot of code If a constructor takes other objects, nullify them
50 Find Location of Managed Heap STACK L 024e9fe8 (Object) H IntPtr IntPtr = 024e9fe8 = 5
51 Find Location of Managed Heap L H STACK 024e9fe8 (Object) IntPtr IntPtr = 024e9fe8 = 5 Managed Heap
52 Find Location of Managed Heap STACK L 024e9fe8 (Object) H IntPtr IntPtr = 024e9fe8 = 5
53 Find Location of Managed Heap STACK L 024e9fe8 (Object) H IntPtr = 024e9fe8
54 Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
55 Signature Instantiated Type Object Instances contain a Method Table pointer to their corresponding type. (x86) 0:009> dd 024e9fe8 024e9fe c Bytes 0-3 are the Method Table (MT) Bytes 4-7 in MT is Instance Size
56 Signature Instantiated Type Object Instances contain a Method Table pointer to their corresponding type. (x64) 0:008> dd e9fe `0286b8e0 ea fe Bytes 0-7 are the Method Table (MT) Bytes 8-11 in MT is Instance Size
57 Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
58 Scan Managed Heap Scan down incrementing by size of object Scan linearly up to top of heap Compare object s Method Table to the reference If they match, get IntPtr address of object
59 Scan Managed Heap Scan down incrementing by size of object Scan linearly up to top of heap Compare object s Method Table to the reference If they match, get IntPtr address of object Use ASM!
60 GrayStorm/objectHunter Using ASM!
61 Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
62 Convert Object ptr -> raw obj L H STACK Refer (System.IntPtr) pointer(024ea00c )
63 Convert Object ptr -> raw obj L H STACK Refer pointer(024ea00c (System.IntPtr) ) pointer(024ea00c )
64 Convert Object ptr -> raw obj L H STACK Refer (GrayStorm.testClass) pointer(024ea00c )
65 Superpowers and Things? Change Keys Change Fields / Properties Call Methods With arguments!
66 Automation
67 Automation GrayFrost can be used with automated payloads
68 Automations == <3
69 Constructing Attack Chains
70 How to construct attack chains Gray Wolf / IL Decompiler Find Methods, Fields & Properties of interest Locate meaningful objects Discover high level control flow Gray Storm Debugging functionality Breakpoint at constructors or methods from Method Pointers Use with WinDbg Utilize DLL Hijacking!
71 Hybrid.NET/ASM Attacks Hybrid C#/ASM code in.net Encrypting.NET payloads and unwinding Encrypting ASM Payloads
72 Payload System C# is easy Can use Gray Frost in any application Low and High level gap is easy
73 .NET Hacking Space Small Few tools Mostly hacking WoW Lots of PowerShell Lots of decompilers and not many attackers!
74 Conclusion Arbitrary.NET applications can be injected and changed New.NET attack possibilities New tools that support automation Get Gray Frost and Storm github.com/graykernel
75 Questions? Contact Get Gray Frost and Storm github.com/graykernel White Papers Hijacking Arbitrary.NET Application Control Flow Acquiring.NET Objects from the Managed Heap
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