Security & Exploitation

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1 Security & Exploitation Operating Systems Spring 2015 RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 1

2 whoami Markus Gaasedelen B.S. Computer Science 15 Security Enthusiast I like to hack things President of RPISEC RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 2

3 What is RPISEC? The Computer Security RPI The leading authority on campus for any and all things computer security related We compete in hacking competitions known as CTFs (Capture The Flag) and we re very good at them RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 3

4 CSAW 2014 Finals RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 4

5 CSAW 2014 Finals RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 5

6 CSAW 2014 Awards RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 6

7 What is RPISEC? The Computer Security RPI The leading authority on campus for any and all things computer security related We compete in hacking competitions known as CTFs (Capture The Flag) and we re very good at them We teach cool and applicable security skills at our weekly meetings 5-7pm Fridays, DCC 324 RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 7

8 Weekly Meetings RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 8

9 let s get rolling WHAT IS SECURITY? RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 9

10 RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 10

11 What is Security? Security == Hacking politically correct Cyber is the buzzword Very technical and rewarding challenges Rarely touched upon in academia Many different categories of security RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 11

12 Categories of Security Cryptography Web Security Vulnerability Research Binary Exploitation Reverse Engineering Malware Analysis Systems Security Embedded Hardware Hacking Network Security Digital Forensics Physical Security Pentesting RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 12

13 Categories of Security Cryptography Web Security Vulnerability Research Binary Exploitation Reverse Engineering Malware Analysis Systems Security Embedded Hardware Hacking Network Security Digital Forensics Physical Security Pentesting The kind of stuff I ll talk about today RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 13

14 MEMORY CORRUPTION & BINARY EXPLOITATION RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 14

15 Defining Binary Exploitation Binary Exploitation Carefully leveraging bugs in an application to cause extreme but controlled failure RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 15

16 Binary Exploitation extreme but controlled failure RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 16

17 Binary Exploitation extreme but controlled failure RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 17

18 Binary Exploitation extreme but controlled failure But what does that even mean? RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 18

19 Visualizing Exploitation RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 19

20 Visualizing Exploitation RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 20

21 Visualizing Exploitation RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 21

22 Visualizing Exploitation RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 22

23 Visualizing Exploitation RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 23

24 Visualizing Exploitation wat RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 24

25 Super Mario World Sillyness RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 25

26 Defining Binary Exploitation Binary Exploitation Carefully leveraging bugs in an application to cause extreme but controlled failure Exploitation requires intimate knowledge of the language, compiler, and the machine RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 26

27 Language Pyramid RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 27

28 The Unexciting Languages Binary exploitation isn t really a thing for managed or scripting languages C#,.NET, JavaScript, Lua, Python, etc RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 28

29 The Unexciting Languages RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 29

30 The Unexciting Languages Binary exploitation isn t really a thing for managed or scripting languages C#,.NET, JavaScript, Lua, Python, etc Slower, automates a lot of stuff for you Driving an automatic RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 30

31 The C Language C is a low level language RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 31

32 The C Language C is a low level language Compiles straight to machine code Very fast RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 32

33 The C Language RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 33

34 The C Language C is a low level language Compiles straight to machine code Very fast Very fine control over the machine and memory It s like driving a manual! RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 34

35 The C Language C is a low level language Compiles straight to machine code Very fast Very fine control over the machine and memory It s like driving a manual! Easy to do stupid things RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 35

36 RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 36

37 Going Deeper RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 37

38 Pulling Back the Curtain there's way too much information to decode the Matrix. You get used to it, though. Your brain does the translating. I don't even see the code. All I see is blonde, brunette, redhead. -Cypher, The Matrix RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 38

39 let s dive right in and try breaking some stuff WELCOME TO THE WARZONE RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 39

40 warzone.rpis.ec ssh username/password lab2c / RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 40

41 Getting Started / Tips cd /levels/lab2./lab2c AAAA python c print A *20 gdb./lab2c run In GDB: Info functions Info registers i r disassemble <function> disas main breakpoint <function> b main breakpoint * <address> b * 0x RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 41

42 Stack Overview The stack is a region of memory for a program to maintain function variables, arguments, and control flow metadata during execution RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 42

43 Understanding the Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 43

44 Understanding the Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 44

45 Corrupting the Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 45

46 PWNING the Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 46

47 Endianess Endianess How data is stored in memory Modern computers are generally little endian little end in Endianess can be confusing, and I don t want to get into the details 0x stored as 0x44, 0x43, 0x42, 0x41 0xdeadbeef stored as 0xef, 0xbe, 0xad, 0xde RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 47

48 lab2c Exploit./lab2C $(python -c 'print "A"*15 + "\xef\xbe\xad\xde"') RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 48

49 Bend it like Beckham UNDERSTANDING CONTROL FLOW RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 49

50 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory 0x Start of memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment 0x Start of.text Segment.data segment Heap Stack 0xbfff0000 Top of stack 0xFFFFFFFF End of memory RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 50

51 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment Executable code.data segment.text segment Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 51

52 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment.data segment Executable code EIP.text segment Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 52

53 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment.data segment Executable code EIP.text segment Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 53

54 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment.data segment Executable code EIP.text segment Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 54

55 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment.data segment Executable code EIP.text segment Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 55

56 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment.data segment Executable code EIP.text segment Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 56

57 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment Executable code.data segment.text segment EIP Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 57

58 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) EIP ELF Executable.text segment.data segment.text segment Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 58

59 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment.data segment.text segment EIP Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 59

60 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) ELF Executable.text segment Executable code.data segment.text segment Heap EIP Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 60

61 Example ELF / EXE in Memory Runtime Memory Libraries (libc) EIP ELF Executable.text segment.data segment.text segment Heap Stack RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 61

62 How Calling Works EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 62

63 How Calling Works EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 63

64 How Calling Works EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 64

65 How Calling Works EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 65

66 How Calling Works EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 66

67 How Calling Works EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 67

68 Returning EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 68

69 Returning EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 69

70 Returning EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 70

71 Returning EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 71

72 Returning EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 72

73 Now that you know how it works OWNING CONTROL FLOW RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 73

74 Stack Smashing EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 74

75 Stack Smashing EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 75

76 Stack Smashing EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 76

77 Returning EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 77

78 Returning home EIP SEGFAULT 0x RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 78

79 RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 79

80 If your program simply segfaulted, consider yourself lucky. -Chuck Stewart RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 80

81 Redirecting Control Flow Overwrite with a code address EIP RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 81

82 warzone.rpis.ec SSH in as lab2b use the password you got from solving lab2c RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 82

83 RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 83

84 lab2b Exploit./lab2B $(python -c 'print "A"*27 + "\x7d\x84\x04\x08" + "B"*4 + "\xa0\x85\x04\x08"') RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 84

85 Modern Protections Data Execution Prevention (DEP) Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Stack Cookies (Canaries) Read Only Relocation (RELRO) FORTIFY_SOURCE These only make things harder, not impossible RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 85

86 Those were more academic challenges BREAKING SOMETHING MODERN RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 86

87 Exploitation on Windows 8.1 (x64) CSAW 2014 LINKS.EXE RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 87

88 links.exe Challenge from the CSAW 2014 CTF Finals 64bit exploitation on Windows 8.1 Basically all protections are on by default No source code, lots of x64 reversing Doubly linked circular list implementation pushfront, pushback, delete, copy, print, sort RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 88

89 reversing is tedious RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 89

90 Windows 8.1 Exploitation (x64) CSAW 2014 LINKS.EXE - DEMO RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 90

91 CSAW 2014 Finals RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 91

92 Wrapping up Binary Exploitation You might consider yourself a *rockstar* programmer, but you probably know little to nothing about secure coding practices or the implications of your mistakes Compilers go out of their way to prevent your bugs from causing catastrophic failure Because your program doesn t appear to segfault or crash, doesn t mean it is bug free or without vulnerabilities Binary exploitation is nothing like standard software development - I truly think of it as an art RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 92

93 welcome to the real world JOB OPPORTUNITIES RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 93

94 so many jobs Typical titles / positions Information Security Analyst / Engineer Security Software Engineer Vulnerability Research Engineer Web Application Security Engineer Computer Network Operations Threat & Incident Response Engineer Product Security Reverse Engineer Malware Analyst / Reverse Engineer RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 94

95 Entering the Job Market There is a major shortage of qualified security individuals in industry Skilled in security & have a B.S. in CS? Government, Contractors, FFRDCs $70k $100k Private / Commercial $100k?? Anything less and you re missing out RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 95

96 One Great Adventure RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 96

97 RPI RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 97

98 RPI Malware Analysis Fall 2015 Coming soon! Modern Binary Exploitation Spring Hardware Reverse Engineering Spring Malware Analysis Spring Secure Software Principles Spring RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 98

99 Questions? gaasem [at] rpi.edu irc.rpis.ec 6667 RPISEC - 05/11/2015 OS Security 99

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