Return-oriented programming without returns
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1 Faculty of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group Return-oriented programming without urns S. Checkoway, L. Davi, A. Dmitrienko, A. Sadeghi, H. Shacham, M. Winandy Dresden,
2 Fundamental problem with stacks User input gets written to the stack. x86 allows to specify only read/write rights. Idea: Create programs so that memory pages are either writable or executable, never both. W ^ X paradigm Software: OpenBSD W^X, PaX, RedHat ExecShield Hardware: Intel XD, AMD NX, ARM XN
3 A perfect W^X world User input ends up in writable stack pages. No execution of this data possible problem solved. But: existing code assumes executable stacks Windows contains a DLL function to disable execution prevention used e.g. for IE <= 6 Nested functions: GCC generates trampoline code on stack
4 Circumventing W^X We cannot anymore: execute code on the stack directly We still can: Place data on the stack Format string attacks, non-stack overflows, Idea: modify urn address to start of function known to be available e.g., a libc function such as execve() put additional parameters on stack, too urn-to-libc attack
5 Chaining urns Not restricted to a single function: Modify stack to urn to another function after the first: Param 1 for bar <addr bar> Param 1 for foo Param 2 for foo <addr foo> ESP And why only urn to function beginnings?
6 Return anywhere x86 instructions have variable lengths (1 16 bytes) x86 allows jumping (urning) to an arbitrary address Idea: scan binaries/libs and find all possible instructions Native RETs: 0xC3 RET bytes within other instructions, e.g. MOV %EAX, %EBX 0x89 0xC3 ADD $1000, %EBX 0x81 0xC3 0x00 0x10 0x00 0x00
7 Return anywhere Example instruction stream:.. 0x72 0xf2 0x01 0xd1 0xf6 0xc3 0x02 0x74 0x08.. 0x72 0xf2 jb <-12> 0x01 0xd1 add %edx, %ecx 0xf6 0xc3 0x02 test $0x2, %bl 0x74 0x08 je <+8> Three byte forward:.. 0x72 0xf2 0x01 0xd1 0xf6 0xc3 0x02 0x74 0x08.. 0xd1 0xf6 0xc3 shl, %esi
8 Many different RETs Claim: Any sufficiently large code base e.g. libc, libqt,... consists of 0xC3 bytes == RET with sufficiently many different prefixes == a few x86 instructions terminating in RET (in [Sha07]: gadget) sufficiently many : /lib/libc.so.6 on Ubuntu 10.4 ~17,000 sequences (~6,000 unique)
9 Return-Oriented Programming Return addresses jump to code gadgets performing a small amount of work Stack contains Data arguments Chain of addresses urning to gadgets Claim: This is enough to write arbitrary programs (and thus: shell code). Return-oriented Programming
10 ROP: Load constant into register EIP pop %edx 0x00C0FFEE Return Addr ESP EDX: Stack
11 ROP: Load constant into register EIP pop %edx 0x00C0FFEE ESP EDX: Stack
12 ROP: Load constant into register EIP pop %edx 0x00C0FFEE ESP Stack EDX: 0x00C0FFEE
13 ROP: Add 23 to EAX EIP (1) EAX: 19 EDX: 0 (4) ptr to 23 (3) (1) (2) ESP (2) pop %edi (3) pop %edx EDI: 0 23 (4) addl (%edx), %eax push %edi
14 ROP: Add 23 to EAX (1) EAX: 19 EDX: 0 (4) ptr to 23 EIP (2) pop %edi EDI: 0 (3) (1) (2) ESP (3) pop %edx 23 (4) addl (%edx), %eax push %edi
15 ROP: Add 23 to EAX (1) EAX: 19 EDX: 0 (4) ptr to 23 EIP (2) pop %edi EDI: addr of (1) (3) (1) (2) ESP (3) pop %edx 23 (4) addl (%edx), %eax push %edi
16 ROP: Add 23 to EAX (1) EAX: 19 EDX: 0 (4) ptr to 23 (3) ESP (2) pop %edi EDI: addr of (1) (1) (2) EIP (3) pop %edx 23 (4) addl (%edx), %eax push %edi
17 ROP: Add 23 to EAX (1) EAX: 19 EDX: addr of '23' (4) ptr to 23 ESP (2) pop %edi EDI: addr of (1) (3) (1) (2) EIP (3) pop %edx 23 (4) addl (%edx), %eax push %edi
18 ROP: Add 23 to EAX (1) EAX: 19 EDX: addr of '23' (4) ptr to 23 ESP (2) pop %edi EDI: addr of (1) (3) (1) (2) (3) pop %edx 23 EIP (4) addl (%edx), %eax push %edi
19 ROP: Add 23 to EAX (1) EAX: 42 EDX: addr of '23' (4) ptr to 23 ESP (2) pop %edi EDI: addr of (1) (3) (1) (2) (3) pop %edx 23 EIP (4) addl (%edx), %eax push %edi
20 ROP: Add 23 to EAX (1) EAX: 42 EDX: addr of '23' (1) (4) ptr to 23 ESP (2) pop %edi EDI: addr of (1) (3) (1) (2) (3) pop %edx 23 EIP (4) addl (%edx), %eax push %edi
21 Return-oriented programming More samples in the paper it is assumed to be Turing-complete. Problem: need to use existing gadgets, limited freedom Yet another limitation, but no show stopper. Good news: Writing ROP code can be automated, there is a C-to-ROP compiler.
22 ROP protection Assuming use of RETs: Detect abnormal frequency of executed RETs Ensure LIFO principle for stack pointer Compile binaries without 0xC3 bytes Shadow urn stack Other: Address-space layout randomization Runtime CFI checking
23 ROP without RETs Dissecting RET: 2 operations at once Memory-indirect JMP (modifies control flow) Update processor state (stack pop on x86, register load on ARM) Is it necessary to use it? No! RET-less compilers show exactly this. Just use some sequence that does exactly the same: pop %edx // modifies stack jmp *(%edx) // indirect jump
24 Update-load-branch Update: update control structures to point to next gadget Load: load next gadget's address Branch: Jump Problem: occurs much less frequent than RET Solution: use exactly one Update-Load-Branch sequence as a trampoline reserve a register as pointer to trampoline then: all sequences ending in indirect jmp through register can serve as gadgets
25 The many faces of update-load-branch Any pop X; jmp *X sequence suffices. Doubly indirect jump JMP on x86 can have register or memory operand Use memory operand: adversary data can contain a table of usable gadgets sequence catalog May even contain immediate operands, such as jmp *4(%edx) Both, jmp and ljmp are valid.
26 ROP gadgets without RET Debian libc contains no ULB sequence! add Mozilla's libxul and libphp or customize attack to target application Trampoline from libxul uses %ebx Trampoline address stored in %edx Gadgets must end with jmp *(%edx) Chose 34 sequences to construct 19 gadgets to show Turingcompleteness of approach. Only a subset of possible sequences Still far fewer than the 6,000 RET sequences in my libc
27 Load register / Store memory pop %eax sub %dh, %bl jmp *(%edx) mov 4(%eax), %ecx jmp *(%edx) mov %esi, -0xb(%eax) jmp *(%edx)
28 Not-so-difficult gadgets Move within memory: combine Load from memory to register Store from register to memory Arithmetic negate, phase 1: (Goal: %esi := - <val>) xor %esi, %esi // %esi := 0 jmp (%edx) // trampoline Arithmetic negate, getting tricky: subl -0x7D(%ebp, %ecx, 1), %esi // %esi := - (%ebp + 1*%ecx 0x7D) // requires // %ebp == <val> + 0x7D - <jmp target> jmp (%ecx) // next gadget
29 Set-less-than Goal: if (a < b) result = -1; else result = 0;
30 Getting the attack to run Need attacks that don't require any RET Stack overflow: Don't overflow RET address (would violate LIFO order) Instead overwrite higher-level function's local data, especially if this is later used for determining where to branch Overwrite SETJMP buffers Overwrite C++ vtables and function pointers Deemed practically impossible without use of RET
31 Discussion Is CFI the ultimate solution? Overhead More code more gadgets? but all jmp sequences look identical CFI vs. JIT compilation??? Allowing JNI on Android (or in any JVM) is obviously broken. Is everything lost?
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