REPORT TO MERTON CLINICAL COMMISSIONING GROUP GOVERNING BODY

Transcription

1 REPORT TO MERTON CLINICAL COMMISSIONING GROUP GOVERNING BODY Date of Meeting: 28 May 2015 Agenda No: 6.5 Attachment: 10 Title of Document: Merton CCG Pandemic Flu Plan v2 March 2015 Report Author: Josh Tarling, Principal Associate Business Resilience, SECSU Purpose of Report: For Approval Lead Director: Lynn Street, Director of Quality Executive Summary: The Merton CCG Pandemic Flu Plan has been developed in collaboration with NHS England, Merton Council and Merton Borough Resilience Forum. It sets out the CCGs response to a pandemic flu event and the interactions required with responding partners. This plan outlines how Merton CCG will prepare for, and respond to, a flu pandemic, however, the principles, systems and processes contained within it are transferable to other types of pandemic. The strategic objectives for the NHS in a pandemic, which Merton CCG will support, are to: Provide the public with information Contain the emergency limiting its escalation or spread Maintain critical and normal services at an appropriate level in response to pressures during the pandemic Protect the health and safety of personnel Promote self-help and recovery Maintain timely and appropriate reporting of the situation to inform decisions Restore normality as soon as possible Evaluate the response and identify lessons to be learned The collaboration undertaken in the development of the plan ensures that it will meet the requirements of NHS England when they conduct their Emergency Preparedness Response and Resilience (EPRR) assurance review later this year, which will focus in pandemic flu readiness. Key sections for particular note (paragraph/page), areas of concern etc: Section 6 Roles and Responsibilities The primary role of the CCG is to manage local pressures in provider organisations during a pandemic and may need to represent NHS England at the local Influenza Pandemic Coordination Group. NHS England may not have sufficient resource to attend every group and NHS involvement is important. The CCG Pandemic Flu Lead, Director of Quality, (or deputy) will liaise with the NHS England London Pandemic Influenza Incident Response Team (PI-IRT). The CCG is responsible for reporting the local issues to the PI-IRT and for distributing NHS messages/ information as directed by the PI-IRT. Recommendation(s): The Governing Body is asked to APPROVE the Pandemic Flu Plan Page 1 of 2

2 Committees which have previously discussed/agreed the report: Executive Management Team; 13 May 2015 Financial Implications: None Implications for CCG Governing Body: In the event of a serious or widespread disruption to the activities of the CCG may be necessary to invoke the Business Continuity Plan. In this case the Governing Body may need to lead the response or delegate incident management coordination to named officers. How has the Patient voice been considered in development of this paper: N/A Other Implications: (including patient and public involvement/legal/governance/risk/diversity/ Staffing) Links to Risk Register Number 792: If the CCG fails to establish internal and provider business continuity/ emergency planning arrangements for a major incident or breakdown of a service within providers, there may be a risk to continuity of services should there be a major incident; 5x2=10 Equality Assessment: Not completed for this document Information Privacy Issues: N/A Communication Plan: (including any implications under the Freedom of Information Act or NHS Constitution) The Pandemic Flu plan will be communicated to relevant staff by cascade and appropriate awareness raising will be instigated as required. Page 2 of 2

3 Merton CCG Pandemic Flu Plan Author : Josh Tarling Principal Associate Business Resilience, South East CSU Draft: V2 March

4 Document approval and review process The following people have been consulted on during the development of this plan: Merton CCG Chief Operating Officer/Accountable Officer: Eleanor Brown Merton CCG Accountable Emergency Officer: Lynn Street Merton CCG Chief Pharmacist: Sedina Agama Merton Council Public Health Flu Lead: Kay Elbert NHS England (London) Pandemic Flu Lead: Chloe Sellwood Merton Borough Resilience Forum: Sarah Chittock (Chair) Plan Author Approved by Date approved Next review date Josh Tarling (SECSU) Merton CCG Governing Body Thanks and acknowledgment goes to Sutton CCG for sharing their Pandemic Flu Plan. This plan is based largely on their material. 1

5 CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION AIMS AND OBJECTIVES ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS ACTIVATION OF THE PLAN COMMAND AND CONTROL CCG ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES NATIONAL AND LONDON COORDINATION LOCAL COORDINATION CCG ON CALL ARRANGEMENTS IMPACT IN MERTON COMMUNICATIONS REPORTING MUTUAL AID RECOVERY TRAINING AND EXERCISING APPENDIX A: Pandemic Alerting Structure APPENDIX B: Merton BRF combined response to an Influenza Pandemic APPENDIX C: Planning Assumptions APPENDIX E: NHS England (London) Roles & Responsibilities APPENDIX F: Primary Care

6 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 The potential for a new influenza pandemic remains unchanged although timing and severity of a future pandemic remains unpredictable. The threat and potential impact of pandemic influenza (flu) is such that it remains the top risk on the UK Cabinet Office National Risk Register. 1.2 Lessons identified during the response to the 2009/10 flu pandemic caused by the A(H1N1) virus ( swine flu ) and subsequent 2010/11 winter seasonal flu outbreak have informed ongoing preparedness activity. 1.3 During a pandemic, NHS and local government commissioning and provider organisations will maintain their existing roles and responsibilities for the management of the local health and social care system. However, some pandemic specific activities will also be required. 1.4 This plan outlines how Merton CCG will prepare for, and respond to, a flu pandemic, however, the principles, systems and processes contained within it are transferable to other types of pandemic. 2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 2.2 The aim of this plan is to outline the roles and responsibilities of Merton CCG during a pandemic and provides operational guidance detailing their response. 2.3 The strategic objectives for the NHS in a pandemic, which Merton CCG will support, are to: Provide the public with information Contain the emergency limiting its escalation or spread Maintain critical and normal services at an appropriate level in response to pressures during the pandemic Protect the health and safety of personnel Promote self-help and recovery Maintain timely and appropriate reporting of the situation to inform decisions Restore normality as soon as possible Evaluate the response and identify lessons to be learned 3. ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS 3.1 This plan, as far as reasonably possible is based on existing systems and processes. Routine processes, including those for managing seasonal flu outbreaks each year, and business continuity plans for responding to other pressures, such as winter illness or major incidents such as flooding are well established, tried and tested. Building on these familiar procedures provides a robust foundation for responding to fluctuation in demand for capacity that may occur in a flu pandemic. 3

7 3.2 This plan, therefore, must be considered in conjunction with the following documents and guidance: Internal Merton CCG Pressure Surge Management Plan Merton CCG Business Continuity Plans Director On call handbook and supporting documents External Pandemic Influenza NHS guidance on the current and future preparedness in support of an outbreak (November 2014) PHE Pandemic Flu Response Plan UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011 Local Authority Business Continuity and Flu Plans UK Pandemic Communications Strategy ACTIVATION OF THE PLAN 4.1 This plan will be activated on declaration of the Detect Stage by NHS England/Public health England. At this point the Merton Influenza Pandemic Coordination (IPC) Group will be convened by the Director of Public Health to lead the response locally, and existing plans and processes will be reviewed. 4.2 Notification of a pandemic The CCG is most likely to receive notification of a pandemic via NHS England (London). The CCG may also receive notification via local Borough Resilience Forum Partners. 5. COMMAND AND CONTROL 5.1 Merton CCG will act on behalf of and in support of NHS England (London). Direction/ actions will be set by NHS England and cascaded via the NHS England Pandemic Influenza Incident Response Team. 5.2 Merton CCG will put in place internal command and control structures in line with its major incident response as set out in the Director on Call hand Book. 5.3 The overall command and control structure for a pandemic response is detailed in the diagram below. 4

8 6. CCG ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 6.1 The primary role of the CCG is to manage local pressures in provider organisations during a pandemic and may need to represent NHS England at the local Influenza Pandemic Coordination Group. NHS England may not have sufficient resource to attend every group and NHS involvement is important. 6.2 The CCG Pandemic Flu Lead (or deputy) will liaise with the NHS England London Pandemic Influenza Incident Response Team (PI-IRT) and may need to attend the Pandemic Influenza Incident Coordination Centre, however Teleconferences are most likely. 6.3 The CCG is responsible for reporting the local issues to the PI-IRT and for distributing NHS messages/ information as directed by the PI-IRT. 6.4 The detailed roles and responsibilities of the CCG are set out below: CCGs have a role in supporting NHS England Regional and Area Teams and providers of NHS funded care in planning for and responding to an influenza pandemic. 5

9 6.5 Before a pandemic The CCG has identified a Pandemic Influenza Executive Lead who will lead internal planning activities in light of national and international developments, advice and guidance. This is: Merton CCG Director of Quality The CCG has business continuity plans in place that are suitable for use in a pandemic to mitigate the shortage of staff that may arise The CCG will: communicate plans with employees, contractors, and affiliated organisations participate in relevant planning groups to discuss, plan, exercise and share best practice ensure early engagement of communications professionals to devise, deliver and maintain internal, external and stakeholder/ cross-partnership communications before, during and after a pandemic work with their commissioned service providers, in planning for surge in relation to elective work and the possible financial implications if there is ongoing disruption to normal service levels over the period of a pandemic and its recovery phase participate in appropriate assurance processes regarding their arrangements and be assured that their commissioned services have adequate provisions in place for managing a pandemic work with NHS England to identify appropriate local providers to support the delivery of a pandemic influenza response, particularly regarding the provision of antiviral collection points through community pharmacies 6.6 During a pandemic During a pandemic, the CCG will: support the national pandemic response arrangements as laid out in Department of Health and NHS England guidance issued prior to or during a pandemic occurring in line with other guidance, ensure 24/7 on-call arrangements remain robust and maintained, particularly with respect to surge and responding to major incidents lead the management of pressure surge arrangements with their commissioned services as a result of increased activity as part of the overall response (See Merton Surge Resilience Plan) Review the impact on social care (which may affect capacity management) via the Influenza Pandemic Coordination Group support NHS England in the local coordination of the response, e.g. through tried and tested surge capacity arrangements, appropriate mutual aid of staff and facilities, and provision of support to the management of clinical queries as necessary share communications with locally commissioned healthcare providers through established routes 6

10 participate in the multi-agency response as appropriate and agreed with NHS England to ensure a comprehensive local response Compile a list of Out of Hours GPs who may be able to support the local response maintain close liaison with local NHS England colleagues, particularly when considering changes to delivery levels of NHS commissioned services enact business continuity arrangements as appropriate to the developing situation to ensure critical activities can be maintained maintain local data collection processes to support the overall response to the pandemic, including completion and submission of relevant situation reports and participation in coordination teleconferences throughout the pandemic, undertake and contribute to appropriate, timely and proportionate debriefs to ensure best practice is adopted through the response 6.7 After a pandemic After a pandemic, the CCG will: contribute to local, regional and national health post-pandemic debriefs and consider the implementation of recommendations from any subsequent reports acknowledge staff contributions assess the impact of the pandemic on the provision of commissioned services and ensure that the ongoing service level is sufficient to meet the demands of the system ensure the recovery of services to business-as-usual as soon as appropriate review response update plans, contracts and other arrangements to reflect lessons identified, particularly where these have been commissioned locally collect financial and contractual impact information from commissioned providers 6.8 A range of practical support mechanisms are available to CCGs in implementing this guidance. These include: the South London Local Health Resilience Partnership (LHRP), a statutory group which oversees health economy-wide pandemic planning activities across the South London Boroughs. Both CCG Emergency Planning Leads are members of this group. the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), a statutory multi-agency forum where NHS England represents local providers and commissioners of NHS funded care across London existing and developing relationships between CCGs, Commissioning Support Units (CSUs), NHS England Regional and Area Teams, local health partners, and members of the wider resilience partnership through formal fora and one to one meetings 7. NATIONAL AND LONDON COORDINATION 7.1 The Department of Health is the lead government department for pandemic preparedness and response. All other departments are directly or indirectly 7

11 involved in preparing and play an active role in informing and supporting contingency planning in their areas of responsibility. 7.2 NHS England will monitor, manage and support the health community during a pandemic. Where possible and appropriate, existing arrangements and procedures will be used, underpinned by major incident coordination processes. The detailed responsibilities of NHS England (London) are set out in appendix E. 7.3 Primary Care will be coordinated by NHS England as the contract holder. The role and responsibilities of Primary Care are set out in appendix F. Stage Detection Assessment Treatment Escalation Lead Organisation Public Health England Public Health England NHS England NHS England 8. LOCAL COORDINATION 8.1 A Merton Influenza Pandemic Coordination Group will be convened by the Director of Public Health with the following core membership: Director of Public Health (Chair) NHS England (London) representative and/or CCG Pandemic Lead Local Authority Directors of Adult s Services Local Authority Directors of Children s Services Public Health England (PHE) Local Authority Emergency Planning Leads Chief Pharmacists Acute Trust Leads (St Georges and St Helier) Mental Health Leads (SWL and St Georges) Community Health Services Leads 8.2 The Group will be able to call on other multi-agency members if necessary, for example: Metropolitan Police Service London Ambulance Service Transport for London London Fire Brigade Chamber of Commerce Rep Merton Voluntary Services Council London Buses Representative BTP Representative Multi Faith Representative(s) 8

12 8.3 This group will be Chaired by the local Merton Public Health team based at Merton Council and will coordinate and lead the local response - requesting information and assurance around systems and processes and issues arising during the response. It will provide leadership, rather than a command role and will consider the following areas: Cases of flu locally Local organisational pressures (staff absence, current demand for services, supply issues) Management of deaths locally Antiviral and vaccination situation Performance issues Incidents relating to flu Communications 8.4 CCG Pandemic Response Team The CCG will identify a team to lead their response to the pandemic. This will include: Pandemic Flu Lead Chief Pharmacist Director of Commissioning and Performance Urgent Care Lead Communications lead (via SECSU) Admin support 8.5 This team will have responsibility for ensuring all actions relating to the pandemic are carried out: reporting; briefing senior CCG staff and attending the local Influenza Pandemic Coordination Group and participating in teleconferences as necessary. 8.6 The CCG Pandemic Response Team will ensure they keep detailed records of all decisions made and actions taken. These records will need to be stored securely following the pandemic. 8.7 The CCG will set up regular teleconferences with their commissioned services to assess pressures and incidents. This function may be coordinated by NHS England during a pandemic. Should there be a need to convene a SWL-wide teleconference, it should be done using the following information: Dial in Details: Participant Code: Note - Chair s code not required on this number 9. CCG ON CALL ARRANGEMENTS 9.1 There are shared on call arrangements in place for all of the six SW London CCGs. At any time, there are two members of staff on call; the Director on call and second Director on call. They both hold a pager which is part of the PageOne network: 9

13 pager number SWL6 10. IMPACT IN MERTON 10.1 The table shows the possible impact of a pandemic in Merton, assuming a 50% attack rate and at varying levels of severity of disease. These assumptions are taken from the Department of Health UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy The planning assumptions are considered to be the reasonable worst case and the number of deaths is factored around there being no effective countermeasure for the virus (vaccine, antivirals, etc.) 10.2 The table below is based upon the national planning assumptions as set out in Appendix C: Borough of Merton Resident population (2011 Census)* 199,700 Possible no. of symptomatic patients over first wave (50%) 99,850 Patients requiring assessment and treatment in usual pathways of primary care (30% of symptomatic) Possible number requiring hospital care (4% of symptomatic) 29,955 3,994 Number of excess deaths (0.5% of symptomatic) 499 Number of excess deaths (1.5% of symptomatic) 1498 Number of excess deaths (2.5% of symptomatic) 2491 Up to 50% of the workforce may require some time off during the entire period of the pandemic, up to 20% on any given day 11. COMMUNICATIONS 11.1 A robust communication strategy is an important part of the response to a pandemic. Nationally this is outlined in the UK Pandemic Influenza Communications Strategy NHS England will lead health communications messaging and will coordinate with CCGs to distribute local messages. NHS England will also coordinate Primary Care messaging NHS England s communications at all levels with the NHS, partners, stakeholders and the public during a pandemic will build on existing mechanisms and good practice. NHS England staff will be trained and briefed to provide messages to audiences in a timely and appropriate manner. Additionally communications 10

14 cascades will be used to ensure information reaches audiences. Where appropriate, messages will be developed and delivered in partnership with other organisations, including PHE and the LHRP and LRF partners Locally, the South East CSU communications team operate a reactive, out-ofhours press office service on behalf of the CCG from 5pm through to 9am five days a week and throughout weekends if required. Merton Council press office would lead the local communications response with direction from the Director of Public Health In addition to supporting Directors on-call in managing pressure surge incidents or major incidents (liaison with NHS England as lead organisation) the communications team may be contacted by the media with an urgent query about the CCG that does not relate to either of these operational processes Further guidance is contained within the SWL CCGs Director on Call handbook. 12. REPORTING 12.1 The requirements for reporting will be set by NHS England as the pandemic emerges Incident reporting is fundamental to the identification of risk and response management and all staff are actively encouraged to use the CCGs existing incident reporting mechanisms. As the pandemic reaches the UK and numbers of cases increases, there will be a requirement for regular situation reports (SitReps) from all organisations, including CCGs. The daily rhythm, ie how frequently these reports are required, will be defined depending on the severity of the pandemic as it progresses The CCG will maintain their usual incident reporting mechanisms for non-flu related incident to ensure these continue to be managed during a pandemic. Flu related incidents will report into the CCG Pandemic Response Team The CCG Pandemic Response Team will ensure there are robust processes in pace to document and record decisions made and actions taken during the pandemic. A decision log will be used to record all communications and activities, including time the decision was made, who made it and the rationale behind the action or decision. 13. MUTUAL AID 13.1 Mutual aid may be varied in nature including but not exclusively confined to personnel and material. Many Trusts have pre-agreed processes in place as part of their major incident plans, however where this is not the case, or where these options have been exhausted NHS England (London) will act as a broker both within London and with other NHS England Regions. For critical care, the aim would be to prevent Trusts moving to triage for resource for critical care 11

15 (as opposed to triage for outcome) when accessible elective capacity or capability remains available elsewhere The CCG will support the health economy where possible seeking and supporting mutual aid requests as required. In addition, the South West London Surge Manager will support and facilitate mutual aid where possible. 14. RECOVERY 14.1 As the impact of the pandemic wanes, the UK will move into a recovery phase. The pace of recovery will depend on the residual impact of the pandemic, ongoing demands, backlogs, staff and organisational fatigue and continuing supply difficulties Health and social care may experience persistent secondary effects for some time, with increased demand for continuing care from: Patients whose existing illnesses have been exacerbated by the flu. Those who may continue to suffer potential medium or long-term health complications. A backlog of work resulting from the postponement of treatment for less urgent conditions. Possible increased demand for services through post-pandemic seasonal flu The CCG will work with local organisations and NHS England to return to normality as soon as is possible. 15. TRAINING AND EXERCISING 15.1 This plan will be circulated to all senior staff for onward cased to their teams. Training will be provided on request and the plan will be updated annually CCG Leads will participate in local and national exercises and workshops where possible. 12

16 APPENDIX A: Pandemic Alerting Structure GPs & Pharmacies NHS England Pandemic Alert Public Health England NHS Merton Clinical Commissioning Group Via usual surge management routes Merton Council (Emergency Planning Team & Public Health Team) Community Wardens & on call staff Sutton and Merton Community Services (Surge management leads) Children s Services Adult Services Learning Disabilities Weather Warning Lead Housing Comms Team Royal Marsden (Surge management leads) RMH01 Children s Social Care Children s placement s Adult Social Care Adult Day Care Centres LD Staff LD Homes Senior Manageme nt updates Housing Teams All staff The Source Care & Nursing Homes (via Merton Council) Nurseries Residential Homes Website Schools Voluntary Orgs Media updates and events 13

17 APPENDIX B: Merton BRF combined response to an Influenza Pandemic New flu virus emerges Case Management Merton BRF combined response to an Influenza Pandemic Response Coordination Business Continuity Communications Detection Spread and impact monitored IPC convened chaired by DPH Business as Usual Regular updates/ advice from NHS England, PHE, LLACC Testing and rapid treatment of cases Resources and plans reviewed Business Continuity Plans Reviewed National public health campaigns Assessment Distribution of PPE to health and social care considered Coordination through existing structures Setting up anti-viral collection points (NHSE) IPC meets regularly to ensure close situation monitoring Consider stopping non urgent services Public flu friend communications Treatment National Pandemic Flu Service Activated Rapid access to treatment for those requiring it Priority groups for vaccination CCG and NHS response coordinated by NHSE Local authority response coordinated by BECC and LLACC Monitor staff absence and capacity Monitor provider service capacity Monitor non-acute care capacity Public expectation management Escalation Management of excess deaths Service resilience group meeting in council Escalating pressure on all services Recovery Monitor further pandemic waves IPC meets less regularly. Continues to provide SitReps 14 Post incident learning identified Reintroduction of BAU services Plan for staff fatigue and resource depletion Debrief, thanks to staff and lessons communicated

18 APPENDIX C: Planning Assumptions The reasonable worst case scenario for a UK Influenza pandemic suggests that up to 50% of the population could experience symptoms of pandemic influenza during one or more pandemic waves lasting 15 weeks, although the nature and severity of the symptoms would vary from person to person. Analysis of previous influenza pandemics suggests that we should plan for up to 2.5% of those with symptoms dying as a result of influenza, assuming no effective treatment was available. The UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011 recognises that the combination of particularly high attack rates and a severe disease is also relatively (but unquantifiably) improbable, and consequently suggests planning for a lower level of population mortality is sensible. Therefore the NHS should ensure plans are flexible and scalable for a range of impacts. While the profile of the next pandemic remains by its very nature unknown, it is prudent to continue to plan and prepare using modelling assumptions based on experiences of previous pandemics. The NHS is likely to be particularly impacted during a pandemic due to an increase in demand for services from patients coupled with a potential reduction in staffing and possible supply chain disruptions. Planning at all levels needs to be comprehensive and flexible to address the breadth of possible scenarios. A proportional, graded response that can be adjusted as the threat alters, including cessation or commencement of certain functions, is required. 15

19 APPENDIX D: National Strategy Not for public circulation This section summarises key aspects of the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011 Strategy and includes references to a range of activities that will be undertaken by various partners. The strategy recognises that the World Health Organization (WHO) pandemic alert phases were not ideally suited as a response framework within individual countries. In 2009, the UK was well into its first wave of infection by the time WHO declared the official start of the pandemic The overall objectives of the UK s approach to preparing for an influenza pandemic are to: - minimise the potential health impact of a future influenza pandemic - minimise the potential impact of a pandemic on society and the economy - instil and maintain trust and confidence Towards this, the Strategy identifies a series of stages, referred to as DATER : Detection, Assessment, Treatment, Escalation and Recovery. These stages are non-linear and have identified indicators for moving between them. The stages are not numbered as they are non-linear and may not follow in strict order; it is also possible to move back and forth or jump stages. It should also be recognised that there may not be clear delineation between stages, particularly when considering regional variation and comparisons. Given the uncertainty about the scale, severity and pattern of development of any future pandemic, three key principles should underpin all pandemic preparedness and response activity: Precautionary: the response to any new virus should take into account the risk that it could be severe in nature Proportionality: the response to a pandemic should be no more and no less than that necessary in relation to the known risks Flexibility: there should be a consistent, UK-wide approach to the response to a new pandemic but with local flexibility and agility in the timing of transition from one phase of response to another to take account of local patterns of spread of infection and the different healthcare systems in the four countries 16

20 APPENDIX E: NHS England (London) Roles & Responsibilities NHS England (London) will establish a dedicated Pandemic Influenza Incident Response Team (PI-IRT) that will operate out of a dedicated Pandemic Influenza Incident Coordination Centre. In line with the national strategy, these will be flexed to meet demands, and some may not be relevant to all DATER stages. These include (but are not limited to) to: oversee and coordinate the response of the NHS in London appropriate to the current and predicted impact ensure the NHS and partners are kept appraised of the evolving situation oversee the most effective deployment of available resources through adapting the response according to capacity ensure that NHS England (London) Directorates and Teams enact their business continuity plans and mobilise resources appropriately as necessary ensure prompt and timely establishment of a Pandemic Influenza Recovery Working Group (PI-RWG) to run in parallel with the response (see section 4.0) set the strategy for the PI-RWG provide progress updates and assurance regarding the NHS response in London to the NHS England (London) Delivery Group liaise with NHS England National, and neighbouring Regional and Area Teams to support the local response, securing mutual aid if required act as a central point of contact for stakeholders and partners (eg London NHS provider and commissioning organisations, NHS England (National), the Department of Health, Public Health England (PHE), and the wider multi-agency partnership through the London Resilience Team (LRT) ensure appropriate escalation and two way communication of relevant issues and decisions oversee the delivery of pandemic-specific aspects of the response; this includes, but is not limited to, antiviral distribution, pandemic specific vaccination campaign, and personal protective equipment (PPE) distribution manage the NHS response to pandemic-related surge; ensuring the commissioning of additional NHS capacity where required (e.g. intensive care capacity (through Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and extra corporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) capacity (through NHS England Specialised Commissioning)) oversee the management of London-wide critical care resources and surge capacity demands through appropriate discussion, escalation and resource allocation with communications colleagues, coordinate London-wide NHS messages to ensure consistent, clear and timely dissemination of information and guidance to the NHS, partners, the public and the media collate and analyse information for submission to NHS England (National) and other bodies as appropriate related to pressures and capacity within the NHS in London 17

21 APPENDIX F: Primary Care Primary care is commissioned by NHS England and therefore they will take the lead in the coordination of the primary care response. During a pandemic general practice will be expected to continue business as usual. The aim of planning is to respond in a practical and proportionate way and to use usual processes as far as possible. If a symptomatic patient comes into a practice then they should separate that patient if it is possible to do so. Usual cleaning and infection control procedures should apply. The National Pandemic Flu Service which enables the public to use a phone or web algorithm to determine whether their symptoms warrant antiviral treatment will be activated nationally when pressures on primary care indicate it is needed. All practices should have business continuity plans in place and a local decision would have to be taken about practices sharing space or personnel ( buddying ). NHS England would not coordinate or direct this. Communications to practices would go through the usual routes CAS alerts plus primary care commissioning. All practices should ensure they are signed up to receive CAS alerts if they haven t done so already. 18