DoS Attack and Its Countermeasure in Energy-Constrained Wireless Networks

Transcription

1 DoS Attack and Its Countermeasure in Energy-Constrained Wireless Networks Sunho Lim (Ph.D., Assistant Professor) T 2 WISTOR: TTU Wireless Mobile Networking Laboratory Dept. of Computer Science Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX Research: Technology Trends Coverage of BS Control of BS Service of BS Current research area!! * Infrastructure mode ** Ad hoc mode Single hop GSM Cellular UMTS IEEE * Ad hoc/ P2P IEEE ** PAN Bluetooth Multihop Cellular multihop MANET WSN VANET

2 On-going Research: Keywords We design and develop algorithms and communication protocols in the level of the link, network, and application layers. Wireless Networks and Mobile Computing RandomCast: Energy Efficient Randomized Communication CMM: Clustered Mobility Model Vibration-Sensitive Energy Harvesting Mobile Data Management Aggregate Caching and Data Access Strategies Cooperative Caching Strategies ConSens: Opportunistic Data Access Network Security DoS Attacks Camouflage-based Detection Cooperative Detection Google Android-based Mobile Software escort: I am not alone SMARTx: Reducing collisions Energy-Constrained Wireless Networks: Energy Harvesting Wireless Sensor Networks, Deployed in an unattended environment Required to operate for a long period time Hard to replace (or replenish) battery Environmental energy harvesting (or scavenging), Extracting an electric energy from various environmental sources for easy of battery energy replenishment Vibrations, magnetic fields, thermal gradients, lights, kinetic motions, and shock waves

3 Energy-Constrained Wireless Networks: Energy Harvesting (cont.) Vibration-Sensitive Energy Harvesting iphone interface PFCB-W14 sensor node sink The U.S. Army has invested about $4.2 million in the development of military Apps and the study of smart phone technology LIMITED BATTERY ENERGY!!! The U.S. Army will eliminate all the military batteries. Each soldier will equip self-powered (or batteryless) communication devices Int l Conf. on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), Feb 2015 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack: Motivation Security threats in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs): Lack of physical protection Can be captured, tampered, or destroyed Shared wireless medium Air Force Summer Faculty Can overhear, duplication, corrupt, or alter data Fellowship Program (AF-SFFP): Lack of security requirements Vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, NY DoS attacks Target service availability rather than subverting the service itself Disrupt network routing protocols or Interfere on-going communications Critical and challenging to develop DoS counterattack mechanisms Sensitive sensory data & secure and reliable delivery

4 Int l Conf. on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), Feb 2015 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack: Selective Forwarding Attack Selective forwarding attack Selectively forward any incoming packet Randomly or strategically Target the network routing vulnerabilities of multi-hop networks Violate an implicit assumption of cooperative routing Faithfully and collaboratively route packets Unlike blackholeattack Simply refuse to forward any incoming packet Non-trivial to detect the forward misbehaviors Temporal node failures or packet collisions?? The malicious nodes (shaded in red) located in a forwarding path can selectively forward sensory data to a sink. Int l Conf. on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), Feb 2015 Cooperative Hop-by-Hop Detection: Approach - Adversarial Scenarios An overhearing of implicit acknowledgment Monitor whether the one-hop forwardeenode has forwarded the received packet without receiving an explicit acknowledgment Maximize the utilization of energy harvested rather than conserve energy consumption Summarize node interactions in a triplet format Mode (M): Active (act), Harvest (hvest), or Don t Care (*) Action (A) and Following Action (F): Forward (fwd), Overhear (ohear), Receive (rcv), No Action (-) Four adversarial scenarios (SM 1 SM 4 )

5 Int l Conf. on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), Feb 2015 Cooperative Hop-by-Hop Detection: Approach - Ideas The basic idea is Monitor and record the trace of forwarding operations What information do nodes keep to monitor the forwarding behaviors of nodes Record traces of forwarding and mode changes How to detect the forwarding misbehaviors of malicious nodes based on the forwarding traces Analyze the forwarding traces How to reduce and adjust the forwarding probability of malicious nodes and other forwarding nodes, respectively Upon detected, (i) reduce the forwarding probability by half and (ii) divide the reduced forwarding probability equally and distribute to the rest of forwarding nodes b b active harvest a m c harvest a m c harvest Int l Conf. on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), Feb 2015 Cooperative Hop-by-Hop Detection: Performance Evaluation Significantly reduce the number of forwarding misbehaviors The forwarding probabilities of malicious nodes becomes lower, and thus more legitimate nodes are chosen as a forwarding node: the PDR significantly decreases

6 Int l Conf. on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), Feb 2015 Embedding Network Security into CS Curriculum Both undergraduate and graduate CS courses that I teach, CS4331: Special Topics in Computer Science Embedded Systems CS4392: Computer Networks CS5376: Communication Networks CS5377: Distributed Computing CS5331: Special Problems in Computer Science -Wireless Networks and Mobile Computing Any Questions?