Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments CIP-010-AB-1
|
|
|
- Cameron Harrington
- 10 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 A. Introduction 1. Title: 2. Number: 3. Purpose: To prevent and detect unauthorized changes to BES cyber systems by specifying configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in support of protecting BES cyber systems from compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the bulk electric system. 4. Applicability: 4.1. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of entities will be collectively referred to as Responsible Entities. For requirements in this reliability standard where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly [Intentionally left blank.] a legal owner of an electric distribution system that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system: each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that: is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the entity in subsection , without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more; each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to transmission where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and each cranking path and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted blackstart resource up to and including the first point of supply and/or point of delivery of the next generating unit or aggregated generating facility to be started; the operator of a generating unit and the operator of an aggregated generating facility; the legal owner of a generating unit and the legal owner of an aggregated generating facility; [Intentionally left blank.] [Intentionally left blank.] Effective: Page 1 of 9
2 the operator of a transmission facility; the legal owner of a transmission facility; and the ISO For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in subsection 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this reliability standard where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kv or less and are owned by a legal owner of an electric distribution system or a legal owner of a transmission facility for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system: each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that: is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by one or more of the entities in subsection 4.2.1, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more; each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to transmission where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and each cranking path and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted blackstart resource up to and including the first point of supply and/or point of delivery of the next generating unit or aggregated generating facility to be started; Responsible Entities listed in subsection 4.1 other than a legal owner of an electric distribution system are responsible for: each transmission facility that is part of the bulk electric system except each transmission facility that: is a transformer with fewer than 2 windings at 100 kv or higher and does not connect a contracted blackstart resource; radially connects only to load; radially connects only to one or more generating units or aggregated generating facilities with a combined maximum authorized real power of Effective: Page 2 of 9
3 less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted blackstart resource; or radially connects to load and one or more generating units or aggregated generating facilities that have a combined maximum authorized real power of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted blackstart resource; a reactive power resource that is dedicated to supplying or absorbing reactive power that is connected at 100 kv or higher, or through a dedicated transformer with a high-side voltage of 100 kv or higher, except those reactive power resources operated by an end-use customer for its own use; a generating unit that is: directly connected to the bulk electric system and has a maximum authorized real power rating greater than 18 MW unless the generating unit is part of an industrial complex; within a power plant which: is not part of an aggregated generating facility; is directly connected to the bulk electric system; and has a combined maximum authorized real power rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the power plant is part of an industrial complex; within an industrial complex with supply transmission service greater than 67.5 MW; or a contracted blackstart resource; an aggregated generating facility that is: directly connected to the bulk electric system and has a maximum authorized real power rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the aggregated generating facility is part of an industrial complex; within an industrial complex with supply transmission service greater than 67.5 MW; or a contracted blackstart resource; and control centres and backup control centres The following are exempt from this reliability standard: [Intentionally left blank.] cyber assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete electronic security perimeters [Intentionally left blank.] Effective: Page 3 of 9
4 for the legal owner of an electric distribution system, the systems and equipment that are not included in subsection above Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES cyber systems categorized as High Impact or Medium Impact according to the CIP 002-AB 5.1 identification and categorization processes. 5. [Intentionally left blank.] 6. [Intentionally left blank.] B. Requirements and Measures R1. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 010-AB 1 Table R1 Configuration Change Management. M1. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 010-AB 1 Table R1 Configuration Change Management and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table. Table R1 Configuration Change Management 1.1 High Impact BES cyber and and Develop a baseline configuration, individually or by group, which shall include the following items: operating system(s) (including version) or firmware where no independent operating system exists; any commercially available or open source application software (including version) intentionally installed; any custom software installed; any logical network accessible ports; and any security patches applied. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: a spreadsheet identifying the required items of the baseline configuration for each cyber asset, individually or by group; or a record in an asset management system that identifies the required items of the baseline configuration for each cyber asset, individually or by group. 1.2 High Impact BES cyber Authorize and document Examples of evidence may Effective: Page 4 of 9
5 and Table R1 Configuration Change Management changes that deviate from the include, but are not limited to: existing baseline configuration. and 1.3 High Impact BES cyber and and 1.4 High Impact BES cyber For a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration, update the baseline configuration as necessary within 30 days of completing the change. For a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration: a change request record and associated electronic authorization (performed by the individual or group with the authority to authorize the change) in a change management system for each change; or documentation that the change was performed in accordance with the requirement. include, but is not limited to, updated baseline documentation with a date that is within 30 days of the date of the completion of the change. list of cyber security controls verified or tested along with Effective: Page 5 of 9
6 Table R1 Configuration Change Management the dated test results. and and 1.5 High Impact BES cyber systems prior to the change, determine required cyber security controls in CIP 005 and CIP 007 that could be impacted by the change; following the change, verify that required cyber security controls determined in are not adversely affected; and document the results of the verification. Where technically feasible, for each change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration: prior to implementing any change in the production environment, test the changes in a test environment or test the changes in a production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects, that models the baseline configuration to ensure that required cyber security controls in CIP 005 and CIP 007 are not adversely affected; and document the results of the testing and, if a test environment was used, the differences between the test environment and the production environment, including a description of the measures used to account for list of cyber security controls tested along with successful test results and a list of differences between the production and test environments with descriptions of how any differences were accounted for, including the date of the test. Effective: Page 6 of 9
7 Table R1 Configuration Change Management any differences in operation between the test and production environments. R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 010-AB 1 Table R2 Configuration Monitoring. M2. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 010-AB 1 Table R2 Configuration Monitoring and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table. Table R2 Configuration Monitoring 2.1 High Impact BES cyber and 2. protected cyber assets Monitor at least once every 35 days for changes to the baseline configuration (as described in requirement R1, part 1.1). Document and investigate detected unauthorized changes. include, but is not limited to, logs from a system that is monitoring the configuration along with records of investigation for any unauthorized changes that were detected. R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 010-AB 1 Table R3. M3. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 010-AB 1 Table R3 Vulnerability Assessments and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table. Table R3 3.1 High Impact BES cyber At least once every 15 months, conduct a paper or active vulnerability assessment. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to: a document listing the date of the assessment (performed at least once Effective: Page 7 of 9
8 Table R3 and and 3.2 High Impact BES cyber systems 3.3 High Impact BES cyber Where technically feasible, at least once every 36 months: perform an active vulnerability assessment in a test environment, or perform an active vulnerability assessment in a production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects, that models the baseline configuration of the BES cyber system in a production environment; and document the results of the testing and, if a test environment was used, the differences between the test environment and the production environment, including a description of the measures used to account for any differences in operation between the test and production environments. Prior to adding a new applicable cyber asset to a every 15 months), the controls assessed for each BES cyber system along with the method of assessment; or a document listing the date of the assessment and the output of any tools used to perform the assessment. document listing the date of the assessment (performed at least once every 36 months), the output of the tools used to perform the assessment, and a list of differences between the production and test environments with descriptions of how any differences were accounted for in conducting the assessment. Effective: Page 8 of 9
9 Table R3 production environment, document listing the date of perform an active vulnerability the assessment (performed assessment of the new cyber prior to the commissioning of asset, except for CIP the new cyber asset) and the 2. protected cyber assets exceptional circumstances and like replacements of the same type of cyber asset with a baseline configuration that models an existing baseline configuration of the previous or other existing cyber asset. output of any tools used to perform the assessment. 3.4 High Impact BES cyber and and Document the results of the assessments conducted according to parts 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 and the action plan to remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities identified in the assessments including the planned date of completing the action plan and the execution status of any remediation or mitigation action items. document listing the results or the review or assessment, a list of action items, documented proposed dates of completion for the action plan, and records of the status of the action items (such as minutes of a status meeting, updates in a work order system, or a spreadsheet tracking the action items). Revision History Date Description Initial release. Effective: Page 9 of 9
Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security Security Management Controls CIP-003-AB-5
A. Introduction 1. Title: 2. Number: 3. Purpose: To specify consistent and sustainable security management controls that establish responsibility and accountability to protect BES cyber systems against
Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems CIP-006-AB-5
Alberta Reliability Stard Final Proposed Draft Version 2.0 September 9, 2014 A. Introduction 1. Title: 2. Number: 3. Purpose: To manage physical access to BES cyber systems by specifying a physical security
Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security Personnel & Training CIP-004-AB-5.1
Alberta Reliability Stard A. Introduction 1. Title: 2. Number: 3. Purpose: To minimize the risk against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the bulk electric system from individuals
Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security System Security Management CIP-007-AB-5
A. Introduction 1. Title: 2. Number: 3. Purpose: To manage system security by specifying select technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting BES cyber systems against compromise
Summary of CIP Version 5 Standards
Summary of CIP Version 5 Standards In Version 5 of the Critical Infrastructure Protection ( CIP ) Reliability Standards ( CIP Version 5 Standards ), the existing versions of CIP-002 through CIP-009 have
CIP-010-2 Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments
CIP-010-2 Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments A. Introduction 1. Title: Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments 2. Number:
CIP 010 1 Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments
CIP 010 1 Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments A. Introduction 1. Title: Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments 2. Number:
CIP-003-5 Cyber Security Security Management Controls
A. Introduction 1. Title: Cyber Security Security Management Controls 2. Number: CIP-003-5 3. Purpose: To specify consistent and sustainable security management controls that establish responsibility and
North American Electric Reliability Corporation: Critical Infrastructure Protection, Version 5 (NERC-CIP V5)
Whitepaper North American Electric Reliability Corporation: Critical Infrastructure Protection, Version 5 (NERC-CIP V5) NERC-CIP Overview The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a
When this standard has received ballot approval, the text boxes will be moved to the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of the Standard.
CIP-002-5 Cyber Security BES Cyber System Categorization When this standard has received ballot approval, the text boxes will be moved to the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of the Standard. A.
NERC Cyber Security Standards
SANS January, 2008 Stan Johnson Manager of Situation Awareness and Infrastructure Security [email protected] 609-452-8060 Agenda History and Status of Applicable Entities Definitions High Level of
Notable Changes to NERC Reliability Standard CIP-010-3
C L AR I T Y AS S U R AN C E R E S U LT S M I D W E S T R E LIAB I L I T Y ORGAN I Z AT I ON Notable Changes to NERC Reliability Standard CIP-010-3 Cyber Security Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability
NERC CIP Tools and Techniques
NERC CIP Tools and Techniques Supplemental Project - Introduction Webcast Scott Sternfeld, Project Manager Smart Grid Substation & Cyber Security Research Labs [email protected] (843) 619-0050 October
CIP-005-5 Cyber Security Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
A. Introduction 1. Title: Cyber Security Electronic Security Perimeter(s) 2. Number: CIP-005-5 3. Purpose: To manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security
CIP-010-1 R1 & R2: Configuration Change Management
CIP-010-1 R1 & R2: Configuration Change Management June 3, 2014 Steven Keller Lead Compliance Specialist - CIP [email protected] 501.688.1633 Outline What is CIP-010-1? How it is different from CIP-003-3
Technology Solutions for NERC CIP Compliance June 25, 2015
Technology Solutions for NERC CIP Compliance June 25, 2015 2 Encari s Focus is providing NERC CIP Compliance Products and Services for Generation and Transmission Utilities, Municipalities and Cooperatives
NERC CIP VERSION 5 COMPLIANCE
BACKGROUND The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards define a comprehensive set of requirements that are the basis for maintaining
Cyber Security Compliance (NERC CIP V5)
Cyber Security Compliance (NERC CIP V5) Ray Wright NovaTech, LLC Abstract: In December 2013, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 791 which approved the Version 5 CIP Reliability
Implementation Plan for Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards
Implementation Plan for Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards April 10September 11, 2012 Prerequisite Approvals All Version 5 CIP Cyber Security Standards and the proposed additions, modifications, and
Reclamation Manual Directives and Standards
Vulnerability Assessment Requirements 1. Introduction. Vulnerability assessment testing is required for all access points into an electronic security perimeter (ESP), all cyber assets within the ESP, and
Standard CIP 007 3 Cyber Security Systems Security Management
A. Introduction 1. Title: Cyber Security Systems Security Management 2. Number: CIP-007-3 3. Purpose: Standard CIP-007-3 requires Responsible Entities to define methods, processes, and procedures for securing
Internal Controls And Good Utility Practices. Ruchi Ankleshwaria Manager, Compliance Risk Analysis
Internal Controls And Good Utility Practices Ruchi Ankleshwaria Manager, Compliance Risk Analysis 2 Introduction Joined WECC in March 2013 6 years of industry experience prior to joining WECC 4 years at
Standard CIP 007 3a Cyber Security Systems Security Management
A. Introduction 1. Title: Cyber Security Systems Security Management 2. Number: CIP-007-3a 3. Purpose: Standard CIP-007-3 requires Responsible Entities to define methods, processes, and procedures for
ReliabilityFirst CIP Evidence List CIP-002 through CIP-009 are applicable to RC, BA, IA, TSP, TO, TOP, GO, GOP, LSE, NERC, & RE
R1 Provide Risk Based Assessment Methodology (RBAM) R1.1 Provide evidence that the RBAM includes both procedures and evaluation criteria, and that the evaluation criteria are riskbased R1.2 Provide evidence
Cyber Security Standards Update: Version 5
Cyber Security Standards Update: Version 5 January 17, 2013 Scott Mix, CISSP CIP Technical Manager Agenda Version 5 Impact Levels Format Features 2 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY CIP Standards Version 5 CIP
NovaTech NERC CIP Compliance Document and Product Description Updated June 2015
NovaTech NERC CIP Compliance Document and Product Description Updated June 2015 This document describes the NovaTech Products for NERC CIP compliance and how they address the latest requirements of NERC
GE Measurement & Control. Cyber Security for NERC CIP Compliance
GE Measurement & Control Cyber Security for NERC CIP Compliance GE Proprietary Information: This document contains proprietary information of the General Electric Company and may not be used for purposes
Information Shield Solution Matrix for CIP Security Standards
Information Shield Solution Matrix for CIP Security Standards The following table illustrates how specific topic categories within ISO 27002 map to the cyber security requirements of the Mandatory Reliability
Completed. Document Name. NERC CIP Requirements CIP-002 Critical Cyber Asset Identification R1 Critical Asset Identifaction Method
NERC CIP Requirements CIP-002 Critical Cyber Asset Identification R1 Critical Asset Identifaction Method R2 Critical Asset Identification R3 Critical Cyber Asset Identification Procedures and Evaluation
The first step in protecting Critical Cyber Assets is identifying them. CIP-002 focuses on this identification process.
CIPS Overview Introduction The reliability of the energy grid depends not only on physical assets, but cyber assets. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) realized that, along with
Cyber Security Standards Update: Version 5 with Revisions
Cyber Security Standards Update: Version 5 with Revisions Security Reliability Program 2015 Agenda CIP Standards History Version 5 Format Impact Levels NOPR Final Rule References 2 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY
BSM for IT Governance, Risk and Compliance: NERC CIP
BSM for IT Governance, Risk and Compliance: NERC CIP Addressing NERC CIP Security Program Requirements SOLUTION WHITE PAPER Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...................................................
2012 CIP Spring Compliance Workshop May 7-11. Testing, Ports & Services and Patch Management
2012 CIP Spring Compliance Workshop May 7-11 Testing, Ports & Services and Patch Management Purpose This presentation provides an overview of the CIP-007-3 R1 Test Procedures which includes a discussion
Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security Implementation Plan for Version 5 CIP Security Standards CIP-PLAN-AB-1
External Consultation Draft Version 1.0 December 12, 2013 1. Purpose The purpose of this reliability standard is to set the effective dates for the Version 5 CIP Cyber Security reliability standards and
Midwest Reliability Organization Procedure For NERC PRC-012
Midwest Reliability Organization Procedure For NERC PRC-012 A. Introduction The following procedure developed by the MRO Protective Relay Subcommittee (PRS) and Transmission Assessment Subcommittee (TAS)
NERC s New BES Definition: How Many CHP Units Will It Impact?
NERC s New BES Definition: How Many CHP Units Will It Impact? A presentation by: Dr. John A. Anderson, President & CEO Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) Washington, D.C. At: US Combined Heat
TASK -040. TDSP Web Portal Project Cyber Security Standards Best Practices
Page 1 of 10 TSK- 040 Determine what PCI, NERC CIP cyber security standards are, which are applicable, and what requirements are around them. Find out what TRE thinks about the NERC CIP cyber security
MONITORING AND VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT PCI COMPLIANCE JUNE 2014
MONITORING AND VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT PCI COMPLIANCE JUNE 2014 COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE REQUIREMENT PERIOD DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT PERIOD DESCRIPTION 8.5.6 As Needed 11.1 Monthly 1.3 Quarterly 1.1.6 Semi-Annually
Generation Interconnection Feasibility Study Report-Web Version. PJM Generation Interconnection Request Queue Position Z1-055
Generation Interconnection Feasibility Study Report-Web Version For PJM Generation Interconnection Request Queue Position Z1-055 South Bend Generation Project March 2014 PJM Interconnection 2014. All rights
Voluntary Cybersecurity Initiatives in Critical Infrastructure. Nadya Bartol, CISSP, SGEIT, [email protected]. 2014 Utilities Telecom Council
Voluntary Cybersecurity Initiatives in Critical Infrastructure Nadya Bartol, CISSP, SGEIT, [email protected] 2014 Utilities Telecom Council Utility cybersecurity environment is full of collaborations
TRIPWIRE NERC SOLUTION SUITE
CONFIDENCE: SECURED SOLUTION BRIEF TRIPWIRE NERC SOLUTION SUITE TAILORED SUITE OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES TO AUTOMATE NERC CIP COMPLIANCE u u We ve been able to stay focused on our mission of delivering
Meeting NERC CIP Access Control Standards. Presented on February 12, 2014
Meeting NERC CIP Access Control Standards Presented on February 12, 2014 Presented By: CyberLock The leading supplier of key-centric access control systems Based in Corvallis, Oregon James T. McGowan Technology
Lessons Learned CIP Reliability Standards
Evidence for a requirement was not usable due to a lack of identifying information on the document. An entity should set and enforce a "quality of evidence" standard for its compliance documentation. A
Standard CIP 003 1 Cyber Security Security Management Controls
A. Introduction 1. Title: Cyber Security Security Management Controls 2. Number: CIP-003-1 3. Purpose: Standard CIP-003 requires that Responsible Entities have minimum security management controls in place
Verve Security Center
Verve Security Center Product Features Supports multiple control systems. Most competing products only support a single vendor, forcing the end user to purchase multiple security systems Single solution
Control System Integrity (CSI) Tools and Processes to Automate CIP Compliance for Control Systems
Control System Integrity (CSI) Tools and Processes to Automate CIP Compliance for Control Systems James Goosby Manager I&C Systems and Field Support 19 th Annual ARC Industry Forum Agenda About Us Compliance
Entity Name ( Acronym) NCRnnnnn Risk Assessment Questionnaire
Entity Name ( Acronym) NCRnnnnn Risk Assessment Questionnaire Upcoming Audit Date: March 16, 2015 Upcoming Audit Type: O&P Audit Start of Audit Period: March 16, 2012 Date Submitted: Table of Contents
Open Enterprise Architectures for a Substation Password Management System
CIGRÉ Canada 21, rue d Artois, F-75008 PARIS (154) Conference on Power Systems http : //www.cigre.org Toronto, October 4-6, 2009 Open Enterprise Architectures for a Substation Password Management System
LogRhythm and NERC CIP Compliance
LogRhythm and NERC CIP Compliance The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a nonprofit corporation designed to ensure that the bulk electric system in North America is reliable, adequate
Plans for CIP Compliance
Testing Procedures & Recovery Plans for CIP Compliance DECEMBER 16, 2009 Developed with: Presenters Bart Thielbar, CISA Senior Research hanalyst Sierra Energy Group, a Division of Energy Central Primer
IT General Controls Domain COBIT Domain Control Objective Control Activity Test Plan Test of Controls Results
Acquire or develop application systems software Controls provide reasonable assurance that application and system software is acquired or developed that effectively supports financial reporting requirements.
NERC CIP Ports & Services. Part 2: Complying With NERC CIP Documentation Requirements
NERC CIP Ports & Services Part 2: Complying With NERC CIP Documentation Requirements White Paper FoxGuard Solutions, Inc. November 2014 Defining Ports And Services In part 2 of our Ports and Services white
Supporting our customers with NERC CIP compliance. James McQuiggan, CISSP
Supporting our customers with NERC CIP compliance James, CISSP Siemens Energy Sector Energy products and solutions - in 6 Divisions Oil & Gas Fossil Power Generation Renewable Energy Service Rotating Equipment
Scope of Restoration Plan
RWG Area Restoration Review Worksheet (10/28/09) EOP-006-02 Directory 8 EOP-005 NYSRG Rule G Text Restoration Plan Requirement R1.Each Reliability Coordinator shall have a Reliability Coordinator Area
4.1.1 Generator Owner 4.1.2 Transmission Owner that owns synchronous condenser(s)
A. Introduction 1. Title: Verification and Data Reporting of Generator Real and Reactive Power Capability and Synchronous Condenser Reactive Power Capability 2. Number: MOD-025-2 3. Purpose: To ensure
Automating NERC CIP Compliance for EMS. Walter Sikora 2010 EMS Users Conference
Automating NERC CIP Compliance for EMS Walter Sikora 2010 EMS Users Conference What do we fear? Thieves / Extortionists Enemies/Terrorists Stuxnet Malware Hacker 2025 Accidents / Mistakes 9/21/2010 # 2
Build (develop) and document Acceptance Transition to production (installation) Operations and maintenance support (postinstallation)
It is a well-known fact in computer security that security problems are very often a direct result of software bugs. That leads security researches to pay lots of attention to software engineering. The
Information Technology Branch Access Control Technical Standard
Information Technology Branch Access Control Technical Standard Information Management, Administrative Directive A1461 Cyber Security Technical Standard # 5 November 20, 2014 Approved: Date: November 20,
FERC, NERC and Emerging CIP Standards
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Cyber Assets in Power Generation and Distribution Embracing standards helps prevent costly fines and improves operational efficiency Bradford Hegrat, CISSP, Principal
Continuous Compliance for Energy and Nuclear Facility Cyber Security Regulations
Continuous Compliance for Energy and Nuclear Facility Cyber Security Regulations Leveraging Configuration and Vulnerability Analysis for Critical Assets and Infrastructure May 2015 (Revision 2) Table of
SCADA Compliance Tools For NERC-CIP. The Right Tools for Bringing Your Organization in Line with the Latest Standards
SCADA Compliance Tools For NERC-CIP The Right Tools for Bringing Your Organization in Line with the Latest Standards OVERVIEW Electrical utilities are responsible for defining critical cyber assets which
CIP v5/v6 Implementation Plan CIP v5 Workshop. Tony Purgar October 2-3, 2014
CIP v5/v6 Implementation Plan CIP v5 Workshop Tony Purgar October 2-3, 2014 Revision History CIP v5/v6 Implementation Plan Change History Date Description Initial Release July 25, 2014 Revision V0.1 August-2014
FRCC Standards Handbook. FRCC Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding Program. Revision Date: July 2003
F R C C FRCC Standards Handbook FRCC Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding Program Revision Date: July 2003 FRCC Underfrequency Load Shedding Program Modification and Approval Process Requests to modify
WHITE PAPER ON SECURITY TESTING IN TELECOM NETWORK
WHITE PAPER ON SECURITY TESTING IN TELECOM NETWORK DATE OF RELEASE: 27 th July 2012 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 2 2. Need for securing Telecom Networks... 3 3. Security Assessment Techniques...
Critical Infrastructure Security: The Emerging Smart Grid. Cyber Security Lecture 5: Assurance, Evaluation, and Compliance Carl Hauser & Adam Hahn
Critical Infrastructure Security: The Emerging Smart Grid Cyber Security Lecture 5: Assurance, Evaluation, and Compliance Carl Hauser & Adam Hahn Overview Assurance & Evaluation Security Testing Approaches
SecFlow Security Appliance Review
Solution Paper. SecFlow Security Appliance Review NERC CIP version 5 Compliance Enabler July 2014 Abstract The alarming increase in cyber attacks on critical infrastructure poses new risk management challenges
References... 4. Appendices... 5. I. INTRODUCTION... 6 A. Background... 6 B. Standards... 6
ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 - Technical Requirements for Generators, Demand Resources, Asset Related Demands and Alternative Technology Regulation Resources Effective Date: January 29, 2015
ForeScout CounterACT and Compliance June 2012 Overview Major Mandates PCI-DSS ISO 27002
ForeScout CounterACT and Compliance An independent assessment on how network access control maps to leading compliance mandates and helps automate GRC operations June 2012 Overview Information security
Voluntary Cyber Security Standards for Industrial Control Systems v.1.0 www.gcsb.govt.nz www.ncsc.govt.nz
National Cyber Security Centre Voluntary Cyber Security Standards for Industrial Control Systems v.1.0 www.gcsb.govt.nz www.ncsc.govt.nz Foreword The national and economic security of New Zealand depends
Patch Management Policy
Patch Management Policy L2-POL-12 Version No :1.0 Revision History REVISION DATE PREPARED BY APPROVED BY DESCRIPTION Original 1.0 2-Apr-2015 Process Owner Management Representative Initial Version No.:
NERC CIP Compliance Gaining Oversight with ConsoleWorks
NERC CIP Compliance Gaining Oversight with ConsoleWorks The current challenge for many Utility companies is finding efficient ways to gain oversight and control over NERC CIP regulation compliance. NERC
Title 20 PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. Subtitle 50 SERVICE SUPPLIED BY ELECTRIC COMPANIES. Chapter 02 Engineering
Title 20 PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Subtitle 50 SERVICE SUPPLIED BY ELECTRIC COMPANIES Chapter 02 Engineering Authority: Public Utility Companies Article, 2-121, 5-101 and 5-303, Annotated Code of Maryland.
Copyright 2014 Carnegie Mellon University The Cyber Resilience Review is based on the Cyber Resilience Evaluation Method and the CERT Resilience
Copyright 2014 Carnegie Mellon University The Cyber Resilience Review is based on the Cyber Resilience Evaluation Method and the CERT Resilience Management Model (CERT-RMM), both developed at Carnegie
Best Practices for PCI DSS V3.0 Network Security Compliance
Best Practices for PCI DSS V3.0 Network Security Compliance January 2015 www.tufin.com Table of Contents Preparing for PCI DSS V3.0 Audit... 3 Protecting Cardholder Data with PCI DSS... 3 Complying with
ISO 27001 Controls and Objectives
ISO 27001 s and Objectives A.5 Security policy A.5.1 Information security policy Objective: To provide management direction and support for information security in accordance with business requirements
Cyber Security for NERC CIP Version 5 Compliance
GE Measurement & Control Cyber Security for NERC CIP Version 5 Compliance imagination at work Contents Cyber Security for NERC CIP Compliance... 5 Sabotage Reporting... 6 Security Management Controls...
NERC CIP Compliance with Security Professional Services
NERC CIP Compliance with Professional Services The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a nonprofit corporation designed to ensure that the bulk electric system in North America is
EnergySec Partnered Webinar with MetricStream Transitioning to NERC CIP Version 5: What Does it Mean for Electric Utilities JANUARY 28, 2015
EnergySec Partnered Webinar with MetricStream Transitioning to NERC CIP Version 5: What Does it Mean for Electric Utilities JANUARY 28, 2015 Housekeeping Items Submit questions using control panel Contact
Patch and Vulnerability Management Program
Patch and Vulnerability Management Program What is it? A security practice designed to proactively prevent the exploitation of IT vulnerabilities within an organization To reduce the time and money spent
San Diego Gas & Electric Company FERC Order 717 Transmission Function Employee Job Descriptions June 4, 2015. Electric Grid Operations
San Diego Gas & Electric Company FERC Order 717 Transmission Function Employee Job Descriptions June 4, 2015 Electric Grid Operations Director Electric Grid Operations: Responsible for overall transmission
Looking at the SANS 20 Critical Security Controls
Looking at the SANS 20 Critical Security Controls Mapping the SANS 20 to NIST 800-53 to ISO 27002 by Brad C. Johnson The SANS 20 Overview SANS has created the 20 Critical Security Controls as a way of
Load Dispatcher (Class Code 5223) Task List
A. Load Dispatching, General Load Dispatcher (Class Code 5223) Task List 1. Prior to work shift speaks to Load Dispatcher(s), reviews hardcopy and computer logs, and looks at the dispatcher's diagram board
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY STANDARDS
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY STANDARDS Version 2.0 December 2013 Table of Contents 1 OVERVIEW 3 2 SCOPE 4 3 STRUCTURE 5 4 ASSET MANAGEMENT 6 5 HUMAN RESOURCES SECURITY 7 6 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
Master/Local Control Center Procedure No. 13 (M/LCC 13) Communications Between the ISO and Local Control Centers
Master/LCC Procedure No. 13 - Communications Master/Local Control Center Procedure No. 13 (M/LCC 13) Communications 1. References... 2 2. Background... 3 3. Responsibilities... 3 4. Procedure... 4 4.1
74% 96 Action Items. Compliance
Compliance Report PCI DSS 2.0 Generated by Check Point Compliance Blade, on July 02, 2013 11:12 AM 1 74% Compliance 96 Action Items Upcoming 0 items About PCI DSS 2.0 PCI-DSS is a legal obligation mandated
