Attribute-proving for Smart Cards
|
|
|
- Ella Nicholson
- 8 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Attribute-proving for Smart Cards progress made over the past two years ir. Pim Vullers Institute for Computing and Information Sciences Digital Security 5th October 2011 Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 1 / 15
2 Outline Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 2 / 15
3 (Verheul, Radboud University) Main ingredient: Attribute certificate Single attribute Issuer s signature Prover s public key Issuance Issuer learns the public key Strongly identifying Attribute proving Fresh blinding of certificate and public key for each session Untraceable Performance Keep smart card implementation in mind while designing. Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 3 / 15
4 (Verheul, Radboud University) Results Good performance: Batina et al. (2010): 1.5 seconds (for 1 attribute) Hoepman, Jacobs and Vullers (2010): 0.6 seconds (for 1) Anonymous credentials on smart cards are becoming possible Issues This protocol proves only a single attribute (efficiency) Attributes do not have values Revocation is not supported by the current protocol Major bottleneck is the limited access to the cryptographic coprocessor of the Java Card smart card Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 4 / 15
5 Outline Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 5 / 15
6 (Brands, Microsoft) Main ingredient: token Multiple attributes Token s public key Issuer s signature Blind issuance Issuer does not learn the public key, only the attribute values Issuer unlinkability Selective disclosure Prover can decide which (properties of) attributes to show Data minimisation Traceability Public key and signature can be used as a pseudonym. Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 6 / 15
7 (Brands, Microsoft) Results Previous Java Card implementation: Tews and Jacobs (2009) 5 seconds (for 2 attributes), 8 seconds (for 4) Previous MULTOS implementation: 2.9 seconds (for 2 out of 5 attributes), 9 seconds (issuing 5) Efficient MULTOS impl.: Mostowski and Vullers (2011) 0.5 seconds (for 2), 0.8 seconds (for 5) Compatible with SDK (only smart card limitations) Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 7 / 15
8 (Brands, Microsoft) time (ms) # attributes Figure: token issuance times ( : computation, : overhead). Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 8 / 15
9 (Brands, Microsoft) time (ms) time (ms) # disclosed (a) 2 stored attributes (b) 5 stored attributes # disclosed Figure: Attribute proving times ( : computation, : overhead). Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 9 / 15
10 (Brands, Microsoft) Results Previous Java Card implementation: Tews and Jacobs (2009) 5 seconds (for 2 attributes), 8 seconds (for 4) Efficient MULTOS impl.: Mostowski and Vullers (2011) 0.5 seconds (for 2), 0.8 seconds (for 5) Compatible with SDK (only smart card limitations) Issues The token serves as a pseudonym (multi-show linkability) Microsoft pursues a different smart card approach Advanced features (derived attributes) are costly Our MULTOS cards have little RAM and limited cryptography Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 10 / 15
11 Outline Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 11 / 15
12 (Camenisch & Lysyanskaya, IBM Research Zürich) Components Pseudonyms Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures blind signature scheme self-blindable signatures Zero-knowledge proofs Features Both issuer and multi-show unlinkability Efficient attributes encoding Complexity The many zero-knowledge proofs make it hard to understand and lead to a high computational complexity. Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 12 / 15
13 (Camenisch & Lysyanskaya, IBM Research Zürich) Results Direct Anonymous Attestation Commercial use of anonymous credentials Anonymous authentication of a TPM No attributes Java Card implementations (of DAA): Bichsel et al. (2009): 7.5 seconds Sterckx et al. (2009): 3 seconds Issues Complexity (steep learning curve) Only smart card implementations for DAA Memory management seems to be the biggest problem Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 13 / 15
14 Outline Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 14 / 15
15 Anonymous credentials on smart cards are becoming possible Our results are in line with previous work Major bottleneck: Java Cards: limited access to the cryptographic coprocessor MULTOS: little RAM and limited cryptography (RSA > 1024, ECC) support Challenges for future research Implementing on MULTOS Study of other schemes (German ID card, French scheme) Dealing with smart card platform shortcomings Adoption (ongoing project with Novay) Pim Vullers e-transport Forum Attribute-proving for Smart Cards 15 / 15
Privacy in e-ticketing & e-identity
Privacy in e-ticketing & e-identity Attribute-proving for Smart Cards ir. Pim Vullers p.vullers@cs.ru.nl Institute for Computing and Information Sciences Digital Security 17th May 2011 Pim Vullers Collis
Outline. IRMA Math. Background about IRMA. Mathematical basis of IRMA. What is authentication? Nijmegen s contribution.
Outline IRMA Math Bart Jacobs Institute for Computing and Information Sciences Digital Security May 17, 2013, Kaleidoscoop, Nijmegen irmacard.org Bart Jacobs May 17, 2013 IRMA Math 1 / 45 Background about
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) Ernie Brickell and Jiangtao Li Intel Corporation
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) Ernie Brickell and Jiangtao Li Intel Corporation 1 Agenda EPID overview EPID usages Device Authentication Government Issued ID EPID performance and standardization efforts 2
Simplified Security Notions of Direct Anonymous Attestation and a Concrete Scheme from Pairings
Simplified Security Notions of Direct Anonymous Attestation and a Concrete Scheme from Pairings Ernie Brickell Intel Corporation ernie.brickell@intel.com Liqun Chen HP Laboratories liqun.chen@hp.com March
QUT Digital Repository: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/
QUT Digital Repository: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ Suriadi, Suriadi and Foo, Ernest and Josang, Audun (2009) A user-centric federated single sign-on system. Journal of Network and Computer Applications,
A New and Efficient Signature on Commitment Values
International Journal of Network Security, Vol.7, No., PP.0 06, July 2008 0 A New and Efficient Signature on Commitment Values Fangguo Zhang,3, Xiaofeng Chen 2,3, Yi Mu 4, and Willy Susilo 4 (Corresponding
A Survey on Untransferable Anonymous Credentials
A Survey on Untransferable Anonymous Credentials extended abstract Sebastian Pape Databases and Interactive Systems Research Group, University of Kassel Abstract. There are at least two principal approaches
Credential-Based Access Control Extensions to XACML
Credential-Based Access Control Extensions to XACML Jan Camenisch, Sebastian Mödersheim, Gregory Neven, Franz-Stefan Preiss, and Dieter Sommer IBM Research Zurich, Switzerland {jca,smo,nev,frp,dso}@zurich.ibm.com
The Impact of Cryptography on Platform Security
The Impact of Cryptography on Platform Security Ernie Brickell Intel Corporation 2/28/2012 1 Security is Intel s Third Value Pillar Intel is positioning itself to lead in three areas: energy-efficient
PseudoID: Enhancing Privacy for Federated Login
PseudoID: Enhancing Privacy for Federated Login Arkajit Dey 1 and Stephen Weis 2 1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA 02139 2 Google Inc., Mountain View, CA, USA 94043 Abstract.
Opaak: Using Mobile Phones to Limit Anonymous Identities Online
Opaak: Using Mobile Phones to Limit Anonymous Identities Online Gabriel Maganis, Elaine Shi, Hao Chen, Dawn Song University of California, Davis University of California, Berkeley ABSTRACT Trust and anonymity
Mobile Electronic Payments
Chapter 7 Mobile Electronic Payments 7.1 Rationale and Motivation Mobile electronic payments are rapidly becoming a reality. There is no doubt that users of mobile phones are willing and even asking to
10 Secure Electronic Transactions: Overview, Capabilities, and Current Status
10 Secure Electronic Transactions: Overview, Capabilities, and Current Status Gordon Agnew A&F Consulting, and University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada 10.1 Introduction Until recently, there were two primary
CERTIFIED PSEUDONYMS COLLIGATED WITH MASTER SECRET KEY
CERTIFIED PSEUDONYMS COLLIGATED WITH MASTER SECRET KEY Vijayakrishnan Pasupathinathan, Josef Pieprzyk ACAC, Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia krishnan@ics.mq.edu.au, josef@ics.mq.edu.au
Direct Anonymous Attestation: Enhancing Cloud Service User Privacy
Direct Anonymous Attestation: Enhancing Cloud Service User Privacy Ulrich Greveler, Benjamin Justus, and Dennis Loehr Computer Security Lab Münster University of Applied Sciences D-48565 Steinfurt, Germany
Electronic Voting Protocol Analysis with the Inductive Method
Electronic Voting Protocol Analysis with the Inductive Method Introduction E-voting use is spreading quickly in the EU and elsewhere Sensitive, need for formal guarantees Inductive Method: protocol verification
Security in Electronic Payment Systems
Security in Electronic Payment Systems Jan L. Camenisch, Jean-Marc Piveteau, Markus A. Stadler Institute for Theoretical Computer Science, ETH Zurich, CH-8092 Zurich e-mail: {camenisch, stadler}@inf.ethz.ch
Mobile Devices to the Identity Rescue
Mobile Devices to the Identity Rescue Gergely Alpár 1,2 and Maarten H. Everts 2 1 Institute for Computing and Information Sciences Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. gergely@cs.ru.nl 2 TNO,
Building an Anonymous Public Storage Utility Wesley Leggette Cleversafe
Building an Anonymous Public Storage Utility Wesley Leggette Cleversafe Utility Storage r Many different target audiences r Business r Content distribution r Off-site backup r Archival r Consumer r Content
Decentralized Anonymous Credentials
Decentralized Anonymous Credentials Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Ian Miers The Johns Hopkins University Department of Computer Science, Baltimore, USA {cgarman, mgreen, imiers}@cs.jhu.edu October 15,
A User-centric Federated Single Sign-on System
2007 IFIP International Conference on Network and Parallel Computing - Workshops A User-centric Federated Single Sign-on System Suriadi Suriadi, Ernest Foo, Audun Jøsang Information Security Institute
Secure & privacy-preserving eid systems with Attribute-based credentials
University of Twente Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS) Master Thesis Secure & privacy-preserving eid systems with Attribute-based credentials Brinda Badarinath
CS 6393 Lecture 7. Privacy. Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair. March 8, 2013. ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu www.profsandhu.
CS 6393 Lecture 7 Privacy Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair March 8, 2013 ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu www.profsandhu.com Ravi Sandhu 1 Privacy versus Security Privacy Security I think this
An Approach to Enhance in Group Signature Scheme with Anonymous Revocation
An Approach to Enhance in Group Signature Scheme with Anonymous Revocation Thu Thu Mon Oo, and Win Htay Abstract This paper concerns with the group signature scheme. In this scheme, anyone who can access
Entrust Managed Services PKI. Getting started with digital certificates and Entrust Managed Services PKI. Document issue: 1.0
Entrust Managed Services PKI Getting started with digital certificates and Entrust Managed Services PKI Document issue: 1.0 Date of issue: May 2009 Copyright 2009 Entrust. All rights reserved. Entrust
A Guide to EMV. Version 1.0 May 2011. Copyright 2011 EMVCo, LLC. All rights reserved.
A Guide to EMV Version 1.0 May 2011 Objective Provide an overview of the EMV specifications and processes What is EMV? Why EMV? Position EMV in the context of the wider payments industry Define the role
Group Signatures: Authentication with Privacy
Group Signatures: Authentication with Privacy Authors Prof. Dr. Mark Manulis, Nils Fleischhacker, Felix Günther, Franziskus Kiefer, Bertram Poettering Cryptographic Protocols Group Department of Computer
Protocols for Secure Cloud Computing
IBM Research Zurich Christian Cachin 28 September 2010 Protocols for Secure Cloud Computing 2009 IBM Corporation Where is my data? 1985 2010 Who runs my computation? 1985 2010 IBM Research - Zurich Overview
Ciphire Mail. Abstract
Ciphire Mail Technical Introduction Abstract Ciphire Mail is cryptographic software providing email encryption and digital signatures. The Ciphire Mail client resides on the user's computer between the
Entrust Smartcard & USB Authentication
Entrust Smartcard & USB Authentication Technical Specifications Entrust IdentityGuard smartcard- and USB-based devices allow organizations to leverage strong certificate-based authentication of user identities
Implementation and Adaptation of the Pseudonymous PKI for Ubiquitous Computing for Car-2-Car Communication
Implementation and Adaptation of the Pseudonymous PKI for Ubiquitous Computing for Car-2-Car Communication Stefan Kaufmann IT-Designers Gruppe STZ-Softwaretechnik Im Entennest 2 73730 Esslingen stefan.kaufmann@stz-softwaretechnik.de
ABC4Trust Pilot Requirements and Review
The ABC4Trust Pilot in Patras Yannis Stamatiou Computer Technology Institute ABC4Trust 1 st Reference Group Meeting Zurich, 13 14 February 2012 Key Messages Students and instructors were introduced to
Privacy in Cloud Computing Through Identity Management
Privacy in Cloud Computing Through Identity Management Bharat Bhargava 1, Noopur Singh 2, Asher Sinclair 3 1 Computer Science, Purdue University 2 Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University
Acronym Term Description
This glossary contains definitions of terms created by TCG, or terms that have a particular meaning in trusted computing, or terms that cause particular confusion in trusted computing. Acronym Term Description
Single Sign-On Secure Authentication Password Mechanism
Single Sign-On Secure Authentication Password Mechanism Deepali M. Devkate, N.D.Kale ME Student, Department of CE, PVPIT, Bavdhan, SavitribaiPhule University Pune, Maharashtra,India. Assistant Professor,
Biometrics, Tokens, & Public Key Certificates
Biometrics, Tokens, & Public Key Certificates The Merging of Technologies TOKENEER Workstations WS CA WS WS Certificate Authority (CA) L. Reinert S. Luther Information Systems Security Organization Biometrics,
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE SIGN-ON MECHANISM FOR DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER NETWORKS
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE SIGN-ON MECHANISM FOR DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER NETWORKS Abstract: The Single sign-on (SSO) is a new authentication mechanism that enables a legal user with a single credential
OIO SAML Profile for Identity Tokens
> OIO SAML Profile for Identity Tokens Version 1.0 IT- & Telestyrelsen October 2009 Content > Document History 3 Introduction 4 Related profiles 4 Profile Requirements 6 Requirements 6
IBM Payment Registry Delivers a Certificate Authority to Promote More-Secure Credit Card Transactions over the Internet
Software Announcement June 26, 2001 IBM Payment Registry Delivers a Certificate Authority to Promote More-Secure Credit Card Transactions over the Internet Overview The Payment products are an end-to-end
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY: PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW
Summary Purpose Business Value Product Type Technical function/certifications Product Family Name 1 General purpose Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) To securely protect cryptographic keys wherever they
Extended SSL Certificates
Introduction Widespread usage of internet has led to the growth of awareness amongst users, who now associate green address bar with security. Though people are able to recognize the green bar, there is
Security and Privacy by Declarative Design
Security and Privacy by Declarative Design Matteo Maffei Kim Pecina Manuel Reinert Saarland University Germany {maffei,pecina,reinert}@cs.uni-saarland.de Abstract The privacy of users has rapidly become
Secure Cloud Identity Wallet
1 CREDENTIAL Secure Cloud Identity Wallet DS-02-2014 Dr. Arne Tauber u 2 CREDENTIAL Research Project Call: H2020-DS-2014-1 Acronym: CREDENTIAL Type of Action: IA Number: 653454 Partners: 12 Duration: 36
Credential-based access control extensions to XACML
Gregory Neven, IBM Research Zurich W3C Workshop on Access Control Scenarios, Nov. 18 th, 2009, Luxembourg Jan Camenisch, Sebastian Mödersheim, Gregory Neven, Franz-Stefan Preiss, Dieter Sommer Credential-based
Design and Implementation of the idemix Anonymous Credential System
Design and Implementation of the idemix Anonymous Credential System Jan Camenisch and Els Van Herreweghen IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory 8803 Rüschlikon Switzerland {jca,evh}@zurich.ibm.com ABSTRACT
Rights Management Services
www.css-security.com 425.216.0720 WHITE PAPER Microsoft Windows (RMS) provides authors and owners the ability to control how they use and distribute their digital content when using rights-enabled applications,
ECC Certificate Addendum to the Comodo EV Certification Practice Statement v.1.03
ECC Certificate Addendum to the Comodo EV Certification Practice Statement v.1.03 Comodo CA, Ltd. ECC Certificate Addendum to Comodo EV CPS v. 1.03 6 March 2008 3rd Floor, Office Village, Exchange Quay,
Digital Identity Management
Digital Identity Management Techniques and Policies E. Bertino CS Department and ECE School CERIAS Purdue University bertino@cs.purdue.edu Digital Identity Management What is DI? Digital identity (DI)
Security Digital Certificate Manager
IBM i Security Digital Certificate Manager 7.1 IBM i Security Digital Certificate Manager 7.1 Note Before using this information and the product it supports, be sure to read the information in Notices,
Notarized Federated Identity Management for Web Services
Notarized Federated Identity Management for Web Services Michael T. Goodrich 1, Roberto Tamassia 2, and Danfeng Yao 2 1 Department of Computer Science, University of California Irvine, CA 92697 USA goodrich@acm.org
Security Digital Certificate Manager
System i Security Digital Certificate Manager Version 5 Release 4 System i Security Digital Certificate Manager Version 5 Release 4 Note Before using this information and the product it supports, be sure
1. Product Overview 2. Product Features 3. Comparison Chart 4. Product Applications 5. Order Information 6. Q & A
www.acs.com.hk 1. Product Overview 2. Product Features 3. Comparison Chart 4. Product Applications 5. Order Information 6. Q & A 2 3 ACOS5 Series (32KB EEPROM) Cryptographic Smart Card and Token Module
Procedure for How to Enroll for Digital Signature
Procedure for How to Enroll for Digital Signature In Online Processing System getting to implement Digital Signature and Electronic Token for security and Authentication Purpose. For that bidder must have
Ray Chance President Browsercraft, LLC rchance@browsercraft.com
Ray Chance President Browsercraft, LLC rchance@browsercraft.com 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Today we have reached a critical turning point for USB flash drive technology. Many exciting applications will soon hit
How to Win the Clone Wars: Efficient Periodic n-times Anonymous Authentication
How to Win the Clone Wars: Efficient Periodic n-times Anonymous Authentication Jan Camenisch Zurich Research Lab IBM Research jca@zurich.ibm.com Susan Hohenberger Zurich Research Lab IBM Research sus@zurich.ibm.com
Electronic Cash Payment Protocols and Systems
Electronic Cash Payment Protocols and Systems Speaker: Jerry Gao Ph.D. San Jose State University email: jerrygao@email.sjsu.edu URL: http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/gaojerry May, 2000 Presentation Outline - Overview
Federated Identity Management Systems: A Privacy-based Characterization
Federated Identity Management Systems: A Privacy-based Characterization Eleanor Birrell Fred B. Schneider Department of Computer Science Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853 {eleanor, fbs}@cs.cornell.edu
A blind digital signature scheme using elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
A blind digital signature scheme using elliptic curve digital signature algorithm İsmail BÜTÜN * and Mehmet DEMİRER *Department of Electrical Engineering, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Department
TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS
THE USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS TO SECURE TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS John Snare * Manager Telematic and Security Systems Section Telecom Australia Research Laboratories Victoria TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Digital Certificates Demystified
Digital Certificates Demystified Alyson Comer IBM Corporation System SSL Development Endicott, NY Email: comera@us.ibm.com February 7 th, 2013 Session 12534 (C) 2012, 2013 IBM Corporation Trademarks The
Introducing etoken. What is etoken?
Introducing etoken Nirit Bear September 2002 What is etoken? Small & portable reader-less Smartcard Standard USB connectivity Logical and physical protection Tamper evident (vs. tamper proof) Water resistant
Smart Card Application Development Using Java
Uwe Hansmann Martin S. Nicklous Thomas Schack Frank Seliger Smart Card Application Development Using Java With 98 Figures, 16 Tables and a Multi Function Smart Card Springer Table of Contents Preface 1
IBM i Version 7.3. Security Digital Certificate Manager IBM
IBM i Version 7.3 Security Digital Certificate Manager IBM IBM i Version 7.3 Security Digital Certificate Manager IBM Note Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information
Smart Card: The Computer in Your Wallet
Smart Card: The Computer in Your Wallet MIPS Technologies, Inc. June 2002 Smart cards, credit-card-size pieces of plastic incorporating a silicon chip, comprise the highest volume computing platform. Roughly
Privacy-preserving Digital Identity Management for Cloud Computing
Privacy-preserving Digital Identity Management for Cloud Computing Elisa Bertino bertino@cs.purdue.edu Federica Paci paci@cs.purdue.edu Ning Shang nshang@cs.purdue.edu Rodolfo Ferrini rferrini@purdue.edu
How To Protect Privacy In A Computer System
PReparing Industry to Privacy-by-design by supporting its Application in REsearch PRIPARE: un projet Européen visant à définir une pratique intégrée de protection de la vie privée par construction PRIPARE:
HTTPS is Fast and Hassle-free with CloudFlare
HTTPS is Fast and Hassle-free with CloudFlare 1 888 99 FLARE enterprise@cloudflare.com www.cloudflare.com In the past, organizations had to choose between performance and security when encrypting their
Extending DigiD to the Private Sector (DigiD-2)
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITEIT EINDHOVEN Department of Mathematics and Computer Science MASTER S THESIS Extending DigiD to the Private Sector (DigiD-2) By Giorgi Moniava Supervisors: Eric Verheul (RU, PwC) L.A.M.
INTEGRATION GUIDE MS OUTLOOK 2003 VERSION 2.0
INTEGRATION GUIDE MS OUTLOOK 2003 VERSION 2.0 Document Code: ST_UT_MB_MSO_2.0_18042012 The data and information contained in this document cannot be altered without the express written permission of SecuTech
GENERIC SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD COMPUTING USING CRYPTONET
http:// GENERIC SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD COMPUTING USING CRYPTONET Manisha Dawra 1, Ramdev Singh 2 1 Al-Falah School of Engg. & Tech., Vill-Dhauj, Ballabgarh-Sohna Road, Faridabad, Haryana (INDIA)-121004
Glossary of Key Terms
and s Branch Glossary of Key Terms The terms and definitions listed in this glossary are used throughout the s Package to define key terms in the context of. Access Control Access The processes by which
NIST s FIPS 201: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors Masaryk University in Brno Faculty of Informatics
NIST s FIPS 201: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors Masaryk University in Brno Faculty of Informatics Jan Krhovják Outline Introduction and basics of PIV Minimum
Privacy through Pseudonymity in Mobile Telephony Systems
Privacy through Pseudonymity in Mobile Telephony Systems Eike Ritter University of Birmingham Joint work with Myrto Arapinis, Loretta Mancini and Mark Ryan Eike Ritter Privacy in Mobile Telephony Systems
ECCA 2014 Conference Santander 26.05.2014
ECCA 2014 Conference Santander 26.05.2014 Introducing -Technology For Strong Authentication Section 3- IT-Systems, Softwareintegration Department 6 Information And Communication Services Dezernat6 - Informations-
Identity Management. Critical Systems Laboratory
Identity Management Critical Systems What is Identity Management? Identity: a set of attributes and values, which might or might not be unique Storing and manipulating identities Binding virtual identities
Microsoft Identity Lifecycle Manager & Gemalto.NET Solutions. Jan 23 rd, 2007
Microsoft Identity Lifecycle Manager & Gemalto.NET Solutions Jan 23 rd, 2007 Microsoft ILM is a comprehensive, integrated, identity and access solution within the Microsoft system architecture. It includes
Fighting product clones through digital signatures
Paul Curtis, Katrin Berkenkopf Embedded Experts Team, SEGGER Microcontroller Fighting product clones through digital signatures Product piracy and forgery are growing problems that not only decrease turnover
An Overview of ANONIZE:
IEEE S&P SYMPOSIUM An Overview of ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System Susan Hohenberger Johns Hopkins University Steven Myers Indiana University Rafael Pass Cornell University abhi shelat University
Card Management System Integration Made Easy: Tools for Enrollment and Management of Certificates. September 2006
Card Management System Integration Made Easy: Tools for Enrollment and Management of Certificates September 2006 Copyright 2006 Entrust. All rights reserved. www.entrust.com Entrust is a registered trademark
D7.1 Application Description for Students
Attribute-Based Credentials for Trust D7.1 Application Description for Students Joerg Abendroth, Vasiliki Liagkou, Apostolis Pyrgelis, Christoforos Raptopoulos, Ahmad Sabouri, Eva Schlehahn, Yannis Stamatiou,
Efficient E-cash in Practice: NFC-based Payments for Public Transportation Systems
Efficient E-cash in Practice: NFC-based Payments for Public Transportation Systems Gesine Hinterwälder 1, Christian T. Zenger 1,2, Foteini Baldimtsi 3, Anna Lysyanskaya 3, Christof Paar 1,2, and Wayne
Key & Data Storage on Mobile Devices
Key & Data Storage on Mobile Devices Advanced Computer Networks 2015/2016 Johannes Feichtner johannes.feichtner@iaik.tugraz.at Outline Why is this topic so delicate? Keys & Key Management High-Level Cryptography
Floating Car Data from Smartphones: What Google And Waze Know About You and How Hackers Can Control Traffic
Floating Car Data from Smartphones: What Google And Waze Know About You and How Hackers Can Control Traffic Black Hat Europe March 12-15, 2013 Tobias Jeske Institute for Security in Distributed Applications
IQS Identity and Access Management
IQS Identity and Access Management Identity Management Authentication Authorization Administration www.-center.com The next generation security solution 2003 RSA Security Conference IAM is a combination
ALPTEKİN KÜPÇÜ. Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Engineering
ALPTEKİN KÜPÇÜ Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Engineering Core Research Cryptography Security Privacy Application Areas Research Topics Cloud Computation Cloud Storage Peer-to-Peer Systems
Co-supervisor at the University of Groningen Prof. dr. Ruth F. Curtain
Supervisor at the University of Groningen Prof. dr. Jaap Top Supervisor at TNO Information and Communication Technology Dr. Jaap-Henk Hoepman Co-supervisor at the University of Groningen Prof. dr. Ruth
RF-Enabled Applications and Technology: Comparing and Contrasting RFID and RF-Enabled Smart Cards
RF-Enabled Applications and Technology: Comparing and Contrasting RFID and RF-Enabled Smart Cards January 2007 Developed by: Smart Card Alliance Identity Council RF-Enabled Applications and Technology:
NIST Test Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Cards
NISTIR 7870 NIST Test Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Cards David A. Cooper http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/nist.ir.7870 NISTIR 7870 NIST Text Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Cards David A. Cooper
Enabling SSL and Client Certificates on the SAP J2EE Engine
Enabling SSL and Client Certificates on the SAP J2EE Engine Angel Dichev RIG, SAP Labs SAP AG 1 Learning Objectives As a result of this session, you will be able to: Understand the different SAP J2EE Engine
What Issuers Need to Know Top 25 Questions on EMV Chip Cards and Personalization
Frequently Asked Questions What Issuers Need to Know Top 25 Questions on EMV Chip Cards and Personalization Issuers across the United States are beginning to embark in the planning and execution phase
Getting Started with AD/LDAP SSO
Getting Started with AD/LDAP SSO Active Directory and LDAP single sign- on (SSO) with Syncplicity Business Edition accounts allows companies of any size to leverage their existing corporate directories
Server based signature service. Overview
1(11) Server based signature service Overview Based on federated identity Swedish e-identification infrastructure 2(11) Table of contents 1 INTRODUCTION... 3 2 FUNCTIONAL... 4 3 SIGN SUPPORT SERVICE...
Public Key Applications & Usage A Brief Insight
Public Key Applications & Usage A Brief Insight Scenario :: Identification, Authentication & Non- Repudiation :: Confidentiality :: Authenticity, requirements and e-business Integrity for electronic transaction
Sicherheitsaspekte des neuen deutschen Personalausweises
Sicherheitsaspekte des neuen deutschen Personalausweises Dennis Kügler Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik egov Fokus 2/2013: Identity- und Access Management im E-Government Rethinking
PUBLIC Secure Login for SAP Single Sign-On Implementation Guide
SAP Single Sign-On 2.0 SP04 Document Version: 1.0-2014-10-28 PUBLIC Secure Login for SAP Single Sign-On Implementation Guide Table of Contents 1 What Is Secure Login?....8 1.1 System Overview.... 8 1.1.1
A Movie Streaming Application & ABC4Trust as Services in the Cloud. Dr. Anja Lehmann
A Movie Streaming Application & ABC4Trust as Services in the Cloud Dr. Anja Lehmann IBM Research Zurich A research project funded by the European Commission s 7th Framework Programme. Lessons learned from
Network-based Access Control
Chapter 4 Network-based Access Control 4.1 Rationale and Motivation Over the past couple of years, a multitude of authentication and access control technologies have been designed and implemented. Although
ARTICLE 29 Data Protection Working Party
ARTICLE 29 Data Protection Working Party 11816/03/EN WP 86 Working Document on Trusted Computing Platforms and in particular on the work done by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG group) Adopted on 23 January
CSC 774 -- Network Security
CSC 774 -- Network Security Topic 4.1: NetBill Dr. Peng Ning CSC 774 Network Security 1 Outline Why is NetBill developed? NetBill Transaction Model NetBill Transaction Protocol Basic Protocol Optimizations
Privacy-preserving Data-aggregation for Internet-of-things in Smart Grid
Privacy-preserving Data-aggregation for Internet-of-things in Smart Grid Aakanksha Chowdhery Postdoctoral Researcher, Microsoft Research ac@microsoftcom Collaborators: Victor Bahl, Ratul Mahajan, Frank