MIL-HDBK-1013/1A 15 DECEMBER 1993 SUPERSEDING MIL-HDBK-1013/1 9 OCTOBER 1987 MILITARY HANDBOOK DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "MIL-HDBK-1013/1A 15 DECEMBER 1993 SUPERSEDING MIL-HDBK-1013/1 9 OCTOBER 1987 MILITARY HANDBOOK DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES"

Transcription

1 +)))))))))), INCH-POUND.))))))))))- MIL-HDBK-1013/1A 15 DECEMBER 1993 SUPERSEDING MIL-HDBK-1013/1 9 OCTOBER 1987 MILITARY HANDBOOK DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES AMSC N/A DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. UNLIMITED APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS AREA FACR

2 ABSTRACT This manual provides guidance to ensure that appropriate physical security considerations are included in the design of facilities. The pre-design phase, including physical security threats, are discussed initially, followed by an overview of the design phase. Specific technical sections include exterior site physical security, building physical security, ballistic attack hardening, standoff weapon hardening, and bomb blast hardening. ii

3 FOREWORD This military handbook has been developed from an evaluation of facilities in the shore establishment, from surveys of the availability of new materials and construction methods, and from selection of the best design practices of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, other DOD services and Government agencies, and the private sector. It uses, to the maximum extent feasible, national professional society, association, and institute standards. Deviations from this criteria, in the planning, engineering, design, and construction of facilities, cannot be made without prior approval of respective military departments. Design cannot remain static any more than can the functions it serves or the technologies it uses. Accordingly, recommendations for improvement are encouraged and should be furnished to the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC), Code ESC12, 560 Center Drive, Port Hueneme, CA , telephone (805) THIS HANDBOOK SHALL NOT BE USED AS A REFERENCE DOCUMENT FOR PROCUREMENT OF FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION. IT IS TO BE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF FACILITIES ENGINEERING STUDIES AND DESIGN (FINAL PLANS, SPECIFICATIONS, AND COST ESTIMATES). DO NOT REFERENCE IT IN MILITARY OR FEDERAL SPECIFICATIONS OR OTHER PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS. iii

4 PAGE iv INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

5 DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES CONTENTS Section 1 INTRODUCTION Purpose and Scope Cancellation Using the Handbook Related Technical Documents Section 2 PRE-DESIGN PHASE Introduction Objective Design Team Section Organization Page 2.2 Physical Security Planning Policy and Requirements DoD Directive R: Security of DoD Installations and Resources Security System Elements and Performance Objectives Physical Security Threat and Prioritization of Assets Protective Design and Military Construction MIL-HDBK-1190: Facility Planning and Design DoD R: DoD Information Security Program Regulation of 30 May 1986; DoD R: DoD Personnel Security Program Regulation of 16 December 1986; and DoD : Distribution Statements on Technical Documents DoD M: Policy Guidelines for Installation, Planning, Design, Construction and Upkeep Establishing the Security System Design Threat Overview Design Threat Aggressor Characteristics Aggressor Objectives Aggressor Types Aggressor Tactics Design Threat Selection Overview Identifying Asset Types Correlate Asset to Aggressor Types Correlate Attack Type and Severity to Aggressor Type v

6 Page For Asset Category Determine Whether Threat Ingress or Egress Denial Must be Provided by the Security System Establishing Guard Force Operating Procedures and Response Times Purpose Guard Types/and Operating Procedures Fixed Location Mobile Reaction Force Combinations Estimating the Guard Response Time Other Constraints and Requirements Section 3 DESIGN PHASE Introduction Objectives Design Team Section Organization Basic Integrated Security System Design Concepts Security System Functional Elements Real-Time Operating Systems Integrated Functional Performance Deterrence Associated with a Security System Real-Time Security System Operating Modes Security Denial/Containment Zones Balancing System Response and Intruder Timelines Barrier Penetration Performance Forcible Entry Barrier Penetration Ballistic or Standoff Weapon Barrier Penetration Vehicle Barrier Penetration Intrusion Detection Exterior Detection Along the Site Perimeter Detection at the Building Surface Detection Within Building Interiors Entry Control Threat Assessment Security Lighting Key Terms and Definitions Introduction Delay Time Barrier Forced Entry Penetration Time Ingress Time Egress Time Man-Passable Opening vi

7 Page Intrusion Detection System Restricted Area Security Design Procedure Overview Design Approach Design Procedure Design Worksheets Design Activity Chart Section 4 EXTERIOR SITE-RELATED PHYSICAL SECURITY Introduction Exterior Site Work and Layout Introduction Installation-Wide Security Considerations Existing Site Security Collocate Facilities of Similar Asset Criticality On Site Routes of Travel Security Area Designation Facility-Specific Exterior Site Layout Maintaining an Adequate Standoff Blast Zone for Vehicle Bomb Threats Limit or Blocking Against Direct Line-of-Sight Weapons Maximize Exterior Site Forced-Entry Threat Ingress/Egress Distances Maintaining Clear Zones for Guard and/or CCTV Observation Exterior Site Perimeter Barriers Introduction Security Fences Vehicle Barriers Exterior Site Entry Control Introduction Function and Location Minimum Requirements Gates to Perimeter Fences Overview Personnel Gates Vehicle Gates Entry Control Point (ECP) Layout and Traffic Control Types of Entry Control Systems Overview Personnel Access Control System for Explosives, Metal and Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) Detection Exterior Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems Introduction Function and Location vii

8 Page Overview Exterior IDS Layout and System Compatibility Minimum Requirements for Exterior IDS Exterior IDS Options for Detection Along Site Perimeter Fences Most Commonly Deployed Sensors Other Exterior IDS Sensor Candidates Exterior IDS Detection at Building Exteriors Ported Coaxial Cable Sensors Vibration Sensors Grid Wire Sensors Exterior Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Introduction CCTV Function and Location Threat Assessment Surveillance Location Minimum Requirements Elements of a CCTV Assessment System Camera Types CCTV Monitors Exterior Security Lighting Introduction Function and Location Standard Exterior Lighting Configurations Continuous Lighting Standby Lighting Minimum Lighting Illumination Specification Guard Visual Surveillance Lighting for CCTV Surveillance Lighting Energy Considerations Overview Restrike Time Maintaining Essential Security Support Functions Overview Security Power Supply General Installation Power Supply Communications Security Control Center Section 5 BUILDING PHYSICAL SECURITY AGAINST FORCED AND COVERT ENTRY Introduction Threat Severity Levels for Forced and Covert Entry Design Forced Entry Covert Entry viii

9 Page 5.3 Integrated Security System Elements for the Building Overview Building Layout and Barrier Design Building Access Control Introduction Function and Location Minimum Requirements Personnel Identity Verification Systems Materials Access Control Building Located Intrusion Detection Systems Function and Location Minimum Requirements Detection at the Barrier Detection Within Building Interior Volumes Duress Switches Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Introduction Function and Location Minimum Requirements Available Technology Minimum Construction Requirements General Vaults Class A Vaults Class B Vaults Modular Vaults Strongrooms Minimum Construction Penetration Times Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E) Facilities Minimum Requirements for AA&E Facilities Nuclear Weapons Facilities Minimum Construction Penetration Times Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) Minimum Construction Penetration Times New Construction Design Introduction Overview Summary of Design Choices Designing for the Very High-Severity Threat Sacrificial Areas Barriers to Counter an Explosive Attack New Wall Construction for Low- to High-Severity Threats Summary Low-Severity Threat ix

10 Page Medium- and High-Severity Threat New Roof/Floor Construction for Low- to High- Severity Threats Summary Low-Severity Threat Level Medium- and High-Severity Threat Levels New Door Construction Summary Personnel Doors Vault Doors Magazine Doors Vehicle Doors New Window Construction Summary Low-Severity Threat Level Bars and Grills Utility Openings for New Construction - Low-to High-Severity Threats Overview New Construction Design Considerations Retrofit Construction Design Introduction Considerations Related to the Very High-Severity Threat Wall Retrofit Construction for Low- Through High-Level Threats Summary Low-Security Threat Level Medium- and High-Security Threat Levels Roof/Floor Retrofit Construction for Low to High Threats Summary Low-Security Threat Level Medium- and High-Security Level Threats Door Retrofit Construction Personnel, Vehicle, and Vault Doors Magazine Doors Window Retrofit Construction Utility Opening Retrofit Construction Overview Hardening Utility Openings for Conventional Buildings AA&E Ventilation Openings Section 6 BALLISTIC ATTACK HARDENING Introduction Ballistic Threat Characteristics Caliber Bullet Characteristics x

11 Page Armor-Piercing (AP) Ball Other Characteristics Ballistic Limit Oblique Attack Affects Projectile Energy Multiple Impacts Ballistic Threats Low-Severity Threat Medium-Severity Threat High-Severity Threat Very High-Severity Threat Overview of Ballistic-Resistant Materials and Defeat Mechanisms Ballistic Resistance Transparent Armor Opaque Armor Common Structural Materials Fibrous Materials Ceramic Composite Materials Inorganic Nonmetallic Materials Metallic Materials Ballistic Hardening Option Recommendations Threat Severity Levels of Protection Protection Measures: New Construction Siting Measures Building Measures Protection Measures: Retrofit Walls Doors Windows Section 7 STANDOFF WEAPONS HARDENING Introduction The RPG Threat RPG Characteristics RPG Jet Formation RPG Jet Penetration RPG Defeat Mechanism Material Density Material Strength Rebound Defeat Mechanisms Oblique Attack Effects RPG Defeat By Predetonation and Standoff Hardening Design Options New Construction Site Layout Sacrificial Areas xi

12 Page Barrier Construction and Predetonation Screens Retrofit Construction Retrofit of Walls Retrofit of Roof and Floors Windows Retrofit of Doors Section 8 BOMB BLAST HARDENING Introduction Design Threats Stationary Bomb Threats Moving Vehicle Bomb Threat Standoff/Hardening and Protection Levels Protection Levels for New Construction Protection Levels Existing Structures Design Approach Introduction Design of New Construction Structure Hardening Vehicle Barriers for Maintaining Moving Vehicle Standoff Retrofit Hardening of Existing Construction Required Standoff for Level of Building Protection Vehicle Barriers APPENDIX APPENDIX A Physical Security Design Worksheets FIGURES Figure 1 Physical Security Threat Matrix (DoD R) Resource and Asset Priorities (DoD R) Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements (Continued) Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements (Continued) Integrated Physical Security System Role of Barriers in a Physical Protection System Against a Forced Entry Attack Defense Layers for Asset Example of Forcible Entry Intruder Timeline Ingress Time Between Barriers (from Barrier Technology Handbook, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND and MRC Report NSF/RA ) Detailed Design Flowchart Multiple Barrier Designs xii

13 11 Checklist of Minimum Site Work Protective Consideration Example of Collocating Facilities of Similar Criticality Exterior Site Blast Zone Fabric With Barbed Wire Outriggers Fence Configuration (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Security Fence Configuration for Nuclear Weapons (DoD C M) Optional Barbed Roll Topping for Nuclear Weapons (DoD M) Concrete Culvert Grill (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Removable Grating for Culverts (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Bar Grill Embedded in Concrete (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Large Culvert with Short Honeycomb Pipes (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Turnstile (Rotational) Personnel Gate (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Single Wheel-Supported (V-Groove) Sliding Gate (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Single Cantilevered Gate (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Example Entry Control Point (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Nuclear Weapons Storage Site Entry Control Facility (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Example Portal Structure for Access Control CCTV Camera Components Checklist of Minimum Building-Related Layout Considerations Class 5 Vault Door Dimensions Example Sacrificial Area Design For Very High Level Threats Penetration Times For Solid Concrete Masonry Walls Wood/Metal Composite Masonry Construction Penetration Times For Conventional Reinforced Concrete Walls/Roofs Penetration Times For Fiberous Reinforced Concrete Walls/Roofs High-Severity Threat Level Penetration Times for Reinforced Conventional and Fibrous-Concrete Floors Based on an Upward Attack Personnel Door Hinge Side Protection for Low- and Medium-Severity Threat Personnel Door, Representative Medium-Security Hinge- Side Protection Personnel Door Anti-Pry Strips For Medium-Security Applications Page xiii

14 39 Personnel Door, Auxiliary Rim-Lock Strike Reinforcement Shrouded Key Operated Shackle Padlock Per MIL-P Shrouded Hasp For Padlocks MIL-H Magazine Door Panel Cross Section For Very High- Severity Threat Window Barrier System For High-Severity Threat Example of Large Vent Pipe and Chases Rendered Non-Man-Passable by a Honeycomb of Welded Sections of Pipe of Non-Man-Passable Diameter High Security Can Be Provided by Vent Frame Hardening as Shown Ten-Gauge (3.4-mm) Hot-Rolled Steel Combinations (MIL-HDBK-1013/5) Nine-Gauge (3.8-mm) Hot-Rolled Steel Combinations (MIL-HDBK ) Polycarbonate Combinations (MIL-HDBK-1013/5) Typical Gratings (MIL-HDBK-1013/4) Retrofit Hardening Options For Hollow 8-inch CMU Wall Construction Retrofit Hardening Options For Mortar-Filled 8-inch CMU Wall Construction Hinge Side Protection Plan for Using a Pin-In-Socket Technique Hinge Side Protection for Doors Using a Forward Doorstop with Angle Hinge Side Protection for Hardening Typical Thick Doors by Using an Angle Stop Hinge Side Protection for Hardening Typical Thick Doors by Using an Angle Stop Riveted Steel Grating Security Intrusion Protection Plan for Hardening a Typical Door Ventilator Installation Details of Hardening a Typical Riveted Steel Grating and Shrouded Louver for Walls or Ceilings Security Intrusion Protection Plan for Hardening a Typical Wall or Ceiling Ballistic Limit Criteria Distance to Penetrate 1 to 4 Inches (25 to 100 mm) Versus Angle of Obliquity Figure 62 Sightlines Blocked From Potential Vantage Points Figure 63 Wall Arrangement to Block Sightlines Figure 64 Walls to Block Sightlines at Doors Figure 65 Oblique Window Openings Figure 66 Example of High-Severity-Ballistic-Threat Bullet- Resistant Glass Cross Section xiv Page

15 67 Parapets to Block Sightlines Example Antitank Grenade Launcher Weapon the Soviet RPG RPG Hardening Concrete/Sand Thickness Versus Standoff Distance ASP Walling System Building Layout Example Building Layout Example Building Layout Example Standard Sand-Grid Materials Retrofit Hardening Concrete/Sand Thickness Versus Distance Blast Wave Geometry Pressure Levels Versus Standoff Distance Reinforced Concrete Wall Design For 220-Pound (100- kg) Explosive Effects (Army Security Engineering Manual) Example Minimum Thickness [feet (meters)] of Thermal- Tempered Glass Glazing to Resist Reflected Overpressusre Application of Traffic Obstacles Security Barrier Moving Vehicle Impact Energy Versus Velocity (Passive Barriers) Moving Vehicle Impact Energy Versus Velocity (Active Barriers) Repair Levels Versus Standoff Distance For Various Charge Weights Page TABLES Table 1 Design Threat Parameters Asset Types Checklist of Asset Categories and Potential Aggressor Types Checklist of Design Threat for Aggressor Categories Checklist of Asset Category Versus Security System Ingress or Egress Denial Common Chain Link Fence Materials (MIL-HDBK-1013/10) Typical Exterior Sensor Types (Most Commonly Used Sensors are Underlined) Minimum Lighting Criteria for Unaided Guard Visual Assessment Relative Efficiencies and Restrike Times of Light Sources (From IES Lighting Handbook, J.E. Kaufman, ed.) xv

16 10 Minimum Construction Requirements for Class A Vaults (DIAM 50-3) Minimum Construction Requirements For Class B Vaults (DoD R) Minimum Construction Requirements For Strongrooms (DOD R) Minimum Construction Requirements For Risk Categories I Through IV (DoD M) Minimum Construction Requirements for Risk Categories II Through IV Arms, and Non-Earth-Covered Magazines (DoD M) Minimum Construction Requirements for Risk Categories II Through IV, Arms and Non-Earth Covered Magazines (Continued) Security Risk Categories (DoD M) Typical Magazine Doors Panels For Explosive Safety For Risk Categories I Through IV For Ammunition and Explosives Minimum Construction Requirements For Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Facilities (DoD M) Minimum Construction Requirements For Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities Reinforced Concrete Wall Designs For Very High Threat Levels Wall Construction Choices For New Construction Penetration Time Chart Index For Figure 31, Reinforced Concrete Masonry Walls Penetration Time Chart Index For Figures 33 and Penetration Time Chart Index For Figure Personnel Door Penetration Times Personnel Door Panel/Edge Details, Low Security Personnel Door Frame Details, Low Security Personnel Door Hardware Notes For Low- and Medium- Severity Threat Personnel Door Panel/Edge Details, Medium Security Personnel Door Frame Details, Medium Security Vault Door Options and Penetration Times High-Security Magazine Door Very High-Security Magazine Construction Vehicle Door Construction Time and Number of Cuts Required to Open a Man- Passable Entry in Grills Composed of Various Size Bars and Bar Spacings Recommended Glazing System Installed In a Low- Security Wall (Wood Frame) for a Low-Severity Threat Attack Page xvi

17 36 Recommended Glazing System Components Installed in a Medium-Security (CMU) Wall for a Medium-Severity Threat Attack Existing Wall Construction Achievable Penetration Times Steel-Ply Retrofit Installations for the High- Severity Level Attack Representative Existing Stud-Girt Construction Stud-Girt Construction Retrofit Options For Medium Threat Levels Existing Roof/Floor Construction Achievable Penetration Times Existing Roof/Floor Concrete Construction Existing Roof/Floor Wood Construction Maximum Penetration Times (Minutes) by Threat Security Levels, Existing Metal Roofs and Floors Firearm Ballistic Threats Construction for Ballistic Resistance Wall Construction Capable of Defeating the MIL-SAMIT Very High Threat Transparent Armor Capable of Defeating the High- Severity Threat Upgraded Walls for High-Severity Threat Retrofit Construction Capable of Defeating the Very High-Severity Level Example Operational Characteristics of an RPG (Soviet RPG-7) Predetonation Screen Effectiveness Stationary Bomb Threats Moving Vehicle Transported Bomb Threats BIBLIOGRAPHY REFERENCES GLOSSARY INDEX Page xvii

18 Section 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose and Scope. This handbook is to be used during the engineering design of Department of Defense (DoD) facilities to assure appropriate physical security is included. The guidelines are based upon the best currently available research and test data, and will be revised or expanded as additional research results become available. The contents include procedures for planning and designing an integrated physical security system for new facilities as well as the retrofit of existing facilities. The focus is on construction choices for protection against forced entry, and ballistic and standoff weapons. Design procedures are also summarized for vehicle bomb blast protection, referencing appropriate sources for details. 1.2 Cancellation. This handbook supersedes Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK) 1013/1, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Fixed Land-Based Facilities, dated 9 October Using the Handbook. This handbook is divided into eight major sections and four appendices. Sections 2 and 3 contain procedures to follow during the planning and design phases of a project to assure adequate security. Sections 4 through 8 contain supporting detailed design data and instructions. The appendices contain physical security system design worksheets. The content of each major section is summarized as follows: Section 2 - Pre-Design Phase: Specific requirements and criteria for the security system are established during the pre-design phase. The section begins with a brief overview of DoD directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements. This is followed by a procedure to establish: (1) the design threat, (2) the operating procedures and expected alarm response times of the security guard forces, and (3) other requirements and constraints that may affect the security system design. Section 3 - Design Phase: The objective of this phase is to design an integrated physical security system that meets the requirements and criteria identified during the pre-design phase. The section begins with a discussion of the elements of a physical security system followed by the definitions of certain key terms. It then provides a step-by-step procedure for designing the security system for a new facility or the retrofit design of an existing facility using the detailed information in Sections 4 through 8. Section 4 - Exterior Site-Related Physical Security: This section addresses the design of the outermost elements of the security system. The exterior area involved lies between the perimeter of the site and the facility containing the assets to be protected. Exterior physical security contributes to the effectiveness of an integrated security system design in the choice of: (1) site layout, including facility location relative to fences and vehicle barriers to enhance protection against forced entry, bomb blast, standoff weapons and ballistic threats; (2) access control at site points of entry to 1

19 protect against covert entry threats; (3) exterior intrusion detection sensors or guards to detect perimeter crossover points; (4) closed-circuit television (CCTV) or guards to assess an alarm as a threat; (5) security lighting to support the threat detection and assessment function; and (6) other essential functions that must be maintained to support the above elements. Each of these elements is addressed referring to other sources for more details when appropriate. Section 5 - Building Physical Security Against Forced and Covert Entry: This section begins with a description of the threat severity levels for forced and covert entry followed by an overview of the important elements required to achieve an effective integrated security system design including building layout, access control, interior intrusion detection system, and CCTV. Minimum prescribed DoD security construction requirements for vaults and strongrooms; sensitive compartmented information facilities; and arms, ammunition, and explosive (AA&E,) and nuclear weapons facilities are then provided, including related penetration delay times. For those cases where the minimum prescribed designs do not provide sufficient delay relative to guard response times, or when there are no prescribed designs for a given facility type, see Section 5.5 (for new construction) or Section 5.6 (for retrofit construction) for design options that achieve the required delays. Section 6 - Ballistic Attack Hardening: This section begins with a description of the small arms and military ballistic threats and the general hardening mechanisms by which they can be stopped. Hardening design options available for both new and retrofit construction are then presented. Section 7 - Standoff Weapons Hardening: This section begins with a description of the standoff Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) threat and the general mechanisms by which RPGs can be stopped. Hardening design options available for both new and retrofit construction are then presented. Section 8 - Bomb Blast Hardening: This section summarizes the design approach for hardening against vehicle-transported bomb blast effects for both new and existing construction. 1.4 Related Technical Documents. Use this handbook to address specific design problems relative to specific subject areas (doors, vehicle barrier, etc.). Related technical documents are identified appropriately within the text for each unique subject area. 2

20 Section 2: PRE-DESIGN PHASE 2.1 Introduction Objective. The objective of the pre-design phase is to establish specific requirements and criteria for the design of a security system for either a new or retrofit facility. These requirements and criteria include: (1) the design threat the security system must protect against; (2) the operating procedures, including response time, of the security guard force; and (3) any physical, functional, or budgetary constraints associated with the site or building that can affect the security system design. These requirements must also consider the specific planning policies and procedures reflected in related military directives and instructions. Establishing security requirements during the pre-design phase allows security to be addressed early at the start of a project allowing it to be integrated into the total design of the building efficiently and cost effectively Design Team. The design team should include representatives from the intended facility users, as well as the designated military installation intelligence officers, operational officers, security or law enforcement officials, and engineering and planning personnel. The facility user can help identify special operational or logistical requirements as well as the relative criticality of the asset contained in the facility. Intelligence personnel can provide input on historical or projected future threats and their likely targets. Operations personnel can provide information on the criticality of assets from the overall installation or activity level. Security personnel can help establish the response capabilities of the security guard forces as well as identify potential criminal threats. Engineering and planning personnel should organize the effort and consolidate all facility information into the appropriate documents Section Organization. Paragraph 2.2 is a brief overview of DoD directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements. Paragraph 2.3 is a general discussion of the steps to be taken during the pre-design phase to establish the design threat. Paragraph 2.4 addresses the response operating procedures and related alarm response time of the security guard force. Paragraph 2.5 presents other requirements and constraints that can affect the security system design. 2.2 Physical Security Planning Policy and Requirements. This section provides a brief overview of a number of DoD and other directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements DoD Directive R: Security of DoD Installations and Resources. This directive prescribes minimum standards and policies related to the physical protection of personnel, installations, and assets of the DoD. The objective is to minimize damage or reduce loss or theft to assets, and to ensure that war-fighting capabilities are maintained. Specific areas 3

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is unlimited. UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

More information

A Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) for Physical Security

A Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) for Physical Security A Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) for Physical Security Violence, vandalism, and terrorism are prevalent in the world today. Managers and decision-makers must have a reliable way of estimating risk to

More information

1. Perimeter fencing or walls should enclose the vicinity around cargo handling and loading areas, as well as storage facilities.

1. Perimeter fencing or walls should enclose the vicinity around cargo handling and loading areas, as well as storage facilities. 2. Physical Security Cargo handling and storage facilities in domestic and foreign locations must have physical barriers and deterrents that guard against unauthorized access. Where applicable, there must

More information

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. Unit I Building Design for Homeland Security

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. Unit I Building Design for Homeland Security BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I Building Design for Homeland Security Participant Introductions Name Affiliation Area of Concentration BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-2 Course

More information

This directive establishes Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy regarding the physical protection of facilities and real property.

This directive establishes Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy regarding the physical protection of facilities and real property. Department of Homeland Security Management Directives System MD Number: 11030.1 Issue Date: 04/21/2003 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF FACILITIES AND REAL PROPERTY I. Purpose This directive establishes Department

More information

Physical Security. Paul Troncone CS 996

Physical Security. Paul Troncone CS 996 Physical Security Paul Troncone CS 996 NSTISSI 4011 Building Construction Alarms Access Controls Information Systems Centers Personnel Security Tamper Resistance Goals of Physical Security Safeguard personnel

More information

Physical Security for Drinking Water Facilities

Physical Security for Drinking Water Facilities Physical Security for Drinking Water Facilities December, 2009 State of Oregon Oregon Health Authority Drinking Water Program In Association with The City of Gresham Water Utilities The City of Portland

More information

PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM. April 9, 2007. Incorporating Change 1, May 27, 2009 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I))

PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM. April 9, 2007. Incorporating Change 1, May 27, 2009 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)) DoD 5200.08-R PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM April 9, 2007 Incorporating Change 1, May 27, 2009 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)) FOREWORD This Regulation is issued under the authority of

More information

How to Solve the Most Persistent Problem in Perimeter Security Systems

How to Solve the Most Persistent Problem in Perimeter Security Systems How to Solve the Most Persistent Problem in Perimeter Security Systems Duane Thompson General Manager of Fiber SenSys Carrondo, Antonio Commercial Manager, Teleprinta Perimeter Security Challenging!! More

More information

Site Security Standards and Strategy

Site Security Standards and Strategy Site Security Standards and Strategy I. Background and Overview A. The City s Program Standards and Procedures (PSP) are intended to be used in conjunction with the data contained in related standards

More information

Security-in-Depth 4/26/2013. Physical Security Webinar. DCO Meeting Room Navigation. Host: Danny Jennings

Security-in-Depth 4/26/2013. Physical Security Webinar. DCO Meeting Room Navigation. Host: Danny Jennings Security-in-Depth Physical Security Webinar Host: Danny Jennings Physical Security Curriculum Manager responsible for: Curriculum development Course instruction Curriculum review Retired military; over

More information

3.0 Nonsystem Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC

3.0 Nonsystem Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC 3.0 Nonsystem Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC 3.1 Security 3.1.1 Design Features The physical security system provides physical features to detect, delay, assist response to, and defend against the

More information

Protection of unoccupied or void properties

Protection of unoccupied or void properties Real Estate Issue one Protection of unoccupied or void properties Introduction The current economic downturn has lead to a greatly increased number of vacant properties. In some countries rates of unoccupancy

More information

Supply Chain Security Audit Tool - Warehousing/Distribution

Supply Chain Security Audit Tool - Warehousing/Distribution Supply Chain Security Audit Tool - Warehousing/Distribution This audit tool was developed to assist manufacturer clients with the application of the concepts in the Rx-360 Supply Chain Security White Paper:

More information

APPENDIX E FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE CHECKLIST Date: Name and Telephone Number of Regional Firearms Manager:

APPENDIX E FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE CHECKLIST Date: Name and Telephone Number of Regional Firearms Manager: APPENDIX E FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE CHECKLIST Date: Name and Location of Activity: Location of Storage Site: Name and Telephone Number of Regional Firearms Manager: Name and Telephone Number

More information

Security Tools. Forms. Physical Security Assessment Security Plan Template Traffic Control Plan Template

Security Tools. Forms. Physical Security Assessment Security Plan Template Traffic Control Plan Template Security Tools Forms Physical Security Assessment Security Plan Template Traffic Control Plan Template 1 Physical Security Assessment (PSA) Date: I. PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT (PSA): EXTERIOR OF THE

More information

Security at San Onofre

Security at San Onofre Security at San Onofre April 16, 2015 Ross Quam Security Manager Overview 1. Mission 2. Adversary Characteristics 3. Plans and Procedures 4. Insider Mitigation 5. Local Law Enforcement Agency Support 2

More information

IOWA LABORATORIES FACILITIES PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

IOWA LABORATORIES FACILITIES PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN IOWA LABORATORIES FACILITIES PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN Submitted pursuant to SF 439, Section 14 Iowa Department of Public Safety Senate File 439 of the 80 th General Assembly, Section 14(1) directed the Department

More information

Security Barriers in the Physical Protection Concept of Nuclear Facilities In Switzerland

Security Barriers in the Physical Protection Concept of Nuclear Facilities In Switzerland Security Barriers in the Physical Protection Concept of Nuclear Facilities In Switzerland B. Wieland Swiss Federal Office of Energy, CH 3003 Berne, Switzerland ABSTRACT: The presentation describes the

More information

Physical Security Checklist and Inventory

Physical Security Checklist and Inventory Tool 1: Assessing Robbery Risk Physical Security Checklist and Inventory Any assessment of robbery risk begins with an evaluation and inventory of the measures you are already taking as a financial institution.

More information

Current as of 11/10/08 1 of 1

Current as of 11/10/08 1 of 1 BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS FOR SCHOOLS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR BEING PLANNED FOR CONSTRUCTION I. Site Layout A. School buildings shall be provided with a securable perimeter. A securable perimeter means that

More information

Does a fence or other type physical barrier define the perimeter of the facility?

Does a fence or other type physical barrier define the perimeter of the facility? PHYSCIAL SECURITY SURVEY CHECKLIST PERIMETER BARRIERS TRANSIT FACILITIES Does a fence or other type physical barrier define the perimeter of the facility? (1) Specify type and height of physical barrier

More information

WESTERVILLE DIVISION OF POLICE Security Survey Checklist: Business

WESTERVILLE DIVISION OF POLICE Security Survey Checklist: Business Business Name: Owner Name: Business Address: Officer: Survey No.: WESTERVILLE DIVISION OF POLICE Security Survey Checklist: Business "Being There When Needed" DOORS 1. Is the exterior doors solid core

More information

SECURITY AND GUARDING SERVICES ORDINANCE (Chapter 460) (Notice under section 6(1)(b)(iii))

SECURITY AND GUARDING SERVICES ORDINANCE (Chapter 460) (Notice under section 6(1)(b)(iii)) SECURITY AND GUARDING SERVICES ORDINANCE (Chapter 460) (Notice under section 6(1)(b)(iii)) MATTERS TO WHICH THE SECURITY AND GUARDING SERVICES INDUSTRY AUTHORITY SHALL HAVE REGARD WHEN DETERMINING AN APPLICATION

More information

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE FOR AVIATION POLICY GUIDE FOR THE CONDUCT OF AVIATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SURVEYS

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE FOR AVIATION POLICY GUIDE FOR THE CONDUCT OF AVIATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SURVEYS Attachment 1 APHIS Directive 1650.2 APHIS Aviation Security Program 2/28/06 INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE FOR AVIATION POLICY GUIDE FOR THE CONDUCT OF AVIATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SURVEYS (PHYSICAL SECURITY) CHECKLIST

More information

Nuclear Plant Security Systems

Nuclear Plant Security Systems Nuclear Plant Security Systems Course Description Gary W Castleberry, PE This course will introduce the student into the design of security systems for commercial nuclear power plants. An overview of plant

More information

File 6: Appendix A, 36 CFR 1234 (formally numbered as 36 CFR 1228 subpart K) Federal Facility Security Standards (version 2.0 issued May 15, 2014)

File 6: Appendix A, 36 CFR 1234 (formally numbered as 36 CFR 1228 subpart K) Federal Facility Security Standards (version 2.0 issued May 15, 2014) File 6: Appendix A, 36 CFR 1234 (formally numbered as 36 CFR 1228 subpart K) Federal Facility Security Standards (version 2.0 issued May 15, 2014) Appendix A -- Minimum Security Standards for Level Federal

More information

Date: Business Name: Business Contact Person: Business Address: Business Telephone Number: Alternate Contact Number/Email: Officer: Case No:

Date: Business Name: Business Contact Person: Business Address: Business Telephone Number: Alternate Contact Number/Email: Officer: Case No: ISLE OF PALMS POLICE DEPARTMENT Thomas E. Buckhannon, III, Chief of Police 30 J. C. Long Boulevard Isle of Palms, South Carolina 29451 (843) 886-6522 BUSINESS SECURITY SURVEY Date: Business Name: Business

More information

Commercial or Business Security Survey

Commercial or Business Security Survey Exterior Grounds Commercial or Business Security Survey Is there a fence around the property or a clear definition of Territoriality? If there is a fence, is it tall enough and maintained in good repair?

More information

REQUIREMENTS RESPECTING THE SECURITY OF OFFSHORE FACILITIES

REQUIREMENTS RESPECTING THE SECURITY OF OFFSHORE FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS RESPECTING THE SECURITY OF OFFSHORE FACILITIES Definitions 1. In these requirements: C-NLOPB means the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board; Chief Safety Officer means

More information

The Tested and Proven Performance* of Security Grade Chain Link Fencing Systems

The Tested and Proven Performance* of Security Grade Chain Link Fencing Systems The Tested and Proven Performance* of Security Grade Chain Link Fencing Systems Deterring Delaying Protecting Published by the Chain Link Fence Manufacturers Institute (CLFMI) 10015 Old Columbia Road Suite

More information

Security Guidelines for. Agricultural distributors

Security Guidelines for. Agricultural distributors Security Guidelines for Agricultural distributors SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR AGRICULTURAL DISTRIBUTORS As a result of global uncertainties the security of agricultural retail facilities has taken on a whole

More information

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 provides background information on electronic safety and secuirty (ESS), including the definition and areas of knowledge required for an ESS designer. Information contained

More information

Risk Management Handbook

Risk Management Handbook Risk Management Handbook 1999 Introduction Risk management is the process of selecting and implementing countermeasures to achieve an acceptable level of risk at an acceptable cost. The analytical risk

More information

Ensuring Better Outcomes in Pharmaceutical Warehouse Security 2012 Supply Chain Security Seminar, Wilmington DE

Ensuring Better Outcomes in Pharmaceutical Warehouse Security 2012 Supply Chain Security Seminar, Wilmington DE Ensuring Better Outcomes in Pharmaceutical Warehouse Security 2012 Supply Chain Security Seminar, Wilmington DE Mike Elliot, Executive Vice President Managed Costs Regulatory Compliance Cargo Theft Product

More information

MONROE POLICE DEPARTMENT

MONROE POLICE DEPARTMENT MONROE POLICE DEPARTMENT 104 Stage Road Monroe, NY 10950 Main: (845) 782-8644 - Fax: (845) 782-2227 A. Alex Melchiorre Website: www.monroepd.org Chief of Police BUSINESS BURGLARY PREVENTION TIPS Is your

More information

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. Unit IV Vulnerability Assessment

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. Unit IV Vulnerability Assessment Unit IV Vulnerability Assessment Vulnerability Any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor or, in a non-terrorist threat environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard damage Unit IV-2 Unit Objectives

More information

Exercise: Using the ISACS AT to Support Physical Security and Stockpile Management

Exercise: Using the ISACS AT to Support Physical Security and Stockpile Management Exercise: Using the ISACS AT to Support Physical Security and Stockpile Management ISACS Operational Module 05.20: Stockpile Management: Weapons SCENARIO Context You are on deployment in a foreign country,

More information

Introduction. Industry Changes

Introduction. Industry Changes Introduction The Electronic Safety and Security Design Reference Manual (ESSDRM) is designed to educate and inform professionals in the safety and security arena. The ESSDRM discusses trends and expertise

More information

Palm Beach County Sheriff s Office

Palm Beach County Sheriff s Office Palm Beach County Sheriff s Office Business Security Self Survey Since 1909, the deputies of Palm Beach County have provided a safe environment for hundreds of thousands of people who live, work and visit

More information

The Design Process of Physical Security as Applied to a U.S. Border Port Of Entry

The Design Process of Physical Security as Applied to a U.S. Border Port Of Entry The Design Process of Physical Security as Applied to a U.S. Border Port Of Entry George G. Wagner Sandia National Laboratories MS 0762, Albuquerque, NM 87185 ABSTRACT This paper describes the design process

More information

U.S. DoD Physical Security Market

U.S. DoD Physical Security Market U.S. DoD Physical Security Market Technologies Used for DoD Applications June 2011 Table of Contents Executive Summary 7 Introduction 8 Definitions and Scope 9-11 Percentage of FY 2010 Total Budget Request

More information

Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive)

Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) Army Regulation 190 51 Military Police Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 30 September 1993 UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY of CHANGE

More information

Chapter 8. EOC Security Concepts and Requirements:

Chapter 8. EOC Security Concepts and Requirements: : One of the primary objectives in the design and construction (or retrofit) of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is to provide a safe and secure environment that will enable the emergency management

More information

"DOT IN-DEPTH HAZMAT SECURITY TRAINING"

DOT IN-DEPTH HAZMAT SECURITY TRAINING PRESENTER'S GUIDE "DOT IN-DEPTH HAZMAT SECURITY TRAINING" For the Department of Transportation's 49 CFR 172.700 Subpart H Training Requirements Quality Safety and Health Products, for Today...and Tomorrow

More information

COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES

COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES SECRETARIAT GENERAL 3bis, rue de la Chaussée d'antin F 75009 Paris Tél. : +33 1 44 83 11 73 Fax : +33 1 44 83 11 85 Web : cea.assur.org DELEGATION A BRUXELLES Square de Meeûs,

More information

Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security. A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach. www.thalesgroup.com/security-services

Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security. A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach. www.thalesgroup.com/security-services Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach www.thalesgroup.com/security-services Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security This white paper discusses current

More information

FIREARMS SECURITY. A Brief Guide

FIREARMS SECURITY. A Brief Guide FIREARMS SECURITY A Brief Guide THIS LEAFLET GIVES ADVICE ON THE LEVELS OF SECURITY REQUIRED FOR SECTION 1 FIREARMS, SECTION 1 AMMUNITION AND SHOTGUNS. ( FIREARMS MEANS BOTH SECTION 1 FIREARMS AND SHOTGUNS).

More information

Emergency Incident Management Systems

Emergency Incident Management Systems Emergency Incident Management Systems Fundamentals and Applications LOUIS N. MOLINO, Sr.,WILEY- INTERSCIENCE A JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC., PUBLICATION CONTENTS Acknowledgments, vii About the Author, ix Preface,

More information

Security Recommendations for the Small Business. Adapted from Security and the Small Business Retailer U.S. Department of Justice

Security Recommendations for the Small Business. Adapted from Security and the Small Business Retailer U.S. Department of Justice Security Recommendations for the Small Business Adapted from Security and the Small Business Retailer U.S. Department of Justice Recommendations for Business Security - Robbery Because of the potential

More information

Effective Solutions for Increased Security in NH Public Schools. State of New Hampshire Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Effective Solutions for Increased Security in NH Public Schools. State of New Hampshire Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management State of New Hampshire Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Effective Solutions for Increased Security in NH Public Schools 33 Hazen Drive Concord, NH 03305 Effective Date: June 25, 2014

More information

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT. Correctional Facilities Are Only as Secure as Their Weakest Point

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT. Correctional Facilities Are Only as Secure as Their Weakest Point VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT Correctional Facilities Are Only as Secure as Their Weakest Point Today's correctional security system is a complex configuration of personnel, procedures, detection, delay and

More information

Appendix G. Security management plan

Appendix G. Security management plan Appendix G Security management plan Security Management Plan Prepared by: Kann Finch Group Project Energy Australia Belmore Park Zone 1- Sub-station component General Design Requirements The perimeter

More information

Walking and Working Surface Checklist:

Walking and Working Surface Checklist: Walking and Working Surfaces Purpose: This information is presented to improve the level of safety in our operations, and to inform you that we will comply with the OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910.23. Responsibility:

More information

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ANY TERRORIST ATTACK ON SCHOOLS.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ANY TERRORIST ATTACK ON SCHOOLS. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ANY TERRORIST ATTACK ON SCHOOLS. 1. Background: Experience gained in handing terrorism in recent years has shown that with a view to gain widespread media

More information

INTRUSION ALARM SYSTEM

INTRUSION ALARM SYSTEM INTRUSION ALARM SYSTEM Case studies reveal most burglars are deterred by the mere presence of an alarm system. Burglars attack unprotected premises considerably more often than ones protected by alarm

More information

Facility XXXX Site Security Survey Date: 10/9-10/10/02. (A) Perimeter Security Feature Yes No Comments

Facility XXXX Site Security Survey Date: 10/9-10/10/02. (A) Perimeter Security Feature Yes No Comments Facility XXXX Site Security Survey Date: 10/9-10/10/02 (A) Perimeter Security DELAY/DETER Site Boundary None of the critical facilities have protective Fence (Height and Construction) fences. Outriggers

More information

Guidance Notes FSR 2014

Guidance Notes FSR 2014 Definition (page 13) TERM DEFINITION GUIDANCE/ AMENDMENT BACKED UP To make a copy of a data file which is stored securely in a separate location and can be used as a security copy. To make a copy of a

More information

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROTECTS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROTECTS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROTECTS 1 DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROTECTS The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is the security and law enforcement arm of

More information

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) SECURITY ENGINEERING: WATERFRONT SECURITY

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) SECURITY ENGINEERING: WATERFRONT SECURITY UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) SECURITY ENGINEERING: WATERFRONT SECURITY APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) SECURITY ENGINEERING: WATERFRONT SECURITY

More information

Barrington Hills Police Department

Barrington Hills Police Department Barrington Hills Police Department Home Security Checklist Use this as a guide as you check your home for safety measures. Boxes marked indicate areas where you could take action to improve your home s

More information

Security Guidelines for Premises Storing/Handling Security Sensitive Materials (SSMs) A-1

Security Guidelines for Premises Storing/Handling Security Sensitive Materials (SSMs) A-1 Security Guidelines for Premises Storing/Handling Security Sensitive Materials (SSMs) S/N Area of Interest Description Recommended Measures 1 Perimeter Security Perimeter barriers Perimeter barriers are

More information

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE SECURITY SYSTEMS BRANCH TECHNICAL SECURITY SERVICES PROTECTIVE POLICING DIRECTORATE OTTAWA, ONTARIO K1A 0R2

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE SECURITY SYSTEMS BRANCH TECHNICAL SECURITY SERVICES PROTECTIVE POLICING DIRECTORATE OTTAWA, ONTARIO K1A 0R2 ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE SECURITY SYSTEMS BRANCH TECHNICAL SECURITY SERVICES PROTECTIVE POLICING DIRECTORATE OTTAWA, ONTARIO K1A 0R2 SECURITY GUIDE SSB/SG-17 VAULTS MARCH, 1985 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

More information

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAN. Organization responsible for the review of physical security

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAN. Organization responsible for the review of physical security NUREG-0800 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAN 13.6.2 PHYSICAL SECURITY DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Organization responsible for the review of physical security

More information

Surveillance and Security Technologies for Bridges and Tunnels

Surveillance and Security Technologies for Bridges and Tunnels Surveillance and Security Technologies for Bridges and Tunnels Sheila Rimal Duwadi, P.E., Team Leader Bridge Safety, Reliability and Security, Federal Highway Administration, 6300 Georgetown Pike, McLean

More information

Palm Beach State College Security Plan

Palm Beach State College Security Plan Palm Beach State Security Plan Prepared by: J.E. Smith Date: September 17, 2008 INTRODUCTION This Security Plan describes the organization, activities, methodology, and documentation by which Palm Beach

More information

SECURITY FACTS. A Physical Security Technology Newsletter

SECURITY FACTS. A Physical Security Technology Newsletter SECURITY FACTS A Physical Security Technology Newsletter IN THIS ISSUE: THE FUTURE IS HERE: THE INTERNAL LOCKING DEVICE SYSTEM X-09 COMBINATION MOTOR REPLACEMENT STORAGE EQUIPMENT AND LOCKING SYSTEMS (SEALS)

More information

How to secure your property after a disaster

How to secure your property after a disaster How to secure your property after a disaster The Red Guide to Recovery HOuse secured properly Board-Up of Windows, Doors and Roof Hole. Lot secured with Perimeter Fencing. Fires, floods, tornadoes, hurricanes,

More information

Stanford University Video Surveillance System Guidelines

Stanford University Video Surveillance System Guidelines Stanford University Video Surveillance System Guidelines Effective Date: May 1, 2014 Stanford University / Video Surveillance System Guidelines Page 1 Video Surveillance System Guidelines Statement All

More information

Integrated Physical Security and Incident Management

Integrated Physical Security and Incident Management IT Enterprise Services Integrated Physical Security and Incident Management Every organisation needs to be confident about its physical security and its ability to respond to unexpected incidents. Protecting

More information

MAJOR PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION SAFETY STANDARD HS-09 Revision 0

MAJOR PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION SAFETY STANDARD HS-09 Revision 0 MAJOR PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION SAFETY SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM STANDARD HS-09 Document Owner(s) Tom Munro Project/Organization Role Supervisor, Major Projects Safety & Security (Canada) Version Control:

More information

Vindicator Security Solutions. Security for Mission-Critical Applications

Vindicator Security Solutions. Security for Mission-Critical Applications Vindicator Security Solutions Security for Mission-Critical Applications About Vindicator Security Solutions Photo courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense. Military, Federal and State Governments Ports

More information

CAT VIII WORKING DRAFT

CAT VIII WORKING DRAFT Category VIII Military Aircraft and Associated Equipment A. End Items, Systems, Accessories, Attachments, Equipment, Parts and Components 1. Fighter, bomber, attack, or specialized fixed or rotary wing

More information

Counterintelligence Awareness Glossary

Counterintelligence Awareness Glossary Counterintelligence Awareness Glossary Access: The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. Anomaly: Activity r knowledge, outside the norm, that suggests a foreign entity

More information

National Infrastructure Protection Center

National Infrastructure Protection Center National Infrastructure Protection Center Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets November 2002 Summary As organizations increase security measures and attempt to identify vulnerabilities

More information

Ten Tips for Completing a Site Security Plan

Ten Tips for Completing a Site Security Plan TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS PETROCHEMICal Commercial Industrial Retail Federal Systems Banking Ten Tips for Completing a Site Security Plan Introduction The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)

More information

Element D Services Electrical

Element D Services Electrical Security Systems PART 1 - GENERAL 1.01 OVERVIEW A. The objective for each security design element is to help MD Anderson meet its mission and vision by promoting an environment in which higher education,

More information

Global Supply Chain Security Recommendations

Global Supply Chain Security Recommendations Global Supply Chain Security Recommendations These minimum security criteria are fundamentally designed to be the building blocks for foreign manufacturers to institute effective security practices designed

More information

Science/Safeguards and Security. Funding Profile by Subprogram

Science/Safeguards and Security. Funding Profile by Subprogram Safeguards and Security Safeguards and Security Funding Profile by Subprogram (dollars in thousands) Protective Forces 35,059 37,147 Security Systems 11,896 10,435 Information Security 4,655 4,595 Cyber

More information

Conducting Security System Site Surveys

Conducting Security System Site Surveys Conducting Security System Site Surveys Written By: Harold C. Gillens, PSP, CFC, CHS-III Quintech Security Consultants, Inc. 102 Sangaree Park Court Suite 4 Summerville, SC 29483 CONDUCTING SECURITY SYSTEM

More information

Advanced Fencing and Security Technologies Ltd

Advanced Fencing and Security Technologies Ltd G.M. Advanced Fencing and Security Technologies Ltd P.O. Box 2327 Kfar Sava Industrial Area 44425, Israel Tel +972-9-7662965 Fax + 972-9-7662964 E-mail: info@gmsecurity.com Website: www.gmsecurity.com

More information

The Fight Against Terror Singapore s National Security Strategy

The Fight Against Terror Singapore s National Security Strategy Enhancing Building Security Useful and Practical Measures Building and Construction Authority Singapore Civil Defence Force Internal Security Department Singapore Police Force The Fight Against Terror

More information

Court Security Guidelines

Court Security Guidelines July 3, 2002 Court Security Guidelines Michigan State Court Administrative Office TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Application of Guidelines....................................... 2 SECTION 1 Administrative

More information

SCHEME OF EXAMINATION PG DIPLOMA IN CORPORATE AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT (PGDCISM) ONE YEAR PROGRAMME

SCHEME OF EXAMINATION PG DIPLOMA IN CORPORATE AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT (PGDCISM) ONE YEAR PROGRAMME 62 SCHEME OF EXAMINATION PG DIPLOMA IN CORPORATE AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT (PGDCISM) ONE YEAR PROGRAMME Note: 1. There will be 70 multiple choice questions (MCQ s) in the question paper consisting

More information

Security 101 For School Safety. Intertech Associates, Inc. Lunch & Learn

Security 101 For School Safety. Intertech Associates, Inc. Lunch & Learn Security 101 For School Safety Intertech Associates, Inc. Lunch & Learn Safe & Secure Educational Environment What type of school is it? What type of security risks do schools see? How can traffic flows,

More information

A Method to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities

A Method to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities NOV. 02 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice Special REPORT Final Version A Method to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities U.S. Department

More information

SECURITY VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST FOR ACADEMIC AND SMALL CHEMICAL LABORATORY FACILITIES

SECURITY VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST FOR ACADEMIC AND SMALL CHEMICAL LABORATORY FACILITIES SECURITY VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST FOR ACADEMIC AND SMALL CHEMICAL LABORATORY FACILITIES by the American Chemical Society, Committee on Chemical Safety, Safe Practices Subcommittee Introduction Terrorism

More information

FRONTIER PITTS Datacentre Protection

FRONTIER PITTS Datacentre Protection FRONTIER PITTS Introduction Bespoke protection for Data and Cash Centres Frontier Pitts secure various Data Centres and Cash Centres in the UK and around the World, with a variety of equipment from both

More information

SECTION 08360 SECTIONAL OVERHEAD DOORS 521 SERIES ALUMINUM SECTIONAL OVERHEAD DOORS

SECTION 08360 SECTIONAL OVERHEAD DOORS 521 SERIES ALUMINUM SECTIONAL OVERHEAD DOORS SECTION 08360 SECTIONAL OVERHEAD DOORS 521 SERIES ALUMINUM SECTIONAL OVERHEAD DOORS Display hidden notes to specifier by using Tools / Options / View / Hidden Text. On newer versions of Microsoft Word

More information

Building Integration System Your platform for customized security and safety management

Building Integration System Your platform for customized security and safety management Building Integration System Your platform for customized security and safety management 2 One platform for everything Efficient building management is becoming not only more important, but also a more

More information

Alarm Systems. The purpose of an intruder alarm system is: Commonly utilised detection devices include:

Alarm Systems. The purpose of an intruder alarm system is: Commonly utilised detection devices include: Alarm Systems An intruder alarm system is designed to detect intruder presence at your premises. When detected, a siren will activate and communicate an alarm signal to one of our highly sophisticated

More information

APPENDIX B ABOUT U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION: MISSION AND CORE VALUES

APPENDIX B ABOUT U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION: MISSION AND CORE VALUES APPENDIX B ABOUT U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION: MISSION AND CORE VALUES Northern Border Activities B-1 July 2012 CBP MISSION We are the guardians of our Nation s borders. We are America s frontline.

More information

Totally Wireless Video Security

Totally Wireless Video Security Traditional Video Surveillance ($50,000+) vs. Event-Based Videofied Solution ($2,500) Executive Summary: Totally Wireless Video Security has been effective but cost and complexity has limited deployment

More information

Building Integration System Your platform for customized security and safety management

Building Integration System Your platform for customized security and safety management A Tradition of Quality and Innovation For 12 years, the Bosch name stands for quality and reliability. Bosch is the global supplier of choice for innovative technology, backed by the highest standards

More information

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) UFC 4-010-01 DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM

More information

Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment

Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment SANDIA REPORT SAND2004-4712 Unlimited Release Printed September 2004 Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment Cynthia L. Nelson Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore,

More information

UFF Position Statement: Fire and Smoke as a Weapon

UFF Position Statement: Fire and Smoke as a Weapon UFF Position Statement: Fire and Smoke as a Weapon According to the United States Department of Homeland Security, international terrorist groups and violent extremists have shown interest in using fire

More information

Department of Defense INSTRUCTION. SUBJECT: Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring and Information Assurance (IA) Readiness Testing

Department of Defense INSTRUCTION. SUBJECT: Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring and Information Assurance (IA) Readiness Testing Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 8560.01 October 9, 2007 ASD(NII)/DoD CIO SUBJECT: Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring and Information Assurance (IA) Readiness Testing References: (a) DoD

More information