MIL-HDBK-1013/1A 15 DECEMBER 1993 SUPERSEDING MIL-HDBK-1013/1 9 OCTOBER 1987 MILITARY HANDBOOK DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES

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1 +)))))))))), INCH-POUND.))))))))))- MIL-HDBK-1013/1A 15 DECEMBER 1993 SUPERSEDING MIL-HDBK-1013/1 9 OCTOBER 1987 MILITARY HANDBOOK DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES AMSC N/A DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. UNLIMITED APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS AREA FACR

2 ABSTRACT This manual provides guidance to ensure that appropriate physical security considerations are included in the design of facilities. The pre-design phase, including physical security threats, are discussed initially, followed by an overview of the design phase. Specific technical sections include exterior site physical security, building physical security, ballistic attack hardening, standoff weapon hardening, and bomb blast hardening. ii

3 FOREWORD This military handbook has been developed from an evaluation of facilities in the shore establishment, from surveys of the availability of new materials and construction methods, and from selection of the best design practices of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, other DOD services and Government agencies, and the private sector. It uses, to the maximum extent feasible, national professional society, association, and institute standards. Deviations from this criteria, in the planning, engineering, design, and construction of facilities, cannot be made without prior approval of respective military departments. Design cannot remain static any more than can the functions it serves or the technologies it uses. Accordingly, recommendations for improvement are encouraged and should be furnished to the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC), Code ESC12, 560 Center Drive, Port Hueneme, CA , telephone (805) THIS HANDBOOK SHALL NOT BE USED AS A REFERENCE DOCUMENT FOR PROCUREMENT OF FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION. IT IS TO BE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF FACILITIES ENGINEERING STUDIES AND DESIGN (FINAL PLANS, SPECIFICATIONS, AND COST ESTIMATES). DO NOT REFERENCE IT IN MILITARY OR FEDERAL SPECIFICATIONS OR OTHER PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS. iii

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5 DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES CONTENTS Section 1 INTRODUCTION Purpose and Scope Cancellation Using the Handbook Related Technical Documents Section 2 PRE-DESIGN PHASE Introduction Objective Design Team Section Organization Page 2.2 Physical Security Planning Policy and Requirements DoD Directive R: Security of DoD Installations and Resources Security System Elements and Performance Objectives Physical Security Threat and Prioritization of Assets Protective Design and Military Construction MIL-HDBK-1190: Facility Planning and Design DoD R: DoD Information Security Program Regulation of 30 May 1986; DoD R: DoD Personnel Security Program Regulation of 16 December 1986; and DoD : Distribution Statements on Technical Documents DoD M: Policy Guidelines for Installation, Planning, Design, Construction and Upkeep Establishing the Security System Design Threat Overview Design Threat Aggressor Characteristics Aggressor Objectives Aggressor Types Aggressor Tactics Design Threat Selection Overview Identifying Asset Types Correlate Asset to Aggressor Types Correlate Attack Type and Severity to Aggressor Type v

6 Page For Asset Category Determine Whether Threat Ingress or Egress Denial Must be Provided by the Security System Establishing Guard Force Operating Procedures and Response Times Purpose Guard Types/and Operating Procedures Fixed Location Mobile Reaction Force Combinations Estimating the Guard Response Time Other Constraints and Requirements Section 3 DESIGN PHASE Introduction Objectives Design Team Section Organization Basic Integrated Security System Design Concepts Security System Functional Elements Real-Time Operating Systems Integrated Functional Performance Deterrence Associated with a Security System Real-Time Security System Operating Modes Security Denial/Containment Zones Balancing System Response and Intruder Timelines Barrier Penetration Performance Forcible Entry Barrier Penetration Ballistic or Standoff Weapon Barrier Penetration Vehicle Barrier Penetration Intrusion Detection Exterior Detection Along the Site Perimeter Detection at the Building Surface Detection Within Building Interiors Entry Control Threat Assessment Security Lighting Key Terms and Definitions Introduction Delay Time Barrier Forced Entry Penetration Time Ingress Time Egress Time Man-Passable Opening vi

7 Page Intrusion Detection System Restricted Area Security Design Procedure Overview Design Approach Design Procedure Design Worksheets Design Activity Chart Section 4 EXTERIOR SITE-RELATED PHYSICAL SECURITY Introduction Exterior Site Work and Layout Introduction Installation-Wide Security Considerations Existing Site Security Collocate Facilities of Similar Asset Criticality On Site Routes of Travel Security Area Designation Facility-Specific Exterior Site Layout Maintaining an Adequate Standoff Blast Zone for Vehicle Bomb Threats Limit or Blocking Against Direct Line-of-Sight Weapons Maximize Exterior Site Forced-Entry Threat Ingress/Egress Distances Maintaining Clear Zones for Guard and/or CCTV Observation Exterior Site Perimeter Barriers Introduction Security Fences Vehicle Barriers Exterior Site Entry Control Introduction Function and Location Minimum Requirements Gates to Perimeter Fences Overview Personnel Gates Vehicle Gates Entry Control Point (ECP) Layout and Traffic Control Types of Entry Control Systems Overview Personnel Access Control System for Explosives, Metal and Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) Detection Exterior Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems Introduction Function and Location vii

8 Page Overview Exterior IDS Layout and System Compatibility Minimum Requirements for Exterior IDS Exterior IDS Options for Detection Along Site Perimeter Fences Most Commonly Deployed Sensors Other Exterior IDS Sensor Candidates Exterior IDS Detection at Building Exteriors Ported Coaxial Cable Sensors Vibration Sensors Grid Wire Sensors Exterior Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Introduction CCTV Function and Location Threat Assessment Surveillance Location Minimum Requirements Elements of a CCTV Assessment System Camera Types CCTV Monitors Exterior Security Lighting Introduction Function and Location Standard Exterior Lighting Configurations Continuous Lighting Standby Lighting Minimum Lighting Illumination Specification Guard Visual Surveillance Lighting for CCTV Surveillance Lighting Energy Considerations Overview Restrike Time Maintaining Essential Security Support Functions Overview Security Power Supply General Installation Power Supply Communications Security Control Center Section 5 BUILDING PHYSICAL SECURITY AGAINST FORCED AND COVERT ENTRY Introduction Threat Severity Levels for Forced and Covert Entry Design Forced Entry Covert Entry viii

9 Page 5.3 Integrated Security System Elements for the Building Overview Building Layout and Barrier Design Building Access Control Introduction Function and Location Minimum Requirements Personnel Identity Verification Systems Materials Access Control Building Located Intrusion Detection Systems Function and Location Minimum Requirements Detection at the Barrier Detection Within Building Interior Volumes Duress Switches Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Introduction Function and Location Minimum Requirements Available Technology Minimum Construction Requirements General Vaults Class A Vaults Class B Vaults Modular Vaults Strongrooms Minimum Construction Penetration Times Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E) Facilities Minimum Requirements for AA&E Facilities Nuclear Weapons Facilities Minimum Construction Penetration Times Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) Minimum Construction Penetration Times New Construction Design Introduction Overview Summary of Design Choices Designing for the Very High-Severity Threat Sacrificial Areas Barriers to Counter an Explosive Attack New Wall Construction for Low- to High-Severity Threats Summary Low-Severity Threat ix

10 Page Medium- and High-Severity Threat New Roof/Floor Construction for Low- to High- Severity Threats Summary Low-Severity Threat Level Medium- and High-Severity Threat Levels New Door Construction Summary Personnel Doors Vault Doors Magazine Doors Vehicle Doors New Window Construction Summary Low-Severity Threat Level Bars and Grills Utility Openings for New Construction - Low-to High-Severity Threats Overview New Construction Design Considerations Retrofit Construction Design Introduction Considerations Related to the Very High-Severity Threat Wall Retrofit Construction for Low- Through High-Level Threats Summary Low-Security Threat Level Medium- and High-Security Threat Levels Roof/Floor Retrofit Construction for Low to High Threats Summary Low-Security Threat Level Medium- and High-Security Level Threats Door Retrofit Construction Personnel, Vehicle, and Vault Doors Magazine Doors Window Retrofit Construction Utility Opening Retrofit Construction Overview Hardening Utility Openings for Conventional Buildings AA&E Ventilation Openings Section 6 BALLISTIC ATTACK HARDENING Introduction Ballistic Threat Characteristics Caliber Bullet Characteristics x

11 Page Armor-Piercing (AP) Ball Other Characteristics Ballistic Limit Oblique Attack Affects Projectile Energy Multiple Impacts Ballistic Threats Low-Severity Threat Medium-Severity Threat High-Severity Threat Very High-Severity Threat Overview of Ballistic-Resistant Materials and Defeat Mechanisms Ballistic Resistance Transparent Armor Opaque Armor Common Structural Materials Fibrous Materials Ceramic Composite Materials Inorganic Nonmetallic Materials Metallic Materials Ballistic Hardening Option Recommendations Threat Severity Levels of Protection Protection Measures: New Construction Siting Measures Building Measures Protection Measures: Retrofit Walls Doors Windows Section 7 STANDOFF WEAPONS HARDENING Introduction The RPG Threat RPG Characteristics RPG Jet Formation RPG Jet Penetration RPG Defeat Mechanism Material Density Material Strength Rebound Defeat Mechanisms Oblique Attack Effects RPG Defeat By Predetonation and Standoff Hardening Design Options New Construction Site Layout Sacrificial Areas xi

12 Page Barrier Construction and Predetonation Screens Retrofit Construction Retrofit of Walls Retrofit of Roof and Floors Windows Retrofit of Doors Section 8 BOMB BLAST HARDENING Introduction Design Threats Stationary Bomb Threats Moving Vehicle Bomb Threat Standoff/Hardening and Protection Levels Protection Levels for New Construction Protection Levels Existing Structures Design Approach Introduction Design of New Construction Structure Hardening Vehicle Barriers for Maintaining Moving Vehicle Standoff Retrofit Hardening of Existing Construction Required Standoff for Level of Building Protection Vehicle Barriers APPENDIX APPENDIX A Physical Security Design Worksheets FIGURES Figure 1 Physical Security Threat Matrix (DoD R) Resource and Asset Priorities (DoD R) Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements (Continued) Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements (Continued) Integrated Physical Security System Role of Barriers in a Physical Protection System Against a Forced Entry Attack Defense Layers for Asset Example of Forcible Entry Intruder Timeline Ingress Time Between Barriers (from Barrier Technology Handbook, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND and MRC Report NSF/RA ) Detailed Design Flowchart Multiple Barrier Designs xii

13 11 Checklist of Minimum Site Work Protective Consideration Example of Collocating Facilities of Similar Criticality Exterior Site Blast Zone Fabric With Barbed Wire Outriggers Fence Configuration (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Security Fence Configuration for Nuclear Weapons (DoD C M) Optional Barbed Roll Topping for Nuclear Weapons (DoD M) Concrete Culvert Grill (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Removable Grating for Culverts (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Bar Grill Embedded in Concrete (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Large Culvert with Short Honeycomb Pipes (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Turnstile (Rotational) Personnel Gate (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Single Wheel-Supported (V-Groove) Sliding Gate (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Single Cantilevered Gate (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Example Entry Control Point (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Nuclear Weapons Storage Site Entry Control Facility (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) Example Portal Structure for Access Control CCTV Camera Components Checklist of Minimum Building-Related Layout Considerations Class 5 Vault Door Dimensions Example Sacrificial Area Design For Very High Level Threats Penetration Times For Solid Concrete Masonry Walls Wood/Metal Composite Masonry Construction Penetration Times For Conventional Reinforced Concrete Walls/Roofs Penetration Times For Fiberous Reinforced Concrete Walls/Roofs High-Severity Threat Level Penetration Times for Reinforced Conventional and Fibrous-Concrete Floors Based on an Upward Attack Personnel Door Hinge Side Protection for Low- and Medium-Severity Threat Personnel Door, Representative Medium-Security Hinge- Side Protection Personnel Door Anti-Pry Strips For Medium-Security Applications Page xiii

14 39 Personnel Door, Auxiliary Rim-Lock Strike Reinforcement Shrouded Key Operated Shackle Padlock Per MIL-P Shrouded Hasp For Padlocks MIL-H Magazine Door Panel Cross Section For Very High- Severity Threat Window Barrier System For High-Severity Threat Example of Large Vent Pipe and Chases Rendered Non-Man-Passable by a Honeycomb of Welded Sections of Pipe of Non-Man-Passable Diameter High Security Can Be Provided by Vent Frame Hardening as Shown Ten-Gauge (3.4-mm) Hot-Rolled Steel Combinations (MIL-HDBK-1013/5) Nine-Gauge (3.8-mm) Hot-Rolled Steel Combinations (MIL-HDBK ) Polycarbonate Combinations (MIL-HDBK-1013/5) Typical Gratings (MIL-HDBK-1013/4) Retrofit Hardening Options For Hollow 8-inch CMU Wall Construction Retrofit Hardening Options For Mortar-Filled 8-inch CMU Wall Construction Hinge Side Protection Plan for Using a Pin-In-Socket Technique Hinge Side Protection for Doors Using a Forward Doorstop with Angle Hinge Side Protection for Hardening Typical Thick Doors by Using an Angle Stop Hinge Side Protection for Hardening Typical Thick Doors by Using an Angle Stop Riveted Steel Grating Security Intrusion Protection Plan for Hardening a Typical Door Ventilator Installation Details of Hardening a Typical Riveted Steel Grating and Shrouded Louver for Walls or Ceilings Security Intrusion Protection Plan for Hardening a Typical Wall or Ceiling Ballistic Limit Criteria Distance to Penetrate 1 to 4 Inches (25 to 100 mm) Versus Angle of Obliquity Figure 62 Sightlines Blocked From Potential Vantage Points Figure 63 Wall Arrangement to Block Sightlines Figure 64 Walls to Block Sightlines at Doors Figure 65 Oblique Window Openings Figure 66 Example of High-Severity-Ballistic-Threat Bullet- Resistant Glass Cross Section xiv Page

15 67 Parapets to Block Sightlines Example Antitank Grenade Launcher Weapon the Soviet RPG RPG Hardening Concrete/Sand Thickness Versus Standoff Distance ASP Walling System Building Layout Example Building Layout Example Building Layout Example Standard Sand-Grid Materials Retrofit Hardening Concrete/Sand Thickness Versus Distance Blast Wave Geometry Pressure Levels Versus Standoff Distance Reinforced Concrete Wall Design For 220-Pound (100- kg) Explosive Effects (Army Security Engineering Manual) Example Minimum Thickness [feet (meters)] of Thermal- Tempered Glass Glazing to Resist Reflected Overpressusre Application of Traffic Obstacles Security Barrier Moving Vehicle Impact Energy Versus Velocity (Passive Barriers) Moving Vehicle Impact Energy Versus Velocity (Active Barriers) Repair Levels Versus Standoff Distance For Various Charge Weights Page TABLES Table 1 Design Threat Parameters Asset Types Checklist of Asset Categories and Potential Aggressor Types Checklist of Design Threat for Aggressor Categories Checklist of Asset Category Versus Security System Ingress or Egress Denial Common Chain Link Fence Materials (MIL-HDBK-1013/10) Typical Exterior Sensor Types (Most Commonly Used Sensors are Underlined) Minimum Lighting Criteria for Unaided Guard Visual Assessment Relative Efficiencies and Restrike Times of Light Sources (From IES Lighting Handbook, J.E. Kaufman, ed.) xv

16 10 Minimum Construction Requirements for Class A Vaults (DIAM 50-3) Minimum Construction Requirements For Class B Vaults (DoD R) Minimum Construction Requirements For Strongrooms (DOD R) Minimum Construction Requirements For Risk Categories I Through IV (DoD M) Minimum Construction Requirements for Risk Categories II Through IV Arms, and Non-Earth-Covered Magazines (DoD M) Minimum Construction Requirements for Risk Categories II Through IV, Arms and Non-Earth Covered Magazines (Continued) Security Risk Categories (DoD M) Typical Magazine Doors Panels For Explosive Safety For Risk Categories I Through IV For Ammunition and Explosives Minimum Construction Requirements For Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Facilities (DoD M) Minimum Construction Requirements For Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities Reinforced Concrete Wall Designs For Very High Threat Levels Wall Construction Choices For New Construction Penetration Time Chart Index For Figure 31, Reinforced Concrete Masonry Walls Penetration Time Chart Index For Figures 33 and Penetration Time Chart Index For Figure Personnel Door Penetration Times Personnel Door Panel/Edge Details, Low Security Personnel Door Frame Details, Low Security Personnel Door Hardware Notes For Low- and Medium- Severity Threat Personnel Door Panel/Edge Details, Medium Security Personnel Door Frame Details, Medium Security Vault Door Options and Penetration Times High-Security Magazine Door Very High-Security Magazine Construction Vehicle Door Construction Time and Number of Cuts Required to Open a Man- Passable Entry in Grills Composed of Various Size Bars and Bar Spacings Recommended Glazing System Installed In a Low- Security Wall (Wood Frame) for a Low-Severity Threat Attack Page xvi

17 36 Recommended Glazing System Components Installed in a Medium-Security (CMU) Wall for a Medium-Severity Threat Attack Existing Wall Construction Achievable Penetration Times Steel-Ply Retrofit Installations for the High- Severity Level Attack Representative Existing Stud-Girt Construction Stud-Girt Construction Retrofit Options For Medium Threat Levels Existing Roof/Floor Construction Achievable Penetration Times Existing Roof/Floor Concrete Construction Existing Roof/Floor Wood Construction Maximum Penetration Times (Minutes) by Threat Security Levels, Existing Metal Roofs and Floors Firearm Ballistic Threats Construction for Ballistic Resistance Wall Construction Capable of Defeating the MIL-SAMIT Very High Threat Transparent Armor Capable of Defeating the High- Severity Threat Upgraded Walls for High-Severity Threat Retrofit Construction Capable of Defeating the Very High-Severity Level Example Operational Characteristics of an RPG (Soviet RPG-7) Predetonation Screen Effectiveness Stationary Bomb Threats Moving Vehicle Transported Bomb Threats BIBLIOGRAPHY REFERENCES GLOSSARY INDEX Page xvii

18 Section 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose and Scope. This handbook is to be used during the engineering design of Department of Defense (DoD) facilities to assure appropriate physical security is included. The guidelines are based upon the best currently available research and test data, and will be revised or expanded as additional research results become available. The contents include procedures for planning and designing an integrated physical security system for new facilities as well as the retrofit of existing facilities. The focus is on construction choices for protection against forced entry, and ballistic and standoff weapons. Design procedures are also summarized for vehicle bomb blast protection, referencing appropriate sources for details. 1.2 Cancellation. This handbook supersedes Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK) 1013/1, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Fixed Land-Based Facilities, dated 9 October Using the Handbook. This handbook is divided into eight major sections and four appendices. Sections 2 and 3 contain procedures to follow during the planning and design phases of a project to assure adequate security. Sections 4 through 8 contain supporting detailed design data and instructions. The appendices contain physical security system design worksheets. The content of each major section is summarized as follows: Section 2 - Pre-Design Phase: Specific requirements and criteria for the security system are established during the pre-design phase. The section begins with a brief overview of DoD directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements. This is followed by a procedure to establish: (1) the design threat, (2) the operating procedures and expected alarm response times of the security guard forces, and (3) other requirements and constraints that may affect the security system design. Section 3 - Design Phase: The objective of this phase is to design an integrated physical security system that meets the requirements and criteria identified during the pre-design phase. The section begins with a discussion of the elements of a physical security system followed by the definitions of certain key terms. It then provides a step-by-step procedure for designing the security system for a new facility or the retrofit design of an existing facility using the detailed information in Sections 4 through 8. Section 4 - Exterior Site-Related Physical Security: This section addresses the design of the outermost elements of the security system. The exterior area involved lies between the perimeter of the site and the facility containing the assets to be protected. Exterior physical security contributes to the effectiveness of an integrated security system design in the choice of: (1) site layout, including facility location relative to fences and vehicle barriers to enhance protection against forced entry, bomb blast, standoff weapons and ballistic threats; (2) access control at site points of entry to 1

19 protect against covert entry threats; (3) exterior intrusion detection sensors or guards to detect perimeter crossover points; (4) closed-circuit television (CCTV) or guards to assess an alarm as a threat; (5) security lighting to support the threat detection and assessment function; and (6) other essential functions that must be maintained to support the above elements. Each of these elements is addressed referring to other sources for more details when appropriate. Section 5 - Building Physical Security Against Forced and Covert Entry: This section begins with a description of the threat severity levels for forced and covert entry followed by an overview of the important elements required to achieve an effective integrated security system design including building layout, access control, interior intrusion detection system, and CCTV. Minimum prescribed DoD security construction requirements for vaults and strongrooms; sensitive compartmented information facilities; and arms, ammunition, and explosive (AA&E,) and nuclear weapons facilities are then provided, including related penetration delay times. For those cases where the minimum prescribed designs do not provide sufficient delay relative to guard response times, or when there are no prescribed designs for a given facility type, see Section 5.5 (for new construction) or Section 5.6 (for retrofit construction) for design options that achieve the required delays. Section 6 - Ballistic Attack Hardening: This section begins with a description of the small arms and military ballistic threats and the general hardening mechanisms by which they can be stopped. Hardening design options available for both new and retrofit construction are then presented. Section 7 - Standoff Weapons Hardening: This section begins with a description of the standoff Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) threat and the general mechanisms by which RPGs can be stopped. Hardening design options available for both new and retrofit construction are then presented. Section 8 - Bomb Blast Hardening: This section summarizes the design approach for hardening against vehicle-transported bomb blast effects for both new and existing construction. 1.4 Related Technical Documents. Use this handbook to address specific design problems relative to specific subject areas (doors, vehicle barrier, etc.). Related technical documents are identified appropriately within the text for each unique subject area. 2

20 Section 2: PRE-DESIGN PHASE 2.1 Introduction Objective. The objective of the pre-design phase is to establish specific requirements and criteria for the design of a security system for either a new or retrofit facility. These requirements and criteria include: (1) the design threat the security system must protect against; (2) the operating procedures, including response time, of the security guard force; and (3) any physical, functional, or budgetary constraints associated with the site or building that can affect the security system design. These requirements must also consider the specific planning policies and procedures reflected in related military directives and instructions. Establishing security requirements during the pre-design phase allows security to be addressed early at the start of a project allowing it to be integrated into the total design of the building efficiently and cost effectively Design Team. The design team should include representatives from the intended facility users, as well as the designated military installation intelligence officers, operational officers, security or law enforcement officials, and engineering and planning personnel. The facility user can help identify special operational or logistical requirements as well as the relative criticality of the asset contained in the facility. Intelligence personnel can provide input on historical or projected future threats and their likely targets. Operations personnel can provide information on the criticality of assets from the overall installation or activity level. Security personnel can help establish the response capabilities of the security guard forces as well as identify potential criminal threats. Engineering and planning personnel should organize the effort and consolidate all facility information into the appropriate documents Section Organization. Paragraph 2.2 is a brief overview of DoD directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements. Paragraph 2.3 is a general discussion of the steps to be taken during the pre-design phase to establish the design threat. Paragraph 2.4 addresses the response operating procedures and related alarm response time of the security guard force. Paragraph 2.5 presents other requirements and constraints that can affect the security system design. 2.2 Physical Security Planning Policy and Requirements. This section provides a brief overview of a number of DoD and other directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements DoD Directive R: Security of DoD Installations and Resources. This directive prescribes minimum standards and policies related to the physical protection of personnel, installations, and assets of the DoD. The objective is to minimize damage or reduce loss or theft to assets, and to ensure that war-fighting capabilities are maintained. Specific areas 3