1 Defending the Case for Free Trade Arvind Panagariya Several fallacious arguments against free trade were made in the debate on outsourcing that raged during the latest presidential election. In my remarks, I will consider four of them: (i) the conventional case for free trade does not apply to outsourcing; (ii) productivity gains abroad in the goods exported by us undermine the case for free trade; (iii) the free flow of many factors internationally renders the principle of comparative advantage and the associated gains from trade invalid; and (iv) soon all jobs will be outsourced to China and India. I will endeavor to demonstrate that these arguments do not stand up to closer scrutiny and the conventional case for free trade survives them without so much as a scratch. Fallacy 1: The conventional case for free trade does not apply to outsourcing. On this, Gregory Mankiw was correct in asserting that outsourcing is another form of trade. Innovations that lower the transport costs turn some goods that were previously non-traded into traded ones. Innovations that likewise allow massive data to be transported internationally at low costs turn some services that were previously nontraded at arms length into traded ones. Just as the opening to trade of non-traded goods generates the gains from trade, opening to trade of non-traded services brings gains. In my joint article with Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan (Bhagwati, Panagariya and The author is Professor of Economics and Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy at Columbia University. He can be contacted by at This briefing paper is prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's hearing on the panel "China and the Future of Globalization" to be held at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, May 19-20, 2005.
2 Srinivasan 2004), I demonstrate this point formally using three different models commonly used by trade economists. Though only outsourcing has received attention in the press, the innovation that makes outsourcing possible also gives rise to in-sourcing from the United States. While moving the call centers and back office activities abroad, the telecommunications revolution has also given rise to the exports of medical, legal, architectural, designing and educational services by the United States. Like outsourcing, in-sourcing also generates gains: outsourcing allows us to buy services at prices lower than our production costs and in-sourcing allows us to sell them at prices higher than our production costs. A caveat to this conclusion arises from the possibility of an adverse secondary effect of outsourcing (or in-sourcing) on the terms of trade in the market for goods that are already traded. For example, cheaper tech support through outsourcing may expand the supply of computers by the U.S. firms and, holding the demand for them constant, lower the prices received abroad for the latter. If the loss due to this induced decline in the price of the U.S. computers is larger than the initial benefit from the purchase of cheaper tech support services, a net loss is possible. Of course, the terms of trade effect can as easily go the other way. The countries earning export revenues from outsourcing by the United States may increase their spending on the U.S. goods. For example, they may demand more of the U.S. computers and office furniture. This demand-driven effect would pull the U.S terms of trade in the favorable direction. The terms of trade caveat arises in the case of every innovations or policy change that alters a country s demand and supply of traded goods. For example, an innovation
3 by the U.S. firms that lowers their production cost of computers or an efficiency enhancing policy change by the U.S. government that lowers its demand for computers would normally result in an increase in the supply of the U.S. computers in the world markets. Such expansion of exports would lead to a harmful reduction in the price of the U.S. computers. If this decline in the price is sufficiently large, the net effect of the innovation or improved government efficiency may be a decline in the overall U.S. welfare. While economists have long recognized this possible harmful effect due to the shift in the terms of trade when any policy change or innovation impacts trade flows, the appropriate policy response to it is not a withdrawal from trade. For while these changes may reduce the gains from trade, the latter remain positive. By walking away from those remaining gains, we would make matters only worse. Fallacy 2: Productivity gains abroad in goods and services exported by us undermine the case for free trade. This is the argument (wrongly) attributed to Paul Samuelson (2004) in his recent article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. All Samuelson argued was that productivity gains abroad in the goods exported by us would lower the prices of our exports and lower our initial incomes. For example, if the Chinese learn to produce the aircraft they currently import from us, their demand for our aircraft will decline and the price we receive for them in the world market would fall. Trade theorists have, of course, been aware of this possibility since the influential papers by Harry Johnson (1954, 1955) written at a time when fears were being raised that the growth and productivity gains in Europe and Japan might impact the United States adversely.
4 As Avinash Dixit and Gene Grossman (2004) have pointed out, this possibility does not offer a reason to deviate from the free-trade policy. 1 True, the U.S. incomes decline as a result of the Chinese gain in productivity but its incomes would decline even more were it to respond by closing its borders to trade. The fundamental message of Ricardo s theory of comparative advantage remains valid: given the new Chinese productivity, the United States is still better off trading than not trading with China. Quite apart from the fact that the adverse terms-of-trade effect does not give one reason to turn to protectionism, the possibility of a loss on this account must itself be questioned. For example, we must ask if China and India were to turn into another Europe or Japan, will it be bad for the United States? There are at least two reasons why the answer is not so clear-cut. First, as these countries grow, they will not just produce more of many goods exported by the United States. They will also demand more of many goods exported by the United States. Second, as the two countries become richer, their trade, like the U.S.-Europe and U.S.-Japan trade, will turn product-differentiation based intra-industry type rather than the factor-endowment-difference based interindustry type. Such trade is less likely to produce the terms of trade shift and is more likely to generate benefits resulting from increased variety. Fallacy 3: The Free flow of many factors internationally renders the principle of comparative advantage and the associated gains from trade invalid. Charles Schumer and Paul Craig Roberts (2003) make this argument most forcefully in an influential op-ed in the New York Times. They argue that in the modern world with factor mobility, the principle of comparative advantage put forth by David 1 Also see Panagariya (2004) in this context.
5 Ricardo in the early 19 th century no longer holds. The resulting trade somehow turns into a zero-sum activity with some countries gaining at the expense of the others. To quote them, However, when Ricardo said that free trade would produce shared gains for all nations, he assumed that resources used to produce goods--what he called the factors of production --would not be easily moved over international borders. Comparative advantage is undermined if the factors of production ca relocate to wherever they are most productive: in today s case, to a relatively few countries with abundant cheap labor. In this situation, there are no longer shared gains--some countries win and others lose. I must say that this is a very puzzling argument. Factor mobility had surely existed in the time of David Ricardo. And it became pervasive during the First Globalization extending from 1870 to the First World War and again during the current Second Globalization that began following the Second World War. It is implausible that Ricardo failed to notice international factor mobility around him. It is even more implausible that trade economists since Ricardo have uniformly ignored the implications of factor mobility and gone about business as usual teaching the principle of comparative advantage and the gains from trade, its contradiction by the fact of widespread international factor mobility notwithstanding. More likely, if Ricardo did not model international factor mobility in his celebrated England-Portugal example of gains from trade, the answer is to be found in the presumption that like all great theorists, he was constructing the simplest example to demonstrate the gains from specialization under trade to all parties involved and to demolish the mercantilist case for protection. In the same vein, while trade economists since Ricardo have formally analyzed the implications of factor mobility in a variety of
6 contexts including the gains from trade, they continue to use the simple England-Portugal example because it continues to be the most powerful tool of demolishing the fallacies arising out of faulty thinking about international trade. But to answer the Schumer-Roberts criticism explicitly, in Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (June 30, 2004), we explain systematically how the Ricardian example extends to the case when labor is allowed to move internationally. I reproduce that extension in the appendix to this paper. Here let me just note that the free-trade equilibrium is always at least as good as the no-trade equilibrium for all parties involved in the presence as well as absence of labor mobility. This conclusion also remains valid when we allow for more than one factor as, for example, in the Hecksher- Ohlin model. Quite apart from this theoretical analysis, the empirical relevance of the assertion by Schumer and Roberts that all factors today want to move to the location with cheap labor must itself be questioned. In a recent paper, my colleagues Donald Davis and David Weinstein (2002) have offered evidence that is just the opposite of the Schumer-Roberts assertion. According to them, The US is the destination for a broad range of net factor inflows: unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital. While I disagree with the manner in which they model migration, they do bring into question the notion that all factors are flowing towards the country with cheap labor today. Moreover, the evidence on gross, as opposed to net, investment flows demonstrates the presence of large volumes of cross investments among the developed countries. The operations of multinationals are concentrated far more within the developed rather than between developed and developing countries.
7 Fallacy 4: Soon all jobs will be outsourced to China and India. This is not an argument directly about the gains from trade but it relates to the principle of comparative advantage in a fundamental way. If the contention here is that all or most service jobs will be outsourced to India and China, the statement involves both empirical and theoretical errors. The empirical error is that not all service jobs can be outsourced. About 70 percent of the jobs in the United States are in service industries such as retailing, catering, restaurants and hotels, tourism and personal care that require the consumer and producer to be present in the same place and, therefore, cannot be outsourced (Agrawal and Farrell, 2003). The theoretical error is that the possibility that all jobs, in both manufactures and services, will go to China and India, whether through outsourcing or other trade, because of low labor costs, comes perilously close to confusing absolute and comparative advantage. One way to see why all jobs cannot shift abroad even if it were physically possible is that we cannot get the Chinese and Indians to work for free for the United States. If we are going to buy their services, we must pay them in some form. The obvious form of payment would be exports and, in that case, the more we import, the more we will have to export. The only alternatives to exports would be that China and India either accept IOUs from the United States in perpetuity or accept IOUs for now and cash them at some time in the future. In the former case, the United States cannot possibly lose since it gets to maintain its high living standard in perpetuity at the expense of China and India. In the latter case, we still continue to reap the gains from trade with trade having the additional inter-temporal dimension.
8 References Agrawal, Vivek and Diana Farrell Who Wins in Offshoring. The McKinsey Quarterly, Special Edition: Global Directions, pp Bhagwati, Jagdish, Arvind Panagariya, and T.N. Srinivasan, 2004, The Muddles over Outsourcing, June 30 draft, Columbia University, New York. [Final version published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2004, 18:4, pp ] Davis, Donald and David Weinstein, 2002, Technological Superiority and the Losses From Migration, New York: Columbia University. Dixit, Avinash and Gene Grossman, 2004, Samuelson Says Nothing About Trade Policy, Princeton University [Forthcoming: Journal of Economic Perspectives] Johnson, Harry Increasing Productivity, Income-price Trends and Trade Balance. Economic Journal 64: Johnson, Harry Economic Expansion and International Trade. Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 23: pp Panagariya, Arvind, 2004, Why the Recent Samuelson Article is NOT about Offshore Outsourcing, New York: Columbia University. Samuelson, Paul, 2004, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer, 18:3,
9 Schumer, Charles and Paul Craig Roberts "Second Thoughts on Free Trade," New York Times, 6 January.
10 Appendix: Factor Mobility and Comparative Advantage It is also readily shown that the gains from trade do not depend on the absence of factor mobility. We can demonstrate this in the Ricardian model cited by Charles Schumer and Paul Craig Roberts. Thus, consider Table 1, which offers three possible examples assuming the familiar Ricardian structure of two goods (X and Y), two countries (A and B) and one factor of production (labor). Table 1: Comparative Advantage and Factor Mobility Output per person year Country Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 X Y X Y X Y A B In Example 1, A has an absolute advantage in both goods but comparative advantage in X. Denoting by FT and NT the level of welfare under free trade and no trade (autarky), respectively, we know from the conventional Ricardian theory that FT NT for each country with strict inequality applying to at least one country. 2 In the trading equilibrium, real wages are higher in A so that allowing labor to move internationally results in the workers migrating from B to A. If only a part of B s labor force is allowed to migrate, the inequality FT NT still holds for the nationals of both countries at the 2 The strict equality holds for one country if it is so large that the relative free-trade price settles at its autarky price, which equals its opportunity cost ratio. As long as the free-trade price lies strictly between the opportunity cost ratios of the two countries, we have FT > NT for each country.
11 post-migration labor endowments. 3 If all labor in B moves to A, the gains-from-trade issue is of course rendered irrelevant. In Example 2, A has an absolute advantage in X and B in Y. Consequently, A also has a comparative advantage in X and B in Y so that FT NT continues to apply. In this case, it is possible for trade to equalize real wages, eliminating the incentive to migrate. If the real wages remain different, however, labor mobility will still be partial and the gains from trade will characterize the trade equilibrium under international factor mobility. In Example 3, A has an absolute advantage in both goods but comparative advantage in none. With the opportunity costs being the same in A and B, there is no scope for trade so that opening to trade is neither beneficial nor harmful: we then have FT = NT. The real wages being higher in A than B, however, labor in B has an incentive to migrate to A. If such migration is permitted, it benefits migrants without hurting the workers in A. But we continue to have FT = NT at the post-migration labor endowments. The outcomes are not dramatically different in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which in its conventional version assumes identical technologies across countries and allows for two factors whose relative endowments differ across the two trading nations. As long as the countries do not specialize completely in production, free trade in commodities (free movement of factors) with no movement of factors (commodities), by equalizing commodity (factor) prices, equalizes factor (commodity) prices, thus eliminating the 3 A different comparison can be done between the welfare levels enjoyed by a country at the free trade equilibriums with and without labor mobility. If the country is small in the goods market so that the terms of trade effects of labor mobility are ruled out, opening to the latter cannot harm the national welfare. If the country is large, however, the ranking between free-trade equilibrium with and without factor mobility compares two sub-optimal equilibriums and can go either way. Our discussion below sheds more light on this question.
12 incentive, that exist in autarky, for movements of factors (trade commodities). 4 By the same token any restrictions on commodity trade (factor movements), by preventing equalization of factor (commodity) prices, could prevent factor (commodity) price equalization, thus leaving positive incentive for factor (commodity) movement as under autarky. If we allow for complete specialization by one country or for differences in technologies across countries, free trade fails to equalize factor prices. In this case, factors do have an incentive to move internationally even under free trade in goods. But such movement does not eliminate the benefits of trade. With resources having moved to new locations, the trade equilibrium will still be characterized by a superior outcome for the nationals of each country than under autarky, so that FT NT. 4 This is the celebrated Factor Price Equalization theorem of Paul Samuelson.
Knowledge Enrichment Seminar for Senior Secondary Economics Curriculum Macroeconomics Series (3): Extension of trade theory by Dr. Charles Kwong School of Arts and Social Sciences The Open University of
Additional Exercises The Ricardian Model 1 Suppose Country A and Country B can both produce bicycles and computers Assume also that Country A s opportunity cost of a computer is three bicycles, and Country
International Technology Transfer: Who Gains and Who Loses? 1 Roy J. Ruffin University of Houston Ronald W. Jones University of Rochester There is much concern these days over the transfer of technology
Lectures, 2 ECONOMIES OF SCALE I. Alternatives to Comparative Advantage Economies of Scale The fact that the largest share of world trade consists of the exchange of similar (manufactured) goods between
Chapter 4 Specific Factors and Income Distribution Introduction So far we learned that countries are overall better off under free trade. If trade is so good for the economy, why is there such opposition?
ECO364 - International Trade Chapter 2 - Ricardo Christian Dippel University of Toronto Summer 2009 Christian Dippel (University of Toronto) ECO364 - International Trade Summer 2009 1 / 73 : The Ricardian
Chapter 3 Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model Introduction There are potential gains from trade whenever there are differences in autarky prices across countries. We now explore
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO BOULDER, COLORADO Economics 4413 International Trade James R. Markusen January 14, 2007 Phone: 492-0748 Office: 216, e-mail: email@example.com Office Hours: Monday, Wednesday,
International Economics, 8e (Krugman) Chapter 8 The Instruments of Trade Policy 8.1 Basic Tariff Analysis 1) Specific tariffs are A) import taxes stated in specific legal statutes. B) import taxes calculated
Economies of Scale, Imperfect Competition, and International Trade Chapter 6 Intermediate International Trade International Economics, 5 th ed., by Krugman and Obstfeld 1 Overview patterns of trade can
ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION Bharati Department of Economics, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, USA Keywords: Economies of scale, economic geography, external economies,
Production Fragmentation and Outsourcing: General Concerns Ronald W. Jones University of Rochester Globalization is a phenomenon greatly in the news. It refers to many things the great expansion in the
Classical International Trade Theory Ricardian Comparative Advantage Explains why economists think trade is good Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem Explains why countries produce and export the goods they do Stopler-Samuelson
Protection and Real Wages Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) Presented by Group Hicks Dena, Marjorie, Sabina, Shehryar No nation was ever ruined by trade Benjamin Franklin Under a system of perfectly
The Muddles over Outsourcing Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya, and T.N. Srinivasan* Forthcoming: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2004. Note: Readers who are not theoretically inclined may
WTO E-Learning WTO E-Learning Copyright August 2012 The WTO and Trade Economics: Theory and Policy 1 Introduction This is a multimedia course on The WTO and Trade Economics: Theory and Policy. The course
KOÇ UNIVERSITY ECON 321 - INTERNATIONAL TRADE Mid-term Exam (100 points; 90 minutes) Answer all 5 questions. In providing answers to the questions in this section algebra or graphs might be helpful. State
Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 18, Number 4 Fall 2004 Pages 93 114 The Muddles over Outsourcing Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya and T.N. Srinivasan In the early 1980s, outsourcing typically
Study Questions (with Answers) Page 1 of 6 (8) Study Questions (with Answers) Lecture 3 and the Gains from Trade Part 1: Multiple Choice Select the best answer of those given. 1. According to the theory
Trade and Resources: The Heckscher-Ohlin Model Professor Ralph Ossa 33501 International Commercial Policy Introduction Remember that countries trade either because they are different from one another or
Remarks by Dr. N. Gregory Mankiw Chairman Council of Economic Advisers at the National Bureau of Economic Research Tax Policy and the Economy Meeting National Press Club November 4, 2003 My remarks today
Cost of Protection: Where Do We Stand? Arvind Panagariya* Economists measure the cost of protection in terms of static efficiency, growth rates and firm- or industry-level productivity effects. This survey
1. a. The production possibility curve is a straight line that intercepts the apple axis at 400 (1200/3) and the banana axis at 600 (1200/2). b. The opportunity cost of apples in terms of bananas is 3/2.
Chapter 13 International Trade: Does it Jeopardize American Jobs Multiple Choice Questions 1. In 2006, trade made up percent of the U.S. economy. a. 1.3 b. 5.0 C. 11.5 d. 22.7 2. In 2005, the U.S. experienced
Analyzing the Debate over Offshore Outsourcing in the Service Industry: Is there a Reason for Concern? Gwyn VanderWeerdt ABSTRACT. The United States has experienced an increase in the offshore outsourcing
The Greater the Differences, the Greater the Gains? Wilfred J. Ethier Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania First version: 30 November 2007 This printing: 21 April 2009 The Greater the Differences,
Who gains and who loses from an import tariff? An export tax? (Assume world prices are fixed). Governments usually impose import tariffs, taxes levied on imports, to promote industries considered to be
II C THE CAUSES OF TRADE C THE CAUSES OF TRADE From an economic perspective, the case for freer trade rests on the existence of gains from trade and most economists typically agree that there are gains
Page 1 of 11 Gains from Trade and the Ricardian Model 1. Use community indifference curves as your indicator of national welfare in order to evaluate the following claim: An improvement in the terms of
McKinsey Global Institute US Offshoring: Rethinking the Response December 2005 Diana Farrell Jaeson Rosenfeld US Offshoring: Rethinking the Response December 2005 Diana Farrell Jaeson Rosenfeld This perspective
Introduction Countries engage in international trade for two basic reasons: Countries trade because they differ either in their resources or in technology. Countries trade in order to achieve scale economies
Offshore Outsourcing Offshore Outsourcing The Offshoring Debate 1. Traditional Theory 2. What s different now? 3. How does this affect The Job The Job Thiefs (India, China, former USSR)? The Victims (America,
Prof. Harrison, Econ 181, Fall 05 1 Economics 181: International Trade Midterm Solutions 1 Short Answer 20 points) Please give a full answer. If you need to indicate whether the answer is true or false,
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS Manuscript No: #2097, Acceptance Date, August 31, 2002 International TradeUnder Oligopoly Conditions* Roy J. Ruffin RRH: TRADE UNDER OLIGOPOLY LRH: Roy Ruffin Abstract
University of Lethbridge Department of Economics ECON 1012 Introduction to Macroeconomics Instructor: Michael G. Lanyi CH 31 1) Goods and services that we buy from other countries are our A) balance of
Globalization: How to Maximize Gain and Minimize Pain An Online Course Review By Alissa DeJonge, Research Analyst, CERC This summary presents issues addressed during the online course Globalization and
ARE YOU TAKING THE WRONG FX RISK? Focusing on transaction risks may be a mistake Structural and portfolio risks require more than hedging Companies need to understand not just correlate the relationship
International Trade For centuries, people of the world have traded. From the ancient silk routes and spice trade to modern shipping containers and satellite data transfers, nations have tied their economies
EC-686 $1.00 Agricultural ECONOMICS Community Development The Use of Multipliers in Economic Impact Estimates David Broomhall Extension Economist Introduction In many communities across America local officials
The Nature and Significance of Intra-industry Trade Roy J. Ruffin Intra-industry trade represents international trade within industries rather than between industries. Such trade is more beneficial than
Public Policy 650 Spring 2008 D.H. Feldman, 101-C Morton International Trade: Theory and Policy Texts: 1. Krugman, P. and M. Obstfeld, International Economics, Theory and Policy, New York: Addison-Wesley,
CEP 14-14 Employment Gains from Minimum-Wage Hikes under Perfect Competition: A Simple General-Equilibrium Analysis Richard A. Brecher and Till Gross Carleton University November 2014 CARLETON ECONOMIC
1 of 5 2/15/2004 10:36 PM February 15, 2004 Many New Causes for Old Problem of Jobs Lost Abroad By STEVE LOHR he chairman of President Bush's Council of Economic Advisers, N. Gregory Mankiw, stepped forcefully
Trading Tasks: The International Organization of Production Esteban Rossi-Hansberg Princeton University with : Pol Antras, Luis Garicano and Gene Grossman Introduction Revolutionary progress in communication
The Muddles over Outsourcing Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya, and T.N. Srinivasan* Forthcoming in revised form: The Journal of Economic Perspectives) Note: Readers who are not theoretically inclined
Australia and the Global market for Bulk Commodities Introduction The share of Australia s export earnings derived from bulk commodities coking coal, thermal coal and iron ore has increased over recent
Statement by Dean Baker, Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (www.cepr.net) Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, hearing on China and the Future of Globalization.
Economics 340: International Economics Andrew T. Hill Heckscher-Ohlin Theory Textbook Readings: Pugel & Lindert, International Economics, 11th Edition, pp. 54-57, 61-76. 10th Edition, pp. 50-52, 57-69.
European Population doubled (1850-1914) Thomas Malthus Economist in the late 1700s-early 1800s felt Europeans will not be able to eat if population increased After World War II, Europeans and other industrial
Economics: MW 235 Summary The impact of immigration into the UK on GDP per head a key measure of prosperity - is essentially negligible. There is tentative evidence to show that immigration of non-eu workers
Chapter 1 Introduction to Macroeconomics Multiple Choice Questions 1. The two major reasons for the tremendous growth in output in the U.S. economy over the last 125 years are (a) population growth and
Balance of Payments The Balance of Payments, the Exchange Rate, and Trade Policy The balance of payments is a country s record of all transactions between its residents and the residents of all foreign
R&D Magazine had a very insightful cover story on the future of outsourcing in their July 2007 issue. Entitled R&D Outsourcing Becomes More Strategic, the article reported on the result of its May 2007
International Business > Offshoring Table of Contents Executive Summary Keywords Overview Applications Critical Insights Terms & Concepts Sources For More Information Executive Summary This article focuses
Economics 165 Winter 2 Problem Set #1 Problem 1: Let Germany and France have respective labor forces of 8 and 6. Suppose both countries produce wine and cares according to the following unit labor requirements:
Department of Economics University of Roma Tre Academic year: 2013 2014 Natural Resources and International Trade Instructors: Prof. Silvia Nenci Prof. Luca Salvatici firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.com
International Trade Theory James E. Anderson Boston College S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, forthcoming, Palgrave Macmillan, reproduced with permission of Palgrave
Technology and Economic Growth Chapter 5 slide 0 Outline The Growth Accounting Formula Endogenous Growth Theory Policies to Stimulate Growth The Neoclassical Growth Revival Real wages and Labor Productivity
Globalization: Outsourcing to Bangalore OVERVIEW & OBJECTIVES Technological advances in communication and the growth of the Internet have created changes in the way companies do business. Someone in Bangalore,
EC 239 Introduction to International Trade Instructor: Sharif F. Khan Department of Economics Wilfrid Laurier University Winter 2010 Suggested Solutions to Assignment 2 (Optional) Part B Short Questions
19. Transfer Prices A. The Transfer Price Problem A.1 What is a Transfer Price? 19.1 When there is a international transaction between say two divisions of a multinational enterprise that has establishments
Commentary: What Do Budget Deficits Do? Allan H. Meltzer The title of Ball and Mankiw s paper asks: What Do Budget Deficits Do? One answer to that question is a restatement on the pure theory of debt-financed
Chapter 11 Keynesianism: The Macroeconomics of Wage and Price Rigidity Chapter Outline Real-Wage Rigidity Price Stickiness Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Keynesian Model The Keynesian Theory of Business
Irina M. Azu 21F.034 Final Paper OUTSOURCING IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET INTRODUCTION Outsourcing also known as contracting out is a business decision to export some to all of an organization s non-core
Fifth Luca d Agliano Lecture in Development Economics DOES OUTSOURCING CHANGE EVERYTHING? Paul R. Krugman Professor of Economics and International Affairs Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
NOÛS 43:4 (2009) 776 785 Critical Study David Benatar. Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) ELIZABETH HARMAN Princeton University In this
Investment Portfolio Philosophy The performance of your investment portfolio and the way it contributes to your lifestyle goals is always our prime concern. Our portfolio construction process for all of
Preferential Trade Agreements 1 Pravin Krishna Johns Hopkins University 1 Prepared for the conference organized at Columbia University on August 5 and 6, 2005 on the occasion of Professor Jagdish Bhagwati
Name: Class: Date: ID: A REVIEW ONE Matching Complete the following using these terms. a. outsourcing b. diversity c. entrepreneur d. competitive differentiation e. strategic alliance f. capital g. vision
Chapter 4 Technological Progress and Economic Growth 4.1 Introduction Technical progress is defined as new, and better ways of doing things, and new techniques for using scarce resources more productively.
Management Practice & Productivity: Why they matter November 2007 Nick Bloom Stanford University Stephen Dorgan McKinsey & Company John Dowdy McKinsey & Company John Van Reenen Centre for Economic Performance,
The National Accounts and the Public Sector by Casey B. Mulligan Fall 2010 Factors of production help interpret the national accounts. The factors are broadly classified as labor or (real) capital. The
Economic Policy Challenges for the 'Social Market Economy' in a Globalized World: Old wine in new skins? Dr. Bodo Herzog ESB Business School, Reutlingen University, Germany ESB Business School Social Market
Gains from trade in a Hotelling model of differentiated duopoly Kenji Fujiwara School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University and Department of Economics, McGill University August 8, 009 Abstract Constructing
Impact of Foreign Direct Investment, Imports and Exports Dr. A. Jayakumar, Professor of Commerce, Periyar University, Salem, India. Kannan.L, Research Scholar, Department of Commerce, Periyar University,
SOFTWARE PIRACY AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIAL WELFARE 1 Toomas Hinnosaar Software piracy involves usage, copying, selling and distributing computer programmes without the permission of its producer. Software
Outsourcing: Is the Third Industrial Revolution Really Around the Corner? Arvind Panagariya * September 1, 2007 * The author is Professor of Economics and Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political
CHAPTER 11: The Problem of Global Inequality MULTIPLE CHOICE 1. The claim that poverty is unethical is essentially a. Normative c. political b. theoretical d. scientific 2. Self-interest is an important
Chapter End of Chapter Review Question KEY - (Key Question) Complete the following table and answer the questions below: Units consumed Total utility Marginal utility 0 0 0 0 0 a. At which rate is total
Chapter 3 Specific Factors and Income Distribution Prepared by Iordanis Petsas To Accompany International Economics: Theory and Policy, Sixth Edition by Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld Chapter Organization
Accepted Manuscript Book review Farhad Rassekh PII: S1059-0560(08)00103-2 DOI: doi: 10.1016/j.iref.2008.10.001 Reference: REVECO 467 To appear in: International Review of Economics and Finance Please cite