An Analysis of the North Korean Perspective on Post-Cheonan Regional Security* Haksoon Paik

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1 An Analysis of the North Korean Perspective on Post-Cheonan Regional Security* Haksoon Paik Director, Center for North Korean Studies, Sejong Institute On March 26, 2010, the South Korean navy ship Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo attack in the West Sea according to the South Korean government-led investigations. North Korea denied its involvement in the incident and offered to dispatch an inspection team, meaning an investigation team, to South Korea. South Korea has not accommodated this offer. The South Korean government referred the Cheonan case to the United States Security Council (UNSC) and the UNSC issued a presidential statement. The U.S. and South Korean governments conducted a joint naval exercise in the East Sea, which was the largest in size in decades, and North Korea immediately put all the military forces and civilians on alert and conducted a military exercise as well. The immediate result of the Cheonan Incident was an instantaneous sharp rise of tension between the two Koreas on the Korean Peninsula, creating a vulnerable situation where a military conflict is not a remote possibility any more. There have been other developments as well: a manifestation of a systemic power transition that has been taking place between the United States and China in East Asia, and a preventive use of a military-security card by the United States vis-à-vis China, aiming at curbing the rise of China and making South Korea and Japan continue to remain close to the United States as allies by driving a wedge between these two countries and China. Key Points of North Korea s Announcements since the Cheonan Incident At first, North Korea did not mention anything on the Cheonan Incident until April 17, when a North Korean military commentator denied North Korea s involvement in the case. He argued that the South Korean government s spread of the theory of North Korea s involvement was designed to guard against or fend off the criticism of the failures in governance and North Korea policy, to win the June 2 local elections, to continue *Presented at The Asan Institute for Policy Studies Symposium on Post-Cheonan Regional Security, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, August 13, 2010, Seoul, Korea.

2 international sanctions on North Korea, and to destroy the strong and prosperous state North Koreans have been trying hard to open in It is noteworthy that North Korea s responses at this early stage were predominantly targeted at the South Korean government, not mentioning the role or involvement of the U.S. government in the case. Second, once the South Korean government-led joint investigation team announced on May 20, 2010 that the corvette Cheonan was sunk by the North Korean torpedo attack, the spokesman of North Korea s National Defense Commission issued a statement that it would respond to South Korea s reckless actions by launching a righteous war and that it would dispatch a National Defense Commission s inspection team to the South in order to check with the authenticity of the material evidence of the South Korean government-led joint investigation report. It is noteworthy that North Korea put forth a new idea that has never been there that it would send its own investigation team in order to disprove South Korea s material evidence. At the same time, North Korean foreign ministry s statement criticized that the South Korean government s investigation report was a self-manufactured thing that was approved, supported, and concocted by the United States and pointed out the U.S. calculation to use South Korea as its instrument with which to realize its strategic design in Asia. Note that North Korea now zeroed in on the United States as the mastermind of the whole incident. Third, just after President Lee Myong-bak appeared on television and released a statement at the War Memorial in Seoul that North Korea was responsible and has to be punished severely, North Korea characterized President Lee s action as a self-invented U.S.- ROK joint scheme and as an extraordinary crime that straightforwardly denies the June 15 and October 4 joint declarations. It is noteworthy that North Korea made clear that the joint investigation report and South Korean and the U.S. actions were responsible for nullifying the two joint declarations, the products of the two inter-korean summit talks. Fourth, on May 25, North Korea gave a warning that it would take military measures; on May 26, the North Korean military notified South Korea that it would destroy the military propaganda speakers by precision firing once the South resumes propaganda broadcast along the demarcation line and that it would take measures to bring the South Korean personnel and automobiles to a halt in the Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang areas; on May 27, the joint chiefs of 2

3 staff of the North Korean army issued an important notification that it would withdraw military guarantees for the inter-korean cooperative projects, cut off military communications, and review a complete halt to the Kaesong Industrial Park, that it would nullify the inter-korean bilateral agreements that was designed to prevent accidental conflicts in the West Sea, cut off maritime communications, and strike physically any violation of the maritime demarcation line, and that it would suspend the passage of South Korean airplane, ships, and automobiles over North Korea s territorial air, waters, and land. It also banned South Korean government officials entry into North Korea. Note that North Korea emphasized its resolve to punish the annulment of the June 15 and October 4 joint declarations. Fifth, when South Korea and the United States decided to refer the Cheonan case to the UNSC, North Korean foreign ministry s spokesman commented on June 4 that the key to the resolution of the Cheonan Incident was to have the truthfulness of the South Korean government-led joint investigation report double-checked by North Korea that was victimized by the whole incident. On June 21, the Korean Central News Agency issues a bill of indictment titled You can t cover up the truth of the ship sink case with regard to the Cheoan Incident. The doubts raised and the questions asked about the Cheonan were comprehensively included in the indictment. The indictment had it that the Cheonan Incident was a fabricated plot that was designed achieve their political objectives by the United States and South Korea and that the invented U.S. schemes were always followed by U.S. invasion and interference. Sixth, on June 28, the North Korean foreign ministry s spokesman stated that the declassified materials on the EC 121 Incident in 1969 disclosed that the United States had planned to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and that it also had planned to use them against North Korea and China in 1954, which means that the United States always planned to use nuclear weapons whenever there were opportunities to do so in its muscle diplomacy. The U.S. Department of Defense issued a nuclear posture review (NPR) report for 2010 on April 6, The United States declared its long-held negative security assurance that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. This 3

4 means that for states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, the United States will not exclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons against them. Against the NPR, the North Korean foreign ministry s spokesman pointed out that President Obama is no different than his predecessors and argued that as long as the nuclear threat from the United States continues, it would increase its stockpile of nuclear weapons as thought necessary and proceed to modernize them. He claimed that North Korea had enough capacity to carry out such plans and that the United States had provided ample reason and pretext for North Korea to do so. Seventh, North Korea criticized South Korea s request for the postponement of restoring the wartime operational control of the South Korean army as one of the special aims of the United States to fabricate the Cheonan Incident. North Korea listed as South Korea s concessions the opening of its markets to the United States, more burden-sharing of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea, dispatch of South Korean military forces overseas, becoming a full member of the U.S.-led missile defense system, and so on. Eighth, when the UNSC issued a presidential statement on July 9, the h Korean foreign ministry s spokesman commented that he paid attention to the part of the UNSC s presidential statement: the Security Council encourages the settlement of outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means to resume direct dialogue and negotiation through appropriate channels as early as possible, with a view to avoiding conflicts and averting escalation. He pointed out that the Cheonan Incident reminded us of the danger of the Korean armistice and the urgency of establishing a peace system on the Korean peninsula. He stated that North Korea will continue its effort to sign a peace agreement and to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks where sovereign equality is assured. Ninth, on July 24, North Korea s National Defense Commission s spokesman issued a statement on the U.S.-ROK joint naval exercise in East Sea: North Korea regards the investigation report of the Cheonan Incident as the first military provocation toward the North and the joint naval exercise as the second military provocation. He made clear that 4

5 North Korea will confront the U.S.-ROK naval exercise with nuclear deterrent; the U.S. and South Korea s double-standard policy just warrants the North Korea s choice of strengthening its nuclear deterrent; the more the United States exercises its nuclear power and the more South Korea follows it, the more North Korea will strengthen its nuclear deterrent at an extraordinary speed and the more remote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be; North Korea will launch its own style sacred retaliatory war based on nuclear deterrent any time thought of necessary when the U.S. and South Korean governments just intentionally drove the situation to the brink of a war. Tenth, there were four times of colonel-level military talks as preparatory steps for the general-level talks between the United States and North Korea for the resolution of the Cheonan Incident from July 1 to August 10. North Korea stressed that the on-the-spot investigation by the North Korea s National Defense Commission s investigation team is a prerequisite for any solution. North Korea suggested sending a 20- to 30-member investigation team to the South, hoping that it would conduct on-the-spot investigation for over 3 to 5 days. At the third meeting, both sides agreed to the objective and scientific clarification of the Cheonan Incident as the agenda of the general-level talks. At the fourth meeting, North Korea proposed a U.S.-DPRK joint investigation team for the early opening of the general-level talks. Eleventh, on July 31, the Korean Central News Agency issues another bill of indictment titled we convict the U.S.-ROK joint naval exercise of bringing about another Korean War. It is noteworthy that North Korea compares the visits to Panmunjom by U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to those visits to the 38 th parallel by the senior officials of the State and Defense Departments and U.S. Presidential special envoy John Foster Dulles just before the outbreak of the Korean War. North Korea argued that the behaviors of the two U.S. Secretaries this time signifies that the final review of U.S. plan for invading North Korea from military and diplomatic perspectives are over and the plan has entered the implementation phase. The indictment also argues that the U.S.-ROK joint navel exercise is also a blunt provocation for the U.S. military hegemony in Northeast Asia and that through the Cheonan 5

6 Incident the U.S. firmly captured South Korea as a major component in realizing its strategy of becoming world hegemony and strengthened its base. Finally, North Korea fired about one hundred shells from the cost-battery in the West Sea on August 9, which was the last day of South Korea s naval exercise in the West Sea. A review of North Korea s responses to the Cheonan Incident above helps us to identify a few characteristics or tendencies in North Korea s thinking and actions: at first, it touched on the inter-korean relations only, then accused the United States as the mastermind; it also found excuses for its strong anti-south Korean and anti-u.s. stance and for its continuation of strengthening its nuclear deterrence by pointing out the nullification of the June 15 and October 4 joint declarations, a U.S.-ROK joint naval exercise in the East Sea; it interprets the meaning of the Cheonan Incident in a larger context of U.S.-Chinese confrontation in East Asia and around the world; and finally, it still keeps alive the agenda the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which it thinks should be discussed and move forward with the progress in the establishment of a permanent Korean peace regime on the peninsula. North Korea s Rationale for Boycotting the Six-Party Talks North Korea has repeatedly made clear that it would not return to the Six-Party Talks unless UN sanctions on North Korea were removed. North Korea s rationale not to participate in the Six-Party Talks and not to recognize the existing agreements that had been concluded to carry out the September 19 th Joint States, could be compared with its rationale for defending itself against U.S. financial sanctions in the case of BDA in North Korea argues that the spirit of mutual respect and equality as expressed in the September 19 th Joint Statement for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the foundation and the soul of the Six-Party Talks, but that the Six-Party Talks parties denied this spirit in full face in the name of the UNSC Resolutions, thereby grossly violating the sovereign rights of North Korea and attempting to disarm it and change its regimes. Under these circumstances, North Korea made clear that it would not participate in the Six-Party Talks ever again, and that it would not be bound by any agreements to carry out the September 19 th Joint Statement. North Korea appears to have been deeply disappointed at the 6

7 fact that the Six-Party Talks parties themselves had played major roles in passing the UNSC Resolution In other words, North Korea appears to have realized that the Six-Party Talks parties could not be trusted in their intentions. Therefore, North Korea appears to have been convinced that it will come back to the Six-Party Talks and negotiate denuclearization only when the United States and other Six-Party Talks parties clearly showed in good faith that they will not attempt a regime change of North Korea, and when they showed respect for North Korea s sovereignty and equality. In the case of the BDA sanctions, North Korea likewise argued that without resolving the U.S. financial sanctions on North Korea first, North Korea would not participate in the Six- Party Talks and negotiate its denuclearization. North Korea s strategy was that North Korea would not begin denuclearization until it became clear that the United States had abandoned its hostile policy to topple the North Korean regime and its leader, and that the United States had reengaged North Korea with the purpose to peacefully coexist with it. In addition, the North Korean leadership also made clear that even if the United States agreed on nonaggression treaty, that it would hold only on paper as long as the United States did not abandon its intention to continue anti-north Korea policy. North Korea demanded the United States show concrete evidence that it had shifted its North Korea policy from attempting regime change to peaceful coexistence. Implications for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula What are the policy implications of the Cheonan Incident for our effort to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea? It appears that denuclearizing North Korea has become more and more difficult by now due to the Cheonan Incident. Not only North Korea but also other countries in the East Asia are fully aware of the impact of the restructuring of international order in East Asia that is taking place at a full speed, and North Korea appears to have almost lost its incentive to give up its nuclear weapons capabilities. The South Korean and U.S. governments immediately tied the navy ship sinking in with the issue of resuming the Six-Party Talks, making clear that the cause and perpetrators of the Cheonan Incident must be determined unambiguously before any effort was to be made to resume talks. The resumption of the Six-Party Talks now appears to be put on the back 7

8 burner, and the possibility of denuclearizing North Korea appears to be growing ever more remote due to a newly-structured confrontation based on power transition that has taken place between the United States and China. The apparent use of the military-security card by the United States in the Cheonan case appears to have been an equivalent to a preventive war typically launched by a declining hegemonic power in the power transition period in the past; it appears to have targeted at curbing the rise of China and simultaneously at making South Korea and Japan dependent on U.S. cooperation. With these, our hope for denuclearizing North Korea was practically lost, a disaster in our effort to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, a failure to achieve our policy goals as designed in the Six-Party Talks. 8