Searle on speech acts 9/8

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1 Searle on speech acts 9/8 Philosophy of Language, Fall 2014 Peter van Elswyk, Rutgers University 1 Explaining communication Regardless of what is being explained, an explanation always has two parts: the explanans and the explanandum. The explanans is whatever does the explaining. In contrast, the explanandum is whatever is explained. When it comes to linguistic communication, disagreement is had over what is the fundamental explanandum. expresses updates Speech act information conversation In other words, disagreement concerns which part of the model of communication should be explained first and foremost and then used to explain the other parts. Here s Searle s perspective on what the fundamental explanandum is for linguistic communication: I think it is essential to any specimen of linguistic communication that it involves a linguistic act. It is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol or word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol or word or sentence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but rather it is the production of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication. To put this point more precisely, the production of the sentence token under certain conditions is the illocutionary act, and the illocutinary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication. In other words, speech acts are by Searle s lights the essential ingredient in linguistic communication. Illocutionary act is the name that Searle borrows from J.L. Austin to identify those speech acts which essentially involve linguistic communication. Speaking inevitably

2 searle on speech acts 2 results in the performance of other actions like the movements of one s jaw, mouth, and lips, but these action not qualify as illocutionary acts. What s his reason for thinking speech acts are the basic explanandum of linguistic communication? Here is an attempt at reconstructing his argument: argument from performance recognition (1) It is necessary for interpreting a noise or mark as an instance of linguistic communication that the noise or mark be intentionally performed as an action. (2) If (1), then being intentionally performed as an action is essential to linguistic communication. (3) So: being intentionally performed as an action is essential to linguistic communication. from (1), (2) To motivate (1), Searle asks us to imagine a process like water erosion somehow creating what appears to be a sentence. Were we to come across an instance of Snow is white faded into the ground, we would not interpret it as an instance of linguistic communication if we knew it were the accidental byproduct of water erosion. assessment Does the argument succeed in showing that speech acts are the only basic unit of linguistic communication? What might be the argument s shortcomings? Is there a better way of reconstructing his argument? 2 Ingredients for a speech act With a fundamental explanandum in view, Searle turns next to explaining a speech act. Searle takes three concepts to be central to explaining a speech act: rules, proposition, and meaning. Without a handle on these, we cannot get a handle on speech acts. 2.1 Rules Searle maintains that speech acts are rule governed. In his voice: To perform illocutionary acts is to engage in a rule governed form of behavior. When it comes to rules, Searle suggests that there are at least two kinds.

3 searle on speech acts 3 regulative rules: Rules that govern activity. The existence of this activity is independent of the existence of the rules. These rules often take the form Do X or If Y, do X. (Examples: etiquette ). constitutive rules: Rules that define an activity. The existence of this activity is dependent on the existence of the rules. These rules often take the form X counts as Y or X is Y. (Examples: game guidelines.) Although speech acts can be associated with regulative rules (e.g. Don t curse!), Searle is interested only in the latter kind of rule because he thinks speech acts are constituted by rules. In this way, speech acts are like moves made in a game. Just as a the rules of basketball define a free throw, the rules of communication define a speech act. 2.2 Proposition More or less, here s how Searle defines a proposition: proposition: The informational content of a speech act that is expressed by performing that speech act. It is apparent that some speech acts do have informational content. For example, assertions clearly express propositions. But Searle thinks there is a proposition expressed by a great number of speech acts. Questions, requests, orders, and wishes are some of the speech acts that he defends outright as expressing propositions. The argument: argument from reference/predication (1) Many speech acts refer and predicate. (2) Every act that refers and predicates expresses a proposition. (3) So: many speech acts express a proposition. from (1), (2) Refresher: reference is what happens when an individual is designated with a noun phrase like Sally, The doctor in the corner, or she. predication is what happens when a property is attributed to an individual with an adjective or verb phrase like is tall or swims. Searle s central claim, then, is that acts which attribute particular properties (tallness) to particular individuals (Sally) are acts that express propositions. assessment Do all speech acts refer and predicate? Can you refer and predicate without expressing a complete chunk of information? Can you express information without referring and predicating?

4 searle on speech acts Meaning Searle draws another distinction. He distinguishes between meaning something and having a meaning. The first is done by an agent. The second is had by whatever is the basic unit of linguistic communication. To define the former, Searle modifies a definition initially provided by Paul Grice. A meant something by x: (1) A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention, and (2) if the words used in x are used literally, A intends this recognition to be achieved because the rules for using the words in x associate the words with the production of the effect had by the audience. Where Searle s definition of meaning something differs from Grice s is the addition of (2). Grice s definition did not include that words have conventions associated with them that enable them to consistently produce certain effects in an audience. To motivate (2) s addition, Searle provides two examples involving cases where people try to communicate information by using words that mean different from the information intended (e.g. using cold to describe something as hot). The failure to communicate in these examples is evidence that merely recognizing the speaker s intentions is not sufficient for linguistic communication. The intentions have to work in concert with the conventions associated with words. Here s how he sums it up: In our analysis of illocutionary acts, we must capture both the intentional and the conventional aspects and especially the relationship between them. spoiler alert The relationship between intention and convention and their bearing on speech acts will come up next class with Strawson. Also: we will read a perspective on how word meaning is determined by convention when we read Lewis in a few weeks. 3 Speech acts Searle aims is state the necessary and sufficient conditions for performing a speech act. Refresher: necessary conditions for x are those that are always required for x to obtain without exception. sufficient conditions for x are those conditions which guarantee that x will obtain without exception. Since Searle wants to enumerate both the necessary and

5 searle on speech acts 5 sufficient conditions, he wants to enumerate exactly what it takes for a speech act to be performed. In other words, he wants to define the constitutive rules. Every speech act is defined by four kinds of constitutive rules. To help explain these four kinds of constitutive rules, Searle offers an analysis of the speech act of promising. Promising breaks down as follows: proposition rule(s) P is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker S. (1) P is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S s doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer S s doing Promising = prepatory rule(s) A to his not doing A. (2) P is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events. sincerity rule(s) P is to be uttered only if S intends to do A. essential rule(s) The utterance of P counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A. Unfortunately, Searle isn t especially forthcoming about the nature of each variety of constitutive rule. At least, he was not forthcoming in the paper we read. We have to peak ahead to his later book Foundations of Illocutionary Logic written in 1985 with Daniel Vanderveken. Here s what he clarifies: proposition rules define what information can be expressed by a particular speech act. (Examples: promises must be about the future ). prepatory rules define the background conditions needed for performing the speech act. (Examples: promises must concern something good ). sincerity rules define what must be true of the speaker to honestly perform the speech act. (Examples: promises must be made with an intent to be kept ). essential rules define what is unique about the speech act and what distinguishes it from other speech acts. (Examples: promises express a commitment to perform a future action ). And those are the four kinds of constitutive rules.

6 searle on speech acts 6 assessment Are these four kinds of rules sufficient for defining speech acts? Are they all necessary? We now have a recipe for generalizing from his account of promising to other speech acts. We just have to pick another speech act and then determine what would go in each box for each kind of rule defining that speech act. proposition rule(s) P is to be P is to be prepatory rule(s) Question = P is to be sincerity rule(s) The utterance of P essential rule(s) recommended reading Austin, J.L. (1962). How To Do Things With Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bach, K. and R. Harnish (1979) Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, Cambridge: MIT Press. Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vanderveken, D. (1990). Meaning and Speech Acts, Vols I and II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.