SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES EN PARIS, FRANCE

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1 Cy / of 7 cys SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES EN PARIS, FRANCE EUROPE :UROPE 2 December 1955 VYT sur 01, MEMORANDUM FQEi GÊNERAI GRlENEffiR SUBJECT: Guidance Required Frcra SACEUR For Ihe Pattern Of Forces Study ïhis memorandum is submitted in response to your request to Colonels Billingslea and Vandevanter for information concerning the guidance required from you with respect to the study on the pattern of forces for We have tentatively established as an outline for your guidance to the Committee: mission* forces. a. Some observations on the politico-military situation b. Comments on NATO objectives and a definition of SACEUR's c. Some guidance on a concept of operations and a pattern of d. Additional considerations The comments and questions in the body of the memorandum will follow this suggested format. 2. Tou also requested that we provide you with any conclusions that we have deduced so far from our discussions. It appears that most of these discussions have been primarily in the area of isolating the issues and, -Uaerefore 3 the majority of material presented herein is in the form of specific questions, although we have submitted certain recommendations here and there as they appear appropriate. Although we have discussed various facets of this problem with appropriate SHAPE personnel, no effort has been made to secure comments or coordination on this paper. 3. We are continuing the preparation of a draft statement of guidance from you pending a response to this memorandum. We will be prepared to discuss this further at your convenience. I ;

2 -IDENHL AHALISIS QF POLITICO-MILITARY SITOAHIOH 4. Gxxidance to the Planning Tsam should be introduced by a statement of our assessment of the politico-military situation in broad terms in order to set the stage for the preparation of a more detailed estimate of the situation. VJe feel that the following general guidance could be giveni a. Ihe objectives of the Soviet Bloc will not vary between now and However, their tactics may alter from time to time as they seek to exploit opportunist tactics. îhese tactics would be almost impossible to predetermine in any detail since, in part, they will be influenced by the strategy we formulate during this period in Allied Command Europe. b. We foresee no major alteration in the alignment of Western European forces; for example, the reunification of Germany. Our planning should be sufficiently flexible to encompass any reasonable changes in situations. c. We feel it would be unrealistic to anticipate any substantial increase in MATO defense expenditures, but could expect that it will remain approximately at its current level. d. The areas of greatest political unreliability which could have an impact on HATO are the Mddle East and various North African areas. ALXiISD OBJECTIVES AND MISSION 5. The major contribution of NATO to its member nations is the provision of a deterrent which will prevent war. To be effective as a deterrent there must be a demonstrated fighting capability and an expressed determination to use this fighting force in war. To date it is probable that our dominant atomic capability has been the basis of our deterrent value, in IigJit of current thinking that by the»60 period each side might have quantitatively a decisive stockpile; Q. With respect to the fighting capability of NATO forces, clo you feel that the obviously increasing Soviet nuclear ability will 'cause such apprehension" among 't'tie' 'NATO nations that they will in time' 'begin to question -aie possibility of winning a war against * he SovaeTsg 6. On this point we feel that it is clear from a numbers standpoint alone that the increased Soviet atomic stockpile coupled with a surprise attack might allow them to strike a disastrous blow at ACE. However, it is also clear that the NATO dispersion program and the ft î h TT- ÎMÎÎ i! ; ; ".tuu Ts r-jfi *r"ï*-> -'-il I v ' i i y.ür : < - - v

3 technological developments such as aero-launched aircraft, guided missiles, and light-wei^ït filters will significantly increase our ability to withstand a surprise attack. Beyond the problem of numbers of atomic weapons the question of delivery and counter-delivery equipments and techniques become very complex. We feel that exploitation of this field might provide us the technological lead to increase our deterrent value, at least through the period of this study. We recognize that the contemplation of a military victory which results in massive civilian destruction will not be an encouraging philosophy to the Continental nations, Ihis has led us to an emphasis of the need for an air defense system which should continue to be a first priority task under any concept of operations. It should lead us also in this stucfy to a much more critical examination of the surprise assumption which appears in the '57 Capabilities Plan, Specifically, it should be a task of the Cammittee to determine the magnitude of any Soviet effort which can realistically be launched at the same time maintaining strategic and tactical surprise. Q. If we design our forces in such a manner that it is clear we are determined' to figfct a nuclear war, does this reduce the deterrent value MTû_'forces _when TfjiT enenjy has attained the apparën^aïïîlitiy to equal the ^orce of "our nuclear attack? 7. Vfe are of the opinion that our nuclear capability and an expressed determination to employ this force will provide our major deterrent under any assumed conditions. The mission of other elements of SACEUÄ' s military establishment is expressed in our concept of operations which follows. We feel that the force composition evolving from this concept will provide the best deterrent within the resources of Allied Comraand Europe, S. Ihe Strategic Guidance contained in K. C. 14./1 indicates that the NATO policy should be, in peacetime, to. * oppose, by all measures short of war, any peacetime attempts ty the U.S.S.R. or her satellites to increase their threat against the Treaty nations;., Q. In peacetime what is SACStE's responsibility in contributing to "measures short of war 11? For example, our responsibility in 'the case of the loss oi 1 Austria, Switzerland., or JJortiTAfri ca. 9. M. C. 14/1 further indicates that in event of aggression the KATO nations "will take combined and coordinated action to defend... and mobilize their combined strength with the objective of achieving the earliest defeat of the U.S.S.R. and the attainment of Allied war objectives, the latter being decided by the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty nations." In attempting to define SACEUR's functions in the achievement of the overall NATO objectives, we were unable to discover any more positive delineation of objectives than that given above.

4 OiffIUENTlAL Q. What is your conception of yourjpart in the achievement of the Allied objective? 10. We feel that a request to the North Atlantic Council for clarification of your objectives would result in little, if any, practical information due to the difficulties in resolving in peacetime the complex political problems associated with such a determination. The only clear statement of your mission is to develop a posture which will convince the U.S.S.R. war will not pay and, in case of hostilities, to defend the territory of Allied Command Europe. It is our opinion that this defensive mission should form the basis of your guidance to the Committee. However, in adopting such a mission, consideration should be given to some of the following factors} Q. Wnat would be the reaction of member nations to the acceptance of a philosophy vftiicti 'did not attempt to push the Hattle line, lrnct resulting destruction, beyond their' national boundaries and bring the war to a conclusion? Q. To what extent are we responsible for the recapture of overrun NATO territory, 'and would the same procedures hold"true for co-belligerents such as Sweden, Finland, of Yugoslavia? Q* Do we have any obligation to reunite Germany in case of hostilities? CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 11. It may not be possible for you at this time to provide us witii some thought on how the next war should be fought. However, it is clear that we cannot provide from our limited resources the forces required to meet all eventualities. If this study is to serve its purpose, it must clearly define what our basic strategy is to be. in K.c. 46 we recognize the necessity for the use of atomic weapons from the outset of any hostilities as a vital adjunct to our conventional force structure. We assume that you consider that this decision is still valid. Q. Do you believe that we have progressed beyond this philosophy to a stage where nuclear' weapons are actually the detemining'"factor and our concept of operations should l Be 'developed "around the use 'of nuclear weapons 'for 'the'" decisive action of the next, war"? Q* If so, would you agree to a statement of a concept along the" lines o a 'primary' atomic striking force" prejected by a 'minimum forward shield of ground units arid warning network in "order to"provide unequivocal evidence of enemy aggression,' coupled with a powerful air"defense umbrella incorporating 'interceptors and guided missiles? nrr! -!»I ^nmflnrr.! - SLHi^

5 Q. An outgrowth of this, or any other operational concept, lsads to "a ' de'temination of duration ot hostilities, What would you accept as a realistic maximum time phasing? 12, We feel that some period in the neighborhood of six months, for planning purposes, might be necessary to evaluate and exploit fully the results of the nuclear offensive j any period very much in excess of six months would involve us in the logistics preparations of an open-end requirements plan. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 13. There has been extensive discussion of the possibility of the Western nations being farced to engage in "limited" or "peripheral" wars. In general this question appears to be particularly applicable to the Near and Far East, Q, In this connection, do you foresee any possibility of NATO forces being"required to conduct combat operations 'in gestern Europe without the use of atomic weapons? 14, In developing a pattern of forces, the committee should not be overly influenced by military tasks of essentially a national character. However, certain national responsibilities, such as air defense, must be integrated into the overall study. Furthermore, the necessity of maintaining a national military establishment in each country which will allow for stability in the cold war should receive due recognition by the committee. E. VANDEVANTSR, JR. Colonel USAF Colonel USA