PH8111 DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY COURSE DESCRIPTION. Fall 2012

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1 PH8111 Fall 2012 Instructor: Robert Murray Office Hours: Fridays 1-3pm or by appointment, preferred Office: Jorgensen 422 Phone: (416) Ext COURSE DESCRIPTION This course traces the roots of the metaphysics of moral agency presupposed by Kantian- Rawlsian liberalism, in order that we might consider the basic plausibility of the criticism that Kantian-Rawlsian liberalism presupposes an atomistic, unencumbered, or noumenal self of some sort. The criticism is important because it raises once again the question of how pure practical reason is possible. We begin from the fact that the modern scientific revolution raised intellectual challenges to religion, by providing an account of reality and causality absent any grand scheme of design, purpose, or teleology. The same ideas raised intellectual challenges to morality, as well however, because morality also has its intellectual roots in the idea that the universe is one of design. If moral judgments are not based on design of some form, how can they be justified, objective, true, or count as knowledge? What would provide our normative distinctions if not design, and how would they be justified as reasons with normative authority for practical agents? Hume and Kant aimed to provide an account of our ordinary sense of moral deliberation, thought, feeling, obligation and agency, such that morality could be endorsed in terms of reasons without appeal to any metaphysics of design. Through selected readings from David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Michael J. Sandel, this course focuses on how moral agency was framed by Hume and Kant, and how their positions were integrated into the moral constructivism defended by John Rawls in his theory of justice as fairness. Many endorse moral skepticism, relativism, or nihilism of some form, instead, of course. According to David Hume, the moral sentiments are the source of our moral distinctions, but our social identities are the sources of motivation, and reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions. Hume was content without unconditional grounding for human obligation of the sort provided in design or reason; instead, he found reason to be happy with an empirically and contingently given basis for our morality; and he found virtue in the conditioned. In that regard, Hume shares certain reasons with naturalistic utilitarianism. In reaction to Hume, Immanuel Kant argued that pure practical reasoning is the source of normative authority and moral motivation, because pure practical reasoning takes normative precedence over all forms of empirical practical reasoning. This is because only pure practical reasoning provides unconditional grounds for the necessitation found in moral experience. According to Kant, the motivations

2 of empirically given sentiments, including sympathy, are heteronomous; and, on his view, heteronomy of any form detracts from the autonomy of the truly moral will. If pure practical reason sets the limits of the truly moral will, however, how is the moral will related to a person s moral sensibility, moral feeling, and moral identity, as we find ourselves in the sensible world? What is the moral psychology of the Kantian moral agent? Kant s metaphysical and epistemological distinctions between the sensible and intelligible worlds led to a disunity in reason, as well as the person, which has to be addressed; Kant unified reason by locating the sources of normative authority in pure practical reason alone. But he could never explain how pure practical reason was possible. John Rawls defends an empirical rendition of Kant s idea of the priority of pure practical reasoning over empirical practical reasoning. In part, this is to avoid the intractable metaphysical problems caused by Kant s distinction between the intelligible and the sensible worlds. Like Kant, Rawls maintains that the moral self shows the capacity for an unencumbered moral point of view, free from the usual sources of moral bias, including those related to the various ethics of association given in our different social identities. This seems to mean that the Kantian-Rawlsian moral self, as a finite but autonomous being, is both embedded and yet able, somehow, to take an unencumbered moral point of view. According to many critics, however, in order to be able to take an unencumbered moral point of view, the self would have to be atomistic, unencumbered, or noumenal in basic nature. But such a self, argues Sandel, is a metaphysical embarrassment and, as such, spells the end of Kantian-Rawlsian liberalism as a political morality. In that case, a political morality found itself rejected by appeal to the metaphysics of moral agency. This criticism is perhaps surprising, however, given Kant s views on the pretensions and fallibilism of speculative reason when it comes to metaphysical knowledge, as well as his idea that practical reason demonstrates itself practically by doing and exemplifying itself. As well, this criticism for the metaphysics of the self is surprising, given Rawls s insistence on the principle of avoidance when it comes to the vexing philosophical problems of first philosophy. On Rawls s view, there is no way to settle conflicting moral issues articulated in political moralities by appeal to the metaphysics of moral agency or any other first philosophy. Accordingly, Rawls defends the use of the principle of avoidance so as to avoid metaphysical issues where possible and reasonable. The method of avoidance is called for by the fact of reasonable pluralism, on Rawls s view, for the sake of reciprocity, consensus, and the avoidance of philosophical sectarianism. All things considered, it isn t altogether clear what to think about the criticisms made against the metaphysics of Kantian-Rawlsian agency, and so we will trace at least part of the issue through readings selected from Hume, Kant, Rawls, and Sandel. For further study, one might consider the role of Hegel and Dewey in Rawls s empirical rendition of Kant; and one might consider how the metaphysics of moral agency relates to other issues in political morality such as group-differentiated recognition, as called for in the politics of difference, recognition, identity, and defended by Iris Young, Charles Taylor, and Nancy Fraser, for example. One might also consider how the scholarship of confrontation relates to Kantian-Rawlsian liberalism for its role in what James Tully refers to in terms of the Trojan horse of European imperialism and the Enlightenment project.

3 Primary texts have to be read, reread, discussed, and considered many times in their own right apart from secondary sources. All the key ideas are to found in the readings and will be discussed during the lectures. When it comes to secondary sources, if you want them, you might read the introductions to each text. Rawls s Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, edited by Barbara Herman, are very useful. For a discussion of Hume, see J.L. Mackie, Hume s Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980); for a discussion of Kant see Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). There are at least a dozen anthologies on the so-called liberal communitarian debate over the metaphysics and moral psychology of the Kantian-Rawlsian self. REQUIRED READINGS (1) David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1983). Edited by J.B. Schneewind. (2) Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Translated by Mary Gregor. (3) Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Translated by Mary Gregor. (4) John Rawls, Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). The following chapters are required reading: Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, Justice as Fairness, Justice as Reciprocity, A Kantian Conception of Equality, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, and Themes in Kant s Moral Philosophy. (5) Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp COURSE REQUIREMENTS You will be required to write one major essay of approximately words, worth 60%, and due December 15; you are required to submit eight 1-2 page summaries of particular arguments and distinctions found in the week s reading (basically your study notes), worth 2.5% each, and to be prepared ahead of time as you study for the lectures and submitted that day, for a total of 20%; and either a minor essay of words worth 20%, or two short in class presentations of the text of roughly ten minutes worth 10% each. It is your choice, but I urge you to do the presentations, as all you have to do is publicly explain and discuss the points in your summary to the rest of us. That counts as a philosophical skill and I urge you to practice it. I am happy to meet with you individually to discuss your presentations and essays before you present or submit them. HELP Anyone having trouble understanding the course readings or lectures is encouraged to raise the relevant questions during the lectures or to visit me during office hours. Anyone feeling anxious about his or her essay is encouraged to visit me during office hours with either an essay outline or draft.

4 PENALTIES The penalty for plagiarism is 0 for the essay, a letter to the registrar s office, and a failure in the course. Students are reminded that they are required to adhere to all relevant University policies including the student code of conduct set out in the Ryerson calendar and the student handbook. Please see the last few pages for an overview. FACULTY COURSE SURVEY An online Faculty Course Survey will provide students with an opportunity to evaluate several aspects of a course and it matters for the ongoing improvement of courses. Any changes in this course outline must be discussed and agreed upon in class or online. TENTATIVE WEEKLY SCHEDULE (TO BE ARTICULATED WEEKLY) Weeks of: Readings and Assignments: 1. Sept. 5 Introduction to the course 2. Sept. 12 Hume: Inquiry, Sections I-V 3. Sept. 19 Hume: Inquiry, Sections I-V 4. Sept. 26 Hume: Inquiry, Section IX; Appendices I-III 5. Oct. 3 Kant: selections from Groundwork, Preface, Section 1, pp. 118, Section II and III p Oct. 10 Fall Study Week Oct Oct. 17 Kant: selections from Groundwork, Preface, Section 1, pp. 118, Section II and III p Oct. 24 Kant: selections from Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, Introduction pp. 3-13, Book one pp , Oct. 31 Kant: selections from Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, Introduction pp. 3-13, Book one pp , Nov. 7 Kant: selections from Critique of Practical Reason, Book II pp , ; Part two Nov. 14 Rawls: Two of Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, Justice as Fairness, and Justice as Reciprocity 12. Nov. 21 Rawls: Two of A Kantian Conception of Equality, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, and Themes in Kant s Moral Philosophy

5 13. Nov. 28 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp December 15. Major essay due. (60%) UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS Conduct, integrity and academic appeals: - Students are responsible for knowing and adhering to all University policies, including Ryerson s Student Code of Academic Conduct ( and Code of Non-Academic Conduct ( Please read these and all other relevant University policies. - Students are strongly advised to read and complete the online Academic Integrity quizzes on policies, penalties and appeals. - Very helpful advice is provided in the Student Guide to Avoiding Academic Appeals : Extensions, accommodations and late penalties: - Students who anticipate difficulty with deadlines or assignments for any reason must notify their program Chair/Director or the instructor as soon as possible to discuss accommodations. See the Student Guide to Avoiding Academic Appeals : ( oidappeals.pdf) and Ryerson Senate Policy 134 ( - Accommodations for religious observance must be formally requested within the first two weeks of class. - Access Centre forms must be submitted as early as possible, and accommodations should be arranged with the instructor at least two weeks before tests and assignment deadlines. - Students are responsible for providing appropriate documentation within three working days of missed exams or deadlines. In cases of illness, a completed Ryerson Medical Certificate must be submitted: - Where appropriate, make-up tests and/or exams will be arranged according to Ryerson s Course Management Policy (Senate Policy 145): Intellectual property Plagiarism and cheating: - Students must respect and protect all intellectual property (ideas), both their own and the intellectual property of other people. - Plagiarism is an extremely serious academic offence. If you have any questions about plagiarism, you must seek clarification before submitting an assignment. Ignorance is not an acceptable defence for any form of plagiarism. Please read and complete the online Academic Integrity quizzes. - If plagiarism is suspected in one of your assignments, you will be invited to attend a Facilitated Discussion with the instructor and Ryerson s Academic Integrity Officer. If the instructor

6 - - determines that plagiarism has occurred, your assignment will receive a grade of 0 (the University s minimum penalty) and a Disciplinary Notice (DN) will be placed on your academic record. Further penalties may also be imposed, including an F in the course and/or suspension from the University. Keep all your notes and drafts to assist in authenticating your work. The instructor also reserves the right to conduct an oral examination on the contents of any submitted assignment, test or exam, and/or to request an electronic copy of any submitted work. Plagiarism includes, but is not limited to, the following practices: Copying from another person s work without using accurate quotation marks and citations (footnotes or in-text references) Substantially paraphrasing another person s words and/or ideas (i.e., changing the original author s words slightly and interspersing them with a few of your own words), without appropriate referencing Failing to incorporate complete and accurate footnotes or in-text references in your written assignments, including exact page numbers Submitting work in this course that has also been submitted in another course (at Ryerson University or elsewhere) Submitting a test and/or other assignment produced partially or entirely by another person and claiming it as your own work