Chapter 52 Routing. Packets on the Large. DeepSec Vienna Layers of Insecurity
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1 Chapter 52 Routing Packets on the Large.
2 Copyright Information Some rights reserved / Einige Rechte vorbehalten Michael Kafka, René Pfeiffer, Sebastian Meier C.a.T. Consulting and Trainings, Vienna, Austria You may freely use, distribute and modify this work under following agreement: Diese Arbeit darf frei genutzt, verbreitet und bearbeitet werden unter folgenden Bedingungen: Authors must be referenced (also for modification) Autoren müssen genannt werden (auch bei Bearbeitung) Only for non commercial use Nur für nichtkommerzielle Nutzung Derivative work under same licence Derivative Arbeit unter selber Lizenz 2
3 Chapter 51 Routing Agenda Attacks on Routing Protocols Attacks on forwarding 3
4 Attacks on Routing Protocols Routing is no Heaven 4
5 Spoofed Routing Updates Modifying routing tables Simple on RIP/EIGRP More Complex on OSPF Unlikely on BGP Redirect user traffic to attacker MitM Stealing data 5
6 Attacks on forwarding Is the way to Amarillo? 6
7 Source Routing The Path is in the Packet Not disabled in most networks Spoofed two way communication Bypassing established Paths Risk high, Impact high 7
8 Chapter 51 TCP/IP Summary Routing protocols can be attacked Use authenticated updates Use ingres filtering and anti spoofing 8
9 Thank You Questions? 9
10 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Chapter 52 Routing Packets on the Large Routing 1
11 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Copyright Information Some rights reserved / Einige Rechte vorbehalten Michael Kafka, René Pfeiffer, Sebastian Meier C.a.T. Consulting and Trainings, Vienna, Austria You may freely use, distribute and modify this work under following agreement: Diese Arbeit darf frei genutzt, verbreitet und bearbeitet werden unter folgenden Bedingungen: Authors must be referenced (also for modification) Autoren müssen genannt werden (auch bei Bearbeitung) Only for non commercial use Nur für nichtkommerzielle Nutzung Derivative work under same licence Derivative Arbeit unter selber Lizenz 2 This presentation is published under the CreativeCommons License which can be viewed in detail on their hompage: Read more on You are free: to Share to copy, distribute and transmit the work to Remix to adapt the work Under the following conditions: Attribution. You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Noncommercial. You may not use this work for commercial purposes. Share Alike. If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under the same or similar license to this one. For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. The best way to do this is with a link to this web page. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission from the copyright holder. Nothing in this license impairs or restricts the author's moral rights Routing 2
12 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Chapter 51 Routing Agenda Attacks on Routing Protocols Attacks on forwarding Routing 3
13 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Attacks on Routing Protocols Routing is no Heaven Routing 4
14 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Spoofed Routing Updates Modifying routing tables Simple on RIP/EIGRP More Complex on OSPF Unlikely on BGP Redirect user traffic to attacker MitM Stealing data Routing 5
15 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Attacks on forwarding Is the way to Amarillo? Routing 6
16 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Source Routing The Path is in the Packet Not disabled in most networks Spoofed two way communication Bypassing established Paths Risk high, Impact high Routing 7
17 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Chapter 51 TCP/IP Summary Routing protocols can be attacked Use authenticated updates Use ingres filtering and anti spoofing Routing 8
18 DeepSec Conference November 2007 Thank You Questions? Routing 9
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