The IAEA Nuclear Security Programme Combating Nuclear Terrorism

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1 The IAEA Nuclear Security Programme Combating Nuclear Terrorism Miroslav Gregoric Office of Nuclear Security Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

2 Four Threats of Nuclear Terrorism Theft of a nuclear weapon Theft of material to make an improvised nuclear explosive device Theft of other radioactive material for an RDD Sabotage of a facility or transport

3 Is there a need to worry? The IAEA Illicit Nuclear Trafficking Database: 86 Member States participate Almost 700 confirmed trafficking cases >120 cases reported yearly Several historical cases of threat to nuclear facilities Many uncontrolled radioactive sources Known interest to sub-state actors Successful other terrorist actions in recent years

4 Combating Nuclear Terrorism What can the IAEA do? Nuclear Security - Primacy of the State Role of the IAEA defined by its Member States Not new: Nuclear material accountancy: SSACs Safety programme: control Illicit Trafficking Data Base:1995 Material Security Programme:1999

5 Nuclear Security: IAEA Plans of Activities September 2001: IAEA General Conference requests review of Agency s activities relevant to preventing nuclear terrorism and proposals for strengthening measures March 2002 : Plan of Activities, with eight activity areas, approved by Board of Governors

6 Nuclear Security Plan I, V II III IV VI VII VIII Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities Assessment of Safety/Security Vulnerability of Nuclear Facilities Detection of Malicious Activities Involving Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials State Systems for Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control Security of Radioactive Material Other Than Nuclear Material Response to Malicious Acts, or threats thereof Adherence to and Implementation of International Agreements, Guidelines and Recommendations Nuclear Security Co-ordination and Information Management

7 New Nuclear Security Plan September 2005: Board of Governors approves new Nuclear Security Plan for next four years Estimated annual budget from voluntary contributions: $15m Three activity areas

8 New Nuclear Security Plan ACTIVITY AREA I Needs assessment, analysis and coordination: Collecting and collating information on needs Collecting and analyzing data on illicit trafficking and nuclear security incidents Information security Coordination with States and other international organizations IAEA International Conferences

9 New Nuclear Security Plan ACTIVITY AREA II Prevention Controls on materials: regulatory systems, SSACs Protection of materials, facilities, transports from theft and sabotage Nuclear security culture

10 New Nuclear Security Plan ACTIVITY AREA III Detection & Response Detection and response for illicit trafficking Detection and monitoring equipment Response to nuclear security incidents Security at major public events

11 Infrastructure: International Legal Instruments Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Strengthened in July Ratification process started. Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Not legally binding. Unilateral declaration to implement. Safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols According to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Convention on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism Security Council resolution 1540 Security Council resolution 1373

12 CPPNM Parties end of June 2005

13 The Comprehensive Approach Prevention; first line of defence Effective in the long-term, sustainable Detection; second line of defence Radiation monitoring at borders and other places Equipment and training of law enforcement officers Response; third line of defence Radiological emergency response Nuclear forensics Return of seized material

14 Tools to Improving Nuclear Security Guidelines and recommendations internationally accepted baseline for nuclear security nuclear and other radioactive materials and associated facilities established process for the development the Nuclear security series Evaluation and advisory services Assessment of present status; recommendations for improvement Over 60 missions since 2001; all regions, increasing interest Education and training Recurring programmes for different categories and levels Almost 80 courses since 2001 Technical improvements and upgrades Information security - confidentiality Networks for co-ordination and co-operation

15 Nuclear Security Guidance Establishing and maintaining accountancy and controls Nuclear Material Safeguards Agreements State Systems of Accountancy and Control Radioactive sources Code of Conduct

16 Nuclear Security Guidance Physical protection of nuclear materials Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 Physical protection objectives and fundamental principles (2001) Handbook on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities (March 2002) Unofficial English version of the text of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted on 26 October 1979, reflecting the Amendment adopted by the States Parties to the Convention on 8 July 2005 CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR FACILITIES

17 Nuclear Security Guidance Recommendations and guidelines on detection and response TECDOC-1311 Prevention of Inadvertent Movement and Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials TECDOC-1312 Detection of Radioactive Materials at Borders TECDOC-1313 Response to Events involving Inadvertent Movement and Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials

18 Nuclear Security Series under development Top level: Fundamentals of nuclear security Second level: Recommendations Third level guidance: Implementing guides Nuclear security culture Design Basis Threat - DBT Protection against sabotage Transport security Security of Radioactive sources Security of Radioactive Waste Security of computer systems Handbook on nuclear material accountancy Handbook on combating illicit trafficking Nuclear security glossary Protecting sensitive information Physical protection of research reactors Emergency guidance Requirements for detection instruments and for nuclear forensics Monitoring radioactive substances in mail

19 Advisory and evaluation services International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Regulatory Safety/Security Infrastructure Advisory Service (RaSSIA) SSAC Advisory Service Advisory services on illicit trafficking incidents Will be reformed into a comprehensive security advisory service, based on modules that will be used according to the needs of the individual Member State. The Incident Emergency Center provides an open door to assist Member States around the clock with both incidents and radiological emergencies.

20 IPPAS and INSServ Missions performed

21 Education and training target audience Policy makers Nuclear Regulators Facility Operators Legislators Emergency responders Police Customs Border forces Military Intelligence

22 Education and training Some training events: International Nuclear Security Seminar 2 weeks ITC International Training Course on PP Albuquerque / USA - 3 weeks ( 18 plus 1 in 2006) RTC Regional Training Course Brno / Czech R. and several regions 2 weeks ( 15 plus 2 in 2006) Practical training on PP systems Obninsk / RF 1 week (5 plus 1) Security Foundations Pilot course in Temelin / Czech (3 plus 4) Design Basis Threat Workshop (23 done plus 4 in 2006) Security of radiation sources (1 week) (3 done, 6 in 2006) Security of research reactors (2 weeks) ( 2 done plus 3 in 2006) National illicit trafficking training course (10 done) SSAC training courses (12 done) and seminars (8 done)

23 Host countries for training

24 Training Activities DBT Workshops performed

25 Technical improvements and upgrades Improving physical protection of facilities and nuclear and radioactive materials Provision of radiation detection equipment Addressing nuclear security at major pubic events (Greece, Summer Olympic Games) Support generated from bilateral support programmes, and support of groups of States, e.g. the EU, the Global Partnership

26 Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans A practical work-plan for an individual country to be implemented over a dedicated period of time Already in place for several countries Tool for co-operation with bilateral support programmes Maintaining confidentiality of information

27 Activities Supporting Nuclear Security Activities included in the nuclear safety and safeguards programmes providing essential synergies Control of radiation sources Radiation safety infrastructures Radiation safety standards Safety of transport of radioactive materials Disposable waste; management of radioactive waste and disused sealed sources Safety of nuclear installations Safeguards; State Systems of accounting and control; interface between State authorities and the Agency.

28 Networks for co-ordination and co-operation IAEA Conferences Nuclear Regulatory Systems (Moscow, 2006) Safety and Security of Sources (Bordeaux, 2005) Nuclear security (London 2005) Security of Radioactive Sources (Vienna 2003) Nuclear Forensics (Karlsruhe 2002) Preventing, Intercepting and Responding to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources (Stockholm 2001) International 0rganizations Interpol WCO Europol OSCE WHO UNICRI ICAO UPU

29 Nuclear Security Fund Financial Contributions Australia Austria Bulgaria Canada China Czech Republic European Union France Germany Greece Hungary Iran Ireland Israel Italy Japan Republic of Korea Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Romania Spain Slovenia Sweden Ukraine United Kingdom United States of America Nuclear Threat Initiative

30 Concluding remarks Efforts to deal with the threat posed by sub- State actors are still in the initial phase, must continue Challenges: Sustainability of efforts Consolidated efforts, rather than ad hoc approaches Continued funding Enhanced co-ordination and co-operation Strengthened legislative basis Improved information exchange

31 Concluding remarks Strive for universal adherence to international legal instruments and its implementation Produce consensus guidance documents Enhance Nuclear security advisory services